THE
American POLITICAL SCIENCE Review

Vol. XLVI — December, 1952 — No. 4

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Published quarterly by

THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION

THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW

Published quarterly by the American Political Science Association

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THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, published quarterly during the months of March, June, September, and December, is supplied to all members of the American Political Science Association. Individual and institutional memberships are $10.00 a year ($4.00 for graduate and undergraduate students). One dollar should be added for foreign postage.

Current issues are priced at $2.50 per copy. Prices of other issues and of complete volumes are furnished on request.

Applications for membership, orders for the REVIEW, and remittances should be addressed to Edward H. Litchfield, Executive Director, American Political Science Association, 1785 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W., Washington 6, D.C.

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The Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature indexes articles and notes which appear in the REVIEW. *Microfilm of the* REVIEW, beginning with Volume 46, may be obtained from University Microfilms, 313 North First Street, Ann Arbor, Michigan.

Office of publication: 450 Ahnaip Street, Menasha, Wisconsin.

Foreign Agent: P. S. King and Staples, Ltd., Great Smith Street, Westminster, London.

Entered as second class matter at the post office at Menasha, Wisconsin, under the Act of August 4, 1912. Acceptance for mailing at special rate of postage provided for in Section 1103, Act of October 3, 1917, authorized May 12, 1928.

Printed in the United States of America by George Banta Publishing Company, Menasha, Wisconsin.

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The American Political Science Review

VOL. XLVI DECEMBER, 1952 NO. 4

ANOTHER "GREAT DEBATE": THE NATIONAL INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES

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University of Chicago

The controversy which has arisen on the occasion of Ambassador Kennan's and my recent publications differs from the great historical debates on American foreign policy in two significant respects. It raises an issue more fundamental to the understanding of American foreign policy and of all politics than those with which the previous "great debates" were concerned, and it deals with the issue largely in terms which are not conducive to understanding.

The great debates of the past, such as the one over intervention vs. neutrality in 1793, expansion vs. the status quo before the Mexican and after the Spanish-American War, international cooperation vs. isolation in the 'twenties, intervention vs. abstention in the late 'thirties —all evolved around clear-cut issues of foreign policy. In 1793 you were in favor of going to war on the side of France or of remaining neutral. In the 1840's you approved of the annexation of Texas or you did not. At the turn of the century you supported overseas expansion or you were against it. In the 'twenties you advocated joining the League of Nations or staying out of it. In the late 'thirties you wanted to oppose the Axis Powers by all means short of war or you wanted to abstain from intervening. What separates the "utopian" from the "realist" position cannot be so sharply expressed in terms of alternative foreign policies. The very same policies can be and are being supported by both schools of thought. What sets them apart is not necessarily a matter of practical judgment, but of philosophies and standards of thought.

The issue which the present debate raises concerns the nature of all politics and, more particularly, of the American tradition in foreign policy. The history of modern political thought is the story of a contest between two schools which differ fundamentally in their conception of the nature of man, society, and politics. One believes that a rational and moral political order, derived from universally valid abstract

principles, can be achieved here and now. It assumes the essential goodness and infinite malleability of human nature and attributes the failure of the social order to measure up to the rational standards to lack of knowledge and understanding, obsolescent social institutions, or the depravity of certain isolated individuals or groups. It trusts in education, reform, and the sporadic use of force to remedy these deficiencies.[1]

The other school believes that the world, imperfect as it is from the rational point of view, is the result of forces which are inherent in human nature. To improve the world one must work with those forces, not against them. This being inherently a world of opposing interests and of conflict among them, moral principles can never be fully realized, but at best approximated through the ever temporary balancing of interests and the ever precarious settlement of conflicts. This school, then, sees in a system of checks and balances a universal principle for all pluralist societies.[2] It appeals to historic precedent rather than to abstract principles, and aims at achievement of the lesser evil rather than of the absolute good.

This conflict between two basic conceptions of man and politics is at the bottom of the present controversy. It is the same conflict which found its classic expression in the polemic of Burke against the philosophy of the French Revolution. Given the sad state of political thought in our time, it would be vain to expect the spokesmen of political realism to speak with the voice of Burke and the defenders of political utopianism to measure up to the standards of Condorcet and Rousseau. Yet one has a right to expect that scholars discuss the issue without resort to invective and with proper regard for established facts.[3]

[1] This is the ideal type of the utopian position rather than the empirical description of any particular historic type. In actuality, and this is true particularly of the present, the utopian position in international affairs is not always consistent with its philosophic premises.

[2] It ought not to need special emphasis that a principle of social conduct, in contrast to a law of nature, allows of, and even presupposes, conduct in violation of the principle. Robert W. Tucker, in "Professor Morgenthau's Theory of Political 'Realism' " in this REVIEW, Vol. 46, pp. 214–224 (March, 1952), has missed this and many other points in his zeal to find contradictions where there are none.

[3] "This [the realist] doctrine," writes one historian—Frank Tannenbaum, "The Balance of Power versus the Coördinate State," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 67, p. 173 (June, 1952)—"is confessedly, nay gleefully, amoral. It prides itself upon being realistic and takes Machiavelli as its great teacher. It is contemptuous of the simple beliefs of honest men, jeers at the sentimentalism of those who believe that men may strive for peace among nations, and looks upon democracy as a hindrance to skilled diplomacy. It looks with a certain derisive superiority upon the great leaders of this nation from Jefferson and John Quincy Adams to Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Delano Roosevelt and describes them as moralistic and sentimental, and suggests that our models ought to be

I

In order to refute a theory which pretends to be scientific, it is first necessary to understand what a scientific theory is. A scientific theory is an attempt to bring order and meaning to a mass of phenomena which without it would remain disconnected and unintelligible. Any one who disputes the scientific character of such a theory either must produce a theory superior in these scientific functions to the one attacked or must, at the very least, demonstrate that the facts as they actually are do not lend themselves to the interpretation which the theory has put upon them. When a historian tells us that the balance of power is not a universal principle of politics, domestic and international, that it was practiced in Europe only for a limited period and never by the United States, that it ruined the states that practiced it,[4] it is incumbent upon him to tell us how we can dispose by means of theory of the historic data by which, for instance, David Hume demonstrated the universality of the balance of power and Paul Scott Mowrer[5] and Alfred Vagts[6] its practice by the United States; what Kautilya was writing about in the fourth century B. C. when he summarized the theoretical and practical tradition of Indian statecraft in terms of the balance of power; what the Greek city states, the Roman republic, and the medieval

Richelieu, Clemenceau and Bismarck. Its adherents believe that international wars instead of being made by men and supported by institutions humanly contrived have their origin in the nature of man himself and are inevitable."

Another historian, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., in "Policy and National Interest," *Partisan Review*, Vol. 18, p. 709 (Nov.–Dec., 1951), however, gives Ambassador Kennan a clean bill of moral health. "But what differentiates," he writes, "the Kennan approach from that of, for example, the followers of Professor Hans J. Morgenthau is that he takes the revelations of international amorality in his stride; more than that, he comprehends them in his understanding of the tragedy of history. Mr. Kennan, in other words, is deeply moral, rather than moralistic, like Judge Hull, or immoral, like the boys who have just discovered that politics involve power."

"This dreadful doctrine," we are told (by Tannenbaum, pp. 173–174), "has now won wide acceptance by teachers and scholars in the field of international relations and has, in fact, become the leading theme in such circles in many of our largest universities. It has become the *science* of international relations—and who would quarrel with science, especially when it comes packaged in good clear English and from high sources? But it is not science. It is, in fact, only poor logic based upon false premises, and its claim to be a science is only a bit of unholy conceit."

It may be remarked in passing that to dispose of a scientific theory as "fashionable" or a "fad," as some do with regard to political realism, may reveal something about the state of mind of the writer, but reveals nothing at all about the scientific value of the theory.

[4] Tannenbaum, in the article cited above, and in "The American Tradition in Foreign Relations," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 30, pp. 31–50 (Oct., 1951).

[5] *Our Foreign Affairs* (New York, 1924), pp. 246 ff.

[6] "The United States and the Balance of Power," *The Journal of Politics*, Vol. 3, pp. 401–449 (Nov., 1941).

emperors and popes were doing if they did not apply the principles of the balance of power; and how the nations which either neglected these principles or applied them wrongly suffered political and military defeat and even extinction, while the nation which applied these principles most consistently and consciously, that is, Great Britain, enjoyed unrivalled power for an unparalleled length of time.

The historian who wishes to replace the balance of power as the guiding principle of American foreign policy with the "humanitarian and pacific traditions" of the "coördinate state"[7] must first of all explain how it has come about that the thirteen original states expanded into the full breadth and a good deal of the length of a continent, until today the strategic frontiers of the United States run parallel to the coastline of Asia and along the River Elbe. If such are the results of policies based upon "humanitarian and pacific traditions," never in the history of the world has virtue been more bountifully rewarded! Yet our historian must explain not only the great sweep of American expansion, but also the specific foreign policies which in their historic succession make up that sweep. Is it easier to explain the successive shifts of American support from Great Britain to France and back again from the beginning of King George's War in 1744 to the War of 1812 in terms of the "coördinate state" than in terms of the balance of power? The same question might be asked about the postponement of the recognition of the independence of the Spanish colonies until 1822, when the Floridas had been acquired from Spain and Spain had thereby been deprived of the ability to challenge the United States from within the hemisphere. The same question might be asked about the Monroe Doctrine itself, about Lincoln's policies toward Great Britain and France, and about our successive policies with regard to Mexico and the Caribbean. One could go on and pick out at random any foreign policy pursued by the United States from the beginning to 1919 and one would hardly find a policy, with the exception perhaps of the War of 1812, which could not be made intelligible by reference to the national interest defined in terms of power—political, military, and economic—rather than by reference to the principle of the "coördinate state." This inevitable outcome of such an inquiry is well summarized in these words:

> Ease and prosperity have made us wish the whole world to be as happy and well to do as ourselves; and we have supposed that institutions and principles like our own were the simple prescription for making them so. And yet, when

[7] Tannenbaum, "The Balance of Power versus the Coördinate State," (cited above, note 3), p. 173.

issues of our own interest arose, we have not been unselfish. We have shown ourselves kin to all the world, when it came to pushing an advantage. Our action against Spain in the Floridas, and against Mexico on the coasts of the Pacific; our attitude toward first the Spaniards, and then the French, with regard to the control of the Mississippi; the unpitying force with which we thrust the Indians to the wall wherever they stood in our way, have suited our professions of peacefulness and justice and liberality no better than the aggressions of other nations that were strong and not to be gainsaid. Even Mr. Jefferson, philanthropist and champion of peaceable and modest government though he was, exemplified this double temper of the people he ruled. "Peace is our passion," he had declared; but the passion abated when he saw the mouth of the Mississippi about to pass into the hands of France. Though he had loved France and hated England, he did not hesitate then what language to hold. "There is on the globe," he wrote to Mr. Livingston at Paris, "one single spot the possessor of which is our natural and habitual enemy. The day that France takes possession of New Orleans seals the union of two nations, who, in conjunction, can maintain exclusive possession of the sea. From that moment we must marry ourselves to the British fleet and nation." Our interests must march forward, altruists though we are; other nations must see to it that they stand off, and do not seek to stay us.

This realist appraisal of the American tradition in foreign policy was published in 1901 in the *Atlantic Monthly*. Its author was a professor of jurisprudence and political economy at Princeton by the name of Woodrow Wilson.[8]

Nothing more needs to be said to demonstrate that facts do not support a revision of American diplomatic history which tries to substitute "humanitarian and pacifist traditions" and the "coördinate state" for power politics and the balance of power as the guiding principle of American foreign policy. What, then, does support it? Three things: the way American statesmen have spoken about American foreign policy; the legal fiction of the "coördinate state"; finally, and foremost, an emotional urge to justify American foreign policy in humanitarian, pacifist terms.

It is elementary that the character of a foreign policy can be ascertained only through the examination of the political acts performed and of the foreseeable consequences of these acts. Thus we can find out what statesmen have actually done, and from the foreseeable consequences of their acts we can surmise what their objectives might have been. Yet examination of the facts is not enough. To give meaning to the factual raw material of history, we must approach historical reality with a kind of rational outline, a map which suggests to us the

[8] "Democracy and Efficiency," *Atlantic Monthly*, Vol. 87, pp. 293–294 (March, 1901).

possible meanings of history. In other words, we put ourselves in the position of a statesman who must meet a certain problem of foreign policy under certain circumstances and ask ourselves, what are the rational alternatives from which a statesman may choose who must meet this problem under these circumstances, presuming always that he acts in a rational manner, and which of these rational alternatives was this particular statesman, acting under these circumstances, likely to choose? It is the testing of this rational hypothesis against the actual facts and their consequences which gives meaning to the facts of history and makes the scientific writing of political history possible.

In the process of writing the history of foreign policy the interpretations by statesmen of their own acts, especially if they are made for public consumption, must needs have a strictly subsidiary place. The public self-interpretation by actors on the political scene is itself, of course, a political act which seeks to present a certain policy to its presumed supporters in terms of their moral and political folklore and to those against which it is directed in terms which intend to embarrass and deceive. Such declarations may indeed shed light upon the character and objectives of the policy pursued if they are considered in conjunction with, and in subordination to, rational hypotheses, actions, and likely consequences. Yet it is quite a different matter to interpret the American tradition of foreign policy in the light of a collection of official statements which, like most such statements, present humanitarian and pacifist justifications for the policies pursued. If anybody should be bold enough to write a history of world politics with so uncritical a method he would easily and well-nigh inevitably be driven to the conclusion that from Timur to Hitler and Stalin the foreign policies of all nations were inspired by the ideals of humanitarianism and pacifism. The absurdity of the result is commensurate with the defects of the method.

It is only from a method which accepts the declarations of statesmen as evidence of the character of the policies pursued, that the principle of the "coördinate state" receives a semblance of plausibility. Statesmen and international lawyers have been wont to speak of the "equal dignity" of all states, regardless of "wealth, power, size, population or culture,"[9] which I take the principle of the "coördinate state" to mean. It is also referred to as the principle of "federalism in international relations."[10] As its prime examples are cited the relations amongst the states of the Union, the states of the American system, the members of the Commonwealth of Nations, and the members of the Swiss Confederation. If the whole world were organized in accordance with this principle,

[9] Tannenbaum, p. 177. [10] *Ibid.*

as are already these four political entities, it is assumed that the freedom, dignity, and peace of all nations would then be assured.

There is no need to examine the theoretical and practical merits of the principle of the "coördinate state," because for none of the four political entities mentioned does the idea of the "coördinate state" provide the principle of political organization. The equality of the states as the political foundation of the United States became obsolescent when Chief Justice Marshall's Supreme Court resolved the ambiguity of the Constitution in favor of the federal government, and it became obsolete when the Civil War proved Chief Justice Marshall's point. The equality of the states survives today only in the shadow and by virtue of the federal government's political supremacy, and without the cohesive force of that supremacy there would be no union of equal states to begin with. That these powers of the federal government are limited and qualified by the principle of federalism, that is, by the constitutionally granted powers of the states, is quite a different matter; it concerns the distribution of powers between federal government and states within a general system of checks and balances, but has nothing to do with the equality of the states as the alleged political foundation of the American system of government. With the exception of the equality of senatorial representation, the principle of the equality of the states is today, as it has been for almost a century, devoid of political content. It serves only as a principle of regional organization, of administrative decentralization, and, above all, of constitutional rhetoric. What it really signifies was pointed out more than fifty years ago by W. A. Dunning when he summarized his answer to the question "Are the states equal under the Constitution?" by saying that "the theory of equal states falls to the ground."[11]

Similarly, the federalism of Switzerland is the result of a long series of civil wars, the last one fought a little more than a century ago, which established the predominance of the German-speaking cantons within the confederation. Here too, it is the existence of predominant power, located in one segment of the federal system, which makes federalism possible in the first place.

By the same token, the unchallengeable supremacy of the United States within the Western Hemisphere has throughout been the backbone of the system of American states. As long as this supremacy is secure, there is, on the one hand, no need for the United States to assert it in the political and military sphere, and, taking it for granted, the United States can well afford to pursue a policy of the Good Neighbor;

[11] William Archibald Dunning, *Essays on the Civil War and Reconstruction and Related Topics* (New York, 1931), p. 351.

and there is, on the other hand, no opportunity for the other members of the system to challenge that supremacy effectively. This is what the principle of the "coördinate state" amounts to in the Western Hemisphere. Consequently, whenever there was even a remote possibility that the supremacy of the United States might be challenged, generally through instigation from outside the hemisphere, the United States asserted its superior power within the hemisphere and acted as all states must act under similar conditions.

Whatever possibility for common political action there remains among the members of the Commonwealth of Nations is the result of the interests which these members may have in common. In other words, the member states may work together or each of them may work with other nations, as their interests dictate. Their membership in the Commonwealth, as the examples of India, South Africa, Australia, and New Zealand clearly show, has no influence upon this decision; that membership is but a faint remembrance of the times when Great Britain could secure cooperation among the member states on its terms by virtue of its superior power.

What, then, have these four examples of the "coördinate state" in common which would establish them as a distinct type of interstate relationship, and what conclusions can be drawn from them for the organization of the world? The only thing that these four examples seem to have really in common is the legal stipulation of the equality of the members of the respective systems and this characteristic is not peculiar to them, but a general principle of international law applicable to all sovereign states. In the political sphere they seem to have nothing in common at all. What they tend to show, however, is the decisive importance of the distribution of political power for the operation of federal and egalitarian relations among states. The political cohesion of a federal system is the result of superior power located in some part of it. It is by virtue of its superior power that the predominant part can afford to grant the other members of the federal system a measure of equality in the non-political sphere. These observations bring us back to power politics and the balance of power to which the principle of the "coördinate state" was supposed to be the alternative.

In truth, it is not the disinterested consideration of facts which has given birth to the theory of the "coördinate state." That theory is rather the response to an emotional urge, and since this emotion is not peculiar to a particular author but typical of a popular reaction to the new role which the United States must play in world affairs, it deserves a brief analysis.

One of the great experiences of our time which have impressed them-

selves upon the American mind is the emergence of the United States as a nation among other nations, exposed to the same opportunities, temptations, risks, and liabilities to which other nations have been traditionally exposed. This experience becomes the more shocking if it is compared with the expectation with which we fought the Second World War. We expected from that war a reaffirmation of the secure, detached, and independent position in world affairs which we had inherited from the Founding Fathers and which we had been successful in preserving at least to the First World War. By avoiding what we thought had been Wilson's mistakes, we expected to emerge from that war if not more independent, certainly more secure than we were when we entered it. In fact, probably not even in the early days of the Republic were we more exposed to danger from abroad than we are today, and never had we less freedom of action in taking care of our interests than we have today.

It is naturally shocking to recognize that a happy chapter in the history of the nation and in one's own way of life has come to an end. There are those who reconcile themselves to the inevitable, albeit with sorrow rather than with glee, and try to apply the lessons of the past to the tasks at hand. There are others who try to escape from a disappointing and threatening reality into the realm of fantasy. Three such escapist fantasies have arisen in our midst in response to the challenge of American world leadership and power: the fantasy of needless American participation in war, the fantasy of American treason, and the fantasy of American innocence.

The first of these fantasies presumes that the present predicament is a result not of necessity but of folly, the folly of American statesmen who needlessly intervened in two world wars. The second of these fantasies attributes the present predicament to treason in high places whereby the fruits of victory were handed to the enemy. The third of these fantasies denies that the predicament is real and prefers to think of it as an intellectual fraud perpetrated upon the American people. To support this fictional denial of the actualities of the present, it draws upon a fictional account of the past. The United States does not need to bear at present the intellectual, moral, and political burdens which go with involvement in power politics and the maintenance of the balance of power; for it has never borne them in the past, never having been thus involved. The golden age of past political innocence sheds its glow upon a but seemingly less innocent present and promises a future in which all the world will follow the example of America, forswear power politics and the balance of power, and accept the principle of the "coördinate state." Our rearmament program, as exemplified

in the Atlantic Security Pact, we are told, has nothing to do with the balance of power but aims at the "organization of as much of the world as we can upon the basis of the coördinate state. . . . It may prove impossible under present conditions to build such a system without having to fight a war with Russia, but then at least we will be fighting, as we did before, for the thing we consider worth defending with our lives and treasure."[12] Thus a fictional account of the American past, begun as an act of uncalled-for patriotic piety, issues in an ideology for a third world war. Escape we must from the unfamiliar, unpleasant, and dangerous present, first into the political innocence of the past and from there into the immediate future of a third world war, beyond which the revived and universalized innocence of the more distant future will surely lie.

We have said that to present the American tradition in foreign policy as having been free from concern with power politics and the balance of power is not warranted by the facts of American history. Yet it might still be argued, and it is actually being argued, that, regardless of the evidence of history, the American people will not be reconciled to power politics and the balance of power and will support only policies based upon abstract moral principles. While in the past the United States might have pursued balance of power policies and while it might be a good thing if it did do so again, the American people will not stand for it. Here the emotional appeal to patriotic piety is joined by calculations of political expediency. Yet the case for misrepresenting American history has nothing to gain from either.

There is a strong tendency in all historiography to glorify the national past, and in popular presentations that tendency takes on the aspects of the jingoist whitewash. Even so penetrating a mind as John Stuart Mill's could deliver himself of an essay in which he proved, no doubt to the satisfaction of many of his English readers but certainly of few others, that Great Britain had never interfered in the affairs of European nations and had interfered in those of the Indian states only for their own good.[13] Yet it is the measure of a nation's maturity to be able to recognize its past for what it actually is. Why should we not admit that American foreign policy has been generally hardheaded and practical and at times ruthless? Why should we deny Jefferson's cunning, say, in the Puget Sound affair, the cruelty with which the Indians were treated, and the faithlessness with which the treaties with the Indians were cast aside? We know that this is the way all nations are when

[12] Tannenbaum, pp. 195–196.

[13] "A Few Words on Non-Intervention," *Dissertations and Discussions: Political, Philosophical, and Historical* (London, 1875), pp. 153–178.

their interests are at stake—so cruel, so faithless, so cunning. We know that the United States has refrained from seeking dominions beyond the seas not because it is more virtuous than other nations, but because it had the better part of a continent to colonize.

As has been pointed out elsewhere at greater length, the man in the street, unsophisticated as he is and uninformed as he may be, has a surer grasp of the essentials of foreign policy and a more mature judgment of its basic issues than many of the intellectuals and politicians who pretend to speak for him and cater to what they imagine his prejudices to be. During the recent war the ideologues of the Atlantic Charter, the Four Freedoms, and the United Nations were constantly complaining that the American soldier did not know what he was fighting for. Indeed, if he was fighting for some utopian ideal, divorced from the concrete experiences and interests of the country, then the complaint was well grounded. However, if he was fighting for the territorial integrity of the nation and for its survival as a free country where he could live, think, and act as he pleased, then he had never any doubt about what he was fighting for. Ideological rationalizations and justifications are indeed the indispensable concomitants of all political action. Yet there is something unhealthy in a craving for ideological intoxication and in the inability to act and to see merit in action except under the stimulant of grandiose ideas and far-fetched schemes. Have our intellectuals become, like Hamlet, too much beset by doubt to act and, unlike Hamlet, compelled to still their doubts by renouncing their sense of what is real? The man in the street has no such doubts. It is true that ideologues and demagogues can sway him by appealing to his emotions. But it is also true, as American history shows in abundance and as the popular success of Ambassador Kennan's book demonstrates, that responsible statesmen can guide him by awakening his latent understanding of the national interest.

II

Yet what is the national interest? How can we define it and give it the content which will make it a guide for action? This is one of the relevant questions to which the current debate has given rise.

It has been frequently argued against the realist conception of foreign policy that its key concept, the national interest, does not provide an acceptable standard for political action. This argument is in the main based upon two grounds: the elusiveness of the concept and its susceptibility to interpretations, such as limitless imperialism and narrow nationalism, which are not in keeping with the American tradition in foreign policy. The argument has substance as far as it goes, but it does not invalidate the usefulness of the concept.

The concept of the national interest is similar in two respects to the "great generalities" of the Constitution, such as the general welfare and due process. It contains a residual meaning which is inherent in the concept itself, but beyond these minimum requirements its content can run the whole gamut of meanings which are logically compatible with it. That content is determined by the political traditions and the total cultural context within which a nation formulates its foreign policy. The concept of the national interest, then, contains two elements, one that is logically required and in that sense necessary, and one that is variable and determined by circumstances.

Any foreign policy which operates under the standard of the national interest must obviously have some reference to the physical, political, and cultural entity which we call a nation. In a world where a number of sovereign nations compete with and oppose each other for power, the foreign policies of all nations must necessarily refer to their survival as their minimum requirements. Thus all nations do what they cannot help but do: protect their physical, political, and cultural identity against encroachments by other nations.

It has been suggested that this reasoning erects the national state into the last word in politics and the national interest into an absolute standard for political action. This, however, is not quite the case. The idea of interest is indeed of the essence of politics and, as such, unaffected by the circumstances of time and place. Thucydides' statement, born of the experiences of ancient Greece, that "identity of interest is the surest of bonds whether between states or individuals" was taken up in the nineteenth century by Lord Salisbury's remark that "the only bond of union that endures" among nations is "the absence of all clashing interests." The perennial issue between the realist and utopian schools of thought over the nature of politics, to which we have referred before, might well be formulated in terms of concrete interests vs. abstract principles. Yet while the concern of politics with interest is perennial, the connection between interest and the national state is a product of history.

The national state itself is obviously a product of history and as such destined to yield in time to different modes of political organization. As long as the world is politically organized into nations, the national interest is indeed the last word in world politics. When the national state will have been replaced by another mode of organization, foreign policy must then protect the interest in survival of that new organization. For the benefit of those who insist upon discarding the national state and constructing supranational organizations by constitutional fiat, it must be pointed out that these new organizational forms will

either come into being through conquest or else through consent based upon the mutual recognition of the national interests of the nations concerned; for no nation will forego its freedom of action if it has no reason to expect proportionate benefits in compensation for that loss. This is true of treaties concerning commerce or fisheries as it is true of the great compacts, such as the European Coal and Steel Community, through which nations try to create supranational forms of organization. Thus, by an apparent paradox, what is historically relative in the idea of the national interest can be overcome only through the promotion in concert of the national interest of a number of nations.

The survival of a political unit, such as a nation, in its identity is the irreducible minimum, the necessary element of its interests vis-à-vis other units. Taken in isolation, the determination of its content in a concrete situation is relatively simple; for it encompasses the integrity of the nation's territory, of its political institutions, and of its culture. Thus bipartisanship in foreign policy, especially in times of war, has been most easily achieved in the promotion of these minimum requirements of the national interest. The situation is different with respect to the variable elements of the national interest. All the cross currents of personalities, public opinion, sectional interests, partisan politics, and political and moral folkways are brought to bear upon their determination. In consequence, the contribution which science can make to this field, as to all fields of policy formation, is limited. It can identify the different agencies of the government which contribute to the determination of the variable elements of the national interest and assess their relative weight. It can separate the long-range objectives of foreign policy from the short-term ones which are the means for the achievement of the former and can tentatively establish their rational relations. Finally, it can analyze the variable elements of the national interest in terms of their legitimacy and their compatibility with other national values and with the national interest of other nations. We shall address ourselves briefly to the typical problems with which this analysis must deal.

The legitimacy of the national interest must be determined in the face of possible usurpation by subnational, other-national, and supranational interests. On the subnational level we find group interests, represented particularly by ethnic and economic groups, who tend to identify themselves with the national interest. Charles A. Beard has emphasized, however one-sidedly, the extent to which the economic interests of certain groups have been presented as those of the United States.[14] Group in-

[14] *The Idea of National Interest: An Analytical Study in American Foreign Policy* (New York, 1934).

terests exert, of course, constant pressure upon the conduct of our foreign policy, claiming their identity with the national interest. It is, however, doubtful that, with the exception of a few spectacular cases, they have been successful in determining the course of American foreign policy. It is much more likely, given the nature of American domestic politics, that American foreign policy, insofar as it is the object of pressures by sectional interests, will normally be a compromise between divergent sectional interests. The concept of the national interest, as it emerges from this contest as the actual guide for foreign policy, may well fall short of what would be rationally required by the overall interests of the United States. Yet the concept of the national interest which emerges from this contest of conflicting sectional interests is also more than any particular sectional interest or their sum total. It is, as it were, the lowest common denominator where sectional interests and the national interest meet in an uneasy compromise which may leave much to be desired in view of all the interests concerned.

The national interest can be usurped by other-national interests in two typical ways. The case of treason by individuals, either out of conviction or for pay, needs only to be mentioned here; for insofar as treason is committed on behalf of a foreign government rather than a supranational principle, it is significant for psychology, sociology, and criminology, but not for the theory of politics. The other case, however, is important not only for the theory of politics but also for its practice, especially in the United States.

National minorities in European countries, ethnic groups in the United States, ideological minorities anywhere may identify themselves, either spontaneously or under the direction of the agents of a foreign government, with the interests of that foreign government and may promote these interests under the guise of the national interest of the country whose citizens they happen to be. The activities of the German-American Bund in the United States in the 'thirties and of Communists everywhere are cases in point. Yet the issue of the national interest vs. other-national interests masquerading as the national interest has arisen constantly in the United States in a less clear-cut fashion.

A country which had been settled by consecutive waves of "foreigners" was bound to find it particularly difficult to identify its own national interest against alleged, seeming, or actual other-national interests represented by certain groups among its own citizens. Since virtually all citizens of the United States are, as it were, "more or less" foreign-born, those who were "less" so have frequently not resisted the temptation to use this distinction as a polemic weapon against latecomers who happened to differ from them in their conception of the na-

tional interest of the United States. Frequently, this rationalization has been dispensed with and a conception of foreign policy with which a writer happened to disagree has been attributed outright to foreign sympathy or influence or worse. British influence and interests have served as standard arguments in debates on American foreign policy. Madison, in his polemic against Hamilton on the occasion of Washington's Neutrality Proclamation of 1793, identified the Federalist position with that of "the foreigners and degenerate citizens among us, who hate our republican government, and the French revolution,"[15] and the accusation met with a favorable response in a majority of Congress and of public opinion. However, these traditional attempts to discredit dissenting opinion as being influenced by foreign interests should not obscure the real issue, which is the peculiar vulnerability of the national interest of the United States to usurpation by the interests of other nations.

The usurpation of the national interest by supranational interests can derive in our time from two sources: religious bodies and international organizations. The competition between church and state for determination of certain interests and policies, domestic and international, has been an intermittent issue throughout the history of the national state. Here, too, the legitimate defense of the national interest against usurpation has frequently, especially in the United States, degenerated into the demagogic stigmatization of dissenting views as being inspired by Rome and, hence, being incompatible with the national interest. Yet here, too, the misuse of the issue for demagogic purposes must be considered apart from the legitimacy of the issue itself.

The more acute problem arises at the present time from the importance which the public and government officials, at least in their public utterances, attribute to the values represented and the policies pursued by international organizations either as alternatives or supplements to the values and policies for which the national government stands. It is frequently asserted that the foreign policy of the United States pursues no objectives apart from those of the United Nations, that, in other words, the foreign policy of the United States is actually identical with the policy of the United Nations. This assertion cannot refer to anything real in actual politics to support it. For the constitutional structure of international organizations, such as the United Nations, and their procedural practices make it impossible for them to pursue interests apart from those of the member-states which dominate their policy-forming

[15] "Helvidius, in Answer to Pacificus, on President Washington's Proclamation of Neutrality," in *Letters and other Writings of James Madison* (Philadelphia, 1867), Vol. 1, p. 611.

bodies. The identity between the interests of the United Nations and the United States can only refer to the successful policies of the United States within the United Nations through which the support of the United Nations is being secured for the policies of the United States.[16] The assertion, then, is mere polemic, different from the one discussed previously in that the identification of a certain policy with a supranational interest does not seek to reflect discredit upon the former, but to bestow upon it a dignity which the national interest pure and simple is supposed to lack.

The real issue in view of the problem that concerns us here is not whether the so-called interests of the United Nations, which do not exist apart from the interests of its most influential members, have superseded the national interest of the United States, but for what kind of interests the United States has secured United Nations support. While these interests cannot be United Nations interests, they do not need to be national interests either. Here we are in the presence of that modern phenomenon which has been variously described as "utopianism," "sentimentalism," "moralism," the "legalistic-moralistic approach." The common denominator of all these tendencies in modern political thought is the substitution for the national interest of a supranational standard of action which is generally identified with an international organization, such as the United Nations. The national interest is here not being usurped by sub- or supranational interests which, however inferior in worth to the national interest, are nevertheless real and worthy of consideration within their proper sphere. What challenges the national interest here is a mere figment of the imagination, a product of wishful thinking, which is postulated as a valid norm for international conduct, without being valid either there or anywhere else. At this point we touch the core of the present controversy between utopianism and realism in international affairs; we shall return to it later in this paper.

The national interest as such must be defended against usurpation by non-national interests. Yet once that task is accomplished, a rational order must be established among the values which make up the national interest and among the resources to be committed to them. While the interests which a nation may pursue in its relation with other nations are of infinite variety and magnitude, the resources which are available for the pursuit of such interests are necessarily limited in quantity and

[16] See, on this point, Hans J. Morgenthau, "International Organizations and Foreign Policy," in *Foundations of World Organization: A Political and Cultural Appraisal*, Eleventh Symposium of the Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion, edited by Lyman Bryson, Louis Finkelstein, Harold D. Lasswell, R. M. MacIver (New York, 1952), pp. 377–383.

kind. No nation has the resources to promote all desirable objectives with equal vigor; all nations must therefore allocate their scarce resources as rationally as possible. The indispensable precondition of such rational allocation is a clear understanding of the distinction between the necessary and variable elements of the national interest. Given the contentious manner in which in democracies the variable elements of the national interest are generally determined, the advocates of an extensive conception of the national interest will inevitably present certain variable elements of the national interest as though their attainment were necessary for the nation's survival. In other words, the necessary elements of the national interest have a tendency to swallow up the variable elements so that in the end all kinds of objectives, actual or potential, are justified in terms of national survival. Such arguments have been advanced, for instance, in support of the rearmament of Western Germany and of the defense of Formosa. They must be subjected to rational scrutiny which will determine, however tentatively, their approximate place in the scale of national values.

The same problem presents itself in its extreme form when a nation pursues, or is asked to pursue, objectives which are not only unnecessary for its survival but tend to jeopardize it. Second-rate nations which dream of playing the role of great powers, such as Italy and Poland in the interwar period, illustrate this point. So do great powers which dream of remaking the world in their own image and embark upon world-wide crusades, thus straining their resources to exhaustion. Here scientific analysis has the urgent task of pruning down national objectives to the measure of available resources in order to make their pursuit compatible with national survival.

Finally, the national interest of a nation which is conscious not only of its own interests but also of that of other nations must be defined in terms compatible with the latter. In a multinational world this is a requirement of political morality; in an age of total war it is also one of the conditions for survival.

In connection with this problem two mutually exclusive arguments have been advanced. On the one hand, it has been argued against the theory of international politics here presented that the concept of the national interest revives the eighteenth-century concept of enlightened self-interest, presuming that the uniformly enlightened pursuit of their self-interest by all individuals, as by all nations, will of itself be conducive to a peaceful and harmonious society. On the other hand, the point has been made that the pursuit of their national interest by all nations makes war the permanent arbiter of conflicts among them. Neither argument is well taken.

The concept of the national interest presupposes neither a naturally harmonious, peaceful world nor the inevitability of war as a consequence of the pursuit by all nations of their national interest. Quite to the contrary, it assumes continuous conflict and threat of war, to be minimized through the continuous adjustment of conflicting interests by diplomatic action. No such assumption would be warranted if all nations at all times conceived of their national interest only in terms of their survival and, in turn, defined their interest in survival in restrictive and rational terms. As it is, their conception of the national interest is subject to all the hazards of misinterpretation, usurpation, and misjudgment to which reference has been made above. To minimize these hazards is the first task of a foreign policy which seeks the defense of the national interest by peaceful means. Its second task is the defense of the national interest, restrictively and rationally defined, against the national interests of other nations which may or may not be thus defined. If they are not, it becomes the task of armed diplomacy to convince the nations concerned that their legitimate interests have nothing to fear from a restrictive and rational foreign policy and that their illegitimate interests have nothing to gain in the face of armed might rationally employed.

III

We have said before that the utopian and realist positions in international affairs do not necessarily differ in the policies they advocate, but that they part company over their general philosophies of politics and their way of thinking about matters political. It does not follow that the present debate is only of academic interest and without practical significance. Both camps, it is true, may support the same policy for different reasons. Yet if the reasons are unsound, the soundness of the policies supported by them is a mere coincidence, and these very same reasons may be, and inevitably are, invoked on other occasions in support of unsound policies. The nefarious consequences of false philosophies and wrong ways of thinking may for the time being be concealed by the apparent success of policies derived from them. You may go to war, justified by your nation's interests, for a moral purpose and in disregard of considerations of power; and military victory seems to satisfy both your moral aspirations and your nation's interests. Yet the manner in which you waged the war, achieved victory, and settled the peace cannot help reflecting your philosophy of politics and your way of thinking about political problems. If these are in error, you may win victory on the field of battle and still assist in the defeat of both your moral principles and the national interest of your country.

Any number of examples could illustrate the real yet subtle practical consequences which follow from the different positions taken. We have chosen two: collective security in Korea and the liberation of the nations that are captives of Communism. A case for both policies can be made from both the utopian and realist positions, but with significant differences in the emphasis and substance of the policies pursued.

Collective security as an abstract principle of utopian politics requires that all nations come to the aid of a victim of aggression by resisting the aggressor with all means necessary to frustrate his aims. Once the case of aggression is established, the duty to act is unequivocal. Its extent may be affected by concern for the nation's survival; obviously no nation will commit outright suicide in the service of collective security. But beyond that elemental limitation no consideration of interest or power, either with regard to the aggressor or his victim or the nation acting in the latter's defense, can qualify the obligation to act under the principle of collective security. Thus high officials of our government have declared that we intervened in Korea not for any narrow interest of ours but in support of the moral principle of collective security.

Collective security as a concrete principle of realist policy is the age-old maxim, "Hang together or hang separately," in modern dress. It recognizes the need for nation A under certain circumstances to defend nation B against attack by nation C. That need is determined, first, by the interest which A has in the territorial integrity of B and by the relation of that interest to all the other interests of A as well as to the resources available for the support of all those interests. Furthermore, A must take into account the power which is at the disposal of aggressor C for fighting A and B as over against the power available to A and B for fighting C. The same calculation must be carried on concerning the power of the likely allies of C as over against those of A and B. Before going to war for the defense of South Korea in the name of collective security, an American adherent of political realism would have demanded an answer to the following four questions: First, what is our interest in the preservation of the independence of South Korea; second, what is our power to defend that independence against North Korea; third, what is our power to defend that independence against China and the Soviet Union; and fourth, what are the chances for preventing China and the Soviet Union from entering the Korean War?

In view of the principle of collective security, interpreted in utopian terms, our intervention in Korea was a foregone conclusion. The interpretation of this principle in realist terms might or might not, depending upon the concrete circumstances of interest and power, have led us to the same conclusion. In the execution of the policy of collective se-

curity the utopian had to be indifferent to the possibility of Chinese and Russian intervention, except for his resolution to apply the principle of collective security to anybody who would intervene on the side of the aggressor. The realist could not help weighing the possibility of the intervention of a great power on the side of the aggressor in terms of the interests engaged and the power available on the other side.[17]

The Truman administration could not bring itself to taking resolutely the utopian or the realist position. It resolved to intervene in good measure on utopian grounds and in spite of military advice to the contrary; it allowed the military commander to advance to the Yalu River in disregard of the risk of the intervention of a great power against which collective security could be carried out only by means of a general war, and then refused to pursue the war with full effectiveness on the realist grounds of the risk of a third world war. Thus Mr. Truman in 1952 is caught in the same dilemma from which Mr. Baldwin could extricate himself in 1936 on the occasion of the League of Nations sanctions against Italy's attack upon Ethiopia only at an enormous loss to British prestige. Collective security as a defense of the status quo short of a general war can be effective only against second-rate powers. Applied against a major power, it is a contradiction in terms, for it means necessarily a major war. Of this self-defeating contradiction Mr. Baldwin was as unaware in the 'thirties as Mr. Truman seems to be in 1952. Mr. Churchill put Mr. Baldwin's dilemma in these cogent terms: "First, the Prime Minister had declared that sanctions meant war; secondly, he was resolved that there must be no war; and thirdly, he decided upon sanctions. It was evidently impossible to comply with these three conditions." Similarly Mr. Truman had declared that the effective prosecution of the Korean War meant the possibility of a third world war; he resolved that there must be no third world war; and he decided upon intervention in the Korean War. Here, too, it is impossible to comply with these three conditions.

Similar contradictions are inherent in the proposals which would substitute for the current policy of containment one of the liberation of the nations presently the captives of Russian Communism. This objective can be compatible with the utopian or realist position, but the policies designed to secure it will be fundamentally different according to whether they are based upon one or the other position. The clearest case to

[17] The difference in these two attitudes is well illustrated by the following passage from a recent Moon Mullins cartoon. An elderly representative of the utopian school asks little Kayo: "Remember the golden rule. Now, supposing that boy slapped you on the right cheek, what would you do?" Whereupon Kayo replies realistically: "Jest how big a boy are you supposin'?"

date for the utopian justification of such policies has been made by Representative Charles J. Kersten of Wisconsin who pointed to these four "basic defects" of the "negative policy of containment and negotiated coexistence":

> It would be immoral and unchristian to negotiate a permanent agreement with forces which by every religious creed and moral precept are evil. It abandons nearly one-half of humanity and the once free nations of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania, Lithuania, Latvia, Esthonia and China to enslavement of the Communist police state.
>
> It is un-American because it violates the principle of the American Declaration of Independence, which proclaims the rights of all people to freedom and their right and duty to throw off tyranny.
>
> It will lead to all-out World War III because it aligns all the forces of the non-Communist world in military opposition to and against all the forces of the Communist world, including the 800,000,000 peoples behind the Iron Curtain.
>
> The policy of mere containment is uneconomic and will lead to national bankruptcy.[18]

This statement is interesting for its straightforwardness and because it combines in a rather typical fashion considerations of abstract morality and of expediency. The captive nations must be liberated not only because their captivity is immoral, unchristian, and un-American, but also because its continuation will lead to a third world war and to national bankruptcy. To what extent, however, these considerations of expediency are invalidated by their utopian setting will become obvious from a comparison between the utopian and the realist positions.

From the utopian point of view there can be no difference between the liberation of Esthonia or Czechoslovakia, of Poland or China; the captivity of any nation, large or small, close or far away, is a moral outrage which cannot be tolerated. The realist, too, seeks the liberation of all captive nations because he realizes that the presence of the Russian armies in the heart of Europe and their cooperation with the Chinese armies constitute the two main sources of the imbalance of power which threatens our security. Yet before he formulates a program of liberation, he will seek answers to a number of questions such as these: While the United States has a general interest in the liberation of all captive nations, what is the hierarchy of interests it has in the liberation, say, of China, Esthonia, and Hungary? And while the Soviet Union has a general interest in keeping all captive nations in that state, what is the hierarchy of its interests in keeping, say, Poland, Eastern Germany, and Bulgaria captive? If we assume, as we must on the historic evidence

[18] *New York Times*, August 14, 1952, p. 1.

of two centuries, that Russia would never give up control over Poland without being compelled by force of arms, would the objective of the liberation of Poland justify the ruin of western civilization, that of Poland included, which would be the certain result of a third world war? What resources does the United States have at its disposal for the liberation of all captive nations or some of them? What resources does the Soviet Union have at its disposal to keep in captivity all captive nations or some of them? Are we more likely to avoid national bankruptcy by embarking upon a policy of indiscriminate liberation with the concomitant certainty of war or by continuing the present policy of containment?

It might be that in a particular instance the policies suggested by the answers to these questions will coincide with Representative Kersten's proposals, but there can be no doubt that in its overall character, substance, emphasis, and likely consequences a utopian policy of liberation differs fundamentally from a realist one.

The issue between liberation as a utopian principle of abstract morality vs. the realist evaluation of the consequences which a policy of liberation would have for the survival of the nation has arisen before in American history. Abraham Lincoln was faced with a dilemma similar to that which confronts us today. Should he make the liberation of the slaves the ultimate standard of his policy even at the risk of destroying the Union, as many urged him to do, or should he subordinate the moral principle of universal freedom to considerations of the national interest? The answer Lincoln gave to Horace Greeley, a spokesman for the utopian moralists, is timeless in its eloquent wisdom. "If there be those," he wrote on August 22, 1862,

> who would not save the Union unless they could at the same time save slavery, I do not agree with them. If there be those who would not save the Union unless they could at the same time destroy slavery, I do not agree with them. My paramount object in this struggle *is* to save the Union, and is *not* either to save or to destroy slavery. If I could save the Union without freeing *any* slave I would do it, and if I could save it by freeing *all* the slaves, I would do it; and if I could save it by freeing some and leaving others alone I would also do that. What I do about slavery, and the colored race, I do because I believe it helps to save the Union; and what I forbear, I forbear because I do *not* believe it would help to save the Union. I shall do *less* whenever I shall believe what I am doing hurts the cause, and I shall do *more* whenever I shall believe doing more will help the cause. I shall try to correct errors when shown to be errors; and I shall adopt new views so fast as they shall appear to be true views.
>
> I have here stated my purpose according to my view of *official* duty; and I intend no modification of my oft-expressed *personal* wish that all men everywhere could be free.

IV

The foregoing discussion ought to shed additional light, if this is still needed, upon the moral merits of the utopian and realist positions. This question, more than any other, seems to have agitated the critics of realism in international affairs. Disregarding the voluminous evidence, some of them have picked a few words out of their context to prove that realism in international affairs is unprincipled and contemptuous of morality. To mention but one example, one eminent critic summarizes my position, which he supposes to deny the possibility of judging the conduct of states by moral criteria, in these words: "And one spokesman finds 'a profound and neglected truth,' to use his words, in the dictum of Hobbes that 'there is neither morality nor law outside the state.' "[19] These are indeed my words, but not all of them. What I actually said was this:

> There is a profound and neglected truth hidden in Hobbes's extreme dictum that the state creates morality as well as law and that there is neither morality nor law outside the state. Universal moral principles, such as justice or equality, are capable of guiding political action only to the extent that they have been given concrete content and have been related to political situations by society.[20]

It must be obvious from this passage and from all my other writings on the subject[21] that my position is the exact opposite from what this critic makes it out to be. I have always maintained that the actions of states are subject to universal moral principles and I have been careful to differentiate my position in this respect from that of Hobbes. Five points basic to my position may need to be emphasized again.

The first point is what one might call the requirement of cosmic hu-

[19] A. H. Feller, "In Defense of International Law and Morality," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 282, p. 80 (July, 1952).

[20] *In Defense of the National Interest: A Critical Examination of American Foreign Policy* (New York, 1951), p. 34.

[21] See, for instance, "The Machiavellian Utopia," *Ethics*, Vol. 55, pp. 145–147 (Jan., 1945); "Ethics and Politics," in *Approaches to Group Understanding*, Sixth Symposium of the Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion, edited by Bryson, Finkelstein, and MacIver (New York, 1947), pp. 319–341; "The Escape from Power in the Western World," in *Conflicts of Power in Modern Culture*, Seventh Symposium of the Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion, edited by Bryson, Finkelstein, and MacIver, pp. 1–12; *Scientific Man vs. Power Politics* (Chicago, 1946), Chaps. 7, 8; "Views of Nuremberg: Further Analysis of the Trial and Its Importance," *America*, Vol. 76, pp. 266–267 (Dec.7, 1946); "The Twilight of International Morality," *Ethics*, Vol. 58, pp. 79–99 (Jan., 1948); "The Political Science of E. H. Carr," *World Politics*, Vol. 1, pp. 127–134 (Oct., 1948); *Politics Among Nations* (New York, 1948), Ch. 14; "National Interest and Moral Principles in Foreign Policy: The Primacy of the National Interest," *The American Scholar*, Vol. 18, pp. 207–212 (Spring, 1949); "The Pathology of Power," *American Perspective*, Vol. 4, pp. 6–10 (Winter, 1950); "The Moral Dilemma in Foreign Policy," in *The Year Book of World Affairs, 1951* (London, 1951), pp. 12–36.

mility with regard to the moral evaluation of the actions of states. To know that states are subject to the moral law is one thing; to pretend to know what is morally required of states in a particular situation is quite another. The human mind tends naturally to identify the particular interests of states, as of individuals, with the moral purposes of the universe. The statesman in the defense of the nation's interests may, and at times even must, yield to that tendency; the scholar must resist it at every turn. For the light-hearted assumption that what one's own nation aims at and does is morally good and that those who oppose that nation's policies are evil is morally indefensible and intellectually untenable and leads in practice to that distortion of judgment, born of the blindness of crusading frenzy, which has been the curse of nations from the beginning of time.

The second point which obviously needs to be made again concerns the effectiveness of the restraints which morality imposes upon the actions of states.

> A discussion of international morality must guard against the two extremes either of overrating the influence of ethics upon international politics or else of denying that statesmen and diplomats are moved by anything else but considerations of material power.
>
> On the one hand, there is the dual error of confounding the moral rules which people actually observe with those they pretend to observe as well as with those which writers declare they ought to observe. . . .
>
> On the other hand, there is the misconception, usually associated with the general depreciation and moral condemnation of power politics, discussed above, that international politics is so thoroughly evil that it is no use looking for ethical limitations of the aspirations for power on the international scene. Yet, if we ask ourselves what statesmen and diplomats are capable of doing to further the power objectives of their respective nations and what they actually do, we realize that they do less than they probably could and less than they actually did in other periods of history. They refuse to consider certain ends and to use certain means, either altogether or under certain conditions, not because in the light of expediency they appear impractical or unwise, but because certain moral rules interpose an absolute barrier. Moral rules do not permit certain policies to be considered at all from the point of view of expediency. Such ethical inhibitions operate in our time on different levels with different effectiveness. Their restraining function is most obvious and most effective in affirming the sacredness of human life in times of peace.[22]

In connection with this passage we have given a number of historic examples showing the influence of moral principles upon the conduct of foreign policy. An example taken from contemporary history will illus-

[22] Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, pp. 174–175.

trate the same point. There can be little doubt that the Soviet Union could have achieved the objectives of its foreign policy at the end of the Second World War without antagonizing the nations of the West into that encircling coalition which has been the nightmare of Bolshevist foreign policy since 1917. It could have mitigated cunning for its own sake and the use of force with persuasion, conciliation, and a trust derived from the awareness of a partial community of interests and would thereby have minimized the dangers to itself and the rest of the world which are inherent in the objectives of its policies. Yet the Soviet Union was precluded from relying upon these traditional methods of diplomacy by its general conception of human nature, politics, and morality. In the general philosophy of Bolshevism there is no room for honest dissent, the recognition of the intrinsic worth of divergent interests, and genuine conciliation between such interests. On all levels of social interaction opposition must be destroyed by cunning and violence, since it has no right to exist, rather than be met half way in view of its intrinsic legitimacy. This being the general conception of the political morality of Bolshevism, the foreign policy of the Soviet Union is limited to a much more narrow choice of means than the foreign policies of other nations.

The United States, for instance, has been able, in its relations with the nations of Latin America, to replace military intervention and dollar diplomacy with the policy of the Good Neighbor. That drastic change was made possible by the general conception of political morality which has been prevalent in the United States from its very inception. The United States is a pluralist society which presupposes the continuing existence and legitimacy of divergent interests. These interests are locked in a continuing struggle for supremacy to be decided by force only as a last resort, but normally through a multitude of institutional agencies which are so devised as to allow one or the other interest a temporary advantage but none a permanent supremacy at the price of the destruction of the others. This morality of pluralism allows the United States, once it is secure in that minimum of vital interests to which we have referred above, to transfer those principles of political morality to the international scene and to deal with divergent interests there with the same methods of genuine compromise and conciliation which are a permanent element of its domestic political life.

The third point concerns the relations between universal moral principles and political action. I have always maintained that these universal moral principles cannot be applied to the actions of states in their abstract universal formulation, but that they must be, as it were, filtered through the concrete circumstances of time and place. The individual may say for himself: "*Fiat justitia, pereat mundus*"; the state has no

right to say so in the name of those who are in its care. Both individual and state must judge political action by universal moral principles, such as that of liberty. Yet while the individual has a moral right to sacrifice himself in defense of such a moral principle, the state has no moral right to let its moral disapprobation of the infringement of liberty get in the way of successful political action, itself inspired by the moral principle of national survival. There can be no political morality without prudence, that is, without consideration of the political consequences of seemingly moral action. Classical and medieval philosophy knew this and so did Lincoln when he said: "I do the very best I know how, the very best I can, and I mean to keep doing so until the end. If the end brings me out all right, what is said against me won't amount to anything. If the end brings me out wrong, ten angels swearing I was right would make no difference." The issue between utopianism and realism, as it bears on this point, has been put most succinctly by Edmund Burke, and what he has to say in the following passage about revolution, that is, civil war, may well be applied *mutatis mutandis* to all war.

> Nothing universal can be rationally affirmed on any moral or any political subject. Pure metaphysical abstraction does not belong to these matters. The lines of morality are not like the ideal lines of mathematics. They are broad and deep as well as long. They admit of exceptions; they demand modifications. These exceptions and modifications are not made by the process of logic, but by the rules of prudence. Prudence is not only the first in rank of the virtues political and moral, but she is the director, the regulator, the standard of them all. Metaphysics cannot live without definition; but Prudence is cautious how she defines. Our courts cannot be more fearful in suffering fictitious cases to be brought before them for eliciting their determination on a point of law than prudent moralists are in putting extreme and hazardous cases of conscience upon emergencies not existing. Without attempting, therefore, to define, what never can be defined, the case of a revolution in government, this, I think, may be safely affirmed—that a sore and pressing evil is to be removed, and that a good, great in its amount and unequivocal in its nature, must be probable almost to a certainty, before the inestimable price of our own morals and the well-being of a number of our fellow-citizens is paid for a revolution. If ever we ought to be economists even to parsimony, it is in the voluntary production of evil. Every revolution contains in it something of evil.[23]

[23] *The Works of The Right Honorable Edmund Burke*, 4th ed. (Boston, 1871), Vol. 4, pp. 80–81. Cf. also Burke, "Speech on A Bill for Shortening the Duration of Parliaments," May 8, 1780, in *Works*, Vol. 7, p. 73: "I must see, to satisfy me, the remedies; I must see, from their operation in the cure of the old evil, and in the cure of those new evils which are inseparable from all remedies, how they balance each other, and what is the total result. The excellence of mathematics and metaphysics is, to have but one thing before you; but he forms the best judgement in all moral disquisitions who has the greatest number and variety of considerations in one view before him, and can take them in with the best possible consideration of the middle results of all."

Fourth, the realist recognizes that a moral decision, especially in the political sphere, does not imply a simple choice between a moral principle and a standard of action which is morally irrelevant or even outright immoral. A moral decision implies always a choice among different moral principles, one of which is given precedence over others. To say that a political action has no moral purpose is absurd; for political action can be defined as an attempt to realize moral values through the medium of politics, that is, power. The relevant moral question concerns the choice among different moral values, and it is at this point that the realist and the utopian part company again. If an American statesman must choose between the promotion of universal liberty, which is a moral good, at the risk of American security and, hence, of liberty in the United States, and the promotion of American security and of liberty in the United States, which is another moral good, to the detriment of the promotion of universal liberty, which choice ought he to make? The utopian will not face the issue squarely and will deceive himself into believing that he can achieve both goods at the same time. The realist will choose the national interest on both moral and pragmatic grounds; for if he does not take care of the national interest nobody else will, and if he puts American security and liberty in jeopardy the cause of liberty everywhere will be impaired.

Finally, the political realist distinguishes between his moral sympathies and the political interests which he must defend. He will distinguish with Lincoln between his "*official* duty" which is to protect the national interest and his "*personal* wish" which is to see universal moral values realized throughout the world.

The issue has been admirably put by Father Wilfred Parsons of Catholic University in defending Ambassador Kennan's position:

> Mr. Kennan did not say state behavior is not a fit subject for moral judgment, but only that it should not sway our realization of the realities with which we have to deal. Msgr. Koenig continues: "Should we accept power realities and aspirations without feeling the obligation of moral judgment?" And he appeals to the present writer and other political scientists to say whether this doctrine agrees with Pope Pius XII's messages on peace.
>
> I am sure that most political scientists, and also Mr. Kennan, would agree with the Monsignor that we should not accept those realities "without feeling the obligation of moral judgment." But there is a difference between *feeling* this obligation (and even expressing it) and allowing this feeling to sway our actions in concrete negotiations that deal with the national or world common good. We can still feel and yet deal.
>
> To make my meaning clearer, I understood Mr. Kennan to hold that we went off the beam with Woodrow Wilson, when we began to make our moral disapprobation an *essential part* of our foreign relations, even sometimes at the

expense of our own and the world's common good. Logically, such an attitude would inhibit our dealing with Britain, France and a host of countries. Pius XI, speaking of Mussolini after the Lateran Treaty, said he would deal with the devil himself if he must. Here was moral disapprobation, but it was not "carried over into the affairs of states."

This relative position, and not the absolute one of Msgr. Koenig (with which in itself I agree), is, I think, the issue raised by Mr. Kennan, and it is worth debating on that basis.[24]

The contest between utopianism and realism is not tantamount to a contest between principle and expediency, morality and immorality, although some spokesmen for the former would like to have it that way. The contest is rather between one type of political morality and another type of political morality, one taking as its standard universal moral principles abstractly formulated, the other weighing these principles against the moral requirements of concrete political action, their relative merits to be decided by a prudent evaluation of the political consequences to which they are likely to lead.[25]

These points are re-emphasized by the foregoing discussion. Which attitude with regard to collective security and to the liberation of the captive nations, the utopian or the realist, is more likely to safeguard the survival of the United States in its territorial, political, and cultural identity and at the same time to contribute the most to the security and liberty of other nations? This is the ultimate test—political and moral—by which utopianism and realism must be judged.

[24] *America*, Vol. 86, p. 700 (March 29, 1952). See also Algernon Cecil, "The Foreign Office," in *The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, 1783–1919* (New York, 1923), Vol. 3, p. 605, concerning Lord Salisbury: "Always, however, the motive of his policy was to be found in the political interests as opposed to the political sympathies of Great Britain; and in this way his treatment of Foreign Affairs is at the opposite policy from that of Palmerston or Gladstone." Cf. also the general remarks in Alexander H. Leighton, *Human Relations in a Changing World* (New York, 1949), pp. 155 ff.

[25] See, on this point, Shirley R. Letwin, "Rationalism, Principles, and Politics," *The Review of Politics*, Vol. 14, pp. 367–393 (July, 1952); L. Susan Stebbing, *Ideals and Illusions* (London, 1941); Vernon H. Holloway, *Religious Ethics and the Politics of Power* (New York, 1951); and Dorothy Fosdick, "Ethical Standards and Political Strategies," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 57, pp. 214 ff. (1942).

THE WHIG TRADITION IN AMERICA AND EUROPE

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I

In a liberal society[1] such as prevailed in America during the Jeffersonian and Jacksonian eras, where the aristocracies, peasantries, and proletariats of Europe are missing, where virtually everyone, including the nascent industrial worker, has the mentality of an independent entrepreneur, two national impulses are bound to make themselves felt: the impulse toward democracy and the impulse toward capitalism. The mass of the people, in other words, are bound to be capitalistic, and capitalism, with its spirit disseminated widely, is bound to be democratic. This is one of the basic insights Tocqueville had about the actual behavior of the American people. The irony of early American history, however, is that these impulses, instead of supplementing each other, seemed to fight a tremendous political battle. The capitalist Whiggery of Hamilton was frightened of democracy, and the democratic tradition of Jackson, which was therefore able to destroy it, formulated a philosophy which seemed to deny its faith in capitalism. The result was a massive confusion in political thought, comparable to the one that we find in the constitutional era, and a set of victories and defeats which the Americans who experienced them scarcely understood. One is reminded of two boxers, swinging wildly, knocking each other down with accidental punches.

Looked at from one point of view, it is strange that Federalism and neo-Federalism should have been shattered so badly in the liberal setting of American politics. For in the old society of Europe, where these movements were surrounded by a whole series of aristocratic and proletarian enemies, they were reaping their greatest triumphs at precisely the moment they were defeated here. The blood relationship between the Federalist-Whig tradition in America and the tradition of upper middle class liberalism in Europe, the tradition of the English Whigs and the French Liberals, has gone very badly neglected. Parrington referred to it of course in the English case, when he said that the Hamiltonian movement exemplified "English Whiggery." Henry Adams, in a characteristic flash of insight, once spoke of the "instinctive cousinship" that bound the Boston of the "upper class bourgeoisie" to the "London of Robert Peel, Macaulay, and John Stuart Mill" and to the "Paris of Louis Phillippe, Guizot, and de Tocqueville."[2] But that is about as far as comparative analysis has gotten, even though the Federalists and the Whigs of America, in their

[1] The concept of a liberal community arises out of the American experience of establishing liberalism without being compelled to fight the heritage of a decadent feudalism. I have discussed a few of the problems raised by this concept during the eighteenth century in "American Political Thought and the American Revolution," this REVIEW, Vol. 46, pp. 321–342 (June, 1952); and during the period of the Civil War in "The Reactionary Enlightenment," *Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. 5, pp. 31–50 (March, 1952).

[2] *Education of Henry Adams*, Mod. Lib. ed. (New York, 1931), p. 33.

love of capitalism and their fear of democracy, duplicate at virtually every point the European pattern of bourgeois thought.

And yet it is not, as I have said, this connection in itself that is really interesting. What is interesting is the fact that the Americans, unassailed by the manifold enemies their brethren have to face abroad, are defeated while their brethren are victorious. The 1830's, which witness the Reform Act in England and the July Revolution in France, witness also the Jacksonian revolution in America. Just as the cry of "enrichissez-vous" goes up in Paris and London, the grim cry of "monopoly" goes up in the Boston that Adams compared them with. Just as Macaulay and Guizot are proclaiming that the day of universal suffrage will never come, Chancellor Kent and John Quincy Adams are bemoaning the disaster it has already brought. It would be hard to find a more vivid contrast than this, and what is curious is that Parrington and Adams, both imaginative minds, should have seen the basis for the contrast but should not have followed through to the contrast itself.

When we do, the peculiar mechanism of American politics begins to become apparent. We see that the American liberal community, if it did not confront its upper middle class with a set of European aristocracies, peasantries, and proletariats, was bound to confront it with something else which in certain ways was worse: a democratic movement of the lower middle class that it could not possibly master. The word "petit-bourgeois" automatically comes to mind in this connection, but even if it were not one of the most hackneyed phrases in the political dictionary, I do not think that we could use it. Jackson was not another edition of Flocon, Jefferson another case of Ledru-Rollin. In the very process of expanding the European category of the "petit-bourgeois" America shattered it, creating a movement so lusty and so powerful that it is more than a bit misleading to identify it with the continental shopkeepers on whom Marx and Engels poured their fine contempt in 1848. Of course small urban traders were enlisted in the American democratic movement, but they did not become its leaders. Two other groups, in Europe outside the "petit-bourgeoisie," clearly overshadowed them: the peasant who had been transformed into a capitalist farmer, and the laborer who had been transformed into an incipient entrepreneur. In the time of Jefferson, indeed, one might even say that America's "landed aristocracy" entered the fray as well. The result was a great new democratic giant, a liberal hybrid unknown in any other land—America's unique contribution to the political culture of the West.[3]

What America was doing here, one might say, was packing all of the traditional enemies of capitalist Whiggery into a single personality. From the angle of Whiggery nothing could have been worse. For the secret of its success in

[3] It is in the American democrat that we find the distinctive impact of the liberal idea in American life: the individualism and the absence of real class consciousness in the worker, the capitalist spirit of the farmer, and the subordination even of the large landowner during the Jeffersonian era to the political aims of the small farmer because of a system of widely diffused and independent land ownership. I intend to deal more closely with these problems in another discussion.

Europe, to put the matter a bit more bluntly than is justifiable, especially in the English case, lay in the fact that it could play its enemies off against each other. That was how it established a claim to national leadership. When the English Whigs and the French Liberals fought the reactionary aristocratic order of Europe, they became liberal heroes, rallying behind them the workers and small property owners both of England and France.[4] When, on the other hand, they insisted on excluding their supporters from the suffrage—the workers from the Reform Act and both the workers and the petit-bourgeois from the July Charter—they became conservative heroes, rallying behind them the "existing institutions," as Brougham put it, that they had before assailed. If on the Continent the petit-bourgeois sought an independent destiny, there was always the image of a hungry proletariat that might be used to frighten it, as the career of the French Mountain so pathetically reveals in 1848. Thus out of the very diversity of its opponents European Whiggery forged a foothold in which to rest, and out of their diversity, too, it managed to give its political thought a series of glorious overtones. Macaulay when he faced the Duke of Wellington developed a high liberal optimism. Guizot when he faced Ledru-Rollin developed a rich empirical traditionalism. Granted that these were rather contradictory types of glory, and in the French case were pursued with shocking allegiance to class interest, they nevertheless provided the basis for some sort of genuine political thought.

Now what America did when it created the American democrat is fairly obvious. It removed the European foothold, and doing so, removed all chance for philosophic glory. Here there are no aristocracies to fight, and the Federalists and the Whigs are denied the chance of dominating the people in a campaign against them. Here there are no aristocracies to ally with, and they cannot use their help to exclude the people from political power. Here there are no genuine proletarian outbursts to meet, and they cannot frighten people into fleeing wildly from them. They are isolated, put at the mercy of a strange new democratic giant they cannot possibly control. Their political thought loses entirely its "liberal" aspect, and its conservative denunciation of the people not only becomes suicidal, since it is precisely the people who are sure to shatter them, but loses most of its connection to reality. It is bad enough for Hamilton and Noah Webster to be denied the chance of developing Macaulay's liberalism, and thus to appear forever as conservatives only, but to be put in the position where their longing for a House of Lords, instead of being traditionalistic, is actually revolutionary, since none has ever existed, and where their denunciation of the "mob" is peculiarly absurd since the "mob" is as liberal as they are, is a horrible additional species of punishment. This knocks out all the props from under them, conservative as well as liberal.

And yet American Whiggery, had it not been strategically paralyzed over

[4] The English aristocracy was of course by no means monolithic in its opposition to the middle class. The Reform Act of 1832 was actually pushed through by aristocrats like Grey who recognized the need for reform. Here, as in other cases in political history, a nascent group found support among sectors of the dominant class.

most of its early history, had it not had an impulse to duplicate European patterns which Henry Adams correctly described when he called it "instinctive," might have avoided most of this. It might have transformed the very liability of the American liberal community into a tremendous asset. For if the American democrat was unconquerable, he was so only because he shared the liberal norm. And this meant two things: one, that he was not a real social threat to Whiggery; and two, that Whiggery had much to offer him in the way of feeding his capitalist impulse. Thus what Whiggery should have done, instead of opposing the American democrat, was to ally itself with him: to give up the idea of exploiting many enemies, as in Europe, and try to exploit the presence of many friends. It should have made a big issue out of the unity of American life, the fact that all Americans were bitten with the capitalist ethos which it was trying to foster. It should, in other words, have developed some sort of theory of democratic capitalism which fitted the Tocquevillean facts of American life.

But this, as we know, is precisely what Whiggery failed to do until it saw the light in 1840, and indeed, in any large sense, until the post-Civil War days of Horatio Alger and Andrew Carnegie. Over most of its early history it pursued a thoroughly European policy, and instead of emphasizing what it had in common with the American democrat, it emphasized precisely what it did not have in common with him. Instead of wooing this giant, it chose, quite without weapons, to fight him. This would be a high species of political heroism, were it not associated with such massive empirical blindness. One can admire a man who will not truckle to the mob, even though the mob is sure to beat him, provided there is actually a mob in the first place. But in America there was no mob; the American democrat was as liberal as the Whigs who denounced him. Consequently the suicidal grandeur of Fisher Ames is tinged with a type of stupidity which makes admiration difficult. At best one can find in the Whigs a kind of Quixotic pathos. One can treat them as Europeans living in an alien world, unwilling and unable to understand it. They have great liberal energies but America has no use for them. They pursue the usual conservative strategies but are baffled and dumbfounded at every turn. It is the sort of pathos one might expect to find in Macaulay had he suddenly been shipped to America—except for the fact, alas, that Macaulay saw more about America from London than did Fisher Ames from Boston.

This analysis gives us, it seems to me, a clue to the solution of an ancient problem: the speedy triumph of democracy in America. Our efforts to explain the rise of American democracy have foundered largely on the fact that they have been unable to withstand any comparative test. Turner's frontier theory breaks down because frontiers are to be found in other lands. An emphasis on urban industrialism, with which some of our newer historians are supplanting it, breaks down even more, since industrialism was farther advanced in England and possibly even in France than it was in the United States in the 1820's. But if we assert that the quick emergence of democracy was inherent in the American liberal community, we advance a proposition that comparative analysis cannot destroy. Indeed the inflexible European behavior of American

Whiggery gives this proposition the kind of support that one might almost expect to get from a laboratory experiment. Had the Whigs adapted themselves at once to the unique reality of America, had they donned something like the garb of Harrison in the age of Fisher Ames, they would have confused the issue considerably. We would have had to work entirely with assumptions that could not be empirically verified. As it is, however, since Fisher Ames tried his best to operate like Guizot, we can clearly say that in a liberal society the only type of antagonism to democracy that can appear is the antagonism of the upper middle class and that in such a society the upper middle class is robbed of the capacity to implement it. In other words, if we could imagine England or France in the 1830's with their feudalisms gone and their masses unified around the liberal norm, we could expect to find, on the basis of their own history, the same sort of pattern that appeared in America. We could expect to find all of the familiar techniques of Whiggery exploding in its face, a huge democrat emerging, and the early triumph of manhood suffrage.[5]

II

Given its early strategy, then, there were three parts to the problem American Whiggery faced: the absence of an aristocracy to fight, the absence of an aristocracy to ally with, and the absence of a mob to denounce.

The first of these was in a sense the most crushing, and if we are to interpret the Whigs in terms of their pathos, here surely is a place where we can give them our deepest sympathy. Of course, looked at from one point of view, it is no minor blessing to have your Wellingtons and Polignacs removed for you in advance. On the rare occasions the American Whigs thought of the battles they had avoided, they breathed a sigh of relief. Rufus Choate, that archapostle, with Story, of Massachusetts Whiggery, compared America with Europe and was delighted to discover that here there was no need to "reform" society "fundamentally."[6] But this was an ironic joy, as is often the case in politics, for enemies can of course perform a positive as well as a negative function. Had the need for fundamental reform actually existed, Choate would

[5] This does not mean, of course, that the frontier did not enter into the creation of American liberalism by providing an abundance of land for individual proprietorship and by providing a virgin ground, unridden by a feudal heritage, for the implementation of liberal ideas. The American liberal community originated out of a happy interplay between the transplanted European concepts Turner neglected and the raw environment that he emphasized. This relationship was brilliantly perceived by B. F. Wright in "Political Institutions and the Frontier," in *Sources of American Culture*, ed. D. R. Fox (New York, 1934), pp. 15–39. Nor need one deny that the emergence of an eastern working class provided an important democratic pressure, though it is essential to insist, curious as it may seem, that it was the nonproletarian outlook of this class, the fact that it did not frighten the mass of small property owners above it, which was crucial in the achievement of democratic objectives. The overriding fact is the unique fact of American liberalism; the others fit into it, but neither separately nor together can they take its place. Certainly the argument over which of the others we should choose, the West or the East, as it were, misses the point badly.

[6] *Works of Rufus Choate*, ed. S. G. Brown (Boston, 1862), p. 419.

have been more than a mere "conservative," spinning negative theories of dubious validity. He would have been a crusading "liberal," developing something like Bentham's utilitarianism or, at the very least, something like the eclectic liberalism of the French Doctrinaires. Since history has been written from the progressive point of view, he would not have gone down in history as a villain merely, but as a hero as well.

This atrophy of Whiggery's liberal talent, this failure of Whiggery to develop the positive side of its personality, is an odd philosophic tragedy. Potentialities are everywhere, but instead of being developed, they are turned back upon themselves. Fisher Ames has a concept of "public liberty," but instead of carrying it forward, he proceeds to limit its application. Daniel Webster hails the revolutions of Europe, but after having done so, he laments the extension of suffrage in Massachusetts. The better half of Whiggery simply cannot flower, and one is reminded again and again of what Brougham might have looked like had his career been exhausted by the fear of annual parliaments. American Whiggery, lacking a proving ground for its liberal energies, loses the hope and the optimism that we find in the Whiggery of Europe. A life of too much ease makes it negative, querulous, and bitter.

The way this shattered its claim to political leadership becomes apparent when we consider the outlook of two men like Francis Place and William Leggett. In England, Place had little affection for a wealthy middle class that was ready to exclude the people from power, but he was at any rate watching it fight a tremendous battle against the grip of Tory landlords, which made him feel that it was at least on the right track, taking a step in his own direction. But in America what has Leggett got to watch? It is all right for Kent to tell him, as Macaulay told the people of England, that "property and intelligence" ought to govern the state, but what are property and intelligence doing in America to justify that honor here? It makes no difference that under the right conditions they might be doing everything they did abroad, that Kent might actually be a legal reformer and that Daniel Webster might be delivering reformist speeches European schoolboys would now be learning by heart. Leggett is not concerned with that, and the truth is, neither is Kent. In America the issue is America, not Europe. And here Whiggery looks very much as if it is making the biggest mistake in politics: claiming a privilege without performing a service.

As men, certainly, the big capitalists of America were no worse than the big capitalists of England or the Continent. Indeed they may well have been better: the proletarian miseries Engels found in Manchester he could not have found in Lowell and the control of the state by finance that Marx found in Paris he could not have found in Washington. But for all that, the inability of the Americans to match the claims of the Europeans dogged them to the end. In Europe during the 'thirties there was a kind of Aristotelian revival in social thought, and theorists like James Mill and Royer-Collard glorified the wealthy middle class as the *juste milieu* in politics, uncorrupted by the decadence of the aristocracy and unmoved by the turbulence of the mob. But in America the

wealthy middle class is cruelly denied this chance of glorifying itself, because here, alas, it is not in the middle but on top. A theory of the "middling class" such as Jonathan Wainwright developed, hurts it rather than helps it. Indeed in the liberal atmosphere of America it is itself the group that is blasted as an "aristocracy," and its dilemma is doubly and triply painful because it cannot even reply to the attack with the time-honored defense of a genuine aristocracy. A genuine aristocracy can claim at least the virtues of a public spirited paternalism, but how can a wealthy middle class ever hide the acquisitive code by which it lives? Thus what happens is this: America roasts its propertied liberals in a pair of completely incongruous fires. At one and the same time they are parasitic "aristocrats" and exploitative "capitalists."

This strange symbolic punishment, which can be documented in any work of Taylor or Leggett, was reflected also on the economic plane. Technically the American Whigs should have produced a Ricardo or a Say just as they should have produced a Macaulay or a Guizot. But because they did not confront the economic heritage of feudalism any more than they confronted its political heritage, they produced neither. True, this was not a story of energies that were totally lost: if they had a large measure of economic freedom, they still needed, because of America's underdeveloped economy, state economic aid, and so they exchanged the cry of "laissez-faire" for the cry of tariffs and the "American system." In the process, however, the "aristocrat"-cum-"capitalist" torture was intensified a notch. They became at once the Corn Law "monopolists" of America, and symbols that looked very much like those they would have hurled at Europe's ancien régime were hurled at them by the American democrat. Here, indeed, is the source of our modern confusion of Jeffersonian theory with European theories of "laissez-faire"—our inability to distinguish between a middle class attack on the established interests of corporate society and a democratic attack on the promotional aims of the middle class itself which are not even established. But words that look the same can be very misleading indeed. Even John Bright, the blood brother of the American Whigs, could not help confusing them with his aristocratic enemies. "The speeches of Henry Clay and Daniel Webster," Bright bitterly remarked in 1844, "might have done credit to the Dukes of Buckingham and Richmond themselves."[7]

Things have come to a pretty pass when Manchester can denounce Lowell as the seat of the English gentry. But in economics as in politics this was the price the Federalists and the Whigs paid for having their liberal victories handed to them on a silver platter, for having their Wellingtons and Polignacs disappear into the thin historical air—for being "born free," as Tocqueville put it. Lacking the feudal enemies that might have made a nation follow them, they looked like the very villains they would have fought. It was an ironic situation, but one of the most ironic things about it is that it has dogged them all the way into our contemporary historical literature, where at the hands of Beard and his disciples they receive much the same incongruous abuse they

[7] *Speeches on Questions of Public Policy*, ed. J. E. T. Rogers (London, 1869), Vol. 1, p. 227.

received at the hands of Taylor and Leggett. They are blasted as "reactionaries" when they are no more reactionary than the founders of European liberalism, they are denounced in the same breath as "aristocrats" and "capitalists" when in fact they are only capitalists, and in general they live the lives they led a hundred years ago. Our progressive historians, one is tempted to say, have not produced a study of American political thought: they have produced a replica of it.

But I am not trying, at this late hour, to rehabilitate the Federalists and the Whigs. They deserve all of the criticism they have received, but not for the reason they have received it. Their crime was not villainy but stupidity, and perhaps in politics a man ought to know that if he is guilty of the second, he is going to be charged with the first. What is remarkable is how long the American Whigs managed to endure the strange abuse of a liberal community without waking up to the logic behind it. Here they were in a setting where the democracy was closer to them than anywhere else in the West, and yet instead of embracing it, they feared and fought it as their comrades did in Europe, even though none of the European weapons were at hand. The lament of the Adamses, that they were born into the wrong sort of world, is not quite correct. They were born into the right sort of world, and they were overwhelmed, not because they could not defeat their enemies, but because they were too unenlightened to recognize their friends.

III

When we turn to the second part of the problem of American Whiggery, the absence of an aristocracy to ally with, we find a story no less subtle but one in which the gloom is occasionally broken by a ray of good fortune. The story begins, to be sure, on an even gloomier note than the other. The fact that Wellington is not available for a battle, whenever it occurs to the Whigs, is actually, as I have said, a source of conscious joy. But the fact that he is not available for an alliance, because it is directly related to the negative side of Whiggery which in America absorbed almost the whole of it, is a source of the keenest pain. It is a fact not easily forgotten. When John Dickinson, discussing aristocratic institutions in the Federal Convention, cried, "Can these be created by a breath or a stroke of the pen?" he voiced a lament that echoed all the way down to the Jacksonian era.[8] As late as 1837 Noah Webster, though dutifully rejecting "distinct orders or ranks of men," reopened the question of how the masses could ever be controlled without them.[9] Macaulay once said that the American political system was "all sail and no anchor," and it was precisely this which bothered his American brethren. They longed for an anchor, something that might hold in check the frightful proletarian rampages on which the American democrat was sure to embark.

Here, however, a strange thing happened, which rescued them a bit from their frustration. Their fear of the American democrat coincided with the Amer-

[8] Max Farrand, *Records of the Federal Convention* (New Haven, 1911–37), Vol. 1, p. 87.
[9] *A Letter to the Hon. Daniel Webster* (Philadelphia, 1837).

ican democrat's fear of himself, for he no more understood than they the liberal world that brought him to power, and hence could not see any better than they could see that in such a world the majority would not want to annihilate the individualist way of life. And so the American democrat, in one of the strangest examples of political confusion and political collapse in the American record, permitted the Whigs to throw a set of chains around him. He would, of course, never accept the House of Lords that Hamilton and Dickinson wanted. But when they shifted their search for an anchor from aristocracy to the law, his resistance diminished considerably. That shift, as Hamilton maneuvered it, was little short of a strategic masterpiece. Denied the rock of aristocracy, confronted with a constitution that was a constantly moving set of wheels and mechanisms, Hamilton seized upon the one thing in this situation that did not move at all: the constitution itself. Nor was this a purely metaphysical enterprise, a conceptual substitute for royalty such as Paine had once envisaged. Hamilton erected on the fixity of the fundamental law the judicial review of a set of life term judges who were very human indeed and who came as close to being a House of Lords as a purely liberal society could produce. Tocqueville, when he arrived in America, was able to call the "bench and the bar" the "American aristocracy."[10]

Brilliant, amazing as all this was, we must not assume that it was a complete solution to Whiggery's problem. Hamilton was gloomy to the very end. And the American democrat, like any giant who has accepted a set of chains as a result of his own confusion, was restive under their impact, striking out now and again in a way designed to terrify the smaller men around him. The Whigs,

[10] It will be seen that I am interpreting the ultimate basis for judicial review, apart of course from the requirements of federalism, in terms of America's social agreement rather than in terms of its social conflict. The real question is not why Hamilton wanted to control the American majority, but why the American majority accepted his controls. And the answer here lies in the liberal individualism of the mass of the American people—in other words, in a fear of itself on the part of the majority. But this very fear, this very devotion to the individualist idea of Locke, meant that the American majority was the last majority in the world to need the elaborate checks to which it in the end submitted. We have here, in other words, a curiously circular logic inherent in the nature of a liberal community: a liberal majority binds itself down with restraints that would be much better suited for one that was a real threat to the individualist principle.

Looked at from a slightly different angle, however, it is this unanimity around the Lockean idea which makes the institution of judicial review, apart again from the matter of federalism, a meaningful thing. When half of a nation believes in Locke and half in Filmer or Marx, the result is not law but philosophy. *Inter arma leges silent.* But when the whole of a nation agrees on Locke, the idea of settling ultimate issues of public policy through adjudication logically arises, since the problem is then not one of principle, but of application. America's famous legalism is thus the reverse side of its philosophic poverty in politics, both of which, like its pragmatism, trace back in large part to a deep and implicit liberal general will. One of the ironies of this situation is called upon to deal with the tyrannical consequences of the very Rousseauian ethos which lies behind its power. Since its courage in the face of Jefferson is made possible by his agreement with Hamilton, it may not be hard to understand why, apart from obvious pressures, it has shown rather less courage when it has had to face Jefferson and Hamilton both.

of course, lectured him passionately on how dangerous he was to everyone including himself. Story insisted that only the power of the fundamental law could serve in America as a substitute for Europe's "ecclesiastical and civil establishments, venerable from their antiquity."[11] Choate, doing his best to expend upon the law the mystic traditionalism those "establishments" got in Europe, said that it embodied the "national history" and the "national mind."[12] But the American democrat, though confused, was never thoroughly convinced. In the time of his Jacksonian anger he simplified common and statute law, he substituted Taney for Marshall, and if neither of these actions went really very far, they were enough to remind the Whigs that here, as elsewhere, their lot in America was a hard one. "I am the last of the old race of judges," Story bitterly lamented when he returned to Massachusetts from the Court.[13]

There was hidden irony in Hamilton's disappointment at not having a real House of Lords to combine with. For the aristocrats of Europe soon showed that, even after being tamed by Whiggery, they could challenge it. They could ally with the people themselves, forging a combination of extremes, and this is the source of that Tory humanitarianism, that "feudal socialism" as Marx and Engels called it, which arose in Europe in the nineteenth century. It would have been poetic justice if Hamilton, after bemoaning the absence of a solid aristocracy of the British type, had had to have a session with Lord Shaftesbury concerning the women and the children he wished to employ in American factories. His "judicial aristocracy," weak as it was, endangered always by the rising ire of the American democrat, would never at any rate provide him with a session like that. The worst thing that could happen in the case of judges was that they might collapse. They would not take the offensive and, in the name of an ancient society of status, demand the control of industrialism.

Thus another minor boon for the Whigs in the midst of their American misery: they did not have to confront either a Shaftesbury or a Berryer. We can hardly begrudge them that. Orestes Brownson, a man who clearly caught their "middle class" character, on occasion seemed to do so. A "Duke of Wellington," he insisted, "is much more likely to vindicate the rights of labor than an Abbot Lawrence."[14] And in the American progressive tradition as a whole Brownson's lament has occasionally been echoed: we have missed the conservative humanitarianism of Europe, the sense of social responsibility it embodies. No one can deny, of course, that we have missed it, just as we have missed other things, the love of variety, for example, which the tradition of Disraeli has given to the life of Europe. The closest in social theory that we have come to

[11] J. Story, *Miscellaneous Writings* (Boston, 1852), p. 156.

[12] *Works of Rufus Choate*, p. 422.

[13] Quoted in A. M. Schlesinger, Jr., *Age of Jackson* (Boston, 1946), p. 327.

[14] *Social Theories of Jacksonian Democracy*, ed. J. L. Blau (New York, 1947), p. 302. The absence of a Wellingtonian feudal conservatism in America after the Civil War is noted in R. G. McCloskey's excellent *American Conservatism in the Age of Enterprise* (Cambridge, 1951), p. 12. A typical Progressive lament on this score, reminiscent of Brownson, is to be found in A. M. Schlesinger, Jr., *The Vital Center* (Boston, 1949), pp. 14–17.

reproducing Disraeli are the Southern "feudalists" who read him with a passion before the Civil War, and surely they were very far from meeting the standard of Tory humanitarianism. New England, with its Calvinist idea of stewardship, has never quite met that standard either. The Calvinist idea attaches social responsibility to the very exploitative wealth-getting that the Tory principle denounces.

But in the last analysis, what else do we have a right to expect? If liberal America is going to shatter its Whigs by removing the aristocrat and expanding the democrat, can we also ask that it shatter them again by restoring the aristocrat? A nation cannot have everything. A Wellington would have made a crusading "liberal" out of Abbot Lawrence and would probably have chained Brownson to his chariot as Cobbett was chained to the chariot of the English Whigs. In general Brownson was lucky that in America the rights of the people had to be vindicated by the people themselves—lucky, that is, until Whiggery, waking up to what it had in common with the "mob," discovering the facts of America's liberal life, began to defend the people itself. This changed the strategic picture entirely. But a lot of water went under the bridge, and the shade of Fisher Ames died a hundred deaths, before Brownson was struck the blow of 1840.

IV

The final dilemma of the Federalists and the Whigs, the fact that the people they denounced as lusting for Caesarism and the destruction of property were liberals like themselves, confronts us with a less intricate problem than the others. This was not a case of blows raining down from unknown sources, as with the absence of an aristocracy to fight, or of subtle adaptations to frustration, as with the absence of an aristocracy to ally with. It was a plain case of unjustly insulting a democracy that could not be controlled, and it reveals American Whiggery at its suicidal worst.

The truth is, the arguments of Whiggery against manhood suffrage were not even valid in Europe. The horror of Macaulay and Guizot at the thought of the universal vote overlooked the attachment of the European peasantry to the institution of property and exaggerated the hunger of the European proletariat. A shrewd conservative like Bismarck saw this, and so did Berryer in France. What America did, when in the person of the American democrat it absorbed both of these groups into the liberal category, was to make the errors of Europe obvious. Indeed some of the European Whigs, unable to perceive these errors at home, actually perceived them here. Thomas Attwood, leader of the Birmingham Political Union in 1831, pointed out that America had "at least nine men interested in property to one man interested in labor alone," which was "exactly the reverse" of the situation in England, and Macaulay agreed that this condition actually justified democracy in America for a time.[15] But their

[15] Quoted in Th. Rothstein, *From Chartism to Laborism* (London, 1929), p. 96. Macaulay's prediction as to the ultimate fate of American democracy was of course a gloomy one.

American brethren, orthodox to the end, behaving "instinctively," advanced the European arguments nevertheless. Chancellor Kent, after concluding the familiar Platonic analysis of popular tyrannies and attacks on property in the New York Convention of 1821, asked: "And dare we flatter ourselves that we are a peculiar people?"[16] It did not occur to him that the answer might be yes.

Since it was such a patent distortion of the truth that even Macaulay and Attwood could see it, the argument of the Federalists and the Whigs was hardly designed to elicit a docile reaction from the American democrat. Of course the American democrat did not ordinarily defend himself by pleading that he was just as liberal as his opponents. He assailed them as "aristocrats" and defined himself as a downtrodden "laborer," thus shattering the Whigs with their own cosmology and in the end, alas, confusing himself almost as much as they were confused. But on occasion the plea of a common liberalism was stung out of him nevertheless. The American people, Leggett bitterly remarked, "are just as well acquainted with the rights of person and property and have as just a regard for them as the most illustrious lordling of the scrip nobility." In Virginia, John R. Cooke, replying to the charge that unpropertied men were potential "levellers," put his finger on a basic mechanism of American life: men who did not own property dreamt of doing so, and hence it could never be to their "interest" to destroy it. And New York's General Root, infuriated by Chancellor Kent, declared: "We are all of the same estate—all commoners. . . ."[17]

All of the same estate: here in five words was the basic fact that ruined Whiggery in the American liberal community. But that Whiggery should have beaten those words out of the American democrat, if only for an angry and enlightened second, shows how blind it was. For if they were the key to Whiggery's collapse in European terms, they were the only key to its survival in American terms: unable to control the American democrat by leading him in a liberal movement and blasting him in a conservative movement, it could only control him by uniting with him in a capitalist movement. Instead of making him say, "we are all of the same estate," it should of course have said so itself—loudly and passionately and publicly.

The mind of Hamilton, for all of the wild ingenuity it displayed in the judicial realm, was unable to go as far as this. Defending manufactures he said that anything which enhances the "total mass of industry and opulence" in a country "is ultimately beneficial to every part of it." But not only did he stick to his unreal conception of the American mob in politics, he extended it to economics as well. A national bank was good because it would "unite the interests and credit of rich individuals with those of the state." Manufactures were good because among other things they provided employment for the women and children of the poor. The idea of a national capitalist partnership in democratic terms was outside the path of his vision. His "nationalism," like Marshall's

[16] J. T. Horton, *James Kent, A Study in Conservatism* (New York-London, 1939), p. 255.

[17] B. F. Wright, *Source Book of American Political Theory* (New York, 1929), pp. 369, 373, 382.

in *McCulloch v. Maryland*, was legal rather than social, defending a federal government but not embracing in any Rousseauian sense—as, ironically enough, Jefferson's "anti-nationalism" did—the American popular community. Indeed so far did he go in ignoring the liberal capitalist impulse in the nation at large that Democratic politicians were able to steal many of his policies in the process of assailing them as "monopoly." The acceptance of much of Whiggery by the Jeffersonians is a familiar fact. In the states particularly they chartered corporations and constructed internal improvements with remarkably happy abandon.[18]

Thus so long as the Hamiltonian view prevailed the suicidal trend in American Whiggery was bound to persist. The fact that Americans were "all of the same estate," instead of being the key to glorious success, remained the key to bitter failure. The Whigs were "aristocrats" as well as "capitalists," they longed for stabilities they could not find, and they aroused the very people who destroyed them. They were Europeans pursuing a strategy that even in Europe would soon become ineffective.

But whatever might be said about philosophers like Fisher Ames and Chancellor Kent, there is a limit to how many times politicians like Weed and Webster are willing to commit political suicide. As the Harrison campaign approached, these men, not out of any particular social insight but out of the sheer agony of defeat, discovered the facts of American life. Giving up the false aristocratic frustrations of the past, and giving up as well its false proletarian fears, they embraced America's liberal unity with a vengeance, and developed a philosophy of democratic capitalism. Willy-nilly, the difference between America and Europe swam into the ken of their vision, and Daniel Webster, pounding away at what he had in common with everyone else, insisted that the "visible and broad distinction" between the masses and the classes of the "old countries of Europe" was not to be found in the United States. Calvin Colton, also pointing to Europe, said that "every American laborer can stand up proudly, and say, I AM THE AMERICAN CAPITALIST. . . ."[19] Whiggery had finally hit on the secret of turning its greatest liability into its greatest asset.

V

If what I have said here is correct, the Whig Counterreformation, as Arthur Schlesinger has aptly called it, has been rather badly misinterpreted. It has been denounced as insincere, and in the case of men like Colton and even Daniel Webster that may well have been true. But it has also been denounced as "unrealistic," as advancing a milk-and-water theory which obscured the facts and which was a sorry contrast to the grim Harringtonian theory of class conflict that Kent and Noah Webster stuck to. This would seem to be precisely invalid. For while there can be no doubt that Edward Everett and Daniel Webster overplayed the bond that existed between rich and poor in 1840, Kent and Webster had underplayed it even more. The whole trouble with the

[18] See L. Hartz, *Economic Policy and Democratic Thought* (Cambridge, Mass., 1948), pp. 56 ff., 292–293.

[19] Quoted in Schlesinger, *Age of Jackson*, p. 270.

old Federalist theory of the "mob" was that in America it was thoroughly unrealistic, and if it was documented with many learned European sources, this merely suggests that it was more "realistic" in Europe than it was in America. Our progressive historians will not give the Whigs a chance. They glory in the suicide the Whigs commit in failing to understand America; yet once the Whigs begin to understand it, the historians denounce them for becoming unwise.

We think of the Whigs in the age of Harrison as stealing the egalitarian thunder of the Democrats, but actually they did more than that. They transformed it. For if they gave up Hamilton's hatred of the people, they retained his grandiose capitalist dream, and this they combined with the Jeffersonian concept of equal opportunity. The result was to electrify the democratic individual with a passion for great achievement and to produce a personality type that was neither Hamiltonian nor Jeffersonian but a strange mixture of them both: the hero of Horatio Alger. Edward Everett emphasized that "in this country" the "wheel of fortune is in constant revolution, and the poor, in one generation, furnish the rich of the next."[20] A new social theory took shape, dynamic, restless, competitive, and because it united the two great traditions of the American liberal community, its impact ultimately became enormous. The American democrat was unprepared to meet it, and one of the reasons ironically enough was that he himself had ignored the fact that Americans were "all of the same estate." Exploiting an unreal demonology of "aristocrats" and "capitalists," he had missed the aristocratic and capitalistic impulses that burned in his own breast, and so without quite knowing why, he found himself, as in 1840, harnessed to the chariot of a reformed Whiggery. The "judicial aristocracy" strategy was worked on him again, this time exploiting not a false fear but a very genuine lust. Two drives—individualist fear and capitalist lust—have ever been the forces which have delivered the American democrat into the hands of his big propertied opponents. They are the strange weaknesses that a liberal community implants in the heart of the egalitarian Hercules it creates.

All of this, of course, reached its climax after the Civil War, when American capitalism surged forward rapidly, when no political movement, however perceptive, could withstand the appeal of the prizes it offered—when Carnegie and Harding took the place of Everett and Clay. But it is not without its relevance to our analysis here. It shows that a paradox apparently implicit in it did not in fact materialize: that the world's most capitalistic community should shatter the philosophy of capitalism. And for what a sentimental point is worth, it suggests that the American Whigs were to be amply repaid for the humiliation they endured while their brethren were triumphant abroad. In the late nineteenth and the twentieth centuries the situation would be reversed, and Chancellor Kent would be watching the agonies of Guizot. While a new movement, the movement of socialism, would be engulfing the Whiggery of Europe, the age of Louis Phillippe would come with a vengeance to America—and it would come precisely because the American Whigs had no aristocracy to fight, no aristocracy to ally with, and above all no "mob" to denounce.

[20] Alexander Everett, *Orations and Speeches* (Boston, 1836), p. 297.

RESEARCH IN POLITICAL BEHAVIOR

The five papers which follow were prepared during the summer of 1951 by the Social Science Research Council's Interuniversity Summer Seminar on Political Behavior. The seminar, which met at the University of Chicago, was attended by seven persons, who accept joint responsibility for the papers: Samuel J. Eldersveld, University of Michigan; Alexander Heard, University of North Carolina; Samuel P. Huntington, Harvard University; Morris Janowitz, University of Michigan; Avery Leiserson, Vanderbilt University; Dayton D. McKean, University of Colorado; and David B. Truman, Columbia University. Ralph M. Goldman met with the seminar as an associate, and later Elizabeth Wirth Marvick assisted in preparing some of the materials.

The papers, one product of the seminar's work, were written to define and illustrate what the participants feel to be a significant contemporary development in political research. The first paper, "The Implications of Research in Political Behavior," outlines some of the requirements, characteristics, and implications of political behavior research. It is followed by plans for three research projects, "Party and Administrative Responsibility: Council-Manager Government," "Political Participation in a Metropolitan District: A Study of Group Influence on Political Activity," and "The Roles of Congressional Leaders: National Party vs. Constituency," drawn up in accordance with these specifications. Finally, there appears a "Selected Critical Bibliography on the Methods and Techniques of Political Behavior Research" which the authors hope will be of use to persons interested in methodological problems in political science research. (*Ed.*)

THE IMPLICATIONS OF RESEARCH IN POLITICAL BEHAVIOR

This report presents the plans for three research projects in political science. They have one thing in common: each tries to understand a phase of the process of government by a systematic study of human behavior in political situations.

The projected studies illustrate the application of the political behavior approach to different problem areas in political science—local government, political parties, and the legislative process. Concentration upon these areas reflects some of the primary interests of the authors rather than any assumption that the viewpoint is relevant only to these segments of the political process. If the viewpoint has merit, it is equally appropriate to research in other areas, including the judicial process and international politics. Indeed, other research plans were prepared by the seminar but are not included here because of shortage of space.

The meaning of the term "political behavior," as used in this report, can best be described by relating "political behavior" to political science, social science, and research methods.

POLITICAL BEHAVIOR AND POLITICAL SCIENCE

Political behavior is not a field of political science. Rather, political behavior research is one way of studying most of the customary subject matter of political science. The political behavior approach is distinguished by its attempt to describe government as a process made up of the actions and interactions of men and groups of men. It is concerned, at the minimum—as is all political science—with the activities of governments, political parties, interest groups, and voters. The study of political behavior attempts to discover the extent and nature of uniformities in the actual behavior of men and groups of men in the political process.

This approach involves two basic requirements. In the first place, it calls for the formulation of concepts, hypotheses, and explanations in systematic terms, borrowing wherever appropriate from other social sciences. Secondly, it depends upon empirical methods of research, whether adapted from other social sciences or developed distinctively, since the actions of men and groups cannot be known except through direct observation or through inference from other behavioral data.

The inquiry into how men *ought* to act is a separate concern of political science and is not a concern of political behavior research. Similarly, the studies of law, constitutions, and formal organization *per se*, all parts of established political science research, are not the focal point for the study of political behavior. Values, laws, and formal structure, however, are important in determining the behavior of men, and as such they are part of the data with which political behavior research is concerned. The political behavior approach implies no denial of values in the political process. It suggests, in fact, that the systematic observation of behavior is an especially useful way of understanding the character of values that operate in the political system. Likewise, the concern of political behavior research with the process of government involves no neglect of legal and constitutional structure. On the contrary, the political behavior approach seeks to go beyond the data supplied by constitutions, statutes, administrative decrees, or judicial decisions—themselves evidence, directly or indirectly, of political behavior—to a more complete description of governmental structure-in-action. It seeks to disclose sets of recurring patterns in the way people behave, involving relationships of leadership and subordination, functional specialization, and the like, which are in varying degrees changeable even though relatively persistent. Laws, after all, are always normative—they express standards or goals—and are only sometimes descriptive of actual behavior. The statement of the conditions under which they are descriptive, and when they are not, is one of the tasks of political behavior research.

The political behavior approach is not a completely new way of studying government. It is rather an orientation which can be traced back many years and which deserves renewed emphasis. Work has been done in the study of political parties and pressure groups which utilizes this approach, and there is a sensitivity to it in the study of public administration and other governmental areas. The path of political behavior research was, indeed, staked out by Charles

E. Merriam in his presidential address to the American Political Science Association in 1925. At that time he prophesied:

> Some day we may take another angle of approach than the formal, as other sciences tend to do, and begin to look at political behavior as one of the essential objects of inquiry. Government, after all, is not made up merely of documents containing laws and rules, or of structures of a particular form, but is fundamentally based upon patterns of action in types of situations.[1]

POLITICAL BEHAVIOR AND SOCIAL SCIENCE

A principal reason for the emphasis upon political behavior research at this time is the use which can be made of new theories, concepts, and research techniques developed in other fields of social science. Although the study of political behavior is concerned with the actions of men and groups of men in politics, there are basic similarities between the actions of men and groups of men in politics and the actions of men and groups of men in other social institutions and situations. Consequently, many of the techniques and concepts developed, particularly by psychology, social psychology, and sociology, for the study of human behavior in general are applicable to the study of human behavior in politics.

As new techniques and concepts are evolved in related disciplines, they afford new opportunities to the student of political behavior to reappraise his own problems, theories, and methods. This does not mean that the procedures of other social sciences can be incorporated in their entirety into political behavior research. Many of the concerns of these other sciences are not relevant to the study of the political process. This is especially true of those which deal with experimental laboratory situations after the manner of the natural sciences. The interest of the student of political behavior is more in being systematic about political realities than in being systematic in experimental situations from which to reason by analogy about politics. But this does not alter the fact that political behavior research in political science can benefit immensely from a selective use of the theories, concepts, and techniques of the other social sciences. Nor are the benefits of such adaptation likely to accrue only to the study of politics. A genuinely behavioral science of politics is essential to the full development of general social science.

The political behavior approach requires important use of historical knowledge. As a matter of convenience and in the interest of completeness of data, research in current and immediately observable political behavior is necessarily emphasized. Some types of basic data may never be collected unless they are collected by contemporary observation. Over the years, data on past behavior patterns, preserved unsystematically and by chance, may become lost or difficult to interpret. Some kinds of data on political behavior, however, will not become available to researchers until some time after the behaviors occur. Moreover, an adequate description of current behavior may require an under-

[1] "Progress in Political Research," AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, Vol. 20, p. 7 (Feb., 1926).

standing of those continuities, social habits, and traditions which are reflected in contemporary attitudes and actions.

POLITICAL BEHAVIOR AND RESEARCH METHODS

The view that the actions and interactions of men and groups of men make up the process of governing requires primary focus upon systematic research and necessitates the use of empirical methods. Such interactions cannot be known except through observation of them or at least through other observations from which they can be more or less directly inferred. In other words, the units of the data must always be reducible to terms of the observed behavior and relationships of men.

In its use of the empirical method, political behavior research attempts to reduce its assumptions to explicit propositions and concepts and always to increase the generality of its explanations. The accomplishment of this aim requires a systematic statement of assumptions and hypotheses—as attempted in the research plans in this report—and a rigorous ordering of evidence. The general objective pre-supposes empiricism, but not crude and indiscriminate empiricism. Rather it requires a systematic statement of hypotheses and a rigorous ordering of evidence which will permit: (1) the effective identification of behavioral uniformities and the conditions under which they are to be expected; (2) ease of replication and validation in successive researches; and (3) an accretion of systematic knowledge of the institutions upon which attention is focused.

The political behavior approach thus has as its basic objectives the identification of the recurring uniformities of political activity and the development of generalizations about political action. To this end it requires the formulation of concepts that can be tested by successive researches and that will facilitate the building of a body of systematic knowledge about various phases of the political process. These aspirations do not necessarily imply that it is possible to reduce all political behavior to known causal relations and thereby achieve complete predictability and control in the political process. They do imply, however, that it is possible to achieve a deeper understanding of political institutions and processes by tracing, to a greater extent than has been done in the past, the uniformities of political behavior and the conditions under which they may be expected to appear.

Because the political behavior orientation implies a major emphasis upon systematic research and upon empirical method, it aims at being quantitative wherever possible. But it cannot be limited by such possibilities. The political scientist cannot escape the obligation and must not deny himself the opportunity to ask important questions, important in the description of the political process, simply because his answers must be more or less qualitative. He deals with the political institution and he must systematically reckon with that assignment, whether in qualitative or in quantitative terms.

THE RESEARCH PLANS

As the foregoing paragraphs have emphasized, this approach to research in

government seeks, through the analysis of the political process in behavioral terms, a political science of increasing system, validity, and generality of statement. This much can be indicated by means of verbal definition and explanation, but definitions are likely to emerge most effectively from operations.

What is meant by political behavior, therefore, will be shown more clearly by a statement of the things which a group of researchers in political behavior propose to do. Research plans are no substitute for research, but the proposals which make up the main body of this report are intended to indicate, in terms as concrete as circumstances will permit, the conception of research in political behavior that the report as a whole advocates.

Although these plans are broadly a group product, each of them represents a research project or program on which the principal author has done some work or hopes to embark at an early date. All of the plans follow a common format. They open with the statement of a problem which is discussed in terms both of public policy and of the theoretical needs of behavioral political science.

This statement is followed by an explanation of the research orientation of the proposed study—how it relates to the existing professional literature and the theoretical standpoint from which the problem has been analyzed, including the planner's basic assumptions concerning the segment of the political process included within the limits of the problem.

The central portion of each plan sets forth a series of leading propositions the validity of which the research is designed to test. These have been labeled "leading" propositions because, while they state the major concerns—the broad perimeter—of each plan, they by no means exhaust the subordinate questions which the research might be expected to answer. A well-designed piece of research must start from an explicit statement of the major questions to be answered. These, of course, may and, in fact, are likely to be altered as the research progresses, but if the central propositions at any stage are implicit or cloudy, the application or development of investigative techniques will be loose and the resulting research will be wasteful and inconclusive. Once the basic propositions have been stated, however, it is possible to elaborate them almost indefinitely.

At the risk of stressing the obvious, the reader should be warned that these propositions are hypotheses, not conclusions. In evaluating them, therefore, it is not relevant to ask whether they are correct. The planner, of course, has included them because he expects that he may find them to be at least partly so, but the important point in evaluating them is whether systematic knowledge of the political process will be advanced significantly either by their invalidation or by their partial or complete validation. The authors, in other words, do not claim that these statements are correct but merely that it is important to find out whether and to what extent they are correct.

The fourth section of each plan, "empirical requirements," stems directly from the propositions. Once the latter have been specified—a task involving the exhausting labor of repeated refining and revising of concepts—description of the data necessary to test them and of the appropriate techniques of data collection follows logically. Because of limitations of space and because these

plans are exploratory and illustrative rather than final, the empirical requirements are discussed in broad categories and without detailed explanation of how they are to be met.

Each plan closes with a section on research and policy implications which is intended to suggest the kinds of subsequent steps which might be taken following the validation or invalidation of the propositions. In a sense this section also returns to the first, in that it raises theoretical and policy problems for subsequent research.

Although these plans are set up as feasible units of research, most of them involve resources of a magnitude not readily available to many students. For this reason it is important to emphasize two points. In the first place, each of these plans can be broken down into smaller research undertakings capable of being done with fewer resources than the total plan would require. Some examples of such subdivisions are indicated in the plans. In the second place, the political behavior approach does not necessarily require large and expensive projects. Many highly important propositions concerning political behavior can be tested with no more expenditure of time and resources than is required by other types of competent research. Each of the projects in this report can, it is believed, be adapted to the realities of available money and personnel.

THE BIBLIOGRAPHY

In order to make the report as effective as possible in achieving its objective, explaining what is implied by research in political behavior, a bibliography has been included. This bibliography consists of a selected list of items which the members of the seminar regard as suggestive for those who are interested in pursuing the approach presented in the report.

The items in the bibliography are grouped under headings which refer to the major emphases in the approach—systematic research (topic I) and empirical techniques (topics II–VIII).

Perhaps it should be noted that the inclusion of any particular item does not mean that the members of the seminar agree with the author or that any item which is included is necessarily a model for others to follow. There are few such models in the literature. The comments following each item are intended both to indicate some of its limitations and to state why the item is expected to prove helpful.

IMPLICATIONS FOR GRADUATE TRAINING

The three plans presented here fall under the label "program research." Program research not only involves a carefully developed program at the outset, but usually involves a variety of research skills and cooperative work among a number of persons as well as, in many cases, substantial resources. These requirements have important implications for the policies of colleges and universities that encourage the research interests of their faculties, for the sponsorship of this kind of research, and especially for the kind of training given graduate students who wish to study political behavior. .

The approach obviously calls for supplementing and modifying the training which political scientists conventionally receive. On the other hand, it does not call for the elimination of such conventional training. Any new departure in an established discipline must build upon the accomplishments of the past. Although much of the existing literature of politics may be unsystematic and impressionistic, it is extensive and rich in insights. Without a command of the significant portions of that literature, behavioral research, no matter how systematic, is likely to be naïve and unproductive. Thus it seems likely that one of the handicaps to the development of systematic political research in the past has been the fact that many such attempts by persons not familiar with the unsystematized facts can be exposed as substantively naïve even when they may be methodologically sound.

At the same time, it is clear that graduate students must receive more intensive training than is normally the case at present in the basic requirements of political behavior research, namely, systematic formulation of assumptions and hypotheses, functional theory, and use of empirical research techniques. This does not imply a rambling eclecticism which asks the student interested in political behavior to become a master of the techniques and theories of all related disciplines. The essential training must be in terms of significant problems in political behavior, and not in general techniques as such or in theory unrelated to empirically researchable questions.

PARTY AND ADMINISTRATIVE RESPONSIBILITY: COUNCIL-MANAGER GOVERNMENT

The contribution of city manager government to Janesville has been political as well as administrative. The business and professional men who were the city's civic leaders were not inclined by tradition to give their time to continuous political leadership. They wanted a better government, but, as far as this group was concerned, it had to be a lazy man's government. The mayor, councilmen, and board members had to do the work under the aldermanic system, but under the city manager plan the civic leaders could get their honest and efficient government without attending personally to the irksome details of municipal procedure and administration, or to the uncongenial work of active political representation. They could let the manager be a public leader and manage the departments, and yet they could retain the right of intervening, or even discharging the manager, if necessary.[1]

THE PROBLEM

As the manager plan steadily spreads throughout the United States (some eleven hundred places now have it, and one or more additional adoptions a week are reported), such generalizations as those quoted above are made concerning its political and administrative effects, usually without any supporting evidence. What type of persons were these business and professional men who were the civic leaders? How did they attain this leadership? How did they view their own leadership role? Did they exert this leadership through an informal group or

[1] Harold A. Stone, Don K. Price, and Kathryn H. Stone, *City Manager Government in Nine Cities* (Chicago, 1940), p. 45.

clique or through a formal, organized association, club, or civic league? What tactics and strategies did they use to produce the change in the form of the city government? What values did they seek under the broad concept of "honest and efficient government"? When the civic leaders, disdaining "the uncongenial work of active political representation," select a surrogate, the manager, and allow him to be the administrative and political leader in public, what happens to the attitudes of the citizens toward government, toward the ruling groups, toward political parties? These and many other questions are unanswered and, in the present state of our information, unanswerable.

The steady spread of the manager plan may be having profound effects upon the American party system. Perhaps the leading policy question concerns what effects the adoption of the plan is having upon political participation, especially at the local level, and not only in voting but in the many other ways in which citizens may take part in the process of politics. By taking city patronage away from local units of the parties it may be undercutting the major parties at their base, and consequently city manager government may have national policy implications which have been insufficiently noticed in the literature. Local politicians commonly assert that the plan is "undemocratic," by which vague term they probably mean that they believe that the plan results in city government by the upper and upper-middle classes. Possibly local politicians overestimate the political importance of patronage, but some of them believe that the veterans' preference and merit systems which usually accompany the manager plan are used by the governing group or groups to purchase the support of veterans' and public employees' associations for the plan to the impairment of the local party organizations. If this damage does occur, it probably injures the Democratic Party more than the Republican.

In order to study these and many other administrative and political problems raised by the adoption of the manager plan, it is proposed that a number of cities be selected for examination. These cities should be numerous enough to allow for comparison of data. The cities should also be selected so as to obtain samples from various sections of the country and thus to permit some evaluation of the varying impacts of sectional political traditions. Don K. Price, for example, believes that party is an important factor in municipal politics (with some exceptions) only east of the Mississippi and north of the Ohio and Potomac. Other considerations affecting the choice of cities and plan of the study appear below. The campaign to change to the manager plan should be carefully observed; the reasons for its success or failure should be examined; and, in those cities in which the campaign succeeds, the effects of the change upon the political and social life of the city should be measured over a period of years.

RESEARCH ORIENTATION

Political scientists have, with some exceptions, tended to assume rather than to prove that the formal structure of government affects political behavior. It is assumed by certain writers, for instance, that federalism and the separation of powers encourage the development and activity of interest groups, atomize

the functioning of political parties, and frustrate the participation of citizens in the political process. It is further assumed that ballot forms, such as the non-partisan ballots commonly used in council-manager cities, have effects upon party responsibility, upon what types of candidates will offer themselves for public office, and upon the patterns of attitudes that citizens acquire toward government. Forms of representation, such as election at large, election by wards, and proportional representation, are strongly advocated and as strongly opposed on assumptions by both friends and foes unsupported by evidence that these forms affect the political process.

We do not know the answers to the questions posed in the opening paragraph of this plan. Nor do we know what concept citizens have of their role in the political process—how much they know of their city government; what they expect it to do for them; what they know and think of parties and interest groups.

We need to know more than we do about the concept of responsibility held by elected public officials and by administrators, such as city managers. What, for instance, accounts for the fact that in some cities members of the council have actively supported changing to the manager form, while in other cities the councilmen have as vigorously opposed the plan? From casual observation it has been noted that once the plan is established various patterns of interaction emerge; in one city, for example, the councilmen will regard the manager as the public leader and chief executive of the city whose removal would almost constitute an act of revolution; in another, he will be considered as a chief administrator carrying out broad public policies laid down by the council; in still another, he will be a glorified errand boy, expected to keep his name out of the papers and not to speak until spoken to. We do not know what factors of personality, what tradition, what concepts of responsibility produce these variations in behavior.

Previous studies of the manager plan have not been conceived in these terms. Some have been excellent examinations of the operation of government or of the structure of local administration, but most publications have been strongly hortatory. There is no up-to-date study of the city manager to show, for instance, what type of person with what training and experience is being recruited. Such a study needs to be made and could be made as a separable part of the research program here proposed. But what is more generally needed is a systematic study that will build upon the administrative studies that have been prepared. In other words, what is needed is a study that will conceive of local public administration in broader terms.

The group interaction approach should be particularly relevant to the answering of the questions that have been raised and to carrying forward the study of public administration. A city, considered functionally, is a system of political power in which groups and parties in a thickly settled area seek to attain their objectives through the existing class and social structure. The assumption of this research plan is that the systematic observation of individuals and groups over a period of time in sample cities should give answers to the

questions posed which would be more reliable than the off-the-cuff assertions that are commonplace.

LEADING PROPOSITIONS

In a study such as that here proposed, it is to be expected that some unanticipated propositions and conclusions would emerge from the data. With this reservation, however, certain propositions and related subpropositions may be advanced for testing in this proposed research.

1. *Geographic and demographic conditions encourage the spread of the manager plan in certain areas faster than in others.* It may be that the conditions of one-party or no-party government common in certain sections encourage adoption of the plan. Manager government appears to be related also to city size: the largest number (234) in 1949 was represented by cities with populations of 10,000 to 25,000, although the highest proportion (38.4 per cent) by cities with populations of 50,000 to 100,000. Only one city of over half a million has manager government at present. Those cities which are undergoing drastic population changes markedly different from national trends are more likely than stable cities to adopt it (the declining New England town as a sort of receivership, and the new or boom town as a device to facilitate orderly growth and development).

2. *The plan has depressing effects upon local party organizations wherever these exist at the time it is adopted.* The introduction of new forms of voting and representation (nonpartisan ballots, election at large, and proportional representation) often accompanies the manager plan. It may be advanced as a subproposition that the introduction of nonpartisan ballots or proportional representation will tend to weaken local parties, but election at large on party ballots will tend to keep party organizations alive.

3. *The manager plan consistently appeals to some types of interest groups; other groups are indifferent to it; and still others are hostile.* From the limited evidence available, it appears that business and professional groups find the weak-mayor or commission forms of city government less satisfactory to their interests than the strong-mayor or manager form, and frequently establish a peak association or some group alliance to produce a change in the form of the local government; if they succeed, this association becomes a sort of city party, whatever it may call itself, to defend the plan. Labor and lower-class organizations, on the other hand, appear usually to oppose the introduction of the manager plan and to be willing to join with one or both political parties to oppose manager government at all stages.

4. *The introduction of the manager plan has observable effects upon voting behavior and political participation.* Fewer votes are cast in most municipal elections than in state or national elections, although the proportions have not been worked out; probably the percentage of eligible voters who vote in municipal elections after the plan is in effect tends to decline further. Participation other than voting, such as attendance at council meetings, probably declines also. It may be that the more successful the manager plan is in removing from the area of civic controversy issues of municipal housekeeping, the lower falls citizen interest and participation in local politics.

5. *The form of a city government influences administrative behavior and affects the types of personalities and skills recruited for municipal executive positions.* The interaction pattern of a manager with his council is probably different from that of a mayor with his council. The pattern of communication between a manager and organized groups and parties is also likely to be different from that of an elected administrator in the same relationship. Managers, moreover, develop patterns of decision-making, characteristically taking certain types of problems to the council or to the civic groups associated with the council majority, but deciding other types of questions themselves. This pattern of decision-

making may vary with city size, i.e., the larger the city the fewer and broader the questions that the manager presents to the council or takes to the groups.

EMPIRICAL REQUIREMENTS

To test these propositions and to build up a body of data on the political effects of the manager plan, it would be desirable to select a sample of cities from the eight thousand in the United States. The sample should be chosen from various sections of the country so as to take into account the varying impacts of sectional political traditions. Some declining and some rapidly growing cities should be included. In addition, it would be desirable to choose cities operating under various types of government to observe what differential effects upon political behavior are associated with the forms. A range of sizes of cities would be necessary to determine whether various forms of government are found to be satisfactory or unsatisfactory to groups and parties in relationship to city size. Certain cities should be included in the sample where agitation for the manager plan is current, and these should be matched so far as possible with comparable cities where there is no agitation, for purposes of providing a control.

When the sample has been selected, the next step would be to study the political and social structure and history of each city—to find out, for example, how many people over the years registered, voted in primaries and elections, attended council meetings, and otherwise participated in the politics of the city. The interest groups in the city should be identified and their internal and external politics studied. Past and current information on the activities of the political parties should be collected. This historical material, while useful, is certain to be incomplete and to be colored by the recollections of such participants as can be interviewed. The comparison of cases carefully observed by comparable methods over the same time span is most likely to yield results approaching scientific accuracy.

The next step would be to interview a representative sample of the voters in each city to ascertain what they know about government, particularly about local government, and specifically about the government of their cities. It would be equally important to find out as much as possible about citizens' attitudes toward national politics, state and local politics, politicians, and the political process, including their conceptions of what it is and of their roles in it.

In those cities where there is agitation for the manager plan, data on the expectations of the political leaders concerning the effects that the manager plan will have upon party organizations should be collected. These data would be particularly important as a means of determining how well such leaders can forecast the political behavior of their fellow citizens and as a means of illuminating their conceptions of the role of party and group in community life.

The campaigns to change the forms of government should be observed as carefully as possible.

In those cities where the drive to obtain the manager plan succeeds, the process of choosing the managers should be studied as fully and minutely as possible to reveal which power groups interact in the decision-making process and

what values they display. Careful observation of the introduction of a non-resident—and most cities now pick non-resident managers—into the community might well give rise to hypotheses about the characteristics of leadership that we cannot anticipate at this point; it may, for instance, become possible to predict the success of managers who have certain personality features or certain educational backgrounds.

The new councils should also be studied to measure the development of interaction and morale in the political group, to observe intergroup interaction, to see how political attitudes of councilmen may be affected by modifications in the legal structure and in the development of new groups, and to note the patterns of behavior that emerge in the relation of council and manager.

After the plan has been in effect for a reasonable period, there should be a resurvey—a reinterview of a sample of the voters and a reinterview of the party, group, and public opinion leaders—to find what modifications, if any, took place in their attitudes, in their value systems, and in their political participation. Registration, voting, and effects of the new systems upon local parties should all be reëxamined at this point. The control cities should also be resurveyed as nearly as possible at the same points of time.

Ideally, the study should be extended over a ten-year period to give adequate opportunity to observe the effects of changes in formal structure upon political behavior. As a preliminary, to test methods of research, it might be desirable to run a pilot study of one city or of a pair of comparable cities.

RESEARCH AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

The research plan here proposed should, first, give us new data and new insights into the process of politics under conditions of structural change and in units of small enough size so that the research would be manageable. In the second place, the study should have value in the training of students of public administration and local government in graduate schools and in the research of faculty members.

Thousands of people are devoting major portions of their lives to promoting, opposing, or operating manager government; hundreds of thousands of dollars are being spent every year in the campaigns; millions are spent by manager cities. No really satisfactory evidence is available to indicate whether all of this time and money is really being spent effectively from the points of view of proponents and opponents of the plan or from that of the managers themselves. Since the manager plan is spreading, there must exist an impressionistic attitude that it is compatible with the values of popular government, but it may actually be impairing them. As the plan has spread, its administrative features have been adopted by some counties and special districts, and it has been proposed for state governments, and even for the government of the United States. Before it is carried to new levels of government, we ought to know what we are doing. The plan is an American invention—Richard S. Childs, its author, is still living—and like any other invention it should be subjected to periodic testing and examination.

But the process of testing and examination should accomplish even more than the observation of the effect of governmental forms on political behavior; it should give us much data we do not now have, and permit judgments we cannot now make, on the process of politics in the United States.

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN A METROPOLITAN DISTRICT: A STUDY OF GROUP INFLUENCE ON POLITICAL ACTIVITY

THE PROBLEM

Considerable research effort has been expended in the social sciences on voting behavior and political participation. Despite such efforts, there is general recognition that much more knowledge of the factors determining participation in the political process is required. No systematic theory has emerged, and no systematic understanding has been achieved. Research which goes beyond previous efforts, both in theoretical orientation and in empirical approach, is needed.

Whether one is alarmed at the decline in political interest and action, or is completely neutral concerning the "value" implications of the problem, does not matter. Rather, the lack of understanding and the inadequacy of our insights into the relationship of the individual to the political process should constitute the primary concern. The President and some members of Congress have recently indicated a desire to set up a commission of inquiry into participation. Without assuming a "values" position, social scientists can be of assistance by conducting research systematically into the variables related to the increase or decrease of citizen participation. This research plan suggests one possible approach. It seeks to utilize the backlog of research experience to date in setting forth basic hypotheses which should be explored in any study of political participation. Further, it does this for one segment of the nation's population only—those who reside in the large metropolitan districts (such as the Detroit metropolitan district).

The rationale for research into this problem is difficult to state in precise language. The objective of such research must in the last analysis be an understanding of the nature and distribution of public attitudes, of the interactional nature of political behavior on the citizen level, and of the conditions of public support of, and integration with, a going political system. Much can be learned about the characteristics of that system, particularly emerging trends in the popular basis of support for it, by intensive study of the dimensions of political participation.

Political participation is defined generally here not in the narrow sense of voting behavior only. The term is used with a broader implication, including many behavioral activities such as working in campaigns, discussing politics, contacting public officials, and so forth. This definition is similar to that of Paul Appleby in his *Policy and Administration*.[1] Viewed from this standpoint,

[1] (University, Alabama, 1949), p. 168.

it is not exclusively behavior on election day which should be investigated, but rather basic dimensions of the individual's relationship to the political system, whether in the setting of an approaching election or in the interlude between elections. And, further, "relationship" involves more than an isolated behavioral act, such as a vote, or a financial contribution to a political party, or a letter to a Congressman; its emphasis is upon the role and place of the individual in the political system, as demonstrated by the nature of his political activities. Political participation ranges from overt activity to mere interest (such as exposure to mass media). We are interested, thus, in that aspect of the continuum which deals with the more overt aspects of political participation. This research plan is, therefore, not primarily concerned with cataloguing the frequency of voting or of campaign contributions or of letter-writing as isolated phenomena. Such activities have meaning only as they help us understand the relationship which individual citizens have to the political process.

Political participation is only one phase or aspect of political behavior. There can be no doubt that leadership behavior, decision-making, administrative behavior, and the like, have a decided impact on individual behavior. No attempt is made here to analyze specifically these relationships although insights concerning them may emerge. The simple limitation must be admitted that all the factors possibly related to participation cannot be researched simultaneously. This plan focuses on what it considers to be the primary factors determining participation at the citizen level of the political process.

Previous studies of political participation, whether of voting behavior or of participation in broader terms, have yielded important clues for the systematic research contemplated. A complete summary of specific findings is not presented here. But it is apropos to point out that these exploratory studies have uncovered variables which should be included in any research plan, such as historical factors, including economic trends and party structural changes; formal institutional factors, including suffrage laws and ballot systems; demographic and socio-economic factors; geographic and sectional differentials; party propaganda and the media of communication. These insights can be helpful for our purposes.

In terms of content there have been three types of political participation studies: voting turnout studies, campaign surveys, and community case studies of participation between elections. The first has been restricted to analysis of the voting act, the second to the voting intention and campaign activity, the third to participation as incidental to a study of social structure. Some of these studies, it is true, conceive political participation, as defined here, in terms of the individual's relationship with and involvement in the political process. Some of them attempt to study aspects of political behavior over time, but no study attempts to make an intensive analysis of community social and political structure as it is related to participation. Often such studies are unfocused and do not operate out of any theoretical structure or employ any related series of hypotheses. They have resulted, therefore, in a sequence of isolated, generally unrelated, sometimes contradictory, studies. Such research is helpful in tabulat-

ing valuable data and in suggesting relationships to be explored. But if understanding of political participation is to be achieved, and if generalizations concerning political behavior are to emerge, much more intensive, systematic research is necessary.

RESEARCH ORIENTATION

This research plan rests on certain central propositions or assumptions concerning both the significance and determinants of political participation.

First, so far as significance is concerned, an underlying assumption posed here is that a decline in political participation has been occurring in the United States concomitant with the emergence of a "nonpartisan" set of attitudes toward the political process. Intermittently, it is true, political participation may increase, but this development is found only in specific public policy or leadership situations and does not generally represent an abiding integration of the public into the political system. In long-range terms the effect of such a trend has been the narrowing of the base of active and actual support for governmental and party leadership and policy.

There is considerable research evidence and support from previous studies which suggests the above assumption. The apparent long-term decline in voting participation since the turn of the century, and the high percentage of apathy and disinterest discovered in studies of non-voting, suggest it. There are additional data indicating that a decline in participation has taken place at the same time that such participation has become less party-oriented. The attitude surveys have revealed that a significant proportion of respondents prefer to be considered "independents," a term which appears to be socially acceptable. The phenomenon of split-voting as well as the fluctuations in party allegiance also support this proposition. The trend toward non-partisan elections in city government, which is still progressing, is additional documentation.

The second major assumption follows. A primary determinant of political participation today is the individual's identification and association with the group and social structure of our society. What is meant here is that the attitudes which accompany the individual's participation or non-participation can be related to the groups of which he is a member or with which he identifies himself. This is not to deny the existence of other factors. Lack of political information, the nature of political leadership, the media of communication, are some of the factors which no doubt are also related. But it is here assumed that a fruitful approach to the study of political participation, which may throw light on these other variables as well, is one which inquires into the group interaction pattern of the community.

Further, this assumption has an historical perspective, for it suggests that the dimensions of political participation in the past, as well as its decline, are linked to the changed conditions of the group structure of society. The increasing heterogeneity in the group composition of many communities, the proliferation of groups, changes in the class strata, are phenomena which may be related to the nature of participation. More importantly, the political role and function

of voluntary groups have been altered, whether for primary groups like the family or secondary groups like political interest groups. Considerable evidence from studies in voting behavior and sociology justifies this major focus for the inquiry into political participation.

What are the implications of such a conceptual orientation for research procedure? First, it means that the research must include specific communities and be related to the social structure and group composition of the community. It will be difficult to project the study on a nation-wide or state-wide basis. Since communities vary in their social structure, the study must include comparisons of participation in different types of communities. Case studies of individual communities will be helpful but will not permit the type of generalizations desired here. What will be specifically proposed and outlined here is one type of comparative community study involving a metropolitan district. Other comparative studies are required. But because there is increasing evidence that metropolitan areas are assuming a crucial role in our political system, and because they include communities of varying size which are adjacent and accessible for research purposes, the census-defined "metropolitan district" is suggested as a point of departure. It will permit an analysis of ecological factors in political relationships.

A second procedural implication concerns the types of data which become indispensable. These are of three basic types: (1) the kinds of political participation activities of the individual—voting, party work, etc.; (2) the subjective meaning of such participation—the individual's perceptions, attitudes, motivations, etc.; and (3) the group and party structure of the community as related to such participation. In securing these data different techniques will have to be employed, as will be described in a following section. However collected, such data must relate the pure description of participation activities to the personal frame of reference and the social context.

A third implication of the central assumption concerns the types of participation behavior patterns which such data will reveal in these communities. Individuals will vary in terms of the group context of their political participation, that is, the types of groups with which they have membership affiliations or with which they identify themselves. Participation will be related to identification with manifestly political and manifestly non-political groups. Within each of these two main categories again are membership groups and non-membership groups. Further, motivational patterns within this group context will be important. Political participation for some individuals may be related to status drives, for others to claims on the political system including "bread and butter" motivations, and for still others to stereotyped perceptions of role. Similarly, group memberships will be related to the levels of participation to which individuals direct their political activity, whether local, county, state, or national. The important consideration here is that these distinctions, however conceived, will inevitably be interrelated in several complex patterns. For our purposes they need to be basically related to the social and political structure of the community.

A fourth and final implication is that the relationship between group association and participation must be studied over time, so that changes in group identification and affiliation can be measured in a community in relation to political participation, which is itself in flux. Such trend-analysis is basic for generalizations of the order desired here.

It should be apparent that certain crucial assumptions are being made. They are: that group influence is determining; that political participation should be studied in specific communities, and in the context of the total community social situation; that personal perceptions and frames of reference will be associated with definite patterns of political participation; that participation will vary as individual-group interaction patterns vary; that the pattern of participation will vary for communities in terms of their social structure. It is firmly believed that if understanding is to be achieved, political participation must be studied in relation to the dynamics of the group process as well as the dynamics of the political process.

LEADING PROPOSITIONS

In submitting the following series of hypotheses it is suggested that they be considered as interrelated and interacting. They are divided into three categories for the sake of convenience. The types of participation patterns outlined should be conceived as falling within each of these major categories of hypotheses. This series, furthermore, is merely suggestive and is not to be construed as complete in itself. All of the hypotheses will no doubt be defined in terms of the specific data. The major objective here is to spell out the variations of our central assumption that a primary determinant of political participation is the individual's identification and association with the group structure of the community.

I. The Individual's Orientation

General Assumption: Differentials in political participation can be related to demographic, socio-economic, ethnic, and religious characteristics; their analytic value is relevant to the degree that they reveal motivational and social structural uniformities.

Primary Groups:

1. Political participation is associated with strong integration of the individual into primary groups which:
   1) place a positive value on the political behavior, and
   2) are realistically related to the political organization of the neighborhood (e.g., personal acquaintance with active party workers).
   a. Deviants who might fulfill neither 1) nor 2) may participate for articulated ideological "reasons."
2. To the extent that the family has political values and orientations it is a prime conditioner of the political participation of its members. One of the political functions of the family is to create a tendency toward political homogeneity.
   a. Women adjust to their husbands' political orientation to the degree that there is strong cohesion and male dominance.
   b. Nevertheless, where children have strong peer group relations which condition their social values, in conflict with family values, they are more likely to secure their political values from the peer groups, mass media, etc., than from their parents.

Perceptions, Attitudes, Personal Frames of Reference:

1. Political participation is associated with attitudes and perceptions in which the individual accepts:
   1) the worthwhileness of participation
   2) a sense of obligation and responsibility, which contributes derivatively
   3) a sense of self-esteem.
   a. Such attitudes and perceptions are more frequently the function of manifestly political groups with which the individual identifies than they are of manifestly non-political groups, provided that the individual is aware of the political orientation of such groups.
   b. Some political participation without these attitudes is possible but likely to be an isolated act.
2. Political participation is hindered where the individual perceives that the social structure prevents social change by political means available to him; in some cases perceptions of extreme obstruction to political action by the social structure will lead individuals to participate, but such participation tends to be unstable and erratic.
3. Individuals who display strong local community identifications are likely to participate politically to a higher degree than those who have low or no local community identification.
   3a. Individuals with extreme local community identifications are likely to overcommit themselves to participate exclusively on the local level.

II. Party Organization

1. The pattern of political participation will increase with the degree of competition and vitality (actuality of effective existence) of the two-party organization in the community.
   a. In the absence of manifestly political groups of a non-party nature, individuals in one-party communities who participate will do so on the state, national, or international levels.
2. Communities in which party organization is broad in its membership base[2] and inclusive in its group composition will be characterized by a higher and more variated political participation than a party organization which is narrow and limited.
   a. The reverse of 2) may occur, and party organizations with a narrow membership base may be related to high participation, but in such communities there is strong identification with other politically oriented groups, the state and national party, or ethnic aggregates.
3. To the extent that community leadership of a nonpolitical variety (e.g., religious groups, fraternal groups, etc.) assumes an active role in the functioning of the local party organization, it will produce an increase in rank-and-file political participation.
4. Political participation increases to the degree that the local party organization and personnel is actually consulted by and perceives itself as linked with county, state, and national party organization.
5. Party organizations which perform a continuing service and welfare function for their partisan constituents will reflect a higher level of participation than those which perform merely routine political functions (nominating, running campaigns, etc.).
6. Political participation on the part of party workers increases where the party operates not only as a political mechanism but also as a focal point of social and group activities; the same is true on the part of the electorate except where the party over-extends the range of its social activities.

[2] Field research is necessary to develop explicit criteria of party membership in the metropolitan district under investigation.

III. Community Structure

1. Communities which have a high percentage of transient population will reveal a lower level of participation than those which have a high percentage of stable population. ("Transient" in this sense merely includes those who do not meet legal residence requirements for voting.)
   a. Within a community political participation will increase with residential stability.
   b. Transients who participate are more likely to do so in relation to state, national and international levels than to the local levels.
2. In general, for most communities political participation is proportionately concentrated in the upper middle-class; aside from this, communities where there is a balance between lower and middle classes will have a higher participation than those where there is a predominance of one class.
3. Opinion leaders fall into two classes: personal (informal) and formal. The informal opinion leaders are characterized by a tendency to similarity of class and ethnicity with the groups which they influence. This is less likely to be the case in formal opinion leadership. As far as formal opinion leadership is concerned, for the upper social and economic classes similarity of class and ethnicity is more important from the standpoint of political influence than for the lower social and economic classes.
4. Communities with competitive communication media will have higher political participation than those communities where the media are noncompetitive.

EMPIRICAL REQUIREMENTS

Most studies of political participation have relied on the survey technique or the analysis of voting statistics. The methodology of this study involves combining the survey techniques and the compilation of statistics with more direct observation of political participation *per se*. In addition, it is believed that the use of content analysis and certain documentary data will be helpful.

The metropolitan district has been selected as the population and area to be studied. As indicated earlier, it is felt that this approach is both significant and manageable. Evidence indicates that in the past thirty years there has occurred a considerable change in the extent and nature of political participation. Further, the district as defined in census terms includes within it a wide variety of community types as well as a thoroughly differentiated group structure. A breakdown of the Detroit metropolitan district may serve as an illustration. According to the 1940 census, it had within its borders the following: the city of Detroit, four cities in the population class 50,000–70,000 (Dearborn, Hamtramck, Highland Park, Pontiac), eight cities in the population class 10,000–30,000, twenty cities in the population class 1,000–10,000, ten cities in the population class below 1,000, six townships over 10,000 in population, and sixteen townships under 10,000 in population. It would be possible to select units for analysis not only within the city of Detroit itself, but also within each of the different population classes. The sample to be selected for study would have to be carefully determined. Various criteria could be used in order to make this selection, among them being population size, conditions of party organization, nature of local city or township government, ethnic and class characteristics, geographical distance, and ecological relationship to Detroit.

The same considerations would hold if a metropolitan district were not used. If the study is to be systematic, we cannot rely on a haphazard selection of communities.

The types of data to be collected can be related to the hypotheses already advanced. In the first place, it is obvious that certain basic descriptive data will have to be collected on the personal orientation of political participation. These will include, firstly, data on what might be called "political and social status," i.e., demographic, religious, ethnic, socio-economic, party preference, and voting; secondly, data on political activities, i.e., membership in politically oriented groups, relationship to the party organization, campaign activities, financial contributions, attention to political issues, readership level, attempts to contact public officials, attendance at party rallies, forum discussions, and discussion of politics with friends; thirdly, some measure of political information about the basic facts of local, state, and national governments; finally, something concerning the individual's frame of political reference. (What are his perceptions, motivations, and attitudes towards the political process? How does the individual hope to communicate his expectations and demands to government? What is his own perceived democratic role? With what groups does he identify himself?) Some of these data can be collected from documentary sources, but heavy reliance must be placed on the survey technique.

A second major body of data concerns the party system in the community. The informal structure (the informal holders of power and decision-makers) as well as the formal and legal structure of the party must be known. The relationship of the local party to the state and national machines is also relevant. Further, we need to know something about the action pattern of the party in the community, as well as about the internal process of the party, the leadership-followership relationships, the functional role of the party in local government, and the like. In sum, we need to know who are the leaders, how decisions are made and by whom, and what is the strategy for the party. Much of these data can be secured only from participant observation, although documentary data can be very helpful also in constructing the picture of the local party as an interaction phenomenon.

The third major body of data concerns the community structure. The class strata, ethnic composition, and population trends are basic data. But it is also necessary to secure a picture of the formal groups in the community, of their relationship to their memberships, and of their interaction with each other as well as with the party organization and the governmental system. Analysis of the governmental leadership group (including, for example, surveys of leadership attitudes), of the nature of the city administration, and of the city council, is necessary in order to relate these to data on the community, as well as to data on perceptions and the party organization. Finally, the local communication system must be studied to learn something about ownership, policy, extent of political orientation, communication content (through the use of content analysis), readership and listenership. Such data must be secured from documentary sources and from participant observation, as well as from the sample survey.

The following table suggests the types of data and categories of analysis which are involved in any such study of the dynamics of political participation:

	Documentary	*Participant Observation*	*Surveys*	*Content Analysis*
The Individual				
Personal status data	Census data		Socio-economic data	
Participation data	Voting, etc.	Party and group activities	All types of data	
Perceptions, attitudes, etc.			Depth interviewing	
The Party Organization				
Internal process	Party proceedings	Decision-making; leader-follower relations, etc.		Party newspaper, etc.
External role	City council proceedings, votes	Party and group interaction	Leadership data	Party propaganda
Community Structure				
Population data	Census data			
Group structure	Membership, policy	Internal processes		
Communication media	Ownership, system data, etc.	Informal, communication lines	Readership, listenership, etc.	Content of mass media
Local government	Type of charter, council actions, election system	Relation to group, party, and constituency		

RESEARCH AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

The first value of the above research plan is its specific applicability. It makes possible empirical investigation on a program research basis, which would be conceived as embracing many communities, as well as individual research into political participation in a single community. Research designed in these terms is aimed at securing a cumulated body of observed relationships concerning the above variables which will eventually permit generalizations in conditional terms about the factors related to political participation. Coordination of effort is thus possible to a degree not attainable in research into voting participation which employs no consistent conceptual or methodological approach.

The knowledge acquired from such research about these observed relationships might have an important bearing on subsequent research into the political process. As stated previously, involved in the above plan are certain postulates as to the relevance to political participation of certain major factors such as social class, opinion leadership, party organization, and public perceptions. If demonstrated as relevant, these concepts can be utilized for research in other aspects of the political process. They may be employed for intensive analysis of political participation as related to other governmental levels, in rural areas as well as urban, abroad as well as in the United States.

What is proposed here is a combination of the traditional political science approach to the study of its problems, some modifications of traditional methodology, and the newer techniques of empirical analysis, such as attitude surveys and content analysis. Joint employment of these techniques is probably difficult to attain but should be attempted because of its potential importance for future research.

Although we are primarily interested in comprehending the nature of political participation and the factors related to it, the public policy implications are also worthy of consideration. Today there is increasing alarm among some governmental leaders, as well as students of politics, over the decline in participation. At the present time this alarm may be premature, pending more precise appraisal of the basic factors involved. But, above all, any proposals for change which are designed to induce greater participation are premature. Until we know more about what aspects of the party system and social structure are involved, we cannot base proposals for change on much more than intuition. Therefore, reforms aimed at improving participation can have little basis until the root-conditions of political participation are explored systematically. If policy decisions apropos of participation are to be made, whether by government or party or researchers, they should be grounded just as much in sound empirical research as in sound theoretical argument.

THE ROLES OF CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS: NATIONAL PARTY VS. CONSTITUENCY

THE PROBLEM

Much current political discussion, both academic and popular, is concerned with alleged defects in the American party system and with the pursuit of "responsible party government." Much of this concern is based upon the extensive body of literature on American politics which indicates that our parties as national institutions do not display the kind of disciplined unity which characterizes the British parties. Few critics in this country seriously propose the possibility of superimposing upon the United States a system which is endemic to the United Kingdom. If, however, critics seriously contemplate the development of a party system which is more responsible but which conforms to the peculiarities of the American political setting, it seems certain that much more precise knowledge is needed than is now available on the constituent elements of what we call our national parties. To what extent do we have anything that can be called "national parties"? Within what limits? Under what conditions?

In the criticism of American parties, the functioning of the party in Congress has been a major focus. The party in the national legislature is viewed as a principal obstacle to the development of a "responsible party system." This view is not lacking in supporting evidence. It is obvious that the relations between the President and the "members" of his "party" in the Congress are unstable. It is also apparent that the preferences of what is presumed to be the

"national party" are often subordinated to the parochial demands of faction, section, interest group, and constituency.

But we need to know more. To speak meaningfully about the need for party government, to anticipate the consequences of various proposed changes (i.e., repeal of the Hatch Acts, alteration of the electoral college system, institution of legislative-executive councils, restriction of freedom of debate in the Senate, abolition of the seniority rule, modification of the power of the House Rules Committee) we must determine more precisely what "the national party" is and the nature of the role played by the key elements in "the national party."

Central among these key elements and one deserving early investigation is the leadership of the Congress. It can be assumed that the two houses of the national legislature have a leadership structure of some sort. Such bodies could not function at all without some such structure. To what degree is it stable? To what extent is the formal leadership group identical with the actual leadership? In what respects can the behavior of formal leaders be interpreted as an aspect of "national party leadership"? Is there a "national party" element in the demands upon such leaders? What happens, if anything, to the behavior of a legislator when he moves into one of these positions? What differences appear in the behavior of majority leaders and minority leaders, in that of leaders of the Senate and leaders of the House? What difference does it make if the party is "in control" in the White House and in the Supreme Court? What trends, if any, have taken place in these and similar patterns?

RESEARCH ORIENTATION

The proposed study of the behavior of legislative leaders as party leaders would build upon studies of legislative behavior running back half a century to the pioneering investigations of Lowell, but it would be more directly concerned with leadership. Lowell was exclusively interested in knowing the incidence of voting along party lines. In fact, he was at some pains to show that such voting was not as "partisan" as the critics of that day claimed. Although Rice's valuable studies in the 1920's developed refined techniques for studying the relation between party and legislative voting, they were chiefly concerned with the usefulness of legislative votes as an index of the attitudes of constituents.[1] He, and later Beyle,[2] started from an aggregate of individual legislators and attempted to arrive at the dimensions and cohesion of blocs of legislators. They were not interested in exploring the proposition that the formal leadership structure could provide at least a rough explanation of the actual behavior patterns in the legislature.

The present plan attempts to get at some of the voting patterns in Congress by stating this assumption explicitly. It attempts to get at the proposition that if there is anything approximating "national party" in the Congress, it should show in the behavior of the formal legislative leaders.

[1] Stuart A. Rice, *Quantitative Methods in Politics* (New York, 1928).

[2] Herman C. Beyle, *Identification and Analysis of Attribute-Cluster-Blocs* (Chicago, 1931).

A legislator may appropriately be viewed, in fairly inclusive behavioral terms, as an affiliate of a variety of groups. In some instances he may be a formal, interacting member; in others he may merely identify with what he conceives to be the values and expectations (norms) of the group; in still others he may identify with symbols, values, and purposes which are widely shared in the society but which are not, at the time of observation, represented by organized groups but merely by what we may call potential groups. His roles in connection with all these groups impose upon him requirements of varying intensity, and they may be in varying degrees incompatible. The member of Congress can be said to "belong" (in one or more of the senses listed above) to such groups as the following:

1. One or more organized interest groups or political interest groups significant in (though not necessarily limited to) his constituency—veterans' organization, business association, industry, occupation, labor union, church, etc.
2. A political organization in (but not necessarily limited to) his constituency. This may be a local or state-wide "machine" of which he is a more or less important part, a personal or local faction of which he may be either a leader or in some sense an agent, or some variant of these.
3. A series of groups in the legislature including: the Congress, the House or Senate, the party group in the Congress or the separate houses, one or more legislative committees, one or more voting "blocs."
4. In some sense a national party, including all those elected officials whose group affiliations impinge on his in such fashion that his ability to maintain or improve his political status in some measure depends upon (or is conceived by him as depending upon) their control of certain public positions. Included here would be the President and/or several presidential aspirants, the national party committee, some fellow legislators, a governor and/or several gubernatorial aspirants, etc.
5. The government of the United States and "potential groups," which may not be represented by organized groups but which are composed of individuals who identify with symbols in the society like the Founding Fathers, the Bill of Rights, and American unity.

This list is representative rather than exhaustive. Other groups, such as a family (not necessarily his own) or a friendship group may in various circumstances be relevant or dominant in his behavior as a legislator, but those listed are likely to be most important over time.

A Congressman's behavior may be conceived of as a resultant of the claims operating upon him through his affiliations with these organized and potential groups. This does not mean, of course, that the claims necessarily are consciously exerted or consciously acceded to, even in the case of organized groups. Most legislators and most observers would repudiate any such imputation with some such statement as "the legislator often (or always) votes his conscience or votes as he thinks best." All that is meant here is that in behavioral terms his "conscience" or his "best" may be viewed as a product of his past and present identification with the attitudes of various organized and potential groups. In Rice's words, "there is a constant 'strain' in the legislator's behavior toward consistency with the *mores* of his various groups."[3]

These group affiliations, however, and the legislator's various roles in con-

[3] Rice, *op. cit.*, p. 194.

nection with them are certain to be in varying degrees conflicting or incompatible. Typically, we think of the Congressman as exposed to conflicting demands from parochial sources, such as interest groups and constituency organizations, and from more inclusive groups or symbols, such as the "national party" or the "national interest." The common impression, furthermore, is that in such circumstances the parochial demands are likely to be dominant.

The formally designated legislative leader, *to the extent that his role has significance for the national party*, is likely to experience such conflicts in accentuated degree. He presumably experiences the same demands as the rank-and-file Congressman, but in addition his leadership role, *if meaningful*, imposes upon him increased demands of a non-parochial character. He is likely to belong to some specialized sub-groups, such as the party leaders in his chamber, the chamber leaders of both parties, the party and two-party leadership of the Congress, and, if the President is of his party, a presidential-congressional group such as the President and the "Big Four."

In the proposed investigation it will be helpful to distinguish two types of formal leaders in the legislature: (1) the "elective" leaders, including principally the Speaker of the House, the President *pro tempore* of the Senate, the floor leaders, and the whips, but possibly extending to all those party officials in the legislature who are chosen by the members of the party conference or caucus (the Vice President might also be included for certain purposes); (2) the "seniority" leaders, including both chairmen and ranking minority members of standing committees. (In cases where the same man simultaneously held positions of both types, his behavior would be analyzed under the "elective" category.)

In addition, two general concepts are proposed as criteria for determining the differences between leadership and rank-and-file behavior, for identifying deviates from the leadership pattern, if any, and for other comparisons. These are party orthodoxy and Administration loyalty. The former refers to the frequency with which a legislator votes with a majority of his party in the chamber on roll calls on which a majority of Republicans is opposed by a majority of Democrats. The latter refers to the frequency with which a legislator votes in support of policies advocated by an Administration or a President of the same party.

LEADING PROPOSITIONS

The following propositions may be summarized briefly in the following terms: The central proposition, or hypothesis, is that, because of differences in their group affiliations and roles, the behavior of formal legislative leaders differs significantly from that of the rank and file of the same party. Explanations of the degree to which this is the case, that is, statements of some of the conditions affecting the behavior of high deviants or high conformists among the leaders, are suggested by a second set of representative (but certainly not exhaustive) propositions. Finally, some of the expected consequences of these differences in role are stated in a third set of propositions. Over time, of course, influences of the latter sort are assumed to affect the others either by reinforcing or by weakening them.

1. The voting behavior of formal leaders of the Congress is significantly different from that of the rank and file; they show greater Administration loyalty and they tend also to show greater party orthodoxy as a consequence of their leadership roles. That is, they tend to play a national party role rather than a constituency role. For the same reasons, as a group they will show a higher degree of cohesion than the rank and file. To the extent that this greater cohesion exists and to the extent that majorities among the rank and file support the formal leaders, the *formal* leadership of the Congress tends to coincide with the *actual*.
   a. There has been an increasing trend in this direction in recent decades.
   b. "Elective" leaders will show greater party orthodoxy and Administration loyalty than will "seniority" leaders or the rank and file.
2. Among the significant determinants of the degree of "national party" behavior by formal legislative leaders are:
   a. Variations in leaders' career lines before entering the Congress. (For example, party orthodoxy and Administration loyalty will be directly correlated with the leader's socio-economic status and the degree of upward mobility he has displayed. They will be inversely correlated with his length of residence in his constituency and the length of his apprenticeship in state and local politics, allowance being made in both cases for the norms characteristic of the section in which his constituency lies.)
   b. Variations in leaders' positions in the legislative process. (For example, party orthodoxy and Administration loyalty will increase with the duration of leaders', especially "elective" leaders', occupancy of those roles. Prior to entrance upon such roles, "elective" leaders will have shown higher party orthodoxy than the remainder of the rank and file. Those "elective" leaders with relatively low party orthodoxy will be unusually skilled in parliamentary tactics. Congressional leaders of a party which "controls" the White House but has become a minority in Congress will show high party orthodoxy but relatively low Administration loyalty. Differences in party orthodoxy between "elective" and "seniority" leaders will be greater within the majority than within the minority party. Party orthodoxy and Administration loyalty of Administration leaders will vary directly with the President's skills and attitudes as a policy maker. Because of differences in the constitutional positions of Senators and Representatives, the Senate leaders will show lower party orthodoxy and higher Administration loyalty than House leaders. But the greater formal powers of House leaders will be reflected by higher party orthodoxy and lower Administration loyalty among them than among Senate leaders.)
   c. Variations in leaders' constituencies and their roles in their constituencies. (For example, party orthodoxy and Administration loyalty will vary directly with the size of the leader's personal following in the constituency, with the "closeness" of the constituency vote, and with the rapidity of population growth in the constituency. They will vary inversely with the "flexibility" (after Bean) of the constituency, with the strength of one-party domination, with the frequency of sectional votes in the Congress, and with the constituency's homogeneity in class terms.)
   d. Variations in leaders' roles in organized interest groups. (For example, party orthodoxy and Administration loyalty will vary directly with the number and diversity and inversely with the intimacy of the leader's group affiliations.)
3. Among the consequences of the kind of "national party" role played by legislative leaders will be ones affecting his role in:
   a. The legislative group. (For example, the party orthodoxy of both "elective" and "seniority" leaders will tend to increase after their assumption of leadership. "Elective" leaders who depart from an orthodox party position or from Administration loyalty will take particular pains to "explain" such deviation. "Seniority"

leaders whose party orthodoxy is high will be more likely to secure unanimity on their committees and acceptance of committee recommendations by the chamber without amendment, allowance, of course, being made for differences in the procedure of the two houses of the Congress.)

b. The constituency. (For example, increasingly as their tenure of leadership positions increases, leaders—especially "elective" leaders—will be better known in their constituencies than will the rank and file in theirs, constituents' perceptions of them will change, the volume and character of their mail will alter; their "service" activities—errands in executive agencies, concern with "pork" appropriations, extension of remarks in the *Record*, etc.—will decrease; they will spend less time and effort in campaigning in their constituencies; their campaign speeches will tend to emphasize inclusive rather than local symbols; they will be less likely to meet opposition in primaries and general elections—in terms of the normal patterns in their areas—but campaign attacks on them will attempt to exploit their detachment from constituency demands.)

c. The organized interest groups. (For example, as their tenure of leadership positions lengthens, leaders—especially "elective" leaders—will be subject to more appeals, not necessarily effective, from a wider variety of interest groups, but they will tend to restrict the number of their formal group affiliations and will reduce the frequency of their participation in the remainder; they will be less likely to occupy formal positions of prominence in organized interest groups and will be less readily available for "social" functions; they will be likely to appear before a greater variety of interest groups, but their speeches will be more likely to stress inclusive, though not necessarily uncontroversial, symbols.)

EMPIRICAL REQUIREMENTS

The data required for testing these propositions will have to be collected through a variety of research techniques, including the collection of documentary facts, intensive interviews and observation, sample surveys in constituencies, content analyses, and the judgments of panels of "expert" observers. Just as the propositions outlined above are representative rather than exhaustive, so the following inventory of empirical requirements and techniques does not cover all contingencies.

The table indicates in condensed form the empirical requirements, classified by categories of propositions and by types of research technique.

The data on party orthodoxy and Administration loyalty will be derived from analyses of roll calls as recorded in the *Congressional Record* or, for recent years, the *Congressional Quarterly Almanac*. Comparisons between leaders and rank-and-file legislators and comparisons among types of leaders will be made by means of indexes such as those developed by Rice. To get enough cases of leaders and to get adequate data on trends, this analysis eventually would have to cover a period of at least twenty-five years, perhaps on a sampling basis. All roll calls, or all within the sample sessions, will be included initially, excepting only those quorum calls unmistakably bearing no relation to floor strategy and possibly unanimous votes. Tabulating machine equipment will be required.

Certain problems will be encountered in the use of roll calls. They must be employed with considerable caution, of course, since they are at best crude data—many of the most significant votes not being ones on which the positions of individual legislators are recorded and many of the most significant actions

Propositions	*Documentary Analysis*	*Intensive Interviews and Observations*	*Sample Surveys*	*Content Analysis*	*Expert Panels*
1. Trends in Leadership	Roll calls, presidential press conferences, etc.				Administration measures
2. Determinants of deviation and conformity					
a. Career lines	Biographical data	Biographical data			
b. Position in legislative process	Biographical data				Parliamentary skills, presidential skills
c. Constituency	Election records; census data	Party organization			
d. Interest groups	Group affiliations, group records	Group affiliations			
3. Consequences for role in:					
a. Legislative group	Committee hearings and reports, floor debates			Leaders' speeches	
b. Constituency	Floor debates, press (campaign tactics), election records, campaign finance	"Service" activities, campaign tactics	Voters' knowledge and perceptions	Leaders' mail, leaders' speeches on floor and in campaigns	
c. Interest groups	Group affiliations, committee hearings, group records	Group affiliations and participation		Leaders' speeches to groups	

taking place in committees rather than on the floor. It may be desirable to classify the roll calls in various ways in order to avoid some pitfalls. For example, while those present and voting might be the base for most calculations, it will be desirable to analyze pairs and patterned absences in order to broaden the base of observation. Also, it may be useful to divide roll calls according to periods within sessions, since the patterns may be different in the late-session rush and in the more leisurely opening days.

The identification of Administration measures can be done in part through the analysis of press reports and other documents, but in order to minimize subjectivity it may be useful to ask a panel of expert observers—press correspondents, legislators, and professional students of politics—to designate such bills, a technique relatively little used in political science.

Testing of the propositions dealing with the conditions affecting the behavior of deviant and highly conformist leaders will have to rely primarily on contemporary observation of present leaders and their constituencies. Although documentary data from the past can be brought to bear on some of the proposi-

tions, much of the data required will not be available in such form. Intensive interviews with, and direct observation of, leaders and their associates will be necessary for much of the data on career lines, for data on party and group organization and activity, and even for data on elections in many instances. For arriving at an acceptable judgment on the matters of leaders' parliamentary skills and Presidents' skills and attitudes, the expert panel discussed in the preceding paragraph would be a valuable, if not essential, device.

A most important problem will be that of allowing for variations in regional norms with respect to such matters as length of residence in the constituency (ten years may be normal in New York, while three generations may be normal in South Carolina), length and nature of apprenticeship in state or local politics, etc. Similarly, in dealing with comparisons between House and Senate leaders, allowance will have to be made for differences in the procedures and traditions of the two bodies. Such factors as these will have to be controlled in all comparisons.

The requirement of contemporary observation is even more strongly indicated in connection with propositions concerning the consequences of the types of roles played by formal legislative leaders. Intensive interviews with leaders and other informants will be required for data on leaders' "service" activities, on campaign tactics, and on group participation. Sample opinion surveys will have to be made in leaders' constituencies and in a representative sample of rank-and-file constituencies on voters' information about leaders and rank-and-file legislators and on changes in voters' perceptions of the various legislative roles. Finally, it will be necessary to employ techniques of content analysis in connection with leaders' mail and their speeches on the floor, in campaigns, and before organized interest groups.

Although this plan is a large one if taken *in toto*, it can be broken down into segments which would be appropriate for more limited investigations. For example, the propositions concerning differences among types of leaders and between leaders and rank-and-file (though not the trends on this score) can be tested in limited compass for individual sessions of the Congress. Once such identifications have been made, intensive case studies of individual leaders, both deviants and high conformists, can be carried on, although care should be taken that these will be so set up as to be comparable to one another. Similarly, case studies of individual leaders which focus upon various of the possible consequences of a particular leadership role can be done. These also should be designed so that they can be compared effectively.

RESEARCH AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

This investigation will permit generalizations concerning the extent to which formal legislative leaders provide a "national party" leadership in the Congress and in each house of the Congress, the conditions under which this occurs, the recent trends, and some of the consequences of variations in such leadership. It should further permit generalization concerning the degree of cohesion and the conditions affecting the cohesion of the formal leader group or of subgroups within it.

Examination of the differences among formal leaders should permit a more nearly adequate statement of the conditions significantly affecting the degree to which leaders succeed in resolving the conflicts between their national roles (legislative and party) and their constituency roles. If these variables, or some of them, can be identified, it should then be possible to follow changes in these through time and to estimate from them changes in the character of Congressional leadership and the implications of the selection of various types of men as future legislative leaders. It would also be desirable and possible to explore the personality factors—in terms of the concepts of dynamic psychology—associated with success or failure in role reconciliation.

Propositions of this sort, adequately validated, would constitute a step forward in the behavioral definition of the legislative segment of the national party and of its constituent elements. Such definition could then be extended and supplemented by similar studies of party leadership roles associated with the national chairman, the national committee and staff, the activities in connection with the quadrennial nominating conventions, and the like.

On the basis of this and of supplementary studies we might be prepared to say something concerning the probabilities that changes in specified legislative conditions, including formal organizational arrangements, would contribute to or obstruct the development of national party organizations of a more disciplined and responsible character. The probable consequences of various proposals—such as those for legislative-executive councils, for the appearance of Cabinet members on the floor of the Congress, for the abolition of the seniority rule, for alteration of the powers of the House Rules Committee, and the like—could be estimated with far greater accuracy than at present. Knowing more about the character of existing national party leadership and about the variables associated with such leadership, in and out of the legislature, we should be able more confidently to predict the effects upon this leadership from changes in supporting institutionalized relationships.

If the investigation were to reveal no significant differences between the behavior of formal leaders—collectively or individually, "elective" or "seniority" —and the rank and file of legislators, it would then be necessary to resume the search for an *informal* leadership structure of the Congress (or of either house); it would, further, be necessary to look elsewhere for a stable meaning for the category "national party" in or outside of the legislature. It is unlikely that the Congress—except in the stereotype of the cartoonist—can operate without some continuing form of leadership structure. If the formal leadership does not constitute it, then other clues must be pursued.

Similarly, in the more probable event that differences are found between individual leaders or types of leaders, on the one hand, and rank-and-file legislators, on the other, then it will be necessary to search for the informal leadership associates of these differentiated formal leaders and for the structure supporting them.

SELECTED CRITICAL BIBLIOGRAPHY ON THE METHODS AND TECHNIQUES OF POLITICAL BEHAVIOR RESEARCH

This bibliography has been prepared to illustrate some of the problems involved in political behavior research. It is divided into eight sections, the first containing works on the general matter of scientific method in political research and the last listing some handbooks on social science research. The other sections are concerned with specific techniques of empirical research: documentary analysis, participant observation, interviews, experiments, institutional and community research, and interpretation and analysis. Selection from the wide range of theoretical writings and empirical research monographs had of necessity to be arbitrary, although criteria of relevance were employed. The details of the criteria are included as notes to each of the section headings under which the selections have been classified. The classification is not exhaustive, and while many items could have been included in more than one section of the bibliography, no effort at cross referencing was made.

In most cases, an entry was selected because it represented a significant point of view or an important development in political behavior research. The problem of exclusion became most difficult when, in a given area, there was an abundance of noteworthy work, while in an adjacent area the small number of contributions greatly narrowed the possibilities.

Most of the theoretical writings bear directly on politics and the governmental process, and, whenever possible, empirical items have been selected from the area of political behavior. Some items have been drawn, however, from related fields of social science, when it has been necessary to illustrate a technique which has not yet been applied to political behavior research. For the most part, citations are drawn from the work of the last fifty years.

I. SCIENTIFIC METHOD IN POLITICAL RESEARCH

A. *The Role of Scientific Method in Political Research*

Scientific method in political research not only assumes some measure of uniformity in human behavior, but it also involves an analytical approach constructed on theoretical concepts, units of analysis, and modes of proof. The question of the ethical relevance of the research, as in all social science, also presses upon the investigator. The titles in this section represent some of the main recent currents in the thinking of logicians, political scientists and social scientists engaged in self-conscious efforts to adapt scientific method to political research.

Catlin, George E. G. "The Delimitation and Measurability of Political Phenomena," AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, XXI (1927), 255–269.

A suggestive definition of the subject matter of political science in terms of the units of values affecting the distribution of power.

Cohen, Morris, R., and Nagel, Ernest. *An Introduction to Logic and Scientific Method.* New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1934. Pp. 467.

See especially Chapter XI: "Hypotheses and Scientific Method"; Chapter XIV: "Probability and Induction"; Chapter XV: "Measurement."

Lasswell, Harold D. "Why be Quantitative?" in *The Language of Politics* (Lasswell, Harold D., and Leites, Nathan, eds.). New York: George W. Stewart, 1949, pp. 40–52.

An exposition of the advantages of quantification in the study of propaganda.

Mannheim, Karl. *Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge.* New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1936. Pp. 318.

Chapter II: "Ideology and Utopia" contains concepts relevant for dealing with bias in the social sciences and for analyzing various types of political ideologies.

Merton, Robert K. "The Bearing of Sociological Theory on Empirical Research," in *Social Theory and Social Structure* by Robert K. Merton. Glencoe: The Free Press, 1949, pp. 83–96.

The theoretical requirements for empirical research discussed in this essay are directly applicable to political behavior research.

Parsons, Talcott. "The Position of Sociological Theory," in *Essays in Sociological Theory: Pure and Applied* by Talcott Parsons. Glencoe: The Free Press, 1949. Pp. 3–14.

Political behavior theory is discussed in relationship to a theory of social action.

Rice, Stuart Arthur. *Quantitative Methods in Politics.* New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1928. Pp. 331.

Pioneer statement on the conceptual and methodological problems involved in applying quantitative techniques to political behavior is contained in Part II: "Conceptual Background." After two decades this volume still stands as an indispensable reading for those interested in the empirical aspects of political behavior research.

Weber, Max. "The Meaning of 'Ethical Neutrality' in Sociology and Economics," in *Max Weber on the Methodology of the Social Sciences* (Shils, Edward and Finch, Henry, eds.). Glencoe: The Free Press, 1949, pp. 1–47.

Important statement on the possibilities and problems inherent in the construction of a value-free social science.

B. *Examples of Theory Construction*

Theory construction in its broadest aspects has been a concern of political science since the writings of Plato and Aristotle. The titles included in this section have been limited to writings of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Moreover, within this period the selection was designed to represent not only major modes of theoretical analysis but in particular to represent the works which were influential in molding empirical research or which remain sources of stimulation and guidance to quantitative investigators.

Bentley, Arthur F. *The Process of Government.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1908. Pp. 501.

Chapter VI: "The Raw Materials" is a well developed argument for concentration on political behavior as the proper object of political research. It develops and elaborates some of the leading ideas found in James Madison's essay No. 10 of *The Federalist.*

Bryce, James. *The American Commonwealth.* London and New York: Macmillan Co., 1888. 2 vols.

Parts III–VI ("The Party System," "Public Opinion," "Illustrations and Reflections," and "Social Institutions") are especially rich in theories—which can be tested empirically—concerning the relationships between political behavior, public opinion and social institutions.

Dicey, Albert Venn. *Lectures on the Relation Between Law and Public Opinion in England in the Nineteenth Century.* London and New York: Macmillan Co., 1905. Pp. 503.

See especially Lectures I and XII for categories of analysis and hypotheses on the relationship between law and public opinion.

Herring, E. Pendleton. *Presidential Leadership: The Political Relations of Congress and the Chief Executive.* New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1940. Pp. 166.

A rich source of hypotheses concerning the factors governing the continuing relations between the chief executive and the legislature at the national level.

Lasswell, Harold D. "The Garrison State," *American Journal of Sociology,* XLVI (1941), 455–468.

Presents a model for the orientation of research based on historical trends toward concentration of power and the growth of the threat of inter-continental war.

Lasswell, Harold D., and Kaplan, Abraham. *Power and Society: A Framework for Political Inquiry.* New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950. Pp. 295.

Introduction contains a set of provisional postulates for political behavior research.

Lasswell, Harold D. *World Politics and Personal Insecurity,* in *The Study of Power.* Glencoe: The Free Press, 1951. Pp. 307.

Theoretical formulations of power politics and international relations which incorporate dynamic theories of psychology.

Lippmann, Walter. *Public Opinion.* New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1922. Pp. 427.

Speculative discussion of public opinion in the political context which is suggestive for empirical research.

Michels, Roberto. *Political Parties.* Glencoe: The Free Press, 1949. Pp. 416.

Theoretical analysis of structural aspects and dynamics of European socialist movements which represents a significant attempt to formulate hypotheses about political party organization in an empirically testable form.

Ostrogorski, Moisei Y. *Democracy and the Organization of Political Parties.* New York: Macmillan Co., 1902. 2 vols.

This treatise traces the relationship of political liberty to the development of modern political party organization in England and the United States. Although the presentation of the broad historical context in which the theoretical speculations are made has been subjected to criticism, the volume is of outstanding significance.

Schumpeter, Joseph A. *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy.* Second Edition. New York and London: Harper and Brothers, 1947. Pp. 411.

Chapter XXII: "Another Theory of Democracy" contains a carefully constructed theoretical model.

Simon, Herbert A. *Administrative Behavior.* New York: Macmillan Co., 1948. Pp. 259.

Problems involved in applying a theoretical distinction between fact and preference statements to the study of administrative behavior are discussed in Chapter III: "Fact and Value in Decision-Making" and the Appendix: "What is an Administrative Science."

Speier, Hans. "Historical Development of Public Opinion," *American Journal of Sociology,* LV (1950), 376–388.

Analysis of historical trends in the development of public opinion relevant for political science.

Thompson, George. *Public Opinion and Lord Beaconsfield, 1875–1880.* London: Macmillan Co., 1886. 2 vols.

Vol. I contains a series of categories for the analysis of the relationship between political opinion and politics.

Tocqueville, Alexis de. *Democracy in America.* New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1945. 2 vols.

This work contains a wealth of hypotheses about American political processes which the author relates to a theory of democracy.

Truman, David B. *The Governmental Process.* New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951. Pp. 544.

Systematic statement of political behavior, theory and research, which builds on a reformulation and elaboration of Bentley's *The Process of Government.*

Wallas, Graham. *Human Nature in Politics.* Third Edition. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1921. Pp. 313.

Chapter V, Part I: "The Method of Political Reasoning" contains a plea for the use of quantitative techniques in the study of politics with suggestions on how the methods of economics might be applied.

Weber, Max. "Politics as a Vocation," in *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology,* translated by H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills. New York: Oxford University Press, 1946. Pp. 490.

Important discussion of ethics and social context as conditioners of political action and political responsibility.

C. *Examples of Research Design*

Designing research into political behavior receives little guidance from the experimental situations of the laboratory. Therefore, the titles for this section were selected because they set forth alternative approaches by which rigorous research design can be adapted to the complex data of political behavior.

Black, Duncan. "The Unity of Political and Economic Science," *Economic Journal,* LX (1950), 506–514.

The author of articles applying equilibrium theory to committee decisions here explains his view that political science, like economics, can employ an analytical system which takes the preferences of individuals as the basic data.

Greenwood, Ernest. *Experimental Sociology: A Study in Method.* New York: King's Crown Press, 1945. Pp. 163.

Review of methodological limitations involved in efforts to conduct social research

through experimental situations. Many implications directly applicable to political behavior research.

Leites, Nathan. "Psycho-Cultural Hypotheses about Political Acts," *World Politics*, I (1948), 102–119.

The national character concept, with its implication for political behavior, is converted into a series of hypotheses which might prove useful to researchers.

Merriam, Charles E., and Gosnell, Harold F. *Non-Voting: Causes and Methods of Control.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1924. Pp. 287.

A careful research design involved comparing a sample of non-voters in a Chicago mayoralty election with one of voters in terms of a wide range of political, social and economic variables. Reasons given by non-voting respondents were classified by similar variables and compared with those offered as explanations for non-voting by 300 politicians.

Williams, Robin M., Jr. *The Reduction of Intergroup Tensions: A Survey of Research on Problems of Ethnic, Racial and Religious Group Relations.* (Social Science Research Council Bulletin 57.) New York: Social Science Research Council, 1947. Pp. 153.

Chapter III: "Propositions on Intergroup Hostility and Conflict" contains an effort to delineate the problems and to organize researchable hypotheses. Because of its systematic character, it stands as a model of conceptualization of existing research and an orientation for future research.

II. DOCUMENTARY ANALYSIS

A. *Statistical Sources*

The relative availability of voting data has helped make the analysis of statistical sources a major current of political behavior research. A wide variety of statistical devices has been applied to voting statistics. The items included in this section are representative of the most important methods employed.

Arneson, Ben A. "Non-voting in a Typical Ohio Community," *American Political Science Review*, XIX (1925), 816–825.

and

Arneson, Ben A., and Eells, William H. "Voting Behavior in 1948 as Compared with 1924 in a Typical Ohio Community," *American Political Science Review*, XLIV (1950), 432–435.

A unique repetition of an empirical investigation after an interval of 23 years. Changes in the characteristics and proportions of non-voters are described within a limited theoretical framework.

Bean, Louis H. *How to Predict Elections.* New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948. Pp. 196.

Analyzes the relationship of state voting trends in presidential elections to national voting trends. Suggests correlations between deviations from trends and business cycle fluctuations. Includes a projection of trends and a statistical appendix (161–195).

Beyle, Herman C. *Identification and Analysis of Attribute-Cluster-Blocs.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1931. Pp. 249.

Application of factor analysis to voting patterns in the Minnesota non-partisan state legislature makes possible delineation of political blocs. Elaborate technique which may not have general usefulness.

Eldersveld, Samuel J. "The Influence of Metropolitan Party Pluralities in Presidential Elections since 1920," *American Political Science Review*, XLIII (1949), 1189–1206.

Examines quantitatively trends in the importance of metropolitan party pluralities for determining the electoral votes of states.

Ewing, Cortez A. M. *Congressional Elections, 1896–1944.* Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1947. Pp. 110.

Election statistics are used to show trends in party strength. The sectional strength of various parties in elections of Representatives is compared with the sectional pull of the parties' presidential candidates.

Gosnell, Harold F. *Grass Roots Politics: National Voting Behavior of Typical States.* Washington, D. C.: American Council on Public Affairs, 1942. Pp. 195.

Selected elections in six states, whose voting records 1896–1940 conformed to certain trends, are analyzed. Appendix I: "Methods of Studying Political Behavior" gives a summary of the statistical techniques used as well as a

general statement of the application of statistical treatment to political behavior data.

Litchfield, Edward H. *Voting Behavior in a Metropolitan Area.* (University of Michigan, Michigan Governmental Studies, No. 7.) Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1941. Pp. 93.

A study of election statistics for a sample of Detroit precincts, 1930–1938. Participation, Democratic and third party affiliation are analyzed in relation to ethnic, racial, and economic variables.

Lowell, Abbott Lawrence. *The Influence of Party upon Legislation in England and America. Annual Report of the American Historical Association.* Vol. I (1901). Pp. 321–542.

Measures the degree of party solidarity in the legislatures of England and America during the 19th century. Roll-call votes in selected sessions of Parliament, Congress, and certain state legislatures are analyzed. A further breakdown of roll-call votes is made into those which resulted in actual legislation and those which did not.

Neprash, Jerry Alvin. *The Brookhart Campaigns in Iowa, 1920–1926: A Study in the Motivation of Political Attitudes.* (Columbia University Studies in History, Economics, and Public Law, No. 336.) New York: Columbia University Press, 1932. Pp. 128.

Comparisons of the voting behavior of the same electorate at different times were made possible because the same man was repeatedly a Republican senatorial candidate between 1920 and 1926. Correlations are made between indices of economic distress and Brookhart's votes; between 'normal' Republican strength and Brookhart's strength.

Ogburn, William F., and Peterson, Delvin. "Political Thought of Social Classes," *Political Science Quarterly,* XXXI (1916), 300–317.

Pioneer study analyzing class and rural-urban differences in voting on referendum issues in Oregon, 1910–1914. See also Ogburn, William F., and Hill, Estelle, "Income Classes and the Roosevelt Vote in 1932," for application of similar technique. (*Political Science Quarterly,* L [1935], 186–193.)

Olds, Edward B., and Salmon, David W. *St. Louis Voting Behavior Study.* St. Louis: Metropolitan St. Louis Census Committee of the St. Louis Chapter of the American Statistical Association, 1948. (Unbound.)

Voting behavior analyzed by block statistics on housing and population applied to precincts. Relationships are shown between indicators of economic status, social stability, ethnic characteristics, and the way in which St. Louisans voted for issues and party candidates, 1944–1948. A table presents correlation coefficients for all possible combinations of pairs of 33 factors. Section E describes methodology.

Richardson, Lewis F. *Generalized Foreign Politics.* (British Journal of Psychology Monograph Supplements, XXIII.) London: Cambridge University Press, 1939. Pp. 91.

Uses level of armaments, international trade, etc., as indices of rapprochement or hostility between nations in formulating a mathematical theory of international relations.

Siegfried, André. *Tableau Politique de La France de L'Ouest sous la Troisième République.* Paris: Colin, 1913. Pp. 536.

Traces the evolution of political habits of the westernmost region of France after 1871 on the basis of election statistics and voting behavior of legislators. Includes a detailed description of the economic and social structure of the communes of the area as it affects the political complexion of the deputies chosen by the electorate. The interpretative sections should be viewed with caution.

Tingsten, Herbert. *Political Behaviour: Studies in Election Statistics.* London: P. S. King, 1937. Pp. 231.

Survey of studies of election statistics in Scandinavia, Germany, Switzerland and the U. S. An original treatment of Swedish data (169–174) shows relationship between the size of the representation of a given class in a community and the extent to which the corresponding party will be able to elicit its vote.

Titus, Charles Hickman. *Voting Behavior in the United States: A Statistical Study.* (Publications of the University of California at Los Angeles in Social Sciences, Vol. V, No. 1.) Berkeley: University of California Press, 1935. Pp. 74.

Study of voting records which shows constant relations between the percentage of eligible voters voting and (a) the offices being filled (b) the size of the population of the community. Also seeks to establish existence in various stages of rhythmic cyclical fluctuations in percentage of votes cast out of total eligible.

B. *Case Studies of Documentary Sources*

The problems involved in the analysis of documentary sources for political behavior are identical with those of researchers who seek to write systematic social, economic and political history. Many of the items included here are indicative of growing tendencies to use statistical methods in the treatment of personal records and documents and to bring to bear intensive qualitative analyses where quantitative data are not available.

Beard, Charles Austin. *An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States.* New York: Macmillan Co., 1913. Pp. 330.

A documentation of hypotheses on economic interests affecting the content of the Constitution and the movement for its adoption by the use of quantitative analysis of historical data. Suggestive, although not beyond challenge conceptually.

Gaudet, Frederick Joseph. *Individual Differences in the Sentencing Tendencies of Judges.* New York: Archives of Psychology No. 230, 1938. Pp. 58.

Sentencing records of six New Jersey judges compared in different types of cases and sessions. Documentary evidence of severity of judges is compared with ranking in severity given to them by lawyers who filled out author's questionnaire.

Gerth, Hans. "The Nazi Party: Its Leadership and Composition," *American Journal of Sociology,* LV (1940), 517–541.

Analysis of documentary sources to show social origins and composition of the Nazi Party.

Gottschalk, Louis; Kluckhohn, Clyde; and Angell, Robert. *The Use of Personal Documents in History, Anthropology, and Sociology.* (Social Science Research Council Bulletin 53.) New York: Social Science Research Council, 1945. Pp. 243.

Elaborate discussion of the methodological problems involved in the use of personal documents.

Hofstadter, Richard F. *The American Political Tradition and the Men Who Made It.* New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948. Pp. 378.

Some major American political figures are examined with a view to explaining how their life-histories throw light on their ideologies. The study estimates the significance of its subjects' political behavior in terms of the contemporary social context with the use of recent social science and psychological theory. See especially chapters on Abraham Lincoln and Theodore Roosevelt.

Pritchett, C. Herman. *The Roosevelt Court.* New York: Macmillan Co., 1948. Pp. 314.

Analyzes the growth of dissent on the Supreme Court and the alignments of justices on various issues. Chapter IX: "Alignments and Issues" shows the clusters of opinion on the court, 1931–1946, and the extent to which each of the Roosevelt appointees agreed with one another on different types of issues.

Woodward, Comer Vann. *Tom Watson, Agrarian Rebel.* New York: Macmillan Co., 1938. Pp. 518.

Biographical analysis of southern political leader.

Zink, Harold. "A Case Study of a Political Boss," *Psychiatry,* I (1938), 527–533.

Intensive case study of David Curtis Stephenson, political boss of Indiana, 1922–1925, who was a prominent Ku Klux Klan leader in the Midwest.

C. *Content Analysis Techniques*

Content analysis is a systematic procedure for the description of symbolic behavior. It is particularly relevant for political behavior research inasmuch as it supplies, in conjunction with other techniques, a method for understanding the conditions under which propaganda is created and for inferring its probable effects. To date most studies have been mainly descriptive and, therefore, of limited value for understanding the political process. The items selected here are typical of content analysis which seeks to relate this technique to other modes of research.

Berelson, Bernard. *Content Analysis in Communication Research.* Glencoe: The Free Press, 1951.

A clarification of the terms of content analysis, its feasibility and technique with different sorts of content. Comprehensive bibliography.

Janis, Irving L. "The Problem of Validating Content Analysis," in *The Language of Politics* (Lasswell, Harold D., and Leites, Nathan, eds.). New York: George W. Stewart, 1949. Pp. 55–82.

An effort to establish criteria for determining validity in content analysis studies.

Lasswell, Harold D., and Blumenstock, Dorothy. *World Revolutionary Propaganda: A Chicago Study.* New York and London: Alfred A. Knopf, 1939. Pp. 393.

The study is designed to estimate the effectiveness of communist propaganda in Chicago during the first part of the depression of the 1930's. Volume and techniques of the propaganda campaign are studied.

Speier, Hans, and Kris, Ernst. *German Radio Propaganda.* New York: Oxford University Press, 1944. Pp. 529.

Quantitative and qualitative analysis of domestic and foreign German radio propaganda.

Wyant, Rowena. "Voting via the Senate Mailbag (1)," *Public Opinion Quarterly,* V (1941), 359–382.
and

Wyant, Rowena, and Herzog, Herta. "Voting via the Senate Mailbag (2)," *Public Opinion Quarterly,* V (1941), 590–624.

A study of the source and content of letters to Senators supporting and opposing the Burke-Wadsworth draft bill. Elaborate categories of content analysis revealed differences in the types of appeals made to legislators depending upon different social attributes of the writers and the differing positions of the Senators addressed.

III. PARTICIPANT OBSERVATION

Participant observation has been and remains at the core of political behavior research. Recent work based on participant observation has been characterized by growing consciousness of the limitations of the impressionistic method and by attempts to overcome them by multiple observations, techniques for recording, and the like. Items have been included below which reveal a wide range of situations in which participant observation is not only feasible but scientifically fruitful.

Bettelheim, Bruno. "Individual and Mass Behavior in Extreme Situations," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology,* XXXVIII (1943), 417–452.

Well-known analysis of effects of concentration camp life on prisoners, by former inmate. Unique use of participant observation under conditions of extreme brutality. Political organization among the inmates and basis of leadership are discussed.

Dale, Harold Edward. *Higher Civil Service of Great Britain.* New York: Oxford University Press, 1941. Pp. 232.

While data based on documentary sources accompany this description of the top stratum of the administrative class of the British Civil Service, the treatment of the "Temper of Mind and Disposition" of this group (Chapter IV), their relations with Ministers and Parliament, "inter se," and with the public and press (Chapters V–VII) gain much of their interest from direct observation by the author, formerly a Principal Assistant Secretary.

Lasswell, Harold D. *The Analysis of Political Behaviour.* New York: Oxford University Press, 1949. Pp. 314.

Participant observation of relief clients and officials is described in Part III, Chapter I: "The Participant Observer" (a reprint of two earlier papers with Gabriel Almond). Also in Part II is "Self-Observation," containing suggestions of how participants in political activity may keep quantitative records of relevant behavior.

Madge, Charles, and Harrisson, Tom. *Britain by Mass-Observation.* Harmondsworth Middlesex, England: Penguin Books Limited, 1939. Pp. 246.

Mass-observation employed a large group of relatively untrained voluntary observers to report on public reaction to a significant political event. Despite lack of systematic technique,

the data produced are extremely useful and suggestive. Chapters I and X contain mass participant observations on reactions of the English to the Munich crisis and its aftermath, contrasted with press treatment of the same events.

McKean, Dayton. *Pressures on the Legislature of New Jersey.* (Columbia University Studies in History, Economics, and Public Law, No. 440.) New York: Columbia University Press, 1938. Pp. 251.

Detailed analysis of pressure groups based on data which could only be gathered by participant observation. Author was a member of the New Jersey assembly, 1934–1935.

Steffens, Lincoln. *Autobiography.* New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1931. Pp. 884.

Self-portrait of American reformer who had extensive contacts with politicians of his day.

Whyte, William Foote. *Street Corner Society: The Social Structure of an Italian Slum.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1943. Pp. 284.

Prolonged participant observation of local community social organization leads author to analysis of social relationship between crime and organized politics.

IV. INTERVIEW TECHNIQUE

Measured in terms of effort, a significant portion of the recent developments of empirical social science has been based on the use of the various types of interviews: the questionnaire, the sample survey, and the intensive interview. These research techniques as they apply to political behavior research must deal with a two-fold problem: is the population or group being interviewed relevant to the political behavior research, and can adequate access to the population or group be achieved? Frequently these objectives have not been held clearly in mind. The titles in this section seek to represent well planned and effectively executed examples of the application of interview technique. Many additional titles were candidates for inclusion but were excluded either because they duplicated a technique covered in the included titles or because of limitations of space.

A. *Questionnaires*

Bendix, Reinhard. *Higher Civil Servants in American Society: A Study of the Social Origins, the Careers, and the Power Position of Higher Federal Administrators.* (University of Colorado Studies, Series in Sociology, No. 1.) Boulder, Colorado: University of Colorado Press, 1949. Pp. 129.

Analysis of social origins, career lines, and other social characteristics of a sample of U. S. higher civil servants as an approach to understanding the composition and stability of the Federal bureaucracy. Based mainly on a mail questionnaire. Methodology described in Chapter II; statistical data presented in Chapters II–VI.

Moreno, Jacob L. *Who Shall Survive?* Washington: Nervous and Mental Disease Publishing Co., 1934. Pp. 440.

An overview of sociometric theory and technique.

Stouffer, Samuel A., and others. *The American Soldier.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1949. 2 vols.

Chapter VIII, Vol. I ("Attitudes Toward Leadership and Control") and Chapters XII and XIII, Vol. II ("The Aftermath of Hostilities" and "The Soldier Becomes a Veteran") are especially useful for political research in presenting examples of the use of the questionnaire for the investigation of political attitudes.

White, Leonard D. *Prestige Value of Public Employment in Chicago.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1929. Pp. 183.

Measures esteem in which public office is held by use of questionnaires comparing equivalent public and private jobs and of word association tests. The data were treated to determine the effect of sex, age, racial and national origin, and occupation on attitudes. Supplemented by a careful content analysis of newspaper items dealing with public officers during the period of the investigation.

B. *Surveys*

Benney, Mark, and Geiss, Phyllis. "Social Class and Politics in Greenwich," *British Journal of Sociology,* I (1950), 310–327.

The panel method was used to study the re-

lationship between voting behavior and self-accorded as well as interviewer-accorded status in a British community.

Cantril, Hadley. *Gauging Public Opinion.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944. Pp. 318.

Detailed handbook on the practical problems involved in conducting a public opinion survey.

Jones, Alfred Winslow. *Life, Liberty and Property: A Story of Conflict and a Measurement of Conflicting Rights.* Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1941. Pp. 397.

Two types of projective interview are used to measure attitudes towards contending claims of corporate property and "human rights" among significant social groupings in a one-industry town which has been the scene of industrial conflict. In Chapter XXIV: "Class Consciousness and Property" a comparison of the results is made with findings of the *Fortune* and the Institute of Public Opinion polls of 1940 on class consciousness in the U. S. For a description of method see Chapter VIII: "The Village Store-keeper" and Appendices A: "The Interview," B: "The Survey and the Sample," and C: "Statistical Tables."

Lazarsfeld, Paul F.; Berelson, Bernard; and Gaudet, Hazel. *The People's Choice.* Second Edition. New York: Columbia University Press, 1948. Pp. 178.

The panel method is used to trace development of opinion in an Ohio county during a presidential election campaign. The method is described in Chapter I and the way in which it brought out the relationship between time of voting decision and pressures converging on the voter is shown in Chapter VI: "Time of Final Decision."

McNemar, Quin. "Opinion-Attitude Methodology," *Psychological Bulletin,* XLIII (1946), 289–374.

Critical review of methodology of the public opinion poll and survey technique.

Mosteller, Frederick, and others. *The Pre-election Polls of 1948.* (Social Science Research Council Bulletin 60.) New York: Social Science Research Council, 1949. Pp. 396.

Critical attempt to determine limitations of the pre-election polls of 1948.

Stouffer, Samuel A., and others. *Measurement and Prediction.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950. Pp. 756.

Presents recent modifications and developments in statistical methods for handling certain types of attitude data.

C. *Intensive Interviews*

Adorno, Theodore, and others. *The Authoritarian Personality.* New York: Harper and Brothers, 1950. Pp. 990.

A variety of socio-psychological approaches were employed to analyze the correlates and dynamics of prejudice attitudes. Political attitudes and identification data gathered in this connection and the methods of analysis employed constitute a significant body of political behavior data. See especially "Politico-Economic Ideology and Group Membership in Relation to Ethnocentrism" (151–207) and "Politics and Economics in the Interview Material" (654–726).

Dicks, Henry V. "German Personality Traits and National Socialist Ideology," *Human Relations,* III (1950), 111–154.

On the basis of intensive interviews with German P.O.W.'s during World War II, a hypothetical distribution of German opinion on Nazism was constructed which later proved to be largely accurate. Article also contains propositions on the personality of ardent Hitler-supporters.

Heard, Alexander. "Interviewing Southern Politicians," *American Political Science Review,* XLIV (1950), 886–896.

A report on the procedure followed in securing and coding structured interviews with 538 leaders in southern politics. The objective required lengthy preparation by the two interviewers. A content analysis of the topics comprising the interviews is given (894).

Kelley, Douglas McG. *Twenty-Two Cells in Nuremberg.* New York: Greenberg, 1947. Pp. 245.

Case studies of leading Nazis by the psychiatrist at the Nuremberg jail.

Lasswell, Harold D. *Psychopathology and Poli-*

tics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1930. Pp. 285.

A pioneer exposition of the relationship of psychoanalytical theory and techniques to the study of political behavior. Chapters III: "A New Technique of Thinking" and XI: "The Prolonged Interview and its Objectification" discuss the use in understanding political behavior of the intensive interview employing free association. Chapters VI–IX contain illustrations of this technique.

Roethlisberger, Fritz J., and Dickson, William I. *Management and the Worker*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1939. Pp. 615.

See Chapter VIII: "The Interviewing Method" for illustrations and description of interview technique.

V. EXPERIMENTS

Although the artificial or contrived experiment is of limited usefulness in political behavior research, there has been relatively little effort in this field to exploit the "natural experiment." The items selected below suggest that partially controlled experiments, especially those in which the survey technique is employed, appear to have been the most fruitful in results.

Chapple, Eliot. With the collaboration of Conrad Arensberg. *Measuring Human Relations: An Introduction to the Study of the Interaction of Individuals*. (Genetic Psychology Monographs, Vol. 22, No. 1.) Provincetown: The Journal Press, 1940. Pp. 142.

Develops methods of analysis of human interaction for controlled observation primarily in experimental situations.

Gosnell, Harold F. *Getting Out the Vote: An Experiment in the Stimulation of Voting*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1927. Pp. 128.

An account of an experiment designed to discover the effects of non-partisan registration and voting drives. A mailing was made to a selection from the Chicago population in 1924–1925. Control groups were carefully selected, and the campaign was shown to have succeeded. Its varying success from district to district was analyzed in terms of age, sex, color, national origin, income, amount and place of education, party affiliation, party precinct organization, and the type of appeal made by the investigators.

Hartmann, George W. "A Field Experiment on the Comparative Effectiveness of 'Emotional' and 'Rational' Political Leaflets in Determining Election Results," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, XXXI (1936), 99–114.

One experimental group in Allentown, Pa. was given "emotional," another "rational" socalist appeals for votes. The rest of the town was the control. The findings are somewhat limited in value since the "emotional" precincts (which showed the greatest increase in socialist vote) were not carefully matched with the "rational" precincts for social-economic characteristics.

Hovland, Carl I., and others. *Experiments in Mass Communications*. (Vol. III, Studies in Social Psychology in World War II.) Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1949. Pp. 345.

Volume summarizes research experimentation in orientation films by U. S. Army in World War II. Chapter X analyzes some of the methodological conclusions. Statistical procedures for handling before-and-after social experiments are presented in Appendices: "Measurement Problems Encountered."

Lewin, Kurt; Lippitt, Ronald; and White, Ralph K. "Patterns of Aggressive Behavior in Experimentally Created 'Social Climates'," *The Journal of Social Psychology*, X (1939), 271–299.

A report on experiments with groups of children under different types of leadership. Care was taken in determining that the effects of leadership itself were actually being measured. Aggressive behavior of the children in the different groups (and after transfer from one group to another) was calculated.

VI. INSTITUTIONAL AND COMMUNITY RESEARCH

Works of institutional and community research often employ simultaneously a variety of techniques. A number of items in this section are examples of such multiple approaches. In addition, more contemporary examples of community and institutional research are

evolving an integrated methodological attack which, because of its unified approach, promises fruitful results, although it may have in each case to be adjusted to the subject matter at hand.

Bailey, Stephen K. *Congress Makes a Law.* New York: Columbia University Press, 1950. Pp. 282.

A case study of the passage of the Employment Act of 1946.

Commons, John R. *Labor and Administration.* New York: Macmillan Co., 1913. Pp. 431.

In Chapter XIV: "American Shoemakers, 1648 to 1895" the evolution of a trade union and its organizational structure are seen in the light of the technology of the industry.

Garceau, Oliver. *The Political Life of the American Medical Association.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1941. Pp. 186.

This study of the AMA, with emphasis upon its organizational structure and its internal politics, is a good example of institutional analysis.

Gosnell, Harold F. *Machine Politics: Chicago Model.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1937. Pp. 249.

Employs a variety of social science techniques, including historical exposition and refined statistical analysis of the institutional aspects of political parties in Chicago. A noteworthy example of the combination of rigorous techniques with broad descriptive data. A study of the readership of Chicago newspapers in various local communities is correlated with variables relating to voting behavior of these communities and coupled with a content analysis of newspaper space given to the various candidates. Appendices A through C present descriptions of the statistical techniques used.

Herring, E. Pendleton. *Federal Commissioners: A Study of Their Careers and Qualifications.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1936. Pp. 151.

An intensive, pioneering study of the career lines of the members of all important federal regulatory commissions, from 1887 to 1935, in an effort to identify the influences affecting their decisions on policy.

Herring, E. Pendleton. *Group Representation Before Congress.* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1929. Pp. 309.

Analysis of institutional aspects of pressure groups in Washington on a functional basis.

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VIII. HANDBOOKS ON SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH

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THE RELATION BETWEEN ROLL CALL VOTES AND CONSTITUENCIES IN THE MASSACHUSETTS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES*

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A major concern of political theorists has been the definition of the proper role of legislators in relation to their constituencies.[1] Yet relatively little analysis has been made of the uniformities of behavior that actually prevail in these relations. Such uniformities, if they could be found, would bear directly on the theory of the party system, on speculation about the nature of representative government, and on the feasibility of proposals for a reordering of party practices.

It has been shown that the tendencies of Congressmen to vote with their party or to cross party lines are associated with the similarity or dissimilarity between party policy and presumed interest of constituency.[2] One aim of this study is to test the applicability of this proposition to the Massachusetts House of Representatives, by examination of the relation between roll-call votes and constituency characteristics. The evidence indicates that a similar relation exists in this body, and has been present consistently throughout the last two decades.

Over and above this relation, it is also of interest to know whether the state of political competition in a constituency has an influence on a representative's votes. Representatives of similar constituencies do not invariably follow the same voting pattern. These differences in voting may be attributable in part to the differences in the political situations in the constituencies. One way in which political competition might influence a representative's votes is to sensitize him to the wishes of constituents in his quest for support at the next election. The closeness of the vote in a past election may serve as an index to the problems a representative has had in winning past elections and which he may anticipate in future elections. Operationally, the problem is that of holding constant legislative party affiliation and constituency composition to examine the relation between legislative voting behavior and size of the margin of popular vote in the constituency. This examination is the second principal aim of this study.

THE MASSACHUSETTS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

The Massachusetts House has many advantages for the study of the representative process. Massachusetts at present has a highly competitive two-party system, with parties representing fairly distinct regions and socio-economic groups. This competition has come about through a gradual shift in party strength, the Democrats having won a majority in the House in 1948 after a

* The research here reported was conducted with the assistance of the Laboratory of Social Relations, Harvard University. Special acknowledgment is due to Prof. V. O. Key, Jr., for his advice and guidance in the study.

[1] Doctrines on the question are summarized by Alfred de Grazia, *Public and Republic* (New York, 1951).

[2] J. Turner, *Party and Constituency: Pressures on Congress* (Baltimore, 1951).

long period of Republican rule in that body. The House has 240 members, a number sufficient to permit some statistical analysis.

The difference between the Republican and Democratic parties in Massachusetts may be summarized as follows: the Republicans are a suburban and rural, high-status, Protestant party, while the Democrats are an urban, lower-status, Catholic party. This is, of course, an oversimplification, as there are other variables that are also important for political behavior. Nevertheless, such generalizations can be made much more easily within Massachusetts than in the nation as a whole. We shall be concerned with some of these qualifications; others, such as the political affiliations of various ethnic groups, will not be treated here.

One particular variable has been chosen to summarize the various differences between "typically Republican" and "typically Democratic" constituencies: the percentage of owner occupancy of dwelling units in a representative district. This variable was chosen for several reasons. It places on a continuum districts ranging from urban working-class areas to the less densely populated rural districts. To a high degree it discriminates between Republican and Democratic districts. Its chief drawback appears to be that it groups a few Republican high-status districts, such as Brookline, in the same classification with the solidly Democratic urban districts. This is because per cent owner occupancy is, in Massachusetts, largely a rural-urban variable; for more adequate description of districts a variable measuring average socio-economic status should also be used.

The difference between Republican and Democratic constituencies in 1951, in terms of per cent owner occupancy of dwelling units, is shown in Figure 1.



FIG. 1. Distributions of Republican and Democratic State Representative Districts in Massachusetts, 1951, by Per Cent Owner Occupancy of Dwelling Units.*

* In this figure and in all succeeding uses of per cent owner occupany, the source of data is the *Sixteenth Census of the United States, 1940, Housing, Vol. 1, Part 1, Data for Small Areas*, pp. 641 ff.

This figure shows that there is a distinct difference between the types of district that most Democrats and most Republicans represent. There is also an area of overlap, within which most of the competition between parties takes place.

The intensity of competition between parties can be measured by the closeness of elections in various types of districts. If we divide the seats in the House into "sure" and "close" seats, depending on whether or not the representative received as much as 60 per cent of the two-party vote, the distribution of "sure" and "close" seats within the parties is as shown in Table 1. About one-third of the seats held by each party fall in the "close" category.

TABLE I

DISTRIBUTION OF "CLOSE" AND "SURE" SEATS BY PARTIES IN MASSACHUSETTS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 1951

	"Close" Seats (margin less than 60%)	"Sure" Seats (margin 60% or more)	Total
Democrats	43	81	124
Republicans	41	75	116

The way in which "sure" and "close" seats are distributed over the various types of districts, classified by per cent owner occupancy, is shown in Figure 2. In this figure the "close" seats of both parties are grouped together. Figure 2 shows that the close elections in 1950 were largely concentrated in the intermediate range of per cent owner occupancy, while the "sure" Republican and Democratic districts tended to be concentrated at the ends of the scale. These data show that inter-party competition was centered in the intermediate districts. This locus of competition is very similar to what Lubell has called "the urban frontier,"[3] in that a rough dividing point between Democrats and Republicans can be found at a particular level of socio-economic status. A graph similar to Figure 2 for the 1930 election would show a similar picture, with a somewhat less sharp separation of the three curves and a slight shift of the area of party competition back toward the more urban districts. This difference probably reflects the outward push toward the suburbs that has occurred in the last two decades.

In order to examine the relation between election margins and roll-call votes in this body, we shall consider three recent sessions: those of 1931–2, 1941, and 1951. These sessions cover not only the present state of party competition, but also the earlier period of Republican control. They are far enough separated in time so that less than 20 per cent of the membership of one session appears again in the session of a decade later; yet they are close enough so that the use of the 1940 Census as a source of data for all three sessions seems a reasonable approximation.

[3] S. Lubell, *The Future of American Politics* (New York, 1952), pp. 58–80.



FIG. 2. Election Margins (1950) and Per Cent Owner Occupancy of Dwelling Units in District.*

* A "close" seat is one for which the winning candidate received less than 60% of the major-party vote. The way in which election margins were calculated will be discussed in more detail in the next section.

DATA USED IN THIS STUDY

We wish to study the relation between constituency characteristics and roll-call votes, and the possible effect of electoral contest on this relation. For this purpose we need some measures of election margin, voting behavior, and district characteristics.

a. *Election margin*

A representative's previous election margin is to be measured by the fraction of the major-party vote he received, with 60 per cent as the cutting point between "close" and "sure" margins. During the sessions studied, there were few candidates outside the major parties. A small number who obtained the nominations of both major parties will be omitted from the tabulations below.

In a number of districts there were two or three seats to be filled at once. To cover these cases, our definition of election margin will be extended as follows: the vote for the candidate in question is to be compared with that for the highest unsuccessful candidate of the opposing party. These two candidates will be treated as if they were the two major-party candidates for a single seat.[4]

[4] These data were based on the official *Election Statistics* of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, compiled in the office of the Secretary of the Commonwealth and issued annually as Public Document No. 43 (Boston: 1930, 1940, 1950). The index of "closeness" might be improved in several ways, though it is probably adequate for our purpose. The cutting point 60%, derived from electoral mortality studies of Congress, might be re-examined for Massachusetts. Comparison in multi-member districts might be made with

b. *Voting behavior of representatives*

In an effort to magnify the effect we are concerned with, the roll calls chosen were ones that appeared to reflect socio-economic class differences. For the 1951 session, seven roll calls were chosen by the writer to discriminate Democrats' party regularity. Three were on labor measures, two concerned taxation, and two concerned public expenditures or public works. For the Republicans, eight roll calls were chosen; six dealt with labor legislation, one with old-age assistance, and one with public works. On all these roll calls, majorities of both parties found themselves in opposition. For both parties the choice of roll calls was made so as to maximize the discrimination among party members, along the "social class" dimension, that a scale score would afford. The index used was total number of votes deviating from one's party majority. For convenience in graphical presentation, this was converted into a percentage of the total number of roll calls used in the index. Representatives absent on more than a specified number of these votes were omitted from the analysis.[5]

For the 1941 session, an index tabulated by the Massachusetts Federation of Labor (MFL) was used to measure the deviance of both Democrats and Republicans.[6] The MFL selected seven roll calls taken during this session, which discriminated adequately within both parties.

For the 1931–32 session, separate indices were constructed for Republicans and Democrats. The Republicans, who showed less party unity than the Democrats in this session, were discriminated by seven roll calls cited in a MFL report. The Democrats, who as a minority party had high cohesion, were discriminated by a set of ten roll calls, mostly on labor issues, selected by the writer.

c. *District characteristics*

The measure of district characteristics used is per cent owner occupancy of dwelling units, which we have discussed above. The basis for calculation is the 1940 Census. Some redistricting occurred in the intervals 1930–1940 and 1940–1950, and this was taken into account in the grouping of data for wards and townships into representative districts.

Findings

The results of tabulation of these data are summarized in Figures 3, 4, and 5. In these figures, the per cent deviation from party is shown for those representatives having close election margins, and for those having wide margins. Each of these groups is represented by two curves. The upper curve of the two shows

other candidates than the highest unsuccessful one. And, probably most important, other data besides the past election margin might afford a better index of the representative's concern about the wishes of his constituency.

[5] Three out of seven for Democrats, and four out of eight for Republicans, were the numbers of absences necessary for exclusion.

[6] Massachusetts State Federation of Labor, "Official Labor Record of Senators and Representatives, 1941–1942."

the most deviant quartile—the extent of party deviation exceeded by only one-fourth of the cases represented by the curve. The lower curve shows the median per cent deviation. Considered together, these two curves give some indication of the dispersion or variability of the data. They are chosen to emphasize the deviant representatives rather than the party regulars; in terms of the voting indices used, the distributions are always skewed toward party regularity. The data have been grouped so that each point represents six or more cases.



FIG. 3. Party Deviation vs. Per Cent Owner Occupancy, for Wide and Close Election Margins, Massachusetts House 1931–32.*

* Of the four curves in each graph, the pair of solid lines refer to the voting records of representatives with close election margins, and the pair of dotted lines, to that of representatives with wide election margins. The upper line of each pair shows the *most deviant quartile;* only one-fourth of the representatives from a given type of district deviated from their party majority more than this. The lower line of each pair shows the *median* per cent deviation; half the representatives of a given type of district deviated more, and half less, than this value.

Figure 3 shows the results for the 1931-32 session. The following tendencies may be noted in this figure:

1. The extent of party deviation in each party is greatest in districts that are atypical of one's own party, and are most like those of the opposing party. The Democrats from high owner-occupancy districts tend on the average to vote more like Republicans, and the Republicans from low owner-occupancy districts tend to vote more like Democrats.

2. Those representatives with wide election margins (dotted lines) tend more to be party regulars than those with close election margins (solid lines). This effect is especially pronounced for the Republicans in low owner-occupancy districts.

3. The extent of deviation is considerably greater for the Republicans, who

had a majority of 141 seats to 99, than for the Democrats. This probably reflects a general tendency for the majority party to be less cohesive than the minority, even though different indices were used for the two parties.[7]

4. There is some evidence that those representatives with close elections were more sensitive to district characteristics than were those with wide elections. This evidence is less conclusive for the Democrats, since there were few Democrats with wide election margins in high owner-occupancy districts.



FIG. 4. Party Deviation vs. Per Cent Owner Occupany, for Wide and Close Election Margins, Massachusetts House 1941.

In order to test these generalizations further we must examine other sessions as well. Figure 4 shows the same sort of data for the 1941 session of the Massachusetts House. Again we see that the general tendency of the curves is the same: toward greater deviation in districts less characteristic of the party. The Republican representatives with wide election margins were more "regular"—or recorded more of what the MFL considered "bad votes"—than were those with close margins, especially in atypical districts. The same is true of the Democrats in this session, though to a lesser degree. The Republicans, who had a majority of 143 to 97 in this session, tended more than did the Democrats to cross party lines. The comparison between parties is probably more accurate for this session than for the other two sessions studied, because in this session (1941) the same MFL voting index was used for members of both parties.

Figure 5 shows the same sort of tabulation for the 1951 session. During this session the Democrats had a majority of 124 to 116 in the House. This figure shows some similarities to, and some differences from, the graphs for earlier sessions. As before, the votes of those with close election margins tend to reflect

[7] This general tendency was noted in the U. S. House of Representatives by Turner, *Party and Constituency*, p. 25n.

district characteristics to a greater extent than do the votes of those with wide margins. In the 1951 session this is clearly true of Democrats as well as Republicans. With the increasing number of Democratic seats in the House, the Democrats had "wide" election margins in 11 districts of 40 per cent or more owner occupancy. The Republicans retained six seats with "wide" election margins in districts having less than 30 per cent owner occupancy, but only three seats with "close" margins in similar districts. The seats they held by wide margins in urban areas were mostly in Brookline and Back Bay—both relatively well-to-do areas whose status is not adequately described by their low percentage



FIG. 5. Party Deviation vs. Per Cent Owner Occupancy, for Wide and Close Election Margins, Massachusetts House 1951.

owner occupancy. For this reason the left-hand points on the dashed curves for Republicans in Figure 5 should be interpreted with caution. Nevertheless the remaining points are in accord with the hypothesis that election margin makes a difference.

The graph for 1951 (Fig. 5) shows some interesting differences from the previous ones. First, the extent of party deviation among the Democrats is roughly the same as that of the Republicans, for the roll calls used. We might expect greater deviation among the Democrats, who are now the majority party. Perhaps this would be observed if other measures of voting behavior were used. The reason for expecting the minority party to be cohesive is probably that no one is strongly motivated to split it; the battle is won if the majority party is held together. But in this case the Republican minority was split for a different reason. Many of the Republican deviations plotted for this session occurred on a roll call on old-age assistance, which passed by a large margin; many Republicans crossed party lines on this roll call, not because their votes affected its passage, but because they wished to go on record as favoring it.

A second new feature appearing in 1951 is the behavior of Democrats with wide election margins. Previously they tended slightly more toward party regularity than did their party colleagues with narrow margins. In 1951 they tended to diverge more from their party. The voting behavior of the Republi-

cans in this respect did not change. The factors producing this change are of interest, but require further study. Some possible factors that would lead to party regularity are conscientious belief in party principles and the quest for patronage when one's party controls it. A factor that might lead away from party regularity, in addition to one's conscience, is the influence of pressure groups or lobbyists. Some Democrats with wide election margins may have been more susceptible to lobbyists for conservative interests than Republicans in a similar situation were to labor unions. At least this seems a reasonable explanation of the change, for the labor lobbyists could threaten Republicans only with reprisal at the polls, whereas conservative lobbyists may be able to provide other inducements for straying Democrats.

These data may also be used for another purpose: to test Huntington's theory that party differences in liberalism and conservatism are greatest where elections are closest.[8] Figures 3 and 4 show that those representatives having close election margins tended to cross party lines most on issues of interest to the MFL. Figure 5 is inconclusive on this point. Taken together, these data do not indicate any tendency for close elections in themselves, apart from other factors, to accompany ideological divergence between the parties; if anything they indicate the opposite. This emphasizes the fact that Huntington's theory is not concerned with a direct causal relation between closeness of election and ideological divergence between the parties. As he pointed out, where this association exists it is due to underlying cleavages within districts, which may also be accompanied by close elections. The interrelation of these variables can best be clarified by measuring each and examining the effect of each separately while controlling the others. Our data for Massachusetts do not reveal extremely sharp ideological divergences between the parties in "intermediate" districts; rather they show a tendency for the parties to approach one another more closely in those districts where there is a contest between parties. The isolation of these variables on the national scene would be a difficult but enlightening task.

CONCLUSIONS

A study of roll-call votes in three sessions of the Massachusetts House of Representatives, in relation to constituency characteristics and election margins, has described in a relatively precise way certain important aspects of the two-party system in Massachusetts. This description applies to one particular type of legislation: that which reflects socio-economic class differences. Generalization of these findings, either to other types of legislation or to other legislative bodies, should be made only with caution. The main findings are as follows:

1. Republican and Democratic districts tend to be differentiated by percent owner occupancy of dwelling units. This percentage serves as a rough index combining the rural-urban dimension and socio-economic status. The distribution of the two Massachusetts parties with respect to this index is similar to a

[8] S. P. Huntington, "A Revised Theory of American Party Politics," AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, Vol. 44, pp. 669–677 (Sept., 1950).

conventional representation of the national parties; according to this view, both national parties draw support from a wide range of social groups, but they have distinct and separate "centers of gravity."[9]

2. Those representatives who come from districts that are most typical of their parties tend to show highest "party loyalty" on roll calls; those who come from districts atypical of their party tend to cross party lines more often. This agrees with the findings of Turner with regard to Congress.[10]

3. Those representatives whose previous election margins were close tend to reflect constituency characteristics in their votes more closely than do those with wider margins. This confirms our original hypothesis and thus may reflect a heightened sensitivity to constituents' wishes resulting from anxiety about reelection. It is also possible, however, that this sensitivity to constituency characteristics results from a general rise in the level of interest in political issues in constituencies where there is a continuing political contest.

4. The tendency of a two-party system to produce moderate parties, at least as it operates in Massachusetts, can be understood in more detail than heretofore. Schattschneider has pointed out that the tendency of each party to be aligned partially with a wide variety of interests leads to this moderation. This study indicates that the moderating influence is most pronounced in those constituencies where political competition prevails—the close districts that are intermediate on the scale of owner-occupancy.

5. Our analysis indicates that there are certain types of representatives who might be approached most effectively by lobbyists and other interested parties. A representative may vote not only in accord with his own conscientious beliefs, but also in accordance with the situation in which he finds himself. Under conditions similar to those studied, those who wish to swing representatives across party lines can probably be most effective by approaching representatives from districts atypical of their party. Those who wish to influence representatives in a direction different from the inclinations of their districts may have most success with those representatives who are in least danger of defeat at the next election. Those who wish to influence representatives toward the inclinations of their districts will probably be most successful with representatives who are in some danger of defeat at the next election. The converse of this suggestion is that party leaders in a legislature who are interested in holding party lines may anticipate in this way where some of the pressures toward party deviation can be exerted, and may prepare to counteract them.

In summary, this study shows something of the way in which the socio-economic characteristics of a constituency influence its politics. But it also indicates that the political contest in a constituency has a distinct effect, over and above socio-economic characteristics.

[9] This view is presented, for example, in E. E. Schattschneider, *Party Government* (New York, 1942), pp. 85 ff.

[10] Turner, *op. cit.*

THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY—A STUDY IN REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT

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University of Michigan

In the development of democracy in the modern world, increasing attention has been paid to the idea of representation. With the growth of large electorates which resulted from the extension of the franchise, it has been a necessary and logical process for thinkers and constitution-makers to devise methods by which the will of the electors can be formulated and translated into public policy. Since the voters are too numerous to gather in the market place, some means must be found to represent their opinions in the control and administration of the state. In the words of John Stuart Mill, "the meaning of representative government is, that the whole people, or some numerous portion of them, exercise through deputies periodically elected by themselves the ultimate controlling power, which, in every constitution, must reside somewhere."[1]

But specifically whom should the deputy represent—individuals, areas, groups, parties, or himself? Must he be popularly elected and, if so, how, and by whom? These and other vital questions have occupied the attention of scholars and statesmen for more than a hundred years. How to organize a system of good democratic representation is today a very live question in several countries, and a really critical question in one or two of them.

I

Since the end of World War II a number of countries have adopted new constitutions and enacted new electoral laws. Among these is the West German Federal Republic, which lies between East and West as a sort of weather vane of war or peace. Despite its youth and the brevity of its democratic experience, it provides an interesting case study of representative government—postwar model.

Without attempting to explain the different electoral techniques which have been developed throughout the democratic world, I would like both to explain and analyze the particular system which the Federal Republic of Germany produced in 1949 and to point out to what extent it contributes some new and perhaps significant features to our ideas of representative government.

Under the Empire, Germany had universal male suffrage but bad representative government. Urban areas were under-represented and the representatives had little power. In the Prussian Landtag, one-third of the representatives were chosen by four per cent of the populace; another third by fourteen per cent; the remaining third by eighty-two per cent of the people.

The Weimar Republic, which gave Germany its first democratic experience

[1] *Representative Government*, Ch. 5.

on a national scale, developed a completely modern democratic electoral system. Desirous of eliminating the absolutism and misrepresentativeness of the *Kaiserreich*, and following the lead of many other European countries with longer democratic experience, Weimar Germany went the whole way in extending the suffrage to all men and women over twenty years of age, and in establishing a complete system of proportional representation.[2] After twelve years of operation, this system was junked by the Nazi one-party state when Hitler made his Reichstag into the highest paid male chorus in the world!

Under the military occupation of Germany, representative legislative bodies were gradually set up and, in a few years, the various German states developed a variety of election systems, depending in part on what zones they belonged to,[3] with considerable experimentation spurred by either German or allied initiative. In due course, in 1949, a national government was set up in Bonn under a Basic Law approved by the three Western occupying powers.[4] This government resulted from elections held on August 14, 1949, under an electoral law which also had been approved by the three Military Governors.[5]

Thanks to the electoral experience of the Weimar and occupation periods, the Parliamentary Council which drew up the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany had a background which enabled it to arrive at a modern version of representative government. The views of the two largest parties, the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the Christian Democratic Party (CDU, CSU in Bavaria) carried the most weight, and the final decision reflects a compromise between them.[6] These party positions were expressed in the plenary session of the Parliamentary Council held on September 8, 1948. The Social Democrats favored a combination of proportional representation and plurality voting similar to the system found in the state of North Rhine-Westphalia in the British zone. The Christian Democrats preferred a system which produced clear-cut majorities in Parliament—which their spokesmen believed could be attained only "through the majority system in modified form." In this disagreement between the two major parties, one finds many of the basic issues involved in a modern consideration of the idea of a representative legislative body.

The drafting of the electoral law was a long and an arduous process. The first draft was dated February 24, 1949, and the final law was not promulgated until June 15. Disagreements with the Military Governors over whether one law should apply uniformly to the Federal Republic or whether each state should draw up its own law, were resolved in favor of a single national law. From the beginning a combination of the P. R. and majority-plurality systems was favored, the first draft providing for an equal number of seats to be allocated by

[2] Georg Kaisenberg, *Die Wahl zum Reichstag*, 4th ed. (Berlin, 1930), and James K. Pollock, *German Election Administration* (New York, 1934).

[3] See Seymour R. Bolten, "Military Government and the German Political Parties," *Annals*, Vol. 267, pp. 55–67 (Jan., 1950).

[4] Office of Military Government for Germany (U. S.), *Documents on the Creation of the Federal Constitution* (Berlin, 1949).

[5] See Lucius D. Clay, *Decision in Germany* (New York, 1950).

[6] *Documents*, pp. 140–154.

TABLE I

BAVARIA

Calculation of seats won on Land Lists

Divisor	CSU		SPD		BP		WAV		FDP	
1	1,380,448	1	1,075,416	2	986,478	3	681,888	5	404,145	9
2	690,224	4	537,708	6	493,239	7	340,944	13	202,072	20
3	460,149	8	358,472	10	328,826	12	227,296	18	134,715	32
4	345,112	11	268,854	15	246,619	16	170,472	25	101,036	42
5	276,089	14	215,083	19	197,295	21	136,377	31	80,829	55
6	230,074	17	179,236	23	164,413	26	113,648	38	67,357	65
7	197,206	22	153,630	27	140,925	29	97,412	46	57,735	76
8	172,556	24	134,427	33	123,309	35	85,236	51		
9	153,383	28	119,490	36	109,608	39	75,765	59		
10	138,044	30	107,541	40	98,647	43	68,188	64		
11	125,495	34	97,765	45	89,679	48	61,989	71		
12	115,037	37	89,618	49	82,206	53	56,824	78		
13	106,188	41	82,724	52	75,882	58				
14	98,603	44	76,815	56	70,462	62				
15	92,029	47	71,694	61	65,765	67				
16	86,278	50	67,213	66	61,654	72				
17	81,202	54	63,259	69	58,028	75				
18	76,691	57	59,745	74						
19	72,655	60								
20	69,022	63								
21	65,735	68								
22	62,747	70								
23	60,019	73								
24	57,518	77								
Total		24		18		17		12		7
Districts won		24		12		11		0		0
Seats won by P.R.		0		6		6		12		7

KPD	Independents
195,852	3,396

Less than the 5% required by law to figure in P.R. count

Total votes 4,727,623

.05

236,381.15

If no 5% rule, KPD would have been

1	195,852	23
2	97,926	46
3	65,284	71

CSU, WAV, & FDP would lose one seat each

47
31

78

P.R. and to be assigned to single-member districts.[7] A provision for a federal list to utilize remainders, reminiscent of the Weimar electoral law, was dropped at the suggestion of the Military Governors. Finally a 60-40 ratio of seats chosen in single-member districts to those selected by P.R. from lists in the individual *Länder*, or states, was recommended on June 1 by the Ministers-President and was promptly accepted by the allied authorities.[8] Included in the adopted law was a provision which denied representation to a party if it could not secure 5 per cent of the valid votes in a given state or obtain a seat in any one electoral district of that state. Another stipulation permitted *Land* (state) lists to be submitted only by political parties licensed in the *Land*. Table I illustrates how the distribution of seats is made under the law.

How did this new electoral system work in its first trial? By what criteria should it be judged? How does it meet these criteria?

Finer suggests that in judging an electoral system three main questions always arise: "Is it mathematically equitable? Does it produce a wholesome contact between constituents and representatives? Does it favor or jeopardize governmental stability?"[9] I would add, with de Grazia, that a good electoral system should work out an equilibrium of social forces at the same time that it reconciles unity and diversity.[10] I would also add that the amount of popular participation which it secures is not without significance.

[7] A study of the election laws of the eleven original German states which are included in the Federal Republic of Germany reveals many interesting variations in electoral procedures. All of the states except Rheinland-Palatinate and Bremen (and Berlin, which is not yet an integral part of the Bonn republic) have adopted some form of the combined plurality-P.R. system used in the election of Bundestag members. Although the percentages vary from state to state, they correspond to the 60-40 division of the federal law. Similarly, most of the states use the d'Hondt quota, and all of the states require a minimum percentage of votes before seats are obtained. When there have been more elections at the state level, it will be possible to compare state experience under varying electoral systems with the federal experience. There is at present an experimental attitude in the states toward their modified P.R. systems, and a healthy discussion of the relative merits of different systems is going on. Only the Heidelberg-centered *Wählergesellschaft* seems to have its mind made up.

[8] Article 8 provides that "*Land* Governments shall, in an approximate proportion of 60 to 40, distribute the seats allocated to their *Laender* between district and supplementary *Land* nomination lists." Article 9 provides that "one deputy shall be elected in each electoral district." P.R. is introduced in Article 10, which directs that "all votes cast in a *Land* shall be added together and from this total the mandates accruing to each party shall be calculated according to the maximum figure procedure (d'Hondt)." The number of mandates each party acquires by direct vote in the districts is deducted from the P.R. compilation. The seats accruing to a party from the supplementary *Land* lists are then allocated in the order of precedence of these nomination lists. The number of representatives allocated to each state is specified in Article 8, and vacancies are filled either by special elections in a district (if the vacancy is in one of the district seats) or by taking the next person on a party list (if the vacancy occurs in one of the seats filled from the *Land* lists).

[9] Herman Finer, *Theory and Practice of Modern Government*, rev. ed. (New York, 1949), p. 556.

[10] Alfred de Grazia, *Public and Republic* (New York, 1951), pp. 251–8.

TABLE II

RESULTS OF THE FEDERAL ELECTION ON 14 AUGUST 1949

	BADEN	%	BAVARIA	%	BREMEN	%	HAMBURG	%	HESSE	%	LOWER SAXONY	%	NORTHRHINE-WESTPH.	%	RHINELAND-PALATIN.	%	SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN	%	WUERTT.-BADEN	%	WUERTT.-HOHENZOLL.	%	FEDERAL TOTALS	%
ELIGIBLE VOTERS	815,221		5,980,683		379,639		1,130,655		2,907,297		4,408,190		6,678,335		1,902,150		1,730,060		2,519,244		727,946		31,179,422	
VOTERS PARTICIPATING	570,239	69.96	4,851,576	81.1	310,980	82.0	926,435	81.9	2,247,390	77.3	3,439,964	78.0	6,909,716	79.1	1,513,756	79.6	1,431,020	82.7	1,825,339	71.3	499,196	64.5	24,495,613	78.5
VALID VOTES CAST	542,723		4,727,623		303,985		905,444		2,128,278		3,365,965		6,726,543		1,431,556		1,397,671		1,749,271		483,459		23,732,389	
INVALID VOTES CAST	27,516		123,953		7,115		20,991		119,112		73,999		183,175		82,200		33,349		76,068		15,737		763,215	
PARTY VOTE																								
1 CDU/(CSU)	277,276	51.1	1,380,448	29.2	51,290	16.9	178,786	19.8	454,437	21.3	593,691	17.6	2,481,523	36.9	702,125	49.1	426,956	30.7	542,588	31.0	267,984	55.1	7,359,094	31.0
2 SPD	129,599	23.7	1,075,416	22.8	104,509	34.4	358,873	39.5	684,042	32.1	1,128,296	33.4	2,109,172	31.4	406,906	28.6	413,257	29.6	441,237	25.2	88,670	18.9	6,934,975	29.2
3 FDP/DVP/BDV	94,612	17.4	404,145	8.5	39,228	12.9	143,371	15.8	597,081	28.0	252,141	7.5	581,456	8.6	226,622	15.8	103,492	7.4	318,498	18.2	69,271	15.3	2,829,980	11.9
4 KPD	22,755	4.2	195,852	4.1	20,530	6.7	78,747	8.5	142,539	6.7	104,132	3.1	513,225	7.6	89,026	6.2	43,746	3.1	129,253	7.4	23,573	5.2	1,361,708	5.7
5 BP	—		966,479	20.9	—		—		—		—		—		—		—		—		—		966,479	4.2
6 DP	—		—		54,569	18.0	118,583	13.1	—		397,542	17.8	—		—		169,240	12.1	—		—		939,934	4.0
7 DKP/DRP	—		—		—		10,838	1.2	—		273,129	8.1	117,998	1.8	—		27,066	1.9	—		—		429,031	1.8
8 EVD	19,481	3.6	—		—		—		—		—		—		—		—		—		6,681	1.5	26,162	0.1
9 RSF	—		—		6,446	2.1	13,830	1.5	—		33,275	1.0	142,646	2.1	—		18,122	1.3	2,428	0.2	—		216,749	0.9
10 FWVP	—		—		—		—		—		—		21,931	0.3	—		—		—		—		21,931	0.1
11 SSW	—		—		—		—		—		—		—		—		75,396	5.4	—		—		75,396	0.3
12 WAV	—		681,888	14.4	—		—		—		—		—		—		—		—		—		681,888	2.9
13 ZP	—		—		—		—		—		115,464	3.4	601,435	8.9	—		12,806	0.9	—		—		727,805	3.1
14 INDEPENDENTS	—		3,396	0.1	27,293	9.0	4,416	0.5	250,179	11.9	273,296	8.1	187,155	2.4	4,875	0.3	108,800	7.6	315,237	18.0	—		1,141,647	4.8
TOTALS	542,723	100	4,727,623	100	303,985	100	905,444	100	2,128,278	100	3,365,965	100	6,726,543	100	1,431,556	100	1,397,671	100	1,749,271	100	483,459	100	23,732,389	100

DISTRIBUTION OF SEATS

	DEPUTIES ELECTED DIRECT	LAND LISTS	TOTAL	DEPUTIES ELECTED DIRECT	LAND LISTS	TOTAL	DEPUTIES ELECTED DIRECT	LAND LISTS	TOTAL	DEPUTIES ELECTED DIRECT	LAND LISTS	TOTAL	DEPUTIES ELECTED DIRECT	LAND LISTS	TOTAL	DEPUTIES ELECTED DIRECT	LAND LISTS	TOTAL	DEPUTIES ELECTED DIRECT	LAND LISTS	TOTAL	DEPUTIES ELECTED DIRECT	LAND LISTS	TOTAL	DEPUTIES ELECTED DIRECT	LAND LISTS	TOTAL	DEPUTIES ELECTED DIRECT	LAND LISTS	TOTAL
1 CDU(CSU)	7	—	7	24	—	24	—	1	1	3	—	3	3	6	9	4	8	12	40	3	43	11	2	13	7	1	8	11	1	12	5	2	7	115	24	139
2 SPD	—	3	3	12	6	18	3	—	3	4	2	6	12	1	13	24	—	24	25	12	37	4	3	7	6	2	8	5	5	10	1	1	2	98	33	131
3 FDP/DVP/BDV	—	2	2	—	7	7	—	1	1	1	1	2	7	5	12	1	4	5	1	9	10	—	4	4	—	2	2	2	5	7	—	1	1	12	40	52
4 KPD	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	1	—	2	2	—	—	—	—	9	9	—	1	1	—	—	—	—	2	2	—	—	—	—	15	15
5 BP	—	—	—	11	6	17	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	11	6	17
6 DP	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	1	—	1	1	—	—	—	5	7	12	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	3	3	—	—	—	—	—	—	5	12	17
7 DKP/DRP	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	5	5	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	5	5
8 SSW	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	1
12 WAV	—	—	—	—	12	12	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	12	12
13 ZP	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	10	10	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	10	10
14 INDEPENDENTS	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	1	2	—	2	—	—	—	3	—	3
TOTALS	7	5	12	47	31	78	3	2	5	8	5	13	22	14	36	34	24	58	66	43	109	15	10	25	14	9	23	20	13	33	6	4	10	242	160	402

II

Let me submit the election returns of 1949 to close analysis.[11] Table II, prepared by OMGUS, gives a summary of all basic figures. These, first of all, make it quite clear that the new system has secured mathematical equitability. A glance at Tables III and IV shows, in addition, that the advantages of a straight P.R. system in accurately representing all of the main streams of opinion are present in the new German combination system. The selection of 40 per cent of the delegates to the *Bundestag* from the *Land* lists made it possible to rectify any imbalance caused by plurality election in the 242 districts, and produced a Parliament which accurately reflects minority as well as majority opinion. A straight plurality system would not have given any one party the majority, and such a system would certainly have excluded a number of smaller parties from any representation at all.[12]

Reference to Tables V and VI demonstrates, among other things, that nearly 40 per cent of the total popular vote was cast for all of the small parties (the CDU and SPD constituting the major parties). With these votes the small parties secured 32.6 per cent of the seats, i.e., 132. The largest of the minor parties, the FDP, received 77 per cent of its seats through the operation of the P.R. provisions of the law. Interestingly enough, no less than 1,141,647 votes, or 4.8 per cent of the total vote, were cast for Independent candidates (*Parteilose*). Quite clearly the German voters do not want to be regimented or restricted even to several parties. Even with the 5 per cent rule, three Independents were elected by direct vote in the districts; and if they could have pooled their strength on *Land* lists, they would have received more. This does not mean, however, that the present system does not discriminate at all against the small parties. With 39.8 per cent of the popular vote, they received only 32.6 per cent of the seats in the *Bundestag*—a fact which would not, of course, be

[11] See also the excellent article by Otto Kirchheimer and Arnold Price, "Analysis and Effects of the Elections in Western Germany," in *State Department Bulletin*, Vol. 21, No. 537, pp. 563–573 (Oct. 17, 1949), and note *Wirtschaft und Statistik*, Vol. 1, No. 5, pp. 128–132 (Aug., 1949).

[12] Without P.R., four parties (KPD, DKP/DRP, WAV, and ZP) would have had no representation at all. Thus on a national basis P.R. effectively counters the defects of the district system by awarding representation to the smaller parties in close proportion to the popular vote received.

GLOSSARY OF POLITICAL PARTIES

1	CDU(CSU):	Christian Democratic Union (Christian Social Union, in Bavaria)
2	SPD:	Social Democratic Party of Germany
3	FDP(DVP)(BDV):	Free Democratic Party (Democratic People's Party, in Wuerttemberg), (Bremen Democratic People's Party, in Bremen)
4	KPD:	Communist Party of Germany
5	BP:	Bavarian Party
6	DP:	German Party
7	DKP/DRP:	German Conservative Party, German Rightist Party
8	EVD:	European People's Movement of Germany
9	RSF:	Radical Social Freedom Party
10	RWVP:	Rhenish-Westphalian People's Party
11	SSW:	South-Schleswig Voters Association
12	WAV:	Economic Reconstruction Association
13	ZP:	Center Party
14	Independents:	Including Parties not Licensed on Land Leve

TABLE III

COMPARISON BETWEEN PRESENT GERMAN ELECTORAL SYSTEM AND STRAIGHT P.R. AND PLURALITY SYSTEMS

	P.R.	Plurality	Bundestag
CDU, CSU	34.5	47.5	34.6
SPD	32.5	39.7	32.6
FDP, DVP, BDV	13.0	5.0	12.9
KPD	3.8	—	3.7
BP	4.2	4.5	4.2
DP	4.2	2.1	4.2
DRP, DKP	1.2	—	1.2
SSW	0.3	—	0.3
WAV	3.0	—	3.0
ZP	2.5	—	2.5
Independent	0.8	1.2	0.8
	100.0	100.0	100.0

considered an objection among writers who favor strong governments based on a plurality system. In any event, it must be recorded that the dual system of single member districts combined with P.R. slightly favors the large parties at the same time that it gives fairly proportional representation to the small parties.

Having noted the effect of partial proportional representation in securing accuracy in representation, we may now ask what has been the effect of elect-

TABLE IV

COMPARISON OF PRESENT GERMAN ELECTION SYSTEM WITH STRAIGHT PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION

Party	Seats Received	Seats Under P.R.	Votes Per Seat Received
CDU/CSU	139	125	52,932
SPD	131	117	52,918
FDP/BDV	52	48	54,382
BP	17	17	58,036
DP	17	16	55,299
KPD	15	23	90,667
WAV	12	12	56,832
ZP	10	12	54,382
DRP/DKP	5	7	85,790
Independents	2	15	422,315
SSW	1	1	75,387
Refugees	1	5	318,418
Other	—	4	—
Total	402	402	59,711*

* Average number of valid votes for each seat.

TABLE V

PARTY STRENGTH ON A REGIONAL BASIS

(As represented by the number of deputies elected to the Bundestag from Länder)
FEDERAL TOTALS: 402 Seats—23,732,398 valid votes cast

Party	Direct	Land List	% of Seats	Votes	% of Votes	Differential*
FDP	12	40	12.9	2,829,920	11.9	+1.0%
KPD	0	15	3.7	1,361,708	5.7	−2.0%
BP	11	6	4.2	986,478	4.2	even
DP	5	12	4.2	939,934	4.0	+0.2%
DKP/DRP	0	5	1.2	429,031	1.8	−0.6%
EVD	0	0	—	26,162	0.1	−0.1%
RSF	0	0	—	216,749	0.9	−0.9%
RWVP	0	0	—	21,931	0.1	−0.1%
SSW	0	1	0.2	75,386	0.3	−0.1%
WAV	0	12	3.0	681,888	2.9	+0.1%
ZP	0	10	2.5	727,505	3.1	−0.6%
Independents	3	0	0.7	1,141,647	4.8	−4.1%
Totals	31	101	32.6	9,438,339	39.8	

* Difference between % of seats gained and % of votes received.

ing 242 deputies in single-member districts by a relative majority—by what Americans call a plurality. It can be seen from Table II above that the two largest parties elected 115 and 96 deputies from districts out of their totals of 139 and 131 seats respectively in the *Bundestag*, but that only 31 deputies of the minor parties were elected in the districts. Individual analysis of the contests in the 242 districts discloses the further interesting fact that very few districts were won by a clear majority vote. Examining the three largest states, we find in North Rhine-Westphalia that winning percentages ranged all the way from

TABLE VI

P.R. DISTRIBUTION

Party	% Vote	BUNDESTAG SEATS				Total	Difference
		DIRECT		LAND LIST			
		Seats	Per Cent	Seats	Per Cent		
FDP	11.9	12	2.99	40	9.96	12.95	+1.0%
KPD	5.7	0	—	15	3.74	3.74	−2.0%
BP	4.2	11	2.74	6	1.49	4.23	even
DP	4.0	5	1.24	12	2.99	4.23	+0.2%
DKP	1.8	0	—	5	1.24	1.24	−0.6%
SSW	0.3	0	—	1	0.25	0.25	−0.1%
WAV	2.9	0	—	12	3.00	3.00	+0.1%
ZP	3.1	0	—	10	2.49	2.49	−0.6%
IND.	4.8	3	.75	0	—	.75	−4.1%

25 per cent to 64 per cent; that 43 of the 66 districts were won with 35 to 45 per cent of the vote, 10 with less than 35 per cent, 13 with over 45 per cent and only 7 of these with a majority. (See Table VII.) In Bavaria only one district was carried by a majority vote (District 38) while in Lower Saxony there were only two such districts (Districts 4 and 19).

TABLE VII

PARTY PERCENTAGES OF POPULAR VOTE, BY DISTRICTS, IN NORTH RHINE-WESTPHALIA

Percentages	CDU	SPD	FDP	KPD	DKP	RSF	RWVP	Z
0– 5%	1		20	25	58	62	64	30
5–10%			22	19	2	4		13
10–15%			15	19	1			9
15–20%		5	6	2				3
20–25%	2	13	1	1				9
25–30%	11	7						1
30–35%	16	20						1
35–40%	13	10	1					
40–45%	12	9						
45–50%	4	2						
50–55%	3							
55–60%	1							
60–65%	3							
Average	36.9%	31.4%	8.6%	7.6%	1.8%	2.1%	.3%	8.9%

Number of delegates elected from districts: 66.

In the party struggle the Social Democrats elected only one of their district candidates by a clear majority, this striking victory occurring in the city of Hannover, where until recently the party kept its national headquarters. The Christian Democrats, on the other hand, as the leading party, were able to elect 26 of their 115 district candidates by an absolute majority, 8 of these in the Rhine-Palatinate, 6 in North Rhine-Westphalia, and 4 each in Baden and Württemberg-Hohenzollern—all states in which the party is strong.

The average winning plurality for the whole country was around 35 per cent. When one adds to this fact another one of significance—namely that many districts are won by percentages as low as 25, and some by only a few hundred votes—one gets an excellent idea of what would have happened in the *Bundestag* election if these close plurality victories had been the only basis for securing fair representation in Germany's Parliament. Election by single-member districts has much to commend it where clear majorities result, but with a multi-party system it can be seen how illusory the idea of majority election could become. This is the reason for the inaccuracy of the nomenclature used by anti-P.R. writers, who keep referring to their favored system as a Majority System (*Mehrheitswahl*) when in fact it is more often a Plurality System. If there had been a single-member district system in force without the balancing factor of P.R. in the 1949 *Bundestag* election, the leading party, with 34.5 per

cent of the popular vote, would have received 47.5 per cent of the seats. It is only one step further to the infamous Acerbo law of Mussolini whereby any party which received more votes than any other party, provided that they amounted to at least 25 per cent (a mere plurality), was given two-thirds of the seats!

Interestingly enough, most of the leading party figures in the *Bundestag* were elected from the districts, including all members of the Adenauer cabinet except Vice-Chancellor Blücher. Only in the case of the smaller parties do some of the leaders owe their election to reserve lists under P.R. (Baumgartner and Loritz in Bavaria, for example). Both personal observation in Germany and conversations with *Bundestag* deputies lead me to conclude that the direct election feature of the new German law is a great improvement over the Weimar system. The districts are quite large in population (about 200,000); but deputies now pay a great deal of attention to their districts (242 of them do), and a closer contact exists today between members of Parliament and their constituents than was the case during the Weimar period. This feature of the law does personalize elections and therefore makes an essential contribution to the success of the combined system.

III

But how has the new law affected governmental stability? So many factors other than the electoral system are involved in considering this question that one can easily get far afield. Chancellor Adenauer was elected by a one-vote majority in 1949; but thanks to Article 67 of the Basic Law, a Chancellor once in power can be replaced only by a successor elected by the *Bundestag* with a majority of its membership. This provision, plus the great respect accorded to Dr. Adenauer, not to mention his remarkable shrewdness and experience, has contributed to giving West Germany a stable government. Under the electoral law, it is true, all governments are likely to be coalition governments; but this situation results from the existence of many parties, a fact which would in all probability continue to complicate the German party situation whatever the electoral law might be, unless, as indicated above, such a law utterly disregarded minority groups and based election on mere pluralities.

In the 1949 election small parties and independent candidates contended for election even when they were faced with certain defeat, and when they could be given no reserve seats under proportional representation provisions. (Unless they could secure 5 per cent of the vote in a *Land* or one seat in a district of that *Land*, they were not entitled to cumulate their votes for use in electing candidates from the reserve list.) But since the present German system puts a premium on the concentration of voting strength, thus eliminating a great evil of dissipated and wasted votes of the Weimar system, even Independents *can* be elected, and in fact three were elected to the *Bundestag* in 1949.

It would seem, therefore, that the experience so far indicates that although all parties, large or small—and even independents—are fairly treated, governmental stability has not been jeopardized. When the refugee groups develop

an effective national organization, there may arise another large party and some small parties like the WAV may be atrophied. But in any case, with numerous parties in existence, coalition government can never be as easy as two-party government; and only the exclusion of small parties could produce the strong government with unchallenged authority which several writers, both German and German-American, seem to desire.[13] Meanwhile, German opinion and governmental arrangments being what they are, a strong stable government does exist at present, and the basis for similar stable governments in the future also exists. If democracy means anything, it certainly should provide for a clear expression of the public will; and if that recording of public opinion is confused and divided, there must be arrangements to get on with the work of government by coordinating conflicting views. To say that the Germans are confused is to put it mildly. They have nevertheless devised an electoral system which not only permits the expression of many diverse views but which also provides a means of pulling divergent views together under a stable—many would even say an enlightened—government.

A few words dealing with the popular participation secured under the new German election law seems also to be necessary. We find that a high participation of 78.5 per cent was achieved in the election of 1949. This corresponds to the pattern which prevailed during the normal years of the Weimar Republic, and is somewhat higher than in the elections since 1945 during the occupation period.[14] Under the different conditions of the postwar period it is noteworthy that the German voting record continues to be high and to compare favorably with the records of other democratic countries. In any case, the new law has not resulted in lowering voting participation, at the same time that it has succeeded in eliminating wasted votes. And although the percentage of invalid votes in 1949 was higher than it was under straight P.R. in Weimar days, this appears to be due to certain political conditions and not to the electoral system.

It is, of course, too early to say whether the present equilibrium of social forces and the present reasonably united German government will become the pattern for the future. Cabinet government under a multi-party system is at best a difficult business. However, insofar as electoral arrangements can fairly provide, the German combined district-P.R. system appears at this time to have contributed toward stable and representative government. Actually the Germans, presented with various theories of representation, may well have been more influenced by practical party considerations than by anything else; they have nonetheless produced a new synthesis of antithetical electoral sys-

[13] See F. A. Hermens, *Demokratie oder Anarchie* (Frankfurt, 1951). This is a new German edition of an earlier English text with a new foreword by Alfred Weber. See also Arnold Brecht's article in *Social Research*, Vol. 16, pp. 446–449 (Dec., 1949), and Carl J. Friedrich's in AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, Vol. 43, p. 712 (Aug., 1949), in addition to Friedrich's foreword to Hermens' book. A useful but opinionated German pamphlet is G. B. Hartmann, *Für und wider das Mehrheits-wahlrecht* (Frankfurt, 1950), a publication of the German Institute of Public Affairs.

[14] See Kirchheimer and Price (cited above, n. 11), pp. 564–6.

tems which not only has worked, but meets any fair set of criteria for a good representative system.

Finally, this analysis and evaluation would not be complete without a few critical comments about certain other details, some minor, some significant, of the new electoral law. For instance, it should be noted that voting districts are far from being equal in population. The average parliamentary district contains between 150,000 and 200,000 people, but there is wide variation between states and within states. In Baden the difference between the largest and smallest district is 36,521; in Bavaria, 49,085; in North Rhine-Westphalia, 115,656; and in Schleswig-Holstein, 25,342. In North Rhine-Westphalia there are six districts with populations of 250,000 or more, and six with populations under 150,000.[15] In Lower Saxony districts range in population from 102,000 to 229,000. These variations could be significant; but, thanks to the corrective of P.R. reserve lists, a vote in a larger district, although not as weighty in the election of a district member, has equal value in the calculations under the d'Hondt quota. Actually the variations between districts in the United States and France are much greater than in Germany and affect more seriously the representative result.

Another defect of the German electoral law was revealed in Bremen, where the SPD won 60 per cent of the representation with only 34.4 per cent of the popular vote. This was due to the fact that the total number of representatives from Bremen, three, was so small that P.R. did not have the opportunity to correct any inequities in the district system. If all the German states could be of more uniform population, or at least have a minimum population of over a million people, a result like this would not occur. In other words, the basic territorial organization of a country has a distinct bearing on the operation of its electoral system.

One other provision of the law, which allows a party to retain all the seats won in districts even though this number exceeds the proportion under the d'Hondt quota calculations, should be pointed out. In the 1949 election this situation occurred in Bremen and Baden, with the result that the SPD was over-represented in Bremen and the CDU in Baden. The inequity was mild, but conceivably it might not always be so. This provision should be watched in future elections.

IV

My conclusion, after studying the evidence, is that the present German electoral system is on the whole fair and accurate. It has brought most of the representatives closer to the voters, and it has held the balance fairly even among the numerous parties, though it has slightly favored the larger parties. Some small injustices in individual cases and in individual states have occurred: but even the refugee candidates, who in this election were unable to put up

[15] It may be significant that five of the six overpopulated districts were SPD constituencies.

Land lists of their own, managed through the other parties to elect about forty of their number to the *Bundestag*, while independent candidates ran in nine states and were elected in three districts. Perhaps in future elections the two large party machines will make it more difficult for the smaller parties to function. Yet under the combination of district election and 40 per cent proportional representation, German voters of all shades of opinion may cast their votes and be assured that they will count in the choice of members of Parliament.

One cannot measure the exact relation between governmental stability and the electoral system since several other factors are involved. It will be wiser therefore to await a later date, after there has been the experience of several more elections, before passing final judgment on this point. The Germans have, however, devised a sound and workable electoral system which, if it is not maneuvered for partisan advantage, promises to emerge as a real contribution to representative government.

PUBLIC OPINION AND POLITICAL PARTIES IN FRANCE

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To any observer the French party system is bewildering. On the one hand, he sees that ten parliamentary groups are officially established in the National Assembly (not including the Overseas Independents);[1] and, at the same time, he notes that only five of them are really organized throughout the country, and so entitled to be considered "parties" in the true sense of the word: the RPF, the Radicals, the MRP, the Socialists, and the Communists. On the other hand, he observes that the ablest French specialists in electoral sociology—particularly André Siegfried and his disciple, François Goguel—consider that, behind the apparent profusion of political groups, two basic divisions are always found, the continuing opposition of which has supplied for more than a century the essential dynamics of French politics. These two divisions are, of course, the Right and the Left, traditionally called "Order" and "Movement."[2] Nevertheless, the brief history of the Fourth Republic reveals an attempt to break down these two blocs, and to build a "Third Force" from smaller units. Under various names, such a Third Force has governed France from March, 1947, to March, 1952; and if our hypothetical observer will look back and analyze the political life of the Third Republic, he will find the same tendency there, not so marked and not so strong, but always present.

A dual tendency behind multiple parties and an effort to break through this dualism by forming a movement of the Center, casting the extremes into the opposition: this pattern is a fairly accurate description of what remains constant in the French political scene. But within this frame, which is practically intact, a profound change has taken place. That is to say, although the container is almost exactly the same, the liquid it holds has changed considerably. In particular, without causing what may properly be called a rupture, World War II abruptly brought to the surface divisions which, until then, had been secondary and submerged.

I. MULTIPARTYISM AND ITS BASES

The present-day divisions of public opinion in France cannot be considered separate from the European political developments of the last hundred years. French multipartyism today assuredly reveals many characteristics peculiar to the nation, but these have developed from a basis common to all European

[1] Communists, Progressive Republicans, Socialists (SFIO), Popular Republicans (MRP), Radical Socialists, Democratic and Social Union of the Resistance (UDSR), Rally of the French People (RPF), Independent Republicans, Independent Republicans for Peasant Social Action, and Peasants' Party.

[2] See André Siegfried, *Tableau Politique de la France de l'Ouest sous la Troisième République* (Paris, 1913) and *Géographie électorale de l'Ardèche sous la Troisième République* (Paris, 1949); and François Goguel, *La Politique des Partis sous la Troisième République* (Paris, 1946) and *Géographie des élections françaises de 1870 à 1951* (Paris, 1952).

peoples. In other words, the political temperament of France in 1952 is composed of a national superstructure built upon a substructure common to all nations in Western Europe.

The substructure was itself built first of all upon the fundamental conflict which dominated the nineteenth century, that between conservatives and liberals. This conflict was complex, born of many factors, in which ideas from both the French and American revolutions, on the one hand, and economic changes, on the other, seem to have played an essential role. The principal actors were a land-owning aristocracy, bound to the monarchical principles of the old regime, and, opposed to this aristocracy, an industrial, commercial, and intellectual bourgeoisie, attracted by the principles of political liberty.[3]

The first phase in the moulding of the prevailing spirit in modern Europe ended with the appearance and development of the socialist parties, at the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth. Industrial concentration and the growth of an urban proletariat, the development of trade unions and the propagation of Marxian doctrines and, finally, universal suffrage were factors which preceded and marked the change. Between 1900 and 1914, the bipartisan tendency which had dominated the preceding century was replaced everywhere by a swing toward tripartisanism; the "conservative-liberal" duo now changed to a "conservative-liberal-socialist" trio.

The Russian Revolution of 1917 and the setting up of the Soviet regime were bound to provoke violent reactions within the socialist parties during the years 1920 to 1924. Often the result was a split, a communist party usually being formed from one of the various pieces. The trio then gave way to a quartet: conservatives, liberals, socialists, and communists. Ten years later the advent of the Nazi regime, which followed on the heels of the Italian Fascist system and various Balkan experiments, created some ferment among the young generation of anti-communists. They were uneasy because of the weakness and powerlessness of the old conservatives and liberals (and socialists as well); and it was then that in almost all European countries various movements more or less fascist began to evolve (led by Mosley in England, Quisling in Norway, Mussert in Holland, Degrelle in Belgium, Doriot and La Rocque in France, etc.). The quartet began to turn into a quintet. A reverse movement was started in 1945 by the destruction of these same fascist parties, which had played the role of fifth columns for the German army. But the same causes begetting the same effects, they can be seen surging up once more on the horizon under scarcely different guises.

[3] Of course, this schema often became more complicated. In the Scandinavian countries, the presence of a small peasantry developed an agrarian liberalism; in the Catholic countries, the religious question superimposed itself on political and social oppositions; in Germany and Austria, national and local rivalries displaced the "conservative-liberal" rivalry. Then, too, in the second half of the nineteenth century, disagreements broke out between moderate and radical liberals, sometimes going so far as to result in a schism—but rarely. But in spite of all this, the fundamental opposition between the conservatives and the liberals is easily perceptible in leading European countries during the nineteenth century. The reader is referred, on this point, to Charles Seignobos' fundamental book, *Histoire politique de l'Europe Contemporaine*, 2 vols., 3rd ed. (Paris, 1928).

Thus the motif of the political development among the European peoples for the past century has been a trend toward a multiplication of "spiritual families," evolving from an original bipartisanship to a tripartisanship with the appearance of the socialists and then to a quadripartisanship with the development of communism. Most recently the rebirth of fascism tends to add a fifth party. But this common web has been more or less modified in each country by the influence of national factors. In some countries a tendency counter to the direction of the general trend has limited the multiplication of parties; other countries, including France, have witnessed a fertilization of the tendency toward multipartisanism. This double phenomenon explains why the line of development in Europe as a whole has assumed such a complex character.

The presence or absence of "brakes" upon the tendency to multiply has played an important part in this matter. In certain countries the influence of these brakes has been very great, whether they worked through the operation of the electoral system or through the strong organization of the parties themselves. It is a recognized fact that single elections determined by an absolute majority tend to support or reestablish bipartisanship, whereas other systems ("run-off" elections or proportional representation) are inclined to favor multipartisanship. In Great Britain, for example, the trend to eliminate the Liberal Party can clearly be seen by an examination of the single-member constituency and plurality system of elections of the period from 1919 to 1935, the final result of which was the "Conservative-Labour" combination, successor to the "Conservative-Liberal" combination. Elsewhere in the Commonwealth—in New Zealand, and in Australia prior to 1914 as examples—the same electoral system also gave impetus to the fusion of Conservatives and Liberals. But France has not used the method of the single ballot since 1848, having preferred either "run-off" elections or P.R.—both systems which tend toward multipartisanism.[4] Instead of the brake, she has used the accelerator.

Strongly organized parties as well as particular electoral systems constitute an effective obstacle to multiplication. When powerful "machines" have been operating for a long time in a country, new political tendencies are apt to be absorbed by them as they appear, either because the machine prevents them from expressing themselves or because the machine itself expresses them through a sort of internal renovation. Thus the radical tendency at the end of the nineteenth century resulted in the formation of a separate party only in those countries where the liberal party was loosely organized, as it was in France. Elsewhere—in Great Britain and in Belgium, for example—this tendency expressed itself within the liberal party itself. In the same way communist parties have often developed as a part of the existing organization of the socialist parties[5]; and in those countries where socialist parties are well integrated, the communist parties have stayed weak and without political influence. And, finally, the growth of fascist parties has taken place in those countries where the

[4] Cf. on this point Maurice Duverger, *Les partis politiques* (Paris, 1951), pp. 236 ff., and *L'Influence des systèmes electoraux sur la vie politique* (Paris, 1950).

[5] This was the case in France and in Italy. Germany, however, from 1919 to 1933 proved an exception.

conservative parties were poorly organized. In France the absence of a trade union basis has always given the socialist parties the parliamentary and electoral character that is in keeping with an essentially loose organization; and no powerful conservatve party has ever existed.

The lack of restraints upon the common tendency to multiply political divisions has in France been accompanied by factors which have provoked supplementary divisions. The most important of these has been the internal division of the Right and the absence of a unified conservative party. In the middle of the nineteenth century, the period when the fundamental opposition of conservatives and liberals first started in Europe, French conservatives were already subdivided into three irreducible fragments, formed during the aftermath of the Revolution of 1789: the Legitimists (partisans of the "legitimate" monarchy of Louis XVI and Louis XVIII), the Orleanists (partisans of the monarchy of Louis Philippe) and the Bonapartists (partisans of the Emperor Napoleon). There was no question of integrated parties, but only of tendencies with indeterminate limits and no stable organization. Forty years later, at the beginning of the Third Republic, the Right showed the same rifts and the same lack of organization. A tradition was born, which has remained alive and strong: the French conservatives, having rejected at the beginning both a political framework and unification, normally operate as divided and inorganic units. Except under unusual circumstances, there does not exist in France–at least to the right of the Radicals—political parties worthy of the name. This normal state of affairs ceases only when there is a serious threat to national security or when some other compelling concern creates an ephemeral coalition around one man (as that around Louis Napoleon in 1848, General Boulanger in 1886–1889, and Colonel de la Rocque in 1937–1938). To a certain extent, de Gaulleism today is the same type of phenomenon.

France has really never experienced the bipartisanship of the nineteenth century, not only because the conservatives have split internally, but also because the dividing line separating them from the liberals has never been very clear. This means that there are always intermediary groups which, trying to minimize differences and establish contacts, are willing to serve the Right as well as the Left and to influence both towards the Center. The existence of these "pivotal parties," oscillating between the two extremes, is still another tradition of French political life. After the Bonapartists and the Orleanists of 1830–1850, the "Opportunists" filled this role between 1880 and 1914 and the Radicals between 1919 and 1939. It is the Radicals who share the role today with the MRP.

Another cause of the present ideological divisions in France stems from the actual political role played by the Catholic Church in the nineteenth century, and even more from the conception of this role which people have held in mind. At first the majority of the clergy were favorable to the Revolution of 1789; but when an attempt was made to impose on them the famous "Civil Constitution," they were thrown into the opposite camp. During the nineteenth century the Church, as a matter of fact, was the basic link among all the parties

of the Right. In 1848 a change nearly took place when the great movement of social catholicism, stirred by the misery of the working classes, drew the clergy toward the people. (Almost everywhere the revolutionaries called on the priests to bless the "liberty trees.") But then the bourgeoisie—Voltairean and atheist for the most part at that time—began to return to the Church in fear of socialism; and the Church, as of old, took on the function of cementing the rifts between the various conservative tendencies.[6] This historical role fired republican hostility against "clericalism" at the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth, and it is this resentment which explains, in large measure, the passionate tone struck in France when questions arise concerning aid to Catholic schools. The problem could easily be resolved if only it could be lifted out of its historical context and separated from the reactions it provokes in the political subconscious of the citizens.

The Catholicism of the nineteenth century, in other words, can be considered to have been an agent of political union among all conservative tendencies rather than one of division. Today, however, this is not the case. In practice, the religious question alone separates the Radicals from members of the Right, and the MRP (apart from certain conservative elements) from the Socialists. It is less a present religious question than the memory of one, but that memory is deep. In 1945 the dream of creating a huge "French Labor Party" from a union of Socialists and the MRP failed because the anti-clericalism of the former could not exist side by side with the clericalism of the latter. The grants to non-government schools, approved by statute in October, 1951, have widened this breach.

The general evolutionary process of the past century, which has been influenced both by national factors and by factors common among European nations, makes it possible to describe the "political compass-card" of present-day France. The great "spiritual families" of Europe provide the background for the French picture—i.e., conservatives, liberals, socialists, communists, and fascists. The first family is divided into multiple groups on the Right; these are divided and unorganized in keeping with the traditional state of French conservatism. The second family, the liberals, includes both the Radical Party and the right wing of the MRP. The left wing of the MRP and the SFIO[7] are co-heirs to the socialist patrimony. (As we have seen, this complication results from the religious conflicts of 1900–1910. The Right of the MRP is composed of Catholics in the liberal tradition of the nineteenth century—"Christian Radicals," so to speak; and the Left of the same party is made up of Catholics more or less clearly socialist.) The French Communist Party (to which a small number of poorly organized "Christian Progressives" should be added) incarnates purely and simply the European communistic tendency,

[6] Cf. Henri Guillemin, *Histoire des Catholiques français au XIXeme siècle* (Geneva, 1947), a passionate and partisan book by a "leftist" Catholic, but accurate on the whole. See also Adrien Dansette, *Histoire religieuse de la France contemporaine*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1950–1951).

[7] French Section of the Workers' International, official name of the French Socialist Party since it was unified in 1905, after the International Socialist Congress in Amsterdam.

which the weakness of the socialists has to the present allowed to develop in France. On the other hand, the RFP cannot be completely assimilated within a fascist party; it corresponds more nearly to the traditional Bonapartist movement of French conservatives. And the personality of its leader, whose moral integrity is unquestionable, gives it a quite distinctive character.

This multiplicity of groups and parties resulting from the evolutionary process described above provides only one side of the picture of contemporary French public opinion; behind them, still other types of groupings have been formed, resulting in more or less permanent coalitions which play an important part in another side of the picture.

II. COALITIONS AND EQUILIBRIUM BETWEEN POLITICAL POWERS

In all countries with multiparty systems, alliances have a basic importance. The numerous cellules into which public opinion is broken up generally tend to reassemble into two or three conformations. This phenomenon has always been very marked in France; and the best observers of the political scene have been able to perceive, behind the numerous parties, the enduring character of relatively stable coalitions which come to power more or less regularly. The history of the Third Republic can thus be described as the struggle between the "party of Order" and the "party of Movement"—the Right and the Left; and this duality in tendencies has been retained as a working base by the majority of French specialists in electoral sociology.[8] However, the development of public opinion immediately after World War II made for such a reversal in alliances that it has brought a fundamental change in the traditional equilibrium of the political powers.

It was essentially the religious question that caused the parties to regroup into two large opposition camps under the Third Republic. Against a Right in which the Catholic Church was the main bond, the various elements of the Left formed at the beginning of the twentieth century a coalition which rejected the myth of the "clerical menace." It is true that after the War of 1914 this question was only secondary to other, more immediate concerns of the public; but it continued to serve as the dividing line between political coalitions and to hold an important place in the political subconscious. Especially in the small towns and in the rural areas, partisans and adversaries grouped themselves with relation to the priest, as "clericals" and "anticlericals."[9] Laicism denoted the stamp of the Left, and Catholicism that of the Right. It was impossible to be a true Leftist, according to the prevailing opinion, and go to Mass. An effort on the part of a small group of Catholics to create a left party which would not

[8] See above, n. 2.

[9] The "clerical" problem played a certain role in the 1924 elections because of its introduction into the recovered Alsace-Lorraine, in which were still operative the laws voted at the beginning of the century. These laws provided for separation of church and state, lay teaching, regulation of religious congregations, etc. In addition, the members of the teaching profession, and especially those of the primary grades (who play a fairly important role in the framework of the Socialist Party), have remained very sensitive regarding the problem of private schools—which are virtually synonymous with denominational schools.

be anti-clerical (Popular Democratic Party) was largely a failure; the membership was weak and had no real influence on the national scene.

World War II produced a basic change with regard to the religious issue. On the one hand, in the Resistance, the old traditional division broke down. While the Radical Party—the ancient pillar of the anti-clerical Left—contributed only a small effort in the fight against the enemy occupant, militant Catholics (former members of the Popular Democratic Party and of the divisions of the ACJF),[10] played a very active role, along with the Socialists and Communists. On the other hand, economic troubles brought to the fore problems for solutions which the Third Republic had always tried to avoid. It was necessary to choose between "liberal" and "State-controlled" methods, between a conservative social policy and a progressive social policy, etc.; and the same militant Catholics who took part in the Resistance did not hesitate to take rather a socialistic stand, whereas the Radicals reflected the conservative attitudes of the classical Right.

Immediately following the Liberation there occurred a new grouping of political forces: the small Popular Democratic Party of the Third Republic became the powerful Popular Republican Movement, allied with the Communist and Socialist Parties in a majority of the Left, which advocated both "the purge" of collaborators and reforms of a socialist character (nationalization and social security measures). The Radical Party, considerably weakened, adopted almost the same political line as that of the Right, opposing the purges[11] as well as most social changes and policies of economic control by the government.

It is true that the old conflict between "clerical" and "nonclerical" has not altogether disappeared; the question of grants to privately-owned schools has brought it to the surface again several times. In 1945 it was the cause of the first serious breach between the Popular Republicans and the Socialists, a breach which has been well exploited by the Communists and which, as we have noted, has put an end to all hope for a powerful French Workers Party—through the fusion of the MRP and the SFIO. In October, 1951, the vote on the Barangé Act[12] resurrected, though temporarily, the old coalitions of the Third Republic. But the matter of grants to private schools remains very secondary; except in Vendée and Lorraine, public opinion itself does not attach much important to this issue.

The MRP's stand on economic and social problems has remained fundamentally leftist. If it supports the Pinay experiment, it does so with the visible hope of seeing it fail, thus proving the incapacity of the Right. The last National Congress of the MRP[13] confirmed the progressive orientation of the majority of

[10] Catholic Association for French Youth, organized on various social levels: The Christian Working Youth, the Christian Agricultural Youth, the Christian Student Youth, etc.

[11] Their stand on the laws governing the press which abolished those newspapers that appeared or continued to appear under the occupation, is very symptomatic. It must be remembered that many of these newspapers were Radical.

[12] This law grants, in an indirect and roundabout way, financial help from the state to privately-owned schools.

[13] This Congress was held at Bordeaux, May 22–25, 1952.

its members. In the new Left, based upon economic and social attitudes, this party plays about the same role as the Radicals did in the old anti-clerical Left. It is ready to establish contacts with the Right if the political opportunity makes it desirable, ready, even, to participate in a government with the Right for a limited period, if external or internal danger makes it necessary; but it stays to the Left emotionally and doctrinally, and thereby obliges the forces of the Right with whom it works to orient their basic programs somewhat to the Left.

It is possible to describe the substitution of the Fourth Republic for the Third as a regrouping of parties around economic and social problems instead of around the religious question; or again as a change from the conflict between a Catholic Right and an anti-clerical Left to the conflict between a conservative Right and a socialist Left. These latter political groupings could have the same (relative) stability as the ones under the Third Republic. The ratio of their strength is about the same as the ratio between the old clerical and anti-clerical coalitions. The old Left had a slight numerical superiority over the old Right which particular events could temporarily eradicate but which, in the long run, always tended to be reestablished. The center of political gravity in the country therefore was, on the whole, slightly to the Left. It is the same today, for the new social and economic Left is slightly larger than the new Right: in the elections of June 17, 1951, the three allies of 1945 (Popular Republicans, Socialists, and Communists) secured 53.3 per cent of the votes cast,[14] even though these elections showed an immense increase in conservative strength since 1945–46.

Still another fact is affecting the structure of French opinion: the dividing of the world into two blocs, which has already destroyed the unity of the new Left and which makes impossible any resurrection of tripartism or any formation of a new Popular Front. Communist participation in a parliamentary and governmental alliance is now out of the question, yet the Communists represent 26.5 per cent of the electorate, or slightly less than half of the economic and social Left. The Iron Curtain now stretches through the middle of this new French Left and paralyzes it. True, a coalition is conceivable of all "Western" parties against the Communist Party, a vast alliance extending from the extreme Right to and including the Socialists. But these prospective allies would have nothing in common, aside from their positions on foreign policy (and even there their Westernism would be of all shades, from a moderate neutralism to a complete support for the North Atlantic Pact). Such a regrouping would finally harness the MRP and the Socialists to the Right, though in a very minor capacity in such an alliance.

The power of the Communist Party coupled with its isolation results, paradoxically, in weakening the Left and paralyzing it. Because the hundred Communist deputies in the National Assembly can, in effect, neither participate in

[14] Undoubtedly a certain number of MRP deputies are nearer the Right than the Left. But some Radical deputies (Mr. Mendès-France, for example) are definitely to the Left, so that the one defection makes up for the other. Incidentally, among the Radicals under the Third Republic (at the time that party was considered Left), there were also quite a few conservatives.

the government nor support it in any way, no majority coalition of the Left can be formed to support the government—yet, the Left continues to show a small majority of the electorate throughout the country. Thus the center of gravity in Parliament and the center of gravity in public opinion no longer coincide; the center of gravity of the former has shifted to the Right in relation to the latter. This phenomenon produces two fundamental consequences. First, because no government of the Left can stabilize itself in a position of strength which permits it to act in response to the aspirations of the masses of people (as, for example, did the 1906 Bloc, the Cartel of 1924, and the Popular Front of 1936), there is reason to fear that the popular vote may be drawn towards the Communist Party, the natural beneficiary of the bitterness engendered by this situation. (Ironically, this development would slow down or arrest the gradual but continued decline of the Party since 1946.) The second consequence is that the instability of the ministry, more apparent than real under the Third Republic,[15] will be in danger of becoming worse. Governments of the Right are unable to survive without the support of a fraction from the Left (MRP, for example). But such a fraction will always be inclined to withdraw from a coalition which does not please it; and the governments of the Center are continually placed in essentially contradictory positions on all basic problems.

General de Gaulle's Rally of the French People is increasing this instability, but not without profit to itself. To the extent that the RPF refuses to ally itself with other parties, it can be said that its existence divides the Right in the same way that the Communists divide the Left, and that a sort of equilibrium is thus achieved by two positions out of balance. But it is more important that the refusal of the RPF to work with other parties prevents the present House from achieving that homogenous majority of the Right which theoretically is possible—thanks to an electoral system which gives the Right more than 320 deputies of 627, even though it received only 46.7 per cent of the votes. This failure of the Right minimizes the accomplishments of the RPF in the eyes of the moderate-minded public, which does not understand the purpose of its opposition; but, in the long run, this very failure strengthens the position of the party by increasing and emphasizing the powerlessness of the existing parliamentary regime.

Care should be taken, however, not to pass a superficial judgment concerning the RPF which would place it within a preestablished category. It is true that it has the classical Bonapartist goal of rallying the scattered elements of a traditionally divided Right around one man, and it is also true that it presents some traits of fascism, including a willingness to oppose the communist danger by authoritarian and non-democratic methods. But it must be remembered that a large portion of the Right stays outside the ranks of the RPF; that the Communist Party, now isolated and stabilized, is no longer a real danger to

[15] Ministries changed, but the members were largely the same; they perpetuated themselves in office, and general policy was little affected by the changes. As a continuation to A. Soulier's *L'Instabilité ministérielle sous la Troisième République* (Paris, 1938), another book could be written, paradoxically not in any way contradicting it, on "The Stability of the Ministers under the Third Republic." "The Stability of the Policy Followed by the Ministers of the Third Republic" is also an entirely appropriate title.

France; and that de Gaulle, as a man, is far different from Hitler or Mussolini. As a matter of fact, from the beginning of the Pinay experiment the RPF has been playing a subtle game—one which misleads many of its supporters as well as its adversaries and which could well alter the position it occupies on the political checkerboard. Breaking with those of its members who (in spite of directives from the party's Committee Chairman[16]) back a government clearly oriented toward the Right, it is now attempting to straddle the moderates and the Radicals to find a Left-Center, alongside the MRP and the Socialists. At the last MRP Congress the hope was clearly expressed—though in veiled terms—for a majority which could result from the grouping of this dominant section of the RPF with the MRP, the Socialists, and a faction of the Radicals. It is now uncertain whether this "new Third Force" is feasible, but it is noteworthy that the attempt to form it is resurrecting, after a seven-year interval, the hope cherished in some quarters in 1945 for a regrouping based upon Labor around the General.

These attempts serve essentially to present anew the fundamental problem of the Fourth Republic since the eviction of the Communists from the government in 1947 and their parliamentary isolation accompanying the intensification of the cold war. That problem is the old one of "concentration." Many people under the Third Republic (including such important personages as Briand, for example) have in vain harbored this dream of a majority of the Center, which could break the "Right-Left" struggle. However, in the past a majority of the Center had no electoral base and was therefore incapable of stability. The religious schism and local conditions favored clustering at each extremity, constantly enfeebling centralist parties. But today these obstacles no longer exist. And it is certain that a government built by concentration—Third Force type or other—is technically the only way to reconcile the parliamentary center of gravity with that of the country at large; and it will continue to be the only way so long as the isolation of the communists holds. Without this reconciliation no real government stability can be assured, whatever may be the constitutional reforms. The real problem lies not in juridical regulations but in the equilibrium of political forces.

There is, however, one obstacle on this road to concentration. This obstacle is the body of economic and social problems. For a majority of the Center to have adequate electoral support, it is essential that a certain proportion of the middle classes and of the peasants be permanently weaned from the rather narrowly conservative mentality that is now theirs. This process is not easy, yet it is not impossible.

[16] Mr. Pinay's investiture as President of the Council was made possible because 27 RPF deputies (out of 114) voted for him, in spite of the group's decision to abstain. Since then, according to the balloting, this number has increased to between 40 and 44. Among the deputies are those who very reluctantly follow orders from the Executive Committee. But the RPF left flank, with the General's support, has reacted energetically. In a meeting held on the 6th of July, the Party's National Committee made the "vote discipline" compulsory for the Parliamentary Group. In the future, party members are to vote as directed by the Executive Committee. As a result of this decision 26 RPF deputies withdrew from the Party, strengthening thereby its left wing.

JUDICIAL REVIEW IN MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEMS

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I. INTRODUCTION

The problem of guarding the constitution is fundamental in any political system. If the term "constitution" is given a very broad definition, such dictatorial devices as powerful secret police and special tribunals for the safety of the state may be regarded as means for the protection of the "constitution" of a totalitarian regime. However, western democracy does not rely upon repressive means for safeguarding the constitution, except in times of crisis when use is made of martial law, the state of siege, and constitutional dictatorship. For normal times, western democracy has developed constitutional means of protection that essentially resemble ordinary legal and political processes, such as the amending process, special deliberative bodies, and judicial review.

This study is concerned with judicial review as a means of guarding against legislative encroachments on the constitution. The acceptance of judicial review in national constitutional systems will be traced historically, with emphasis upon twentieth-century developments. Some attention will be given to the historical background of judicial review and to its theory and practice under various modern constitutions, but no systematic treatment of these subjects is attempted.

II. THE BACKGROUND OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

Ancient and Medieval Precedents. As Max Radin pointed out, the "theory that courts may review statutes and determine their validity is not quite as new as it sounds."[1] The ancient Greek *graphai paranomon* was a process by which a legislator could be indicted on grounds that the law was illegal or unconstitutional.[2] In the latter days of republican Rome, the Senate occasionally asserted the power to annul statutes because of various unconstitutional features, frequently because of the use of violence in their passage.[3]

Medieval European constitutionalism, far from admitting any absolute power of kingship, was often concerned with putting, in Bracton's phrase, a "bridle" on the king.[4] Later, in the fifteenth century, Sir John Fortescue argued that the

[1] "The Judicial Review of Statutes in Continental Europe," *West Virginia Law Quarterly*, Vol. 41, p. 112 (1935).

[2] See R. J. Bonner and G. Smith, *The Administration of Justice from Homer to Aristotle*, Vol. 1 (Chicago, 1930), pp. 264–267, Vol. 2 (Chicago, 1938), pp. 290, 296–297; also Aristotle, *Constitution of Athens*, Ch. 29.

[3] See G. W. Botsford, *The Roman Assemblies* (New York, 1909), pp. 107, 113, 405, 457 and 459, for instances of the Senate's annulling of various enactments; also Cicero, *De legibus*, Book 2, Ch. 6.

[4] *De legibus et consuetudinibus Angliae*, F. 34, F. 107. See especially C. H. McIlwain, *The Growth of Political Thought in the West* (New York, 1932), pp. 195–197.

laws of England did not sanction the maxim, *quod principi placuit legis vigorem habet.*[5] In sixteenth-century France the *Parlements*, especially the *Parlement* of Paris, claimed, without much success, the right to refuse to register royal edicts, thus denying them validity.[6] Mention may also be made of John Dickinson's allusion, in the American Constitutional Convention of 1787, to the Justiciary of Aragon, which through the power to set aside the laws "became by degrees the law-giver."[7]

There is not sufficient evidence, however, to attribute the development of modern judicial review, either wholly or mainly, to ancient and medieval precedents. In many respects, the Greek courts were simply the assembly operating in another guise; the Roman Senate was not a judicial body at all; and the activities of the French *Parlement* were not directed against a representative legislature. Indeed, the modern conception of law-making was hardly comprehended until the medieval era had passed.

On the other hand, to certain background concepts of ancient and medieval political philosophy the development of judicial review owes a great deal.[8] It is doubtful whether judicial review would have emerged at the time and in the form it did without such concepts as natural law and the equality of man which had been developed by ancient and medieval thought.

The Anglo-American Tradition. As a political institution, judicial review is a product of the liberal epoch of modern constitutionalism, with its germinal stage in the English political experience of the early seventeenth century. During the struggle between the Stuarts and Parliament for sovereign power, some English judges maintained that both contending parties were under the law. With respect to Parliament, Lord Coke in *Dr. Bonham's Case* (1610) gave his celebrated *dictum* that "the common law will controul acts of parliament, and sometimes adjudge them to be utterly void."[9] Coke's *dictum*, although not the only expression of such views, encountered opposition, even from the English judiciary. "We must submit to the legislative power," said the judges in *Captain Streater's Case* (1653), else "things would run round."[10] In England's American colonies, however, Coke's *dictum* was given a favorable reception.

To account for the success of judicial review in America and its failure in

[5] *De laudibus legum Anglie*, Ch. 34.

[6] See F. Olivier-Martin, *Histoire du droit française des origines à la Révolution* (Paris, 1948), pp. 541–552; Gaston Zeller, *Les institutions de la France au XVI^e siècle* (Paris, 1948), pp. 155–161.

[7] James Madison, *Journal of the Federal Convention* (Scott ed., Chicago, 1893), p. 534.

[8] For discussions of the theoretical background of the development of judicial review and references to the literature on the subject, see B. F. Wright, *American Interpretations of Natural Law* (Cambridge, 1931); C. G. Haines, *The Revival of Natural Law Concepts* (Cambridge, 1930); E. S. Corwin, "The 'Higher Law' Background of American Constitutional Law," *Harvard Law Review*, Vol. 42, pp. 149–185, 365–409 (1928–29).

[9] 8 Coke 118a. For comment on the case, see T. F. T. Plucknett, "Bonham's Case and Judicial Review," *Harvard Law Review*, Vol. 40, pp. 30–70 (1926).

[10] 5 Howard State Trials 365. For views similar to Coke's in *Dr. Bonham's Case*, see *Day v. Savadge*, Hobart 85 (1614); *City of London v. Wood*, 12 Mod. Rep. 678 (1701). After service in Parliament, Coke seems to have changed his views and to have regarded Parliament as the supreme law declaring body, 4 *Institutes* 36.

England is no easy task. Both England and the colonies shared a common heritage of liberal thought, in particular Locke's ideas on natural rights and the social contract theory which insisted upon limited legislative power. However, some factors conducive to the growth of judicial review were absent in the English scene, especially a written constitution, a well-developed theory of separation of powers and a legal distinction between constituent and legislative organs. Nor was judicial review compatible with either the English tradition that tended to identify King-in-Parliament with the body politic or the historical trend toward parliamentary supremacy.[11] On the other hand, there existed in the colonies several factors which probably contributed to the growth of judicial review, namely written constitutions, high regard for the theory of separation of powers, and familiarity with the practice of appeals to the Privy Council regarding the validity of colonial laws.[12]

The course of their political development also aided the growth of judicial review in the colonies. In their movement toward independence, the colonists sought various legal ways to attack parliamentary statutes. One line of attack led to the argument of James Otis, in the *Writs of Assistance Case* (1761), that an "act against the Constitution is void."[13] Others repeated the argument prior to independence. And after 1776 the principle that legislative acts should conform to the constitution was given practical application in some of the American states. In Pennsylvania and Vermont, a Board of Censors was established,[14] and the courts reiterated the principle of constitutionality in a few other states.[15]

By the time of the Constitutional Convention of 1787, many of the men involved in framing the Constitution were aware of the principle of judicial review, and some of them favored it.[16] Nevertheless, judicial review was not ex-

[11] See F. D. Wormuth, *The Origins of Modern Constitutionalism* (New York, 1949), pp. 43–159, 169–210; C. H. McIlwain, *The High Court of Parliament and Its Supremacy* (New Haven, 1910), Chs. 4 and 5, and *Constitutionalism Ancient and Modern* (Ithaca, 1940), pp. 95–149; Roscoe Pound, "Common Law and Legislation," *Harvard Law Review*, Vol. 21, pp. 383–407 (1908); Corwin, *op. cit.* (above, n. 8).

[12] See B. F. Wright, *The Growth of American Constitutional Law* (New York, 1942), Chs. 1 and 2; E. B. Russell, *The Review of American Colonial Legislation by the King in Council* (New York, 1915); A. M. Schlesinger, "Colonial Appeals to the Privy Council," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 28, pp. 279–297, 433–450 (1913); E. S. Corwin, *Court over Constitution* (Princeton, 1938).

[13] See John Adams, *Works*, Vol. 2, p. 522, for a summary of Otis' argument; see also the argument of George Mason in *Robin v. Hardaway*, Jeff. 109 (1772).

[14] Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776, Sect. 47; see also Vermont Constitution of 1777, Sect. 44.

[15] For discussion of state precedents, see E. S. Corwin, *The Doctrine of Judicial Review* (Princeton, 1914), Note 5 on "Alleged Precedents for Judicial Review," pp. 71 ff.; the Note on "Development of Judicial Power," in W. F. Dodd, *Cases and Materials on Constitutional Law* (3d ed., St. Paul, 1942), pp. 8–13; and C. G. Haines, *The American Doctrine of Judicial Supremacy* (2d. ed., Berkeley, 1932), pp. 88–121.

[16] See the discussion in C. A. Beard, *The Supreme Court and the Constitution* (New York, 1912), pp. 17 ff., and the remarks of Corwin, *Court over Constitution*, pp. 26 ff.; also *The Federalist*, No. 78. The fact that some members of the Convention favored judicial review is not conclusive proof that the Convention intended that the judiciary exercise the power.

plicitly written into the Constitution, but was adopted by way of court decisions. Both in the United States and in Britain, then, the judiciary itself was instrumental in proposing judicial review, with the great difference that John Marshall's decision in *Marbury* v. *Madison*[17] succeeded, whereas Coke's *dictum* in *Dr. Bonham's Case* failed.

Judicial review, of course, is not peculiarly American; it can be traced back to the English concept of the "rule of law," a fact attested by the appearance of judicial review in countries with close legal and political ties with Great Britain. Even before World War I, judicial review was a reality in Canada and Australia. And, as will be seen below, several members of the Commonwealth, attaining their independence more recently, have also adopted judicial review.

The French Civil Law Tradition. In contrast to the Anglo-American tradition, a dominant attitude of hostility toward judicial control of the constitutionality of laws has developed in France. This bias was early proclaimed in the French Constitution of 1791 as follows: "The tribunals cannot interfere in the exercise of legislative power, nor suspend the execution of the laws, nor encroach upon the administrative functions, nor cite before them the administrators on account of their functions."[18]

Several factors have been suggested as contributing to the French revolutionary attitude toward judicial control. It has been pointed out that the judge in the civil law system was a subordinate magistrate who had never achieved the status of the common law judge;[19] the opposition of the *Parlement* to the monarch under the *ancien regime* apparently was considered a dangerous political precedent, indicating the possibility of a deadlock between courts and a democratic legislature.[20] French liberal theories have also been difficult to reconcile, in general, with judicial control. The *volonté générale*, Rousseau's version of popular sovereignty, hardly admits of a judicial check.[21] The dominant French interpretation of the doctrine of separation of powers has differed from the American, holding that true separation forbids the judiciary to interfere with the legislative process, especially by way of questioning the intrinsic validity of statutes.[22]

[17] 1 Cranch 137 (1803). The literature on judicial review in the United States is voluminous; in addition to the writings previously cited, the following may be mentioned: C. Warren, *The Supreme Court in United States History* (3 vols., Boston, 1922); C. B. Swisher, *The Growth of Constitutional Power in the United States* (Chicago, 1947); Brinton Coxe, *An Essay on Judicial Power and Unconstitutional Legislation* (Philadelphia, 1893).

[18] Title 3, Ch. 5, Art. 3.

[19] See Roscoe Pound, "A Comparison of Systems of Law," *University of Pittsburgh Law Review*, Vol. 10, pp. 271–272 (1948).

[20] See J. W. Garner, *Political Science and Government* (New York, 1928), p. 766.

[21] The discussion in the French Constituent Assembly of 1945–46 on whether the constitution may limit popular sovereignty may be noted. Pierre Cot maintained that when Rousseau spoke of "limits of sovereignty" he referred to those imposed by the *contrat social*, and hence the phrase did not apply to a constitution. *Séances de la Commission de la Constitution: Comptes rendus analytiques, imprimés en execution de la résolution votée par l'Assemblée le 25 avril 1946* (Paris, 1946), pp. 407–408.

[22] A. Esmein, *Éléments de droit constitutionnel français et comparé* (8th ed., Paris, 1927), Vol. 1, pp. 575–576; J. W. Garner, "Judicial Control of Administrative and Legislative Acts in France," AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, Vol. 9, pp. 637–665 (1915).

Nevertheless, French thought appreciates the distinction between fundamental and ordinary law. In the sixteenth century a line was drawn between *lois du royaume* and *lois du roi*, while French constitutions since 1789 have frequently proclaimed the supremacy of the constitution over the legislative power.[23] And notwithstanding the dominant tone of hostility, an undertone of opinion favorable to judicial review was expressed in the revolutionary period. In the late 1790's Abbé Siéyès proposed a constitutional jury with power to annul acts contrary to the constitution. Siéyès' proposal led to the *sénat conservateur* of the Constitution of the Year VIII and of the First Empire, which was supposed to act as the guardian of the constitution.[24] Nor can the Napoleonic innovation of the Council of State be overlooked. Through the Council, the acts of executive officials can be questioned on grounds of *excés du pouvoir*, and executive interpretation of basic statutory norms is subjected to judicial control —a point of importance in view of the broad character of the norms themselves.[25]

Despite the distinction between different kinds of law which it recognizes, the French democratic tradition has avoided adopting judicial review as a check on the constitutionality of legislative enactments. Constitutional guardianship has usually been entrusted to the "people," with special procedures for amendment as specific protection against the legislature.[26]

III. THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

European Constitutions. At the end of the nineteenth century, James Bryce remarked that no feature of American government had "awakened so much curiosity in the European mind, caused so much discussion, received so much admiration, and been more frequently misunderstood" than judicial review.[27] The interest and admiration noted by Bryce, however, did not lead to any widespread adoption of judicial review on the Continent, although it was accepted in a few instances. The Constitution of the Portuguese Republic (1911) provided that whenever the parties to a case should question the constitutional validity of a law, the judicial power was to pronounce upon the statute's constitutionality.[28] In Rumania, Norway and Greece, the courts in a few specific cases refused to apply unconstitutional legislation.[29]

[23] L. Duguit, *Traité de droit constitutionnel* (3d ed., Paris, 1930), pp. 691, 696–709.

[24] Constitution of the Year VIII, Arts. 21, 37; *Sénatus-consulte*, 28, *floreal*, Year XII, Arts. 60–68, 72. For details and references on Siéyès proposal, see Esmein, pp. 637–638, and Duguit, p. 716.

[25] See J. W. Garner, *op. cit.* (above, n. 22); J. Auboyer-Treuille, *L'évolution des attributions legislatives du Conseil d'Etat* (Paris, 1938).

[26] See Constitution of 1791, Title 5; Constitution of the Year III, Arts. 375, 377; Constitution of 1848, Arts. 110 and 111 and the Preamble, in which recognition is given to "rights and duties existing before and superior to positive laws."

[27] *The American Commonwealth* (3d ed., New York, 1906), p. 241.

[28] Art. 63.

[29] Rumania, decisions of the Tribunal of Ilfove, Feb. 2, 1912, Court of Cassation, March 16, 1912; Norway, Supreme Court of Norway, June 3, 1890, Supreme Court of Christiana, Feb. 2, 1893; Greece, First Chamber of Areopagus, No. 145, 1904. For references to the literature on these decisions, see Esmein, p. 633; Duguit, pp. 726–728, 732.

In France, the opposition to judicial review prevailed during the 19th century; the only step taken in the direction of judicial checks on constitutional questions was the resurrection of the *sénat conservateur* by Napoleon III.[30] Yet proposals and suggestions favoring judicial control continued to appear. In 1833 the constitutionality of a law was questioned before the Court of Cassation but, significantly, the Court refused to admit the attack.[31] The possibility of judicial review was discussed in the course of the debates leading to the Constitution of the Third Republic (1875),[32] and later a number of unsuccessful proposals to establish a special court to deal with questions of constitutionality were introduced in the French Parliament.[33] Meanwhile, a group of influential French lawyers had come to endorse the principle of judicial review, and some argued, even before World War I, that French courts possessed the inherent power of review.[34]

Constitutional questions raising the problem of judicial review were discussed in other European countries. Some of these questions dealt with the judicial interpretation of the distribution of powers in federal unions. For example, under the Swiss Constitution of 1874, the Federal Court could pass upon the constitutionality of cantonal laws, but not upon the constitutionality of laws of the Federation.[35] Similarly, under the Constitution of the German Empire (1871), the courts could refuse to apply state legislation conflicting with the imperial constitution or laws.[36] Other questions arose from the distinction between the "formal" or "procedural" validity of laws and their "material" or "substantive" validity. In both France and the German Empire, the prevailing doctrine seemed to be that the courts could only inquire into the "formal" constitutionality of laws.[37] On the other hand, Italian doctrine apparently denied the courts the power to pass even upon the "procedural" validity of promulgated statutes.[38]

Prior to World War I, then, judicial review was the subject of legal and

[30] Constitution of 1852, Arts. 25–27, 29.

[31] Duguit, p. 721.

[32] See remarks of Louis Blanc, *Jour. off.*, March 12, 1873, p. 1707.

[33] See propositions of Jules Roche, Feb. 28, 1903, and of Charles Benoist, Jan. 28, 1903, *Journal officiel*, Chambre, *Documents parlementaire*, sess. ord., p. 97, p. 99.

[34] See J. Laferrière, *Manuel de droit constitutionnel* (2d ed., Paris, 1947), pp. 330–340; J. Coumoul, *Traité du pouvoir judicaire* (2d ed., Paris, 1911), Ch. 6; Garner, *op. cit.* (above, n. 22).

[35] W. E. Rappard, *The Government of Switzerland* (New York, 1936), p. 50, p. 90, and *Le contrôle de la constitutionalité des lois fédérales par le juge aux Etats-Unis et en Suisse* (Bâle, 1934). It may be noted that Swiss cantonal courts have refused to apply cantonal laws on grounds of conflict with the cantonal or federal constitution.

[36] J. W. Garner, "The German Judiciary," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 18, p. 529 (1903); Johannes Mattern, *Principles of the Constitutional Jurisprudence of the German National Republic* (Baltimore, 1928), p. 251.

[37] For France, see Garner, "Judicial Control of Administrative and Legislative Acts in France," p. 659; for Germany, see Garner, "The German Judiciary," p. 526. Laband, *Staatsrecht*, Vol. 2, pp. 44 ff., endorsed the opposite doctrine, and Radin, *op. cit.* (above, n. 1), p. 125, stresses Laband's view. In some German states, notably Prussia, the courts were forbidden to inquire into the formal validity of laws.

[38] Radin, p. 119.

constitutional discussion in many European countries, but it was not widely adopted. And even where accepted, it was not used to any great extent.

Latin-American Constitutions. A number of external influences affected Latin-American constitutional practice during the nineteenth century. The constitutional structure of the United States inspired many features of Latin-American constitutions. However, the legal background of Latin America was that of civil law, primarily Spanish law. The French influence on Latin American developments was based on some of the ideals of the Revolution and on the Napoleonic codes. The effects of these various influences can be seen in the form judicial review has taken in Latin America.

The earliest constitutions of Colombia and Haiti apparently followed the French example in setting up the Senate as a guardian of the constitution; later, however, judicial review was adopted in both countries.[39] In other countries, Guatemala and Peru, for example, courts had no power to pass upon the constitutionality of laws.[40] On the other hand, three major Latin-American nations, Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico, all of them with federal constitutions, adopted judicial review before the end of the century,[41] and, in addition, the constitutions of several other states, including El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua, at least permitted the question of constitutionality to be raised in court.[42] While in some of these latter states, notably Brazil, some use was made of judicial review, on the whole the principle was of little practical effect in nineteenth-century Latin America.

Asiatic and Other Constitutions. Prior to World War I, the most notable developments in Asia relative to judicial review occurred within the areas under British and American control. In the Philippines, the Islands Supreme Court asserted the right to annul statutes in 1907, even though specific statutory authority for the exercise of this power seems to have been lacking.[43] In Australia (and Canada as well) the federal structure of government provided occasions for conflicts between central and constituent authorities, and in both countries the courts passed upon the question of whether central and constituent government legislation was in accord with the constitutional distribution of powers.[44]

[39] G. Jaffin, "New World Constitutional Harmony: A Pan-Americanadian Panorama," *Columbia Law Review*, Vol. 42, p. 44, p. 47 n. 109 (1942), asserts that Colombia and Haiti at first followed the French example of the *sénat conservateur;* see, for Colombia, Constitution of Cundinamarca, 1811, Title 1, Art. 9. For the later adoption of judicial review, see Constitution of Haiti, 1843, Art. 162; Colombia, Constitutional Law of 1910, Art. 41.

[40] Guatemala, Constitution of 1879; Peru, Constitution of 1860.

[41] Argentina, Constitution of 1860, Art. 100; Brazil, Constitution of 1891, Art. 59 (1), 60; Mexico, Constitution of 1857, Art. 101.

[42] Honduras, Constitution of 1894, Arts. 118, 126, 128; El Salvador, Constitution of 1886, Arts. 37, 102; Nicaragua, Constitution of 1911, Arts. 63, 124.

[43] *Casanovas v. Hord*, 8 Phil. 125 (1907). On the basis for the exercise of judicial review, see E. M. Fernando, "Judicial Supremacy," *Philippine Law Journal*, Vol. 23, pp. 613–614 (1948). Statutory appeal did lie, however, from the Islands Supreme Court to the United States Supreme Court, Philippine Bill of 1902, Sect. 10.

[44] See R. M. Dawson, *The Government of Canada* (Toronto, 1947), Ch. 20; W. Mendelson, "Dual Federalism in Canada, Australia and the United States," in J. B. Shannon

Under the Japanese Constitution of 1889, the courts possessed no powers of review over statutes, but, it is said, they could refuse to apply invalid ordinances and any law violating the Imperial House Law.[45] In China, Sun Yat Sen's revolutionary regime seemed willing to recognize the principle that laws conflicting with the constitution should be held invalid.[46]

Finally, it may be mentioned that the high court of Transvaal in 1897 claimed the power to exercise review. The doctrine of review was charged by President Kruger with being the invention of the "devil," however, and the court had to change its position.[47]

IV. POST WORLD WAR I CONSTITUTIONS

European Constitutions. New European constitutions of the interwar period appeared under a variety of circumstances. A number of new states were created following the military defeats of Russia and the Central Powers. In only one of these states, Czechoslovakia, was judicial review expressly provided for in the constitution. In the Czechoslovak Constitution (1920), power to pass upon the constitutionality of laws was vested in a special Constitutional Court, which, indeed, did hand down decisions on several occasions during the short life of the Republic.[48] And, although not explicitly empowered to do so by the constitution, Estonian and Lithuanian courts are said to have asserted the right to refuse to apply unconstitutional laws.[49] In addition, the Polish Constitution (1921) specifically stipulated that no statute might be in opposition to or violate the constitution, despite the fact that the same document forbade the exercise of judicial review.[50]

The German Weimar Constitution (1919) did not expressly provide for judicial review, although the possibility was discussed during the drafting and was favored by several members of the convention, including Dr. Hugo Preuss, chief architect of the constitution. Also, under the constitutional principle that *Reichsrecht bricht Landrecht*, the compatibility of *Land* legislation with the federal constitution and federal statutes was arguable. Later, in 1925, the *Reichsgericht* held that it could inquire into the material validity of *Reichs*-legislation, and prior to 1933 did actually on a few occasions declare federal

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(ed.), *The Study of Comparative Government* (New York, 1949); W. A. Wynes, *Legislative and Executive Power in Australia* (Sydney, 1936), Ch. 3; K. C. Wheare, *Federal Government* (2d ed., London, 1949). The appeal to the Privy Council was a much more important factor in Canada than in Australia, where the appeal was greatly restricted.

[45] N. Kitazawa, *The Government of Japan* (Princeton, 1929), pp. 30, 86–7.

[46] See Temple of Heaven Draft Constitution, 1913, Art. 94.

[47] See Bryce, *Studies in History and Jurisprudence* (New York, 1901), p. 378; A. Lawrence Lowell, *The Government of England* (new ed., New York, 1912), Vol. 1, p. 7.

[48] Introductory Law, Arts. 1–3; Constitutional Charter, Art. 102.

[49] Laferrière, *op. cit.* (above, n. 34), p. 329.

[50] Arts. 38, 81. Under the Finnish Constitution of 1919, Art. 58, the Supreme Court and the Supreme Administrative Court may formally request legislation modifying or interpreting laws and ordinances.

statutes to be unconstitutional.[51] Further developments were stifled by Hitler's rise to power; judicial review was obviously incompatible with Nazi doctrine.[52]

The Austrian Constitution of 1920 (as amended) made provision for judicial review, but not on the American model, for the regular courts were expressly forbidden to inquire into the validity of a duly promulgated statute. A Constitutional Court was established with jurisdiction to determine the constitutionality of a federal law (a) at the request of a provincial government, (b) at the request of the Supreme Court or the Administrative Court, or (c) whenever the question of constitutionality arose in a case before the Constitutional Court itself. Thus, under Austrian practice, the individual litigant could raise the question of unconstitutionality before the Supreme and Administrative Courts, but with no assurance that the question would be referred by these courts for decision to the Constitutional Court. After the constitutional revision of 1934, judicial review ceased to exist in Austria.[53]

Provision for judicial review was made in a few other European constitutions of the interwar period. The Irish Free State Constitution (1922) conferred power upon the courts to annul legislation violating either the constitution or the Anglo-Irish Treaty, reserving, however, the right of appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council; in the later Constitution of Eire (1937), judicial review provisions were retained, although appeal to the Privy Council had been abolished earlier.[54] The Spanish Republican Constitution of 1931 contained elaborate provisions for judicial review, some details of which were apparently borrowed from Latin-American constitutions.[55] Under the Portuguese Constitution of 1933, the courts were forbidden to apply laws transgressing the Constitution.[56] In Greece and Rumania, where judicial review had developed without express constitutional stipulation, formal provisions for review were inserted in the respective constitutions.[57] Finally, it may be noted

[51] C. J. Friedrich, "The Issue of Judicial Review in Germany," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 43, pp. 188–200 (1928); Mattern, *op. cit.* (above, n. 36), pp. 249–304, 570–609.

[52] One Nazi legalist, Ernst R. Huber, *Verfassung* (Hamburg, 1937), p. 26, argued that *Rechtsstaat* philosophy and judicial control of politics had contributed to the "catastrophe" of the Weimar regime.

[53] J. A. C. Grant, "Judicial Review of Legislation under the Austrian Constitution of 1920," AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, Vol. 28, pp. 670–676 (1934); Hans Kelsen, "La garantie jurisdictionnelle de la constitution," *Revue de droit public et de la science politique en France et à l'étranger*, Vol. 35, pp. 197–259 (1928) and "Judicial Review of Legislation," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 4, pp. 183–200 (1942).

[54] Constitution Act, 1922, Art. 2 and Constitution of 1922, Arts. 65, 66. See Nicholas Mansergh, *The Irish Free State* (London, 1934), pp. 315–327, for discussion of judicial review and appeals to the Privy Council under the Free State constitution.

Constitution of 1937, Art. 34. For cases in which the issue of unconstitutionality entered, see (1940) I.R. 136, (1940) I.R. 470, (1947) I.R. 77.

[55] Arts. 121, 123.

[56] Art. 123. The National Assembly was given certain powers with respect to safeguarding the constitution, Arts. 91 (1), 123.

[57] Rumania, Constitution of 1923, Art. 103; Greece, Constitution of 1927, Art. 5.

that the tiny Principality of Liechtenstein made provision for judicial review in its Constitution of 1921.[58]

Although judicial review was adopted in several new European constitutions of the interwar period, in most new constitutions of the period it was not. (In addition, in Germany, Austria and Spain, the political developments of the 1930's cancelled such advances toward judicial review as had been made.) Among the constitutional systems which rejected judicial review, that of the Soviet Union may be particularly noted. Neither Soviet practice nor Soviet legal theory endorses judicial review. Soviet practice has in fact shown a tendency to restrict the power of the courts to interpret even ordinary laws. Under the Constitution of 1924, the Soviet Supreme Court had the power, upon request, to interpret federal law; but under the Stalin Constitution of 1936 the power of interpretation has been vested in the Presidium, an organ of the legislative body.[59] In addition, the Soviet Procurator General has gradually been given extensive powers to appeal court decisions and to cause them to be reviewed. As to Soviet theory, Vishinsky claims that interpretation of the laws by the Presidium insures the identity of interpretation with the will of the sovereign people. On the other hand, he argues that judicial review, especially as practiced in the United States, results in the will of the Supreme Court prevailing over that of Congress, the representative of the will of the people. In addition, he continues, judicial review is used by reactionary and monopolist elements to obtain annulment of laws that are contrary to their interests.[60]

Latin-American Constitutions. In the period between World War I and World War II, constitutional revision took place in many Latin-American states, with the result that the principle of judicial review was also adopted in Chile, Guatemala and Uruguay.[61] The principle that laws contrary to the constitution are void was accepted in Paraguay (1940), but procedural means for dealing with questions of unconstitutionality were not established.[62] In the Peruvian Constitution of 1933, the judiciary was empowered to pass upon the constitutionality of legal rules and regulations other than laws, but Congress apparently retained the power to interpret laws.[63] The Ecuadorian Constitution of 1929 like that of 1906 vested the right to decide on constitutionality of laws in Congress.[64]

A feature of several Latin-American constitutions of this period was the procedure developed for initiating court action in cases of allegedly unconstitutional laws. In particular, several constitutions provided for the *acción pública*

[58] Art. 104.

[59] A. Y. Vishinsky, *The Law of the Soviet State* (Babb trans., New York, 1948), p. 340. Compare Julian Towster, *Political Power in the U.S.S.R.: 1917–1947* (New York, 1948), pp. 300–310.

[60] Vishinsky, pp. 339–340.

[61] Chile, Constitution of 1925, Art. 86; Guatemala, Constitutional Modifications of 1935, Art. 23; Uruguay, Constitution of 1934, Arts. 232–235.

[62] Constitution of 1940, Art. 6.

[63] Arts. 26, 123, 133, 231.

[64] Art. 163.

or *acción popular*.[65] By this type of action, any citizen (or a designated small number) can question the constitutionality of a law, even though the citizen is not directly affected by the legislation. Also, the Cuban Constitution of 1940, apparently following continental precedents, established a special court (the Tribunal of Constitutional Guarantees) with jurisdiction over cases involving the constitutionality of laws and other official acts.[66] However, despite the widespread adoption of judicial review in Latin America, political events continued to cast doubt on the importance of formal constitutional documents, and hence upon the practical effect of the judicial review provisions.

Near Eastern and Asiatic Constitutions. Nearly all of the Near Eastern countries adopted written constitutions in the period between the two great wars. In one constitution, that of Iraq (1925), provision was made for judicial determination of whether a law contravened the fundamental charter.[67] In the Turkish Constitution of 1924, it was stipulated that "no law may contain provisions contrary to the organic law," but no method for judicial determination of the question of contravention was actually provided for.[68] The Near Eastern constitutions usually required special procedures for constitutional amendments, and, in addition, many of them contained detailed provisions for the application of Islamic law.[69] Although of an earlier period, the Iranian Supplemental Fundamental Laws of October 7, 1907, provided for a committee of "learned doctors of theology" to determine whether proposed laws conformed to the sacred rules of Islam. In case of conflict, the committee could "reject and repudiate" a law so that it should "not obtain the title of legality."[70]

In Asia, Chinese constitutional documents issued during the 1920's and 1930's usually declared that laws contrary to the constitution were invalid. The Constitution of 1923 provided that a law in conflict with the constitution was void and vested in a Constitution Conference (composed of members of the National Assembly) the power to interpret the meaning of the constitution.[71] The Draft Constitution of 1925 created a Grand Tribunal for Adjudication of State Cases which had jurisdiction in cases of conflict between a statute and the constitution.[72] The Draft Chinese Constitution of 1936 proposed that the Censor Yuan could request interpretation by the Judical Yuan as to whether a law conflicted with the fundamental charter and, hence, was null and void.[73]

In the Philippines, the Filipinos had become familiar with judicial review long before the adoption of the Constitution of 1935. This constitution provided that treaties and laws may be declared unconstitutional by a two-thirds vote of all members of the Filipino Supreme Court.[74] Prior to the adoption of

[65] Art. 149. See also, Cuba, Constitution of 1934, Art. 78; Venezuela, Constitution of 1936, Art. 123; Haiti, Constitution of 1929, Arts. 26, 99. The citizen's action apparently first appeared in Colombia, 1910.

[66] Arts. 182, 183, 194.

[67] Arts. 83–86. [68] Art. 103.

[69] See, Transjordan, Constitution of 1928, Arts. 42–55; Hejaz, Constitution of 1926, Art. 6; Iraq, Constitution of 1925, Arts. 75–80.

[70] Art. 2. [71] Arts. 108, 139.

[72] Art. 93 (1). [73] Art. 140. [74] Art. 8, Sect. 10.

the Constitution of 1935, the Supreme Court established under American law had declared laws of the Philippines invalid in about a dozen cases. From 1935 through 1948, the Supreme Court of the Philippines declared only two laws unconstitutional, although the question of unconstitutionality was frequently argued in courts.

Writings of Filipino jurists show the influence of American doctrine and practice in the acceptance of judicial review in the Islands. But they also suggest some differences between the operation of judicial review in the United States and in the Philippines. The differences are mainly due to the fact that the Constitution of the Philippines neither establishes a federal system nor enumerates the powers of the legislature; and it does specifically require the state to pursue "social welfare" objectives. Also, the historical background of the law of the Philippines is Spanish civil law, and apparently this tradition has affected the Filipino attitude toward such principles as *stare decisis* and other interpretative methods used by American courts.[75]

V. POST WORLD WAR II CONSTITUTIONS

Western European Constitutions. Three of the most important nations in Western Europe adopted new constitutions after World War II. In each case, the question of judicial review was discussed in the course of the constitution-making process. Judicial review was adopted in the Constitutions of Italy and Western Germany. In France, judicial control was rejected, but a substitute was accepted.

After World War I, proposals to adopt judicial review had been renewed by a number of French constitutional lawyers. Other jurists, using the opinions of the Supreme Court of the United States on social and economic legislation as evidence, had contended that judicial review was a conservative and reactionary device operating to frustrate social welfare programs undertaken by the state.[76] After the collapse of the Third Republic, judicial review was endorsed by the Vichy government; a *projet de constitution* circulated towards the end of the Vichy regime proposed the establishment of a Supreme Court with powers of review.[77] By 1945, judicial control to many Frenchmen had a decided conservative flavor and, moreover, was associated with the constitutional practices of French dictatorial regimes. On the other hand, political events during the

[75] M. J. Gamboa, *An Introduction to Philippine Law* (4th ed., Manila, 1939) and "The Meeting of the Roman and the Common Law in the Philippines," *Seminar*, Vol. 4, pp. 84–98 (1946); Enrique M. Fernando, "Judicial Supremacy," *Philippine Law Journal*, Vol. 23, pp. 98–110 (1948); E. Lazaro y Mina, "The Doctrine of Stare Decisis and the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands," *ibid.*, Vol. 16, pp. 404–419 (1937).

[76] See C. G. Haines, "Some Phases of the Theory and Practice of Judicial Review of Legislation in Foreign Countries," AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, Vol. 24, pp. 583–605 (1930), for references to French writings on judicial review in the interwar period. The volume by Professor Lambert, *Le gouvernment des juges et la lutte contre la législation sociale aux États-Unis* (Paris, 1921), presented an important argument against judicial review.

[77] See Arts. 33–37 of the *projet*, in G. Berlia (ed.), *Les constitutions et les principales lois politiques de la France depuis 1789* (7th ed., Paris, 1952), pp. 392–393.

interwar period in Europe had demonstrated the desirability of additional means to protect the democratic constitution.

At the outset of French constitution-making in 1945, party attitudes toward judicial control varied. The Communists were definitely opposed; the MRP was generally if not overtly favorable; and some rightist elements positively endorsed judicial review. The Socialist position was mixed. The Socialists feared judicial control, primarily on the basis of American experience, but, at the same time, they appreciated the necessity for some additional controls on the constitutionality of legislation.[78]

Early in the life of the First Constituent Assembly, the Constitutional Commission decided, with the Communists in opposition, to insert into the new Constitution the principle of control of the constitutionality of the laws, to be effected by means of a committee chosen by the National Assembly.[79] Later, the Socialists withdrew their support, and then the MRP withdrew support of the so-called Cot Constitution.[80] The Cot Constitution was defeated in the referendum of May, 1946, primarily as a result of the opposition of the MRP. In the Second Constituent Assembly, the MRP was in a position to insist upon control of the constitutionality of the laws, but only—as will be seen below—by paying a heavy price.

Under the Constitution of the Fourth Republic, control is exercised by a Constitutional Committeee chosen by Parliament; seven members of the Committee are chosen by the National Assembly, three by the Council of the Republic, with the President of the Republic and the presidents of the two chambers serving *ex officio*. During a short period after the passage of an ordinary piece of legislation by the National Assembly, the Council of the Republic, with the concurrence of the President of the Republic, may refer to the Constitutional Committee the question of whether the enacted measure entails any revision of the portion of the Constitution dealing with political institutions. A legislative act cannot be questioned on grounds of conflict with the Preamble of the Constitution, in which the provisions on individual rights and general social principles are stated.[81] Elimination of conflicts between the Preamble and legislative acts from the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Committee was the price paid by the MRP for obtaining a limited measure of constitutional control.[82] The Committee has to attempt a reconciliation between the views

[78] See *Séances*, Constitutional Commission, First Constituent Assembly, document cited (above, n. 21), pp. 133–142, especially remarks of Philip (Soc.), Coste-Floret (MRP), and Fajon (Comm.). For a rightist proposal, see proposition of J. Bardoux to establish a supreme court of justice with powers of review, *Documents de l'Assemblée Nationale Constituante élue le 21 octobre 1945*, No. 381 (Paris, 1946).

[79] *Séances*, pp. 141–142.

[80] *Ibid.*, pp. 642–643. M. de Menthon, MRP, *rapporteur général*, resigned his post at this juncture, being replaced by Pierre Cot.

[81] Arts. 91–93.

[82] In agreeing to except the Preamble from the competence of the Constitutional Committee, Coste-Floret declared: "We agree to make a concession, but our position has not changed, and we feel that the constitutional control of the declaration of rights is and re-

of the two Chambers of the French Parliament on the measure referred to it. If reconciliation fails, and the Committee holds that the legislative act under review would actually amount to a revision of the section of the Constitution dealing with political institutions, then that act would have to be adopted by constitutional amendment in order to validate it.

The French Constitutional Committee has not been very active, having deliberated only once, and then not on the substance of a legislative measure.[83] Possibly, since the Committee functions mainly on the initiative of the Council of the Republic, it will become more active if the French upper chamber gains greater political stature.

The innovation of the Constitutional Committee has not stifled discussion as to the advisability of the adoption of judicial review.[84] Moreover, in occasional opinions, French courts have given recognition to the principle that constitutional laws are superior to ordinary laws, without, however, going so far as to declare statutes unconstitutional.[85] It may be mentioned that French proposals for judicial review envisage two types of legal action. The first is the *voie d'action*, or formal annulment of a statute. The second is the *voie d'exception*, or refusal to apply a statute in a specific set of circumstances. In the past, there seems to have been more support for the *voie d'exception* as a method of judicial control among those French jurists favoring judicial review.[86]

The Italian Constitution of 1947 makes provision for a Constitutional Court with jurisdiction over disputes "concerning the constitutionality of laws and of acts having the force of law enacted by the State and the regions." The Constitution provides that whenever the Court "pronounces a provision of law or an act having the force of law as being unconstitutional, such provision or act becomes invalid on the day following the publication of the decision." No appeal lies against the decision of the Court.[87]

Five years after the adoption of the Italian Constitution, however, legislation to implement the provisions for judicial review has not been fully enacted, and the Constitutional Court itself has not been established. A constitutional law of January 31, 1948, provides that the question of constitutionality may be raised before lower courts by either party to a litigation or by the judge himself. The question is to be referred to the Constitutional Court for decision when it is "not held by the [lower court] judge to be manifestly unfounded."[88] A *Norme sulla costituzione e sul funzionamento della corte costituzionale*, regulating

mains possible, and that it will be established one day." *Séances de la Commission de la Constitution: Comptes rendus analytiques, imprimés en execution de la résolution votée par l'Assemblée le 2 octobre 1946* (Paris, 1946), pp. 104–105.

[83] See deliberation of the Committee, in Berlia, *op. cit.* (above, n. 77), pp. 606–607.

[84] See M. Prelot, *Précis de droit constitutionnel* (Paris, 1949), pp. 335–336; M. Duverger, *Cours de droit constitutionnel* (4th ed., Paris, 1947), pp. 124–127; G. Burdeau, *Manuel de droit constitutionnel* (5th ed., Paris, 1947), pp. 65–74.

[85] See, especially, *Lambert c. Jourdan*, Jan. 30, 1948, in which the Court of Appeal of Paris declared that "a constitutional law prevails over ordinary laws." *Revue critique de droit international privé*, Vol. 37, p. 493 (1948).

[86] Radin, *op. cit.* (above, n. 1), p. 118. [87] Arts. 134–137.

[88] *Legge costituzionale*, 9 *febbraio* 1948, n. 1, *Gazz. uff.*, 20 *febbraio* 1948, n. 43, Art. 1.

in detail the organization and procedure of the Court, has been passed by the Italian Senate, but is still awaiting final parliamentary action.[89]

Until the Constitutional Court is in operation, conclusions as to the effectiveness of the judicial review provisions of the Italian Constitution are premature. There are indications from the short history of the High Court established under the statute granting autonomy to Sicily that questions relating to the respective jurisdiction of the State and the regions may likely afford the Constitutional Court considerable opportunity to exercise its powers. In its short life, the High Court mentioned above has been called upon to make two fairly important decisions resolving legal conflicts between Italian legislation and Sicilian provincial rights.[90]

The Basic Law of 1949 of Western Germany (The Federal Republic) provides for a Federal Constitutional Court with wide jurisdictional powers. The Basic Law provides that the issue of the unconstitutionality of federal and *Land* legislation may be raised before lower courts, stipulating as follows:

> If a court considers unconstitutional a law the validity of which is pertinent to its decision, proceedings must be stayed and, if a violation of a Land Constitution is involved, the decision of the Land court competent for constitutional disputes shall be obtained and, if a violation of this Basic Law is involved, the decision of the Federal Constitutional Court shall be obtained. This shall also apply if the violation of this Basic Law by Land law or the incompatibility of a Land law with federal law is involved.
>
> If the court of a Land, in interpreting the Basic Law, intends to deviate from a decision of the Federal Constitutional Court or the constitutional court of another Land, the said constitutional court must obtain the decision of the Federal Constitutional Court.[91]

As noted, the jurisdictional powers of the West German Federal Constitutional Court include a wide variety of problems. Among others, the Court is to decide whether a political party is unconstitutional because it endangers the democratic order; whether an individual's basic rights are to be forfeited because of his attacks upon the freedoms established by the Basic Law; and whether an individual's basic rights have been infringed upon by public authority.[92] Legislation setting up the Federal Constitutional Court became effective in 1951, and the Court has already handed down an important constitutional decision in the *Southwest Case*.[93] Note may also be taken of provisions establishing judicial review in the *Laender* constitutions of the Western German Republic.[94]

[89] *Atti Parlementari, Camera dei Deputati, Documenti—Disegni di legge e relazioni*, 1949, N. 469-A. See A. Tesauro, "La Corte Costituzionale," *Rassegna di diritto pubblico*, Vol. 5, pp. 205–253 (1950); Sereo Galeotti, *La garanzia costituzionale* (Milan, 1950).

[90] *Regio decreto legislativo*, 15 *maggio* 1946, n. 455, *Gazz. uff.*, 10 *giugno* 1946, n. 133–3, Arts. 25–29; *Legge costituzionale*, 26 *febbraio* 1948, n. 2, *Gazz. uff.*, 9 *marzo* 1948, n. 58. *Repertorio generale: Annuale della giurisprudenza italiana, 1949*, p. 559.

[91] Art. 100 (1), (3).

[92] Arts. 18, 19, 21. See also Arts. 92, 93, 94, 98, 99.

[93] BGBl. I, p. 243 (1951). See Gerhard Leibholz, "The Federal Constitutional Court in Germany and the 'Southwest Case'," AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, Vol. 44, pp. 723–731 (1952).

[94] See Constitution for Rhineland-Palatinate (1947), Arts. 134–136; Constitution of Wuerttemberg-Baden (1946), Art 92.

A remaining point to be mentioned in connection with postwar Western Europe concerns Austria. Following the "liberation" of Austria at the end of World War II, the Austrian government began to function under the Constitution of 1920. Since then, the Austrian Constitutional Court has handed down a number of decisions regarding the constitutionality of statutes.[95]

"Iron Curtain" Constitutions. Except in Finland, all of the nations behind the Iron Curtain have adopted new constitutions since Soviet penetration into that region. For the most part, these Iron Curtain constitutions are modeled upon the Stalin Constitution of 1936. Consequently, the Iron Curtain constitutions generally vest in the Presidium or its counterpart the power to interpret the laws.[96] In the Eastern German Constitution (1949), however, a Committee on the Constitution has been provided for. The Committee is elected by the National Representative Body (*Volkskammer*), with all parliamentary groups represented proportionally in the membership of the committee. In addition, three members of the Supreme Court and three professors of constitutional law are to be appointed to the Committee. The Committee has the exclusive right to review national laws as to their constitutionality; however, the question of constitutionality may be raised by certain designated official organs only, and the Committee's report is subject to the final decision of the *Volkskammer*.[97] However, it does not appear likely that the provisions of the East German Constitution instituting the Committee on the Constitution will be very effective.

Although the Iron Curtain constitutions do not give the individual the right to question the constitutionality of laws, many of these charters do provide for the individual to apply to the courts for redress against unconstitutional or unlawful administrative action.[98] But again, the effectiveness of these provisions is questionable.

Latin-American Constitutions. Although a considerable amount of constitutional revision occurred in Latin America after World War II, the situation with respect to judicial review has remained largely unchanged. The Constitution of Ecuador (1946) provides that only Congress has the right of declaring whether a law or legislative decree is unconstitutional. However, if the President and Congress disagree as to the constitutionality of a legislative act, the question is to be submitted to the Supreme Court; if the Court decides the measure to be unconstitutional, Congress "may not insist" upon it. In addition, the Supreme Court may suspend the promulgation of a law not passed in accordance with the formal requirements of the Constitution.[99]

Although different views exist as to the Latin-American states making pro-

[95] See P. L. Baeck, "Postwar Judicial Review of Legislative Acts: Austria," *Tulane Law Review*, Vol. 26, pp. 70–78 (1951).

[96] Constitution of Albania (1946), Art. 54; Constitution of Bulgaria (1947), Art. 35; Constitution of Yugoslavia (1946), Art. 74; Constitution of Czechoslovakia (1948), Art. 65.

[97] Art. 66.

[98] Constitution of Albania (1946), Arts. 29–31; Constitution of Rumania (1948), Art. 34; Constitution of Yugoslavia (1946), Art. 40; Constitution of Bulgaria (1947), Art. 89.

[99] Arts. 67, 76, 189.

vision for judicial review, the great majority of Latin-American countries apparently have endorsed judicial review by mid-twentieth century.[100] In addition, a sizeable amount of legal literature on judicial review has been published in Latin America,[101] and the courts have exercised their power of review on occasion.[102] But there still remains the impression that the elaborate constitutional provisions for judicial review in Latin America are paper provisions rather than constitutional reality.[103] The existence of these provisions, however, may have a real significance as the constitutional systems of Latin America attain greater stability.

Near Eastern and African Constitutions. Post World War II constitutional developments indicate the possibility of adoption of judicial review in additional Near Eastern and African countries. The Draft Constitution of Israel proposes to establish both a High Court with "exclusive original jurisdiction in all questions relating to the validity of any law having regard to the terms of the Constitution" and a Supreme Court as a final court of appeal. The Draft Constitution proposes further that: "No law shall be enacted which is in any respect repugnant to any of the provisions of this Constitution. If the Courts pronounce any law or any provision thereof to be repugnant to the Constitution, such law or provision shall, to the extent of such repugnancy, be thenceforth absolutely void and inoperative."[104]

As to other developments in the Near East, it may be noted that the recent Constitution of Syria (1950) establishes a court with limited jurisdiction to decide the constitutionality of laws.[105]

A very recent development in the Union of South Africa has brought the question of judicial review before that country in a most striking way. Jurists generally stated that, after the passage of the Statute of Westminster (1932), the Union Parliament need not observe the special procedure required by the Union of South Africa Act (1909) in the case of legislation modifying the so-called "entrenched clauses" of the Union Act.[106] In 1951, the Separate Representation of Voters Act, which modified an entrenched clause, was passed without observance of the designated procedural requirements. On appeal, the Su-

[100] See, however, A. S. Christensen, *The Evolution of Latin American Government* (New York, 1951). Christensen writes that only six Latin-American constitutions "specifically state" that the courts have the power of review, and that thirteen are silent on the subject.

[101] For references to the writings, see Jaffin, *op. cit.* (above, n. 39).

[102] Garner, *Political Science and Government*, p. 770; J. A. C. Grant, "Due Process for Ex-Dictators; A Study of Judicial Control of Legislation in Guatemala," AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, Vol. 41, pp. 467–469 (1947); H. G. James, *The Constitutional System of Brazil* (Washington, 1923), Ch. 5.

[103] See Christensen, p. 472; Grant, "Due Process for Ex-Dictators," p. 469; W. S. Stokes, *Honduras* (Madison, 1950), p. 140.

[104] Art. 76.

[105] Arts. 63, 122. The question of constitutionality can be referred by one-fourth of the members of the legislature or the president prior to the promulgation of a law.

[106] W. P. M. Kennedy and H. J. Schlosberg, *The Law and Custom of the South African Constitution* (London, 1935), pp. 98–112; H. J. May, *The South African Constitution* (2d ed., Capetown, 1949), pp. 7–8.

preme Court of the Union, specifically refusing to follow a precedent of 1937, held the Separate Representation of Voters Act invalid. This so-called "Coloured Vote Case" has provoked a strong political reaction on the part of the Malan Nationalist regime, which has enacted legislation vesting in the High Court of Parliament final power to determine the validity of laws.[107]

In the Constitution of the United Kingdom of Libya (1951), the Supreme Court is given exclusive jurisdiction over suits between the Federal Government and the provinces. In addition, the King may refer important legal and constitutional questions to the Supreme Court for its opinion. Finally, the Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction in cases where a dispute concerning the Constitution or its interpretation is involved. The Libyan Constitution was drafted under the auspices of the United Nations, and legal advice was generously available to the native drafting commission. Constitutional procedures and institutions have been based on several modern constitutions, and the judiciary articles are said to have been particularly influenced by the judicial provisions of the new Constitution of India.[108]

Far Eastern Constitutions. Most of the states now existing in the Far East adopted new constitutions in the post World War II era. Several of these constitutions represent the initial constitutional efforts of countries for the first time enjoying national independence. In both old and new independent Far Eastern countries, there has been a considerable tendency to adopt judicial review.

Two of the constitutions which make provision for judicial review or other means of constitutional control are at the present time mainly of academic interest, because of communist successes in China and Korea. The Constitution of South Korea (1948) does not provide for judicial review in the American manner. The South Korean Constitution adopts the French device of a Constitutional Committee, but gives to the Committee a much broader jurisdiction:

> Whenever the decision of the case depends on the determination of the constitutionality of a law, the Court shall proceed in accordance with the decision of the Constitution Committee. The Vice-president shall be the Chairman of the Constitution Committee and five justices of the Supreme Court and five members of the National Assembly shall serve as members of the Constitution Committee. A decision holding that a law is unconstitutional requires a two-thirds majority of the Constitution Committee.[109]

The Constitution of the Republic of China (1947) continued the traditions of

[107] For discussion of the case, see E. N. Griswold, "The 'Coloured Vote Case' in South Africa," *Harvard Law Review*, Vol. 65, pp. 1361–1374 (1952). A bill altering or repealing an entrenched clause is required by the Union Act (1909) to be passed by both Houses of Parliament in joint session on third reading by two-thirds of the total number of both Houses.

See New York *Times*, June 4, 1952, p. 19; June 12, 1952, p. 4. Court action against the High Court of Parliament Act has been filed, on grounds that it is invalid, and the contention of invalidity has been sustained in a lower court.

[108] Arts. 151–153. See *Second Annual Report of the United Nations Commissioner in Libya, 1951*, General Assembly, Official Records, 6th sess., Supp. No. 17 (A/1949), pp. 1–70.

[109] Art. 81.

Chinese republican developments by stipulating that laws in contravention of the constitution shall be null and void. The power to determine whether a law contravenes the constitution is vested in the Judicial Yuan. Some points were in doubt concerning the provisions for determination of a conflict between a law and the constitution, in particular whether an individual could obtain a ruling from the Judicial Yuan. Although opinions were expressed on this and other unsettled points, there was insufficient time for any practice to develop before the communist regime was established.[110]

Three of the new Far Eastern constitutions are found in nations which were formerly part of the British Empire. In one of these countries, Ceylon, the Constitution of 1946 does not provide for judicial review, although the legislature is barred from passing laws infringing certain religious rights. Appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council still lies from Ceylonese courts.[111]

In broad outline, the judicial review provisions of the Constitutions of Burma (1947) and India (1950) are somewhat similar. Each Constitution grants to the individual the right to move in the Supreme Court for enforcement of fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution, and empowers the Court to issue the necessary writs for enforcement of those rights. (Each Constitution contains a section on directive principles of state policy in the social and economic fields, but this section is declared "not to be enforceable by any court.") The power of the highest court to pass upon the constitutionality of national and provincial legislation is explicitly recognized.[112] In both Burma and India, legislation authorizing preventive arrests has been attacked before the courts; in both countries particular sections of the preventive detention legislation have been held invalid.[113] Also, in India, provincial laws infringing upon the freedom of speech have been invalidated.[114]

The Thailand Constitution of 1949 stipulates that any provisions of law contrary to, or inconsistent with, the constitution are unenforceable. If a court deems any provision of law to be inconsistent with the constitution, it is to stay proceedings and refer the question to the Judicial Committee for the Constitution. The decision of the Judicial Committee (composed largely of persons qualified in the law, some of whom are appointed by the legislature) is final. The Thai Constitution is similar to those of India and Burma in that social and economic objectives are placed in a separate section which is declared to be unenforceable by the courts.[115]

[110] See Roscoe Pound, "The Chinese Constitution," *New York University Law Quarterly Review*, Vol. 22, pp. 194–232 (1947).

[111] See Art. 29 of the Ceylon (Constitution) Order in Council of 1946 for provisions relative to religious freedom.

[112] Constitution of Burma, Arts. 25, 32–44, 137. Constitution of India, Arts. 13, 32, 36–51, 132–133, 143.

[113] W. Christian, "Burma's Constitution and Supreme Court," *Tulane Law Review*, Vol. 26, pp. 47–59 (1951); Naresh Chandra Sengupta, "Fundamental Rights," *Indian Law Review*, Vol. 4, p. 39 (1950).

[114] *Thappar v. The State of Madras*, C.W.N. 1950 S.C.R., p. 234; *Brij Bhusan v. The State of Delhi*, C.W.N. 1950 S.C.R., p. 245.

[115] Arts. 54–72, 168–172, 177–179.

One of the most important Far Eastern constitutions making provision for judicial review is the Japanese (1946). Drafted under strong American influence, the Constitution establishes a Supreme Court which is the court of last resort, with the power to determine the constitutionality of any law, order, regulation, or official act.[116] At first, it was not clear whether lower courts had the right to inquire into the constitutionality of laws, but later legislation and practice have admitted this right.[117] During the American occupation, the constitutionality of laws was questioned in the lower courts, and in a few instances the lower courts have declared provisions of laws to be void. With Japan once more an independent nation, the constitution will begin to operate under traditional influences that perhaps were not allowed free rein previously; and some observers have expressed doubt as to whether the Japanese bench will assert its constitutional independence strongly enough to give practical effect to the judicial review provisions of the constitution.[118]

VI. SIGNIFICANCE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW PROVISIONS

Judicial review has gained wide acceptance since its appearance in the United States one hundred and fifty years ago. Today judicial review exists, frequently on paper only, in the constitutional systems of between one-third and one-half of the eighty or more independent states presently existing. Geographically, the principle of judicial review has been accepted in every major area of the world, with the exception of the Soviet sphere. Historically, the period since World War I has been the period of its widest adoption.

As the principle of judicial review has become more widely adopted, many variations in its application have appeared. The major of these variations may be summarized as follows. (1) The power of review has been vested in several cases in organs other than the ordinary courts, such as constitutional courts and constitutional committees whose representative as well as judicial character has been emphasized. (2) The parties enjoying the right to place the question of the constitutionality before the reviewing organ range from only a few designated official organs or persons to private individuals who need not be directly affected by the legislation in question. (3) The power of the reviewing body varies from that of formally annulling a law to that of refusing to apply a law in the particular case before the body, or even to that of giving advisory opinions only. Indeed, in a few cases, the organ of review cannot pass upon the constitutionality of a law at all, but only upon a legislative measure before its promulgation as law. (4) In some instances the jurisdiction of the reviewing body extends not only to cases involving the constitutionality of legislative and administrative acts, but also to cases involving the unconstitutional ac-

[116] Art. 81.

[117] A. C. Oppler, "The Reform of Japan's Legal and Judicial System," *Washington Law Review*, Vol. 24, p. 309 (1949).

[118] T. L. Blakemore, "Post-War Developments in Japanese Law," *Wisconsin Law Review*, Vol. 1947, p. 637; A. C. Oppler, "Courts and Law in Transition," *Contemporary Japan*, Vol. 21, pp. 19–55 (1952).

tivities of political parties and private individuals. (5) Insofar as judicial review is concerned, several constitutions distinguish between enforceable and unenforceable sections, with emphasis, generally, upon the enforceability of sections containing individual rights and the unenforceability of sections setting forth broad economic and social objectives.

The significance of the recent widespread adoption of judicial review cannot be evaluated upon the basis of constitutional provisions alone, for, as Latin-American experience proves, a dozen constitutional clauses may be less effective than one judge or legislator of the stature of John Marshall. To be considered, therefore, are the questions of whether these recent constitutional provisions for judicial review will have any practical effect, and, if so, whether they will serve the purposes for which they were adopted.

As to the practical effect of the provisions, the brief experience since World War II indicates that judges will exercise their powers if the necessary implementing legislation is enacted and if the independence of the judiciary is respected in practice.

Broader aspects of operation involve the factors that have entered into the adoption of judicial review. Many of the factors that have affected both the growth of judicial review and its practical operation have been previously mentioned, particularly legal and political traditions, theoretical beliefs, the effects of federalism, and considerations of economic and social class interests. To these may be added another factor of especial importance in the contemporary era. Totalitarian successes since World War I have demonstrated that undemocratic groups can subvert democratic forms and procedures to the overthrow of democracy and to the eradication of human rights and liberties. For this reason, rightly or wrongly, many modern democrats have endorsed judicial review as a means of guarding the constitution and protecting individual liberties against totalitarian action and undemocratic use of governmental power.

Recent constitution-making has produced, then, somewhat paradoxical results. Judicial review, an institution evolved in the early days of the liberal era, is enjoying its greatest popularity in the period of waning liberalism, and is being endorsed by nations with little if any indigenous liberal heritage. In an attempt to salvage that portion of the liberal tradition which insists upon respect for natural rights and fundamental law, recent constitution-makers have turned to the very institution, judicial review, which has been most severely criticized as a device which tends to perpetuate the most questionable part of liberal theory, its economic tenets. The result promises to be a controversial and delicate constitutional experiment which merits the attention of democrats everywhere.

THE IMPACT OF U. S. ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS ON THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION OF WESTERN EUROPE*

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World War II left Europe economically bankrupt, politically paralyzed, and spiritually sick. In contrast, we find today—thanks to the leaven of the Marshall Plan and other U. S. assistance, and the self-help and mutual-help measures of Western European countries—a vastly improved Continent of Europe.

First, economic collapse has been avoided. The mills, plants, and shops in most countries are humming as they never did before. The current output of industry in Western Europe is roughly forty per cent larger than in 1938, and sixty per cent above that of 1947. Agriculture has likewise shown encouraging improvement. The volume of intra-European trade which had come to a virtual standstill in 1947 has sharply increased until it is now over one-third higher than that of the pre-war era. The dollar deficit in Europe has been substantially reduced from a peak of $7 billion and, except for the special requirements of the post-Korean rearmament program, it would probably have been brought into manageable proportions by 1951.

Second, the countries of Western Europe have not only achieved this tremendous economic improvement while struggling to raise consumption levels to pre-war standards, but they are now, in the wake of Communist aggression in Korea, engaged in a large rearmament program. This is their demonstration of an ability and a willingness to assume today defense burdens which are more than 60 per cent heavier than those they shouldered in 1949, and significantly higher than in 1938.

Third, European military forces now in being are superior to those in 1947. Supplemented by American divisions, air installations, and naval power, European military forces stand as a warning to any aggressor that force will be met with force.

Fourth, a considerable measure of internal political stability has returned to Western Europe. Governments which in 1947 appeared unable to cope with subversion within and to take positive measures to solve their economic and social disorders, are now on the whole far more vigorous, efficient, and democratic. The possibilities of a Communist take-over, or of the planting of Soviet troops on the edge of the Atlantic through "peaceful penetration" are no longer such imminent threats to Europe or the United States.

Fifth, where there was hopelessness, disillusionment, and self-pity, there has arisen in Europe a new spirit of confidence and a determination to work toward unity and self-support. Despite the clever and diabolical opposition by the Communists and a disturbing amount of neutralism on the part of fellow citizens, many of the people of Europe are rolling up their sleeves to solve their

* Paper prepared for the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association at Buffalo, New York, August 27, 1952.

own problems; they have proof in the massive changes during these five years that a better day is actually possible.

But of most significance to our subject here is the new awareness which the leaders of Europe and the Atlantic Community now have of the reasons for these great accomplishments. People on both sides of the Atlantic are slowly learning that a secure future is dependent upon unity of purpose and unity of conviction and unity of effort.

I do not suggest that serious economic, political, and social problems do not now exist. They are staggering: apathy and malice are all too prevalent, and economic and political weaknesses in some countries generate continuous crisis. But, what gives encouragement that a peaceful world can be, are the new political and economic institutions in Europe and in the Atlantic Community which are both the cause and the result of these changes. Self-help and mutual-help in Europe, buttressed by American aid, are the threads out of which an integrated Europe is being woven. To strengthen those threads is the most challenging of the tasks ahead.

INTERACTING STIMULI

Encouragement of the unification of Europe has in recent years become one of the elements of the foreign policy of the United States—an objective which has been progressively expanded and reflected in legislation. It was implicit in General Marshall's address of June, 1947 at Harvard and in the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, although no specific reference was made to it. In 1949, however, the Congress set forth "unification of Europe" as an explicit objective of the U. S. in the amendments to the Economic Cooperation Act.

The Mutual Security Act of 1951 stated that the funds authorized for economic and military assistance should be used "to further encourage economic unification and political federation of Europe." In the Act of 1952 the Congress "welcomes the recent progress in political federation, military integration and economic unification in Europe and reaffirms its belief in the necessity of further vigorous efforts toward these ends as a means of building strength, establishing security, and preserving peace in the North Atlantic area."

Too often a politically and economically united Europe has been viewed as an end in itself—a visionary goal. New institutions will prove successful only when they are the consequence of necessity in solving specific problems and have public support. Integrated institutions must be the fruit of concrete needs rather than a theory pressed for its own sake. However, cause and result are interacting, and an institution established to meet one problem will often provide the inspiration and cooperation required to solve another problem.

The fact is that European unity has grown only within the framework of a fast-developing Atlantic Community; and it is impossible to chart the growth of European or Atlantic institutions since 1947 without tracing initiative, action, and inter-action back and forth endlessly across the Atlantic. Both European unity and the Atlantic Community have grown from the same soil: Europe's need for the aid and moral support of an Atlantic Community, and

the need of the U. S. for a closely-knit Europe as a strong and defensible sector of the Atlantic Community. The instinctive surge of the West toward unity—impelled by common fears and hopes—has thus simultaneously called into being European and Atlantic institutions intertwined and interdependent.

It was Europe's need and U. S. advocacy of maximum self-help and mutual assistance that called forth the first post-war European institution—the Committee (later the Organization) for European Economic Cooperation—and started the snowball of European hope for security and well-being through unity. Likewise, it was the Brussels Pact, signed in March, 1948, that gave rise to the Atlantic Pact and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and led directly to a realization of the century-old dream of a "Council of Europe." It was within the framework of the security of a developing Atlantic Community that the Schuman Plan for a European Coal and Steel Community, purely European in origin, evolved into the "European Community of Six." The Coal and Steel Community provided the principle and the shape for the Pleven Plan which is becoming its military counterpart. It was in the Council of Europe that the idea of a European Defense Force was first projected; but it was the resolution of the North Atlantic Council to integrate forces that made it imperative and furnished the setting for the formal proposal by Prime Minister Pleven of France for a union of the defenses of the six continental countries. The Pleven Plan was pushed toward agreement and reality by inspired European statesmanship and with the aid and encouragement of the executive and legislative branches of the United States government and of General Eisenhower, who regarded it as essential to NATO. And now, to complete the circle, the OEEC, of which the United States and Canada became associate members in 1950, is given new life as an economic arm of the Atlantic Community, and continues to be a fertile breeding ground for further European economic integration.

Many forces and conditions—economic, psychological, political, and military—contributed to these striking achievements. Basic to this progress was far-sighted leadership within Europe and a growing realization that unity of action is indispensable. The post-war policy of the United States to work through international bodies—the United Nations and regional groupings—and to assume international responsibilities thrust upon it have undergirded the whole movement.

The Mutual Security Program is today, as was the Marshall Plan before it, a powerful instrument for aiding the growth of European unification. The United States seeks unity primarily as a means of assuring effective action in protecting freedom—the freedom of men and nations. Financial aid in the execution of these two programs has for the most part been a result, not the cause, of these new organisms.

INSTITUTIONAL PROGRESS

Now that a visible web of European organization exists, it is useful to reexamine the motivations which brought about the creation of each portion and which press for new areas of cooperative action. United States assistance to Europe under the Marshall Plan provided a stimulus acceptable to European

countries for a unified effort for postwar reconstruction and began a chain reaction of which we still see only the early stages. These initial steps toward European integration are too well known to develop in any detail. However, the interweaving of U. S. and European action is often not fully understood.

Organization for European Economic Cooperation

The first significant step toward European economic unity was the establishment, in 1948, of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) which sixteen Western European countries joined despite the refusal of the Soviet Union to participate itself or to allow any of its satellites to do so. For its part, the U. S. Congress established the Economic Cooperation Administration including the Office of U. S. Special Representative for Europe to work with the OEEC and the participating countries.

The mutual goals of the U. S. and its Western European partners in the crucial experiment were clearly stated in the Convention for European Economic Cooperation signed by all OEEC members in April, 1948:

> Recognizing that their economic systems are inter-related and that the prosperity of each of them depends on the prosperity of all;
>
> Resolved to create the conditions and establish the institutions necessary for the success of European economic cooperation and for the effective use of American aid, and to conclude a Convention to this end. . . .

The OEEC has subsequently endeavored to carry out these mutual objectives in the closest, day-to-day informal collaboration with the ECA in Washington, and the ECA's European arm in Paris. In the early years of U. S. assistance, the OEEC performed the critical job of recommending the distribution of Marshall Plan funds among the participating countries. Concurrently, this body worked with varied degrees of success to reduce barriers to the flow of trade, facilitate the supply and distribution of essential materials, promote financial stability, and achieve a more effective utilization of European manpower. More recently the OEEC has been assigned the function of making annual studies of the economic and financial performance and capacity of its members which are essential to NATO in drawing up, annually, its military program.

One of the most positive and forward-looking of the goals which the OEEC has established is that of increasing European production and of widening and deepening the market for European produce. An increase in European production by 25 per cent has recently been set by OEEC as a five-year aim. Progress toward this goal was recently given powerful impetus by the United States through an addition to the Mutual Security Act known as the "Moody Amendment" which provides for $100 million worth of counterpart (local currency funds) generated by dollar assistance to be used by the participating countries "with a view to stimulating free enterprise and the expansion of the economies of those countries with equitable sharing of the benefits of increased production and productivity between consumers, workers, and owners."

In addition to these achievements, the OEEC was also responsible for an accomplishment which, although somewhat intangible, was of prime importance to the success of joint recovery, namely, the development of a common Euro-

pean outlook. As each country drew up national recovery plans and submitted them to OEEC for careful analysis and hammering into a joint program, matters that had for centuries been national secrets became common European knowledge. And in the Secretariat, hundreds of the best experts drawn from member countries learned to work together as Europeans rather than as nationals. It is easy to overlook now, four years later, that nothing like this had ever happened before. The method and practice and outlook developed in the OEEC are among the important foundation stones of the growing movement for the unification of Europe.

European Payments Union

In July, 1950, the OEEC created the European Payments Union, a multilateral clearing system for intra-European payments, including transactions with the associated monetary areas of the member countries. The U. S. made an initial capital contribution of $350 million during the first year of the EPU to get it underway.

The Union has already shown in several instances, most notably Germany, the advantages of the collective approach in recommending measures to deal with serious trade deficits. It opened the way for positive and cooperative action to eliminate post-war trade restrictions and discriminatory barriers which obstruct the free flow of goods. Thus the EPU, as the first post-war operating institution, was the initial step taken by Western Europe toward the ultimate goal of a single, large, competitive West European market within which goods and currencies may freely flow.

U. N. Economic Commission for Europe

While of less significance to our subject, note should be taken of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (ECE), which was an outgrowth of a U. N. temporary sub-commission on economic reconstruction of the devastated areas in Europe established in 1946. Since the USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia, as well as the USA, are members of the ECE, it provides a forum for consideration of European-wide economic problems. Despite the effort of the Iron Curtain participants to use some ECE meetings as a propaganda rostrum the ECE has been able to do some excellent research work on such crucial European economic problems as the flow of trade, availability of raw materials, and transportation.

Council of Europe

The moral encouragement which the U. S. gave to European countries through the Marshall Plan provided a new impetus to the age-old urge for structural unity in Europe so admirably crystallized by Winston Churchill at Zurich in 1946. Unity was intensively promoted by a growing number of voluntary organizations with distinguished leaders and large popular followings. In 1948 one organization, officially called the European Movement, assumed the initiative in creating a permanent unofficial agency to guide the many groups striving toward the political union of Europe.

That same year the European Movement called together in The Hague some 800 of the most eminent leaders of Europe whose deliberations set in motion activities which, after agreement by the Brussels Pact countries, resulted in the creation of the Council of Europe in May, 1949. Thus popular will pressed the governments of Western Europe to create the beginnings of an organization of Europe.

The U. S. Congress not only gave encouragement to this development but also, at the invitation of the Council's Consultative Assembly, authorized representatives of the Senate and the House to meet with representatives of that 14-nation body. This is the first occasion when an official delegation from the Congress has participated in discussions of this kind.

The Council of Europe was not all that many leaders of the European Movement desired, for it was not a federal state empowered to act on urgent economic, social, and political problems. But it did provide a forum, partly official, partly semi-official, in which the voice and conscience of Europe could make itself heard and felt in a regular and orderly manner in favor of the harmonization of national policies and actions and in support of further concrete steps toward the unification of Europe.

During the three years of its active life the Council has grappled with the question of how the organizational unity of Europe can be achieved, and in the debates on this issue the cleavage between those who were prepared to yield sovereign powers to a federal Europe and those who were not continued to be the main stumbling block. Perhaps the Assembly of the Coal and Steel Community will receive an adequate mandate to develop a constitution which will bring into being a European political institution capable of reconciling these divergent views.

Meanwhile, functionalism, in contrast to federalism, as a road to European unity gained support with the implementation of the Schuman Plan and the formation of a European army. Yet the voice and the conscience of Europe continue to be heard insistently in Strasbourg, and the efforts to bring about a federal union continue.

Brussels Treaty

During this same period the mounting realization that the Soviet Union was embarked upon an aggressive program of picking off free nations one by one also encouraged concrete steps to build a positive, collective defense structure, operational in peacetime and capable of assuring the security of the free nations of the West. The first step was the signing of the Brussels Treaty early in 1948 by the governments of Belgium, France, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. The U. S., which was already providing assistance to these countries and therefore interested in the effective utilization of all resources, gave active encouragement to the Treaty.

Under the Brussels Treaty the five countries agreed not only to come to each other's aid in the event of armed attack, but also to organize and coordinate and harmonize their economic policies and activities, to develop social and other related services, and to promote cultural exchange. The Brussels

Treaty, as a regional agreement within the context of the U.N. Charter, provided an instrument for collective action which the U. N., because of the Soviet veto, was finding difficult to provide.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

The Brussels treaty paved the way to still closer forms of joint action on the Continent and to the precipitation of the "Atlantic Community." Recognizing that the collective strength of the Brussels treaty countries might not be sufficient to preserve peace unless the power and influence of the United States and other free nations were brought into association with them, many Americans gave thought to ways in which the United States might help strengthen collective security in Europe as it had in the Western Hemisphere through the Rio Treaty.

Numerous and varied bills were introduced in the Congress, but it was Senator Vandenberg, then Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, who, in close consultation with Undersecretary of State Lovett, steered through the Senate a resolution embodying what was conceived to be the prevailing American attitude toward the United Nations and toward regional defense groups. The resultant Senate Resolution 239 declared, as one of six points, that the policy of the United States is to associate itself "with such regional and other collective areas as are based on continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid."

Buttressed by this expression of objectives and a similar statement by the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives, the United States began exploratory conversations late in 1948 with the Brussels Treaty countries and others for a collective defense arrangement. The end result was the North Atlantic Treaty with a membership in the organization created by it (NATO) of 12 countries: the Brussels Treaty countries and Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Norway, Portugal, and the United States. Subsequently Greece and Turkey were admitted.

Several months later, Congress passed the Mutual Defense Assistance Program to implement the Treaty by making aid available for military equipment and materials to member countries in need of such aid. The Act stipulated, however, that U. S. assistance should become available only after bilateral agreements had been concluded between the United States and the countries receiving aid and after presidential approval of a general defense plan prepared by NATO. Such a three-year plan for build-up of armed forces was prepared and the shipments of military equipment to Europe began.

Communist aggression in Korea in June, 1950 caused an immediate reassessment of the danger of Soviet aggression in the Atlantic area and an acceleration in the pace of rearmament in all NATO countries. It likewise caused a shift from reliance on committees in the building of NATO defenses and the coordination of national policies, to the building of a *unified defense force operational in peacetime*, and directed and supported by integrated NATO staff organizations. This clothing of the Treaty with organs in continuous session and with execu-

tive arms represents a great step forward in the erection of a strong and effective institution.

These decisive NATO developments brought about a great change in the relationship of the United States to its allies in Europe—a relationship characterized by U. S. participation in the NATO goal of the creation of "an integrated military force adequate to defend Europe" functioning under a single command.

The concerns of NATO are by no means restricted to military matters. Even if Article II of the Treaty had not provided for collective action in the political, economic, and social fields, the consequences of carrying out the joint rearmament program would have required this. The most difficult decisions in mobilizing an integrated defense force with burdens equitably shared are primarily political and economic in nature. This fact is manifested in the foreign policy discussions of the North Atlantic Council and the Annual Review of each member's economic capabilities and contribution to mutual security.

The European Community of Six

One of the signs that NATO can become an effective instrument for collective freedom has been the growth of European unity in the last two years evidenced by some merger of sovereignty as regards certain basic economic and defense functions. Such a merger, inclusive of Germany, provides the hope that a practicable and safe means can be found through which the coal and steel and manpower of Germany can be utilized in the defense of Europe and the Atlantic Community.

The precise form in which institutional unity in Europe could be effectively molded has never been clear. This is one reason why ambitious proposals for an all-embracing federation have floundered. It was only slowly, within the framework of the security and economic assurance of a developing Atlantic Community, and responding to courageous, persistent European leadership, that six countries of Europe came to agree in 1951 and early 1952 to cessions of sovereignty that have laid the foundations for the building of a truly unified "European Community of Six."

The Coal and Steel Community (CSC), the first—and in some respects the most significant—step in this direction, was launched by the Foreign Minister of France, Robert Schuman, in May, 1950. He proposed that the coal and steel industries of France and Germany, together with those of any other European country willing to participate, be merged into a single production and market area and that supra-national institutions be established to carry into effect their collective purposes. Now, scarcely two years later, this proposal, in the form of a treaty, has been accepted by the governments of France, Belgium, Italy, Netherlands, Luxembourg, and West Germany, ratified by the parliaments, and has come into operation.

The U. S. relationship to this new organization was indicated by Secretary of State Acheson when he said that the United States will, insofar as possible, deal directly with the CSC on matters within its sphere.

The European Defense Community

The Schuman Plan paved the way for the suggestion by Pleven of France several months later that a unified European army be created under a single European defense minister, financed by a common budget, and integrated into the North Atlantic defense system. Agreement was reached in February of this year by the six Schuman Plan countries to merge their national armed forces into a single European Defense Force (EDF) in which basic national units of troops (around 12,000) including German troops would be integrated at the army corps level. Moreover, it was agreed to create the supra-national political institutions of a European Defense Community (EDC) empowered to raise, equip, train, command, and finance such a force. When the agreement has been ratified, the EDC will stand as one of the most decisive steps ever taken voluntarily and in time of peace toward institutional unity in Europe. The hopes and fears of many decades are at stake in this ratification.

The benefits that may flow in the future from these developments are as great as imagination will allow. The impoverishment, the wars, the myriad tributary evils that have been inflicted on Europe and the world by nationalist aggression —military, economic, and political—in the heart of the European continent, are the substance of modern history. If the danger of nationalist economic and military warfare could be removed even in Western Europe, then, despite the Russian shadow, the possibilities of peaceful economic and social progress in Europe and the Atlantic area as a whole would indeed be promising.

PRESSURES AND INCENTIVES

When viewed in perspective this progress toward unification of Europe in resolving economic, political, and military problems is most encouraging. Indeed, given all the countless reinforcements of separateness—the heavy inertia of the status quo, national and sectional suspicions, the resistance of vested interests, subversive opposition from within and without—the record is impressive.

For centuries men have dreamed of European federation. As wars in this century have grown in scope and destructiveness, as the techniques of production, commerce, and communication have pressed against national barriers, as man's spiritual and physical needs have outrun the ability of the nation-state to supply, the ideal of a unified Europe has acquired powerful mass support. Today, reason and the vision of a better world are joined with the necessity for survival, and European unification is no longer a remote ideal but a vital and attainable political objective.

With recent progress in mind let us examine more closely the prerequisites for a firm and enduring unity, the pressures which support and obstruct it, and the relation of U. S. participation to further integration.

Importance of Spiritual Perceptions

Unity among people and nations stems from many different forces ranging from fear of destruction by a common enemy to that unity which comes when

people believe in and act on the principle of loving their neighbors as themselves. Unity (of a sort) may be achieved by violence and suppression—witness Eastern Europe—but enduring unity can only come from convictions freely arrived at and freely expressed. Indeed, the whole world today faces the choice of unity in freedom or unity in slavery.

Achievement of unity in freedom is the most difficult undertaking to which man can address himself, as it must harmonize two basically different perceptions which govern the social life of man. One is selfishness which ends in man destroying his brother. The other is the "concern" and respect for people as people which leads to unity founded on internal spiritual bonds rather than casual external factors. Inherent in this perception are the advantages which accrue both to an individual and to a nation when narrow "selfism" is submerged into something greater, into the mutual concerns of a common cause. This is why "mutual interest" is a far more positive symbol of our foreign policy rationale than "self interest." The first includes the latter, and if adhered to it affords a mutually acceptable and morally defensible basis for initiative.

Mankind has made enduring social, economic, and political progress only when he has translated the imperatives of this latter perception of concern, equality, responsibility, and brotherhood into his institutional life. This has meant giving up sovereignty of action in the interest of the larger community —license in personal actions which limit the freedom of one's brother; capriciousness on the part of a nation to commit acts of political and economic aggression on another country.

Under the Schuman Plan and the European Defense Community (when the latter is ratified), sovereignty of action is transferred voluntarily from the countries to the new central institutions. The CSC and EDC treaties provide for the exercise of this sovereignty through a CSC executive, an EDC executive, and a common assembly composed of delegates from national parliaments. The establishment of a common Court of Justice with compulsory authority over constitutional and jurisdictional disputes is another significant step toward implementation of the sovereignty of these two institutions.

In contrast, the power of OEEC, NATO, and the Council of Europe is in each instance dependent on the voluntary action of member countries in performing agreed tasks and on their exercise of a full share of social responsibility. It should be noted that a social and moral climate adequate to support responsible performance by participating countries on a mutual interest basis in alliances and other institutions of cooperation is the same kind of climate necessary to the delegation of sovereign authority to the larger community. Since such delegation makes it more difficult at a later date to withdraw from responsibility, the climate itself is favored by every measure that produces unity. Hence the importance of strengthening institutions to the maximum permitted at any time.

The type of sovereignty (a most misunderstood and misused concept) which we should strive to locate in these new institutions is not so much a matter of the transfer of formal authority to them. Rather it is the mutual dependence on

these institutions as the form in which countries make decisions and as the instruments for carrying out essential fact-gathering, services, and action. If decision-making in consultative bodies which meet in continuous session can become a fixed practice, fear will be reduced that, when a crisis arises, a country will act in isolation and fail to fulfill its treaty obligations. In other words, the organizational and executive quality of these institutions and the behavior patterns which participation in them engender furnish the most practical test of their vitality. Nevertheless, as history amply illustrates, the failure to provide an adequate charter for an institution usually results in its disintegration as crisis passes.

Unwillingness of countries to take responsible action on a European, an Atlantic Community, or a world basis perforce reflects inadequacies and instabilities in the perceptions governing their social and spiritual orientation. Here we see the extent to which prospects for enduring unity must be founded on permanent institutions which reflect genuine social, political, and economic realities rather than on alliances and other cooperative devices designed for temporary convenience in times of fear or pressed primarily for purposes of self-interest. Without such a foundation dreams of European unity can only be dreams rudely swept away as mankind awakens from repeated nightmares of wars, depressions, and other catastrophes.

Political Imperatives

Aside from these basic perceptions, many other pressures favor or frustrate efforts of the Western World to reform the political and economic patterns of centuries. Dire necessity for survival has been one of the most potent. Aggressive totalitarianism and the failure of national institutions to prevent devastating world wars, world depressions, German occupations, uprooting of mass populations, slave camps, poverty, and violence, leave man—no matter what his perception may be—if he has any interest in survival, with no alternative but to move decisively toward new forms of association.

Two specific dangers in Europe have been most compelling for integration. First, is the fear that a new crop of German militarists, once free of Allied Occupation, might for a third time—with a new wave of irresponsibility—plunge Europe into bloodshed. Second, is the spectre of Soviet imperialism, implemented by communist infiltration and subversion. These dangers grimly attest to the need for heroic measures.

The fear of a rearmed Germany and an untamed Russia has made clear that the countries of Western Europe and the Atlantic Community must not only arm to defend themselves, but must include Germany and in such a manner that the economic and military potential of Germany cannot fly off again on an independent tangent. Thus Western European leaders have sought to so merge the armies and resources and political authorities of Western Europe that aggressive war by any one country cannot be waged against another and that defensive strength against Soviet imperialism can be maximized at the least cost.

A weighty obstacle in the path of these movements toward integration is the position of Great Britain against full participation in any plan—political, economic, or military—which runs counter to the traditional British feeling that they are not in all respects an integral part of Europe. Their worldwide responsibilities, especially in the Commonwealth and sterling areas, and the potential effect of continental involvement on their internal economic and social programs, have all contributed to their refusal to join the Coal and Steel and European Defense Communities. Perhaps the informal but responsible associations which the United Kingdom is now establishing with these two bodies will go part way in reassuring the Continent and lead to closer affiliation.

The situation of the British in relation to European integration is paralleled in part by the role of the U. S. in connection with the broader area of the Atlantic Community. The countries of Europe suspect that the discharge of our leadership responsibilities or even of basic treaty obligations may be impaired by failures in annual appropriations or other vagaries of our political processes or "excesses of youth." To the extent that they lack confidence in the enduring character of our economic and political commitments the European nations will inevitably feel they are making a disproportionate sacrifice of their freedom of action for a mutual purpose.

Other forces are also driving Western Europe toward political integration. There is a feeling among the nations of Western Europe that they are no longer separately able to play that role in world affairs to which their traditions, wisdom, and interests entitle them. United, they would be able to solve more of their own problems without U. S. financial contributions, and to exert greater influence upon the course of world affairs.

Integration an Economic Necessity

Economic imperatives likewise provide compulsions for integration. Technological changes of the last fifty years, and the postwar experience in the recovery effort, have demonstrated clearly the necessity of making more efficient use of economic resources, eliminating waste, and increasing productivity. Among others these are the deficiencies which are retarding the economic development of free Europe: small fragmented production and marketing areas; barriers to the flow of commodities and capital across national boundaries; lack of an integrated transportation system; immobility of labor; difficulties of building balanced military forces on a national basis; efforts to achieve national self-sufficiency; and trends toward monopoly of resources and productive enterprises. Yet the very existence of these economic maladies which make integration imperative seriously complicates the task of integration.

Moreover, there is real difficulty in uniting a part of Europe which has been economically dependent on the other half. The common cultural heritage of the Western European countries, which Eastern Europe shares only to a slight degree, makes it easier for the West to join together for economic survival, but the problem of the economic half-pie is still of formidable proportions.

Genuine unity is not divisible into sectors, although it is always relative.

Experience of the past four years has shown that collective defense calls for the pooling of economic resources. Unified military and economic efforts also require integrated political arrangements capable of supporting specialized endeavor. Successful progress in all three areas—military, economic, and political—depends on the spirit of the people. To the extent that governments and citizens are possessed of totalitarian or other undemocratic perceptions, the structures will falter.

Role of National Strength

We thus see the importance of national strength to the strength of these new institutions. Too often we forget what constitutes national strength. General Eisenhower, speaking at SHAPE last December, summed it up very succinctly:

> The strength that a nation, or a group of nations, can develop is the product obtained by multiplying its spiritual or moral strength by its economic strength, by its military strength. *It is the product, not the sum.*
>
> Consequently, if any one of these factors falls to zero, the whole is zero. There can be no army unless there is a productive strength with a productive power to support it. There can be neither a strong economy nor an army if the people are spiritless, if they don't prize what they are defending.

Where peoples are governed by perceptions which breed privilege, irresponsibility, lawlessness, greed, and ill will, the low quality of national strength provides a weak link in cooperative endeavors, no matter the size of their military forces or richness of economic resources. In international undertakings success depends upon adequate national strength of all geographic elements involved. It is for this reason that the ECA and today the MSA have placed so much emphasis upon the provision of economic and technical assistance in a manner aimed at building situations of strength. Thus, military aid, or economic assistance, or technical cooperation should be conducted in a manner to encourage courageous leadership, concern for the public welfare, integrity in public and private management, and democratic values generally.

Moreover, in any coalition which operates by persuasion rather than coercion, countries will tend to be supercritical of each other when they feel another fails to bear its full share of the burden. Both the U. S. and other members of the Atlantic Community must realize that every country is in a state of relative development. It is naive to expect perfection. The fact that these weaknesses in national strength—these functional ailments—beset each country should encourage the countries jointly and individually to pursue more positive and increasingly resourceful approaches in the promotion of those social and moral values which will mitigate these frailties.

I believe it is true that cooperative action among nations calls for a higher degree of national strength among the participants than action taken on a national basis. Likewise, collective action taken through sovereign international instrumentalities calls for a still greater degree of national strength than action either on a cooperative or national basis. A federation ordinarily encounters greater political and administrative difficulties than a monolithic form of organization. Suspicion, self-interest, inertia, cultural differences, and many other

obstacles to cooperative endeavor have a compounding effect as the area of cooperation expands.

This thesis seems inconsistent with the idea that countries often see no need to cooperate when they feel strong, or in the absence of external threat. The prime ingredient of strength referred to here, of course, is not size, resources, or armament, but the sense of responsibility and moral and spiritual stamina of the people. In the words of the prophet Zachariah: "Not by might, nor by power, but by my spirit, saith the Lord."

This aspect of national strength as a foundation for collective action can be seen in the forces which have produced an encouraging measure of integration in Western Europe. The "Community of Six" (coal, steel, defense) could not have progressed this far without favorable political, economic, and social imperatives in the participating countries. Whether a suitable blend of these elements of national strength will develop as future steps are taken and future crises arise in the movement for integration, only time can tell.

These imperatives are equally important in the broader movement toward Atlantic Union. The more culturally diverse and numerically large national participation becomes, the more essential is an adequate common basis of national strength. The extent to which the American people demonstrate patience and courage and a sense of responsibility as key elements in their national strength will be of critical significance to the success of current and future endeavors toward an effective Atlantic Union.

FUTURE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES

The postwar responsibility which the U. S. has assumed in world affairs, potently expressed in the Mutual Security Program, and the Marshall Plan before it, has been a powerful factor in the growth of these newly integrated organisms of Western Europe. Recent amendments to the Mutual Security legislation referred to above state the U. S. intention to give even more positive support. Of particular significance is the authorization to provide assistance directly to the new European institutions as well as to individual countries.

> . . . the Congress believes it essential that this Act should be so administered as to support concrete measures for political federation, military integration, and economic unification in Europe. Appropriations . . . relating to military assistance, defense support, and economic assistance . . . may be used . . . to furnish assistance to any of the following organizations: (a) The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, (b) the European Coal and Steel Community, (c) the organization which may evolve from current international discussions concerning a European defense community.

In each instance where this new authority is used to give material and psychological assistance directly to the emerging European central organizations rather than to individual countries, the United States will be taking a major step toward the strengthening of these institutions.

The Mutual Security Program for 1952–53 provides for various kinds of aid, all of which may be so administered as to promote the economic unification and political federation of Europe.

First, there is the "end-item" program—the transfer of some $4 billion worth of finished military equipment under the current year's appropriations to our NATO allies in Europe. This form of assistance not only can be based increasingly on the determinations made in consultation with or as a result of agreements reached in these multilateral institutions, but can also be allocated directly to them for assignment and use.

Second, there is the "off-shore procurement" program—funds for the purchase in Europe of military equipment and supplies, and the construction of facilities both for the use of the U. S. forces and for supply to European nations under NATO defense plans. Just as the EDC will be concerned, when fully established, with the assignment of production responsibilities within the Community on the basis of efficiency and capacity of facilities, so too the United States could work through the EDC or through other central channels in the procurement of materiel.

Third, there is "defense support"—the supply of machinery, raw materials, food, and other commodities to Europe to help the European economies sustain the increased defense effort. While this type of assistance is aimed primarily at meeting the needs of individual countries in their defense production commitments under NATO, and, therefore, calls for much direct negotiation on a bilateral basis, strong central institutions will provide opportunities for channeling assistance through them.

Fourth, there is "counterpart"—the deposits of local currencies equivalent to U. S. dollar aid which are used by the European countries with the approval of the U. S. to carry out mutual security purposes. These local currencies could be utilized increasingly by the countries for multilateral projects or as a means of better financial undergirding of the new central structures.

Beyond these specific ways in which U. S. assistance can be administered to encourage European integration, there is a more fundamental question asked by other countries: in what way and for how long will the U. S. develop common policy and conduct operations through these and any new central institutions? What the Europeans need is an assured sense that the U. S. will continue without vacillation to cooperate economically, politically, and militarily; that it will remain interested in Europe, not merely in the sense of carrying out formal commitments but because the American perception is clearly based on the principle of "community."

Financial aid has been one means of American assurance of interest in Europe, and obviously a vital one. Other symbols of American interest which emphasize partnership and mutual concern need to be found. Technical assistance as a cooperative undertaking—not as the export of "know-how"—is an example. Indeed the development and use of suitable symbols can add much meaning and support for mutual objectives, activities, and values.

Especially to be avoided are bewildering shifts in policy, frequent changes in government organizations which administer foreign programs, and short-run appointments of top mission personnel. All of these may lead to an impression

that our programs are of a temporary and emergency character, and that when the Soviet crisis is over we will pull back into our shell.

To cement our destiny more firmly with Europe's and Europe's destiny with ours, many thoughtful persons are now searching for additional arrangements pursuant to Article II of the North Atlantic Treaty for cooperation in economic and political, as well as military, spheres. Continuous economic cooperation (in matters of trade and financial policy, production commodity stabilization, etc.) is the best substitute for aid. Additional concrete and permanent (as contrasted with emergency) programs in such areas will give heart to the Europeans as they undertake defense build-up, European unification, and closer association in the Atlantic Community. In this connection, the President has recently requested the Public Advisory Board for Mutual Security to make a study of the foreign trade policies of the U. S. particularly as they affect efforts under the Mutual Security Program to achieve economic strength and solvency among the free nations.

SUMMARY

In this broader context these are some of the forward-looking concepts to which the people and government of the United States must address themselves:

1. The U. S. cannot expect more self-sacrifice and statesmanship on a continuing basis on the part of European countries than the U. S. is itself prepared to contribute. Their problems are our problems; our problems are their problems. One world!

2. Greater appreciation is needed of the effect which the towering economic position of the United States has upon the economies of Europe. Slight changes in our internal economy and external relations have such terrific repercussions abroad that a viable Europe cannot be wrought in the absence of a viable Atlantic Community.

3. The contribution of dollars to meet European balance of payments difficulties is a poor substitute for the desirable alternative of lower tariffs, elimination of trade barriers, and the institution of financial, production, and marketing programs for the Atlantic Community under which Europe can earn dollars. Forthright action here is as essential for our own economic well-being as it is for Europe's.

4. Further development of the principle of computing the obligations of each member of the Atlantic Community on a "burden sharing" basis, helps break down the feeling in some quarters of the U. S. that we are contributing a disproportionate amount. This approach—an approach fundamental to the whole concept of integration—also makes our predominant economic role more palatable to the other partners and gives them a greater sense of participation.

5. There now exists an unstable foundation for Western integration to the extent that the U. S. long-term political and economic commitments or those of any country are of a piecemeal or emergency character. Central cooperative

institutions which flourish under crisis may subsequently atrophy in the absence of permanent political and economic commitments.

6. There is need for a political framework in Europe to provide an umbrella for the recently created functional institutions of the Coal and Steel and European Defense Communities. Further development of the Atlantic Community as an organism through which the members carry out political, economic, and social aims will strengthen European integration, and in turn will receive vitality from it.

7. Since the ultimate source of both national and international strength depends on perceptions that govern attitudes and behavior of people, especially of those in positions of leadership, far more attention is needed in the development and sharing within the Atlantic Community of the moral and spiritual values underlying democracy and in the demonstration that the free world has a far superior answer to human needs than have the Communists or any other totalitarian group.

8. A broad basis of public understanding in this country of these problems and of America's responsibility and opportunity is even more essential for future progress toward European and Atlantic Community than at any previous time. Above all we must learn the art of patience, without relaxing our ideals and endeavors.

If we establish adequate long-term relationships between the United States and the countries of Europe, we can look toward an end of the chronic European financial crises, and the situations that have required large sums of U. S. aid on an annual basis. If we do not make such arrangements, we face the prospect of an indefinite continuation of extraordinary U. S. assistance to Western Europe. In the absence of (1) a satisfactory reconciliation of the U. S. internal and foreign economic policies in relation to our position in the Western Community, or (2) U. S. aid, we would have to anticipate (3) a sharp reduction in the defense efforts of our North Atlantic Allies, a serious deterioration in their economic circumstances, and in all likelihood a decline in their internal political stability. The folly of the latter should be self-evident, but the American people must face the challenge which is embodied in the difference between piecemeal assistance to partners in a common effort and an enduring commitment to remain with them.

PROBLEMS OF WORLD ORDER IN THE LIGHT OF RECENT PHILOSOPHICAL DISCUSSION

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Political problems, domestic or international, always involve us in psychological and philosophical issues; but they tend to develop whatever psychology or philosophy they need for their own purposes rather than to borrow from the formidable and not always luminous stock pile of professional literature in these subjects. This tendency to be one's own philosopher is entirely justified, for the simple reason that philosophy is always arising from experience, showing an inductive as well as a deductive side—and that the political experience of mankind is prolific in comment on the nature of man and of the world man lives in. Thomas Hobbes, for example, is a political writer whose contributions to psychology have not yet been fully appreciated.

At the same time, there are recent advances in both psychology and philosophy of which political science ought to enjoy the consequences. If any light is thrown on the nature of the human individual, that light is directly pertinent to political science. Enquiries into the nature of human association are similarly relevant. The present article, in undertaking to indicate a few of the lines of current thought which may be useful in political theory, does not attempt any fine boundaries between psychology and philosophy: whatever promotes our knowledge of human nature concerns both.

The new conception of human nature concerns directly present issues of world order. For during the past half-century, while the nation-state has had to meet a barrage of criticism as a reliable unit of world order, the individual human being has moved forward as a unit-subject not only of domestic law but of international law as well. These two events are not disconnected. The tendency to build up the individual person in his capacity as world-citizen, and not alone nation-citizen, is an index of the extent to which the sovereign nation-state, both through its egoisms and its logic of external sovereignty, has begun to appear to some observers to be the chief obstacle to peace.

In both respects, the trend of the nineteenth century has been reversed. During that century every significant new school of jurisprudence, from Savigny and Austin to Duguit and Roscoe Pound, rejected the "rights of man," the individual, as a basis for legal thought, while the concerns of the historical political community pressed forward and the spirit of the nation-state came to a certain flower of recognition in the "principle of self-determination." At present the "rights of man," never wholly submerged, seek not alone recovery of lost ground but a wide advance: the United Nations has proposed a Convention which would project many of the rights embodied in its Declaration into the constitutional law of member states, not only making these rights a direct concern of the guardians of world order, but seeking to implement them as if national sovereignty had suddenly become transparent.

The nineteenth-century reaction against natural rights was largely a reaction of technical people concerned with facts—lawyers, historians, and sociologists—who had experienced the legal unworkability of a set of absolutes, such as the Jeffersonian axioms, which reduced the community to a means for securing these rights. The reaction, aware that the individual has himself to be made through a history of gestation by the community, came to the position well summarized in Pollock's aphorism: "A person is a person, not because he is human, but because rights and duties are ascribed to him." Ascribed by whom or what? Not by Nature, not by his Creator but by the political community acting through custom and law. Pollock had simply restated in modern terms Aristotle's cryptic saying that "The state is prior to the [matured] individual."

If now we in the twentieth century react against this nineteenth-century reaction, we are also learning from experience. We have invested heavily in the virtues of "society," "community," "nation," and now begin to ask critically what these entities are; we wonder at the failure of the sociologizing jurists like Pollock, Pound, Timasheff, like von Gierke and Maitland who learned from him, to identify a tangible agent as source of the ascription of rights. Apart from persons, it is hard to see how "custom" or "law" can act; and if we are thrown back on persons to produce that acting community which in turn is to create the person by ascribing to human raw material rights and duties in positive law, we are evidently traveling in a circle. This is not of itself a fatal difficulty, for in living things we frequently encounter such circular hen-and-egg relations of cause and effect: only, in such cases we cease to be dogmatic about first causes. The presumption is that neither Jefferson (with Grotius and Locke) nor Pollock (with Aristotle and Hegel) has stated a position in which political theory can rest. What we can at this moment safely assert is that there is a sense in which man makes the state, and another sense in which the state makes the man. Out of this dead center, theory can advance only by determining *what these senses are.*

This, I believe, we are at present prepared to do as contemporary psychology and philosophy absorb the rude shocks administered not alone by the revolt in jurisprudence, but by various other nineteenth and early twentieth-century movements of thought, including the Marx-Engels doctrine of economic determinism and the various theories of subconscious motivation in interpreting social standards—none of which we shall spend time in examining for their own sake. All of these movements have affected our present view of the human individual, and hence of the political individual; and study of this concept should throw some light on the nature of the political community, especially in the form of the nation-state.

There is (fortunately) a good deal in psychological and philosophical discussion which concerns political theory only indirectly—for example the mind-body problem. The political individual is neither a mind without a body nor a body without a mind: he is, in the current psychological phrase, a "psychophysical" organism. This compound word has its points: it asserts a working

unity of mind and body while prudently deferring the questions of how or where the joint is made, whether, indeed, there is any joint, or whether the two are in reality different aspects of the same thing.

For purposes of political and legal identification our individual has to be thought of in terms of his body: if you want the man, *habeas corpus*. It is not, however, the body as lump fact with which political science is concerned so much as the functional body, the body as a center of systematic activities, physical and mental. In this sense political science can utilize the trend of philosophical thought which makes processes rather than substances the "reals" with which we have to do. Bergson and Whitehead undertake to dispense with substances altogether; they describe the world in terms of changes, events, occasions, actions, rejecting any "that which" acts. Political science would find it difficult to adjust its language wholly to this brave (but I think fallacious) effort. It cannot surrender the identity of "that which" acts, the self which remains responsible for its acts and their consequences—and yet it is still in a man's activities that any science must find the evidence of the coherence of his thought and will. The human adult is an organism whose behavior shows a degree of consistency of aim which is our chief evidence that he is a rational animal.

Political theory raises the question as to what aspect of his diverse activity it is which makes man the "political animal." Aristotle was inclined to single out the activity of speech, which, in contrast to the present-action signals of the animal world, creates signs for general ideas, and in particular for the general idea of justice. Kant's picture of the subject of law is much simpler, is, in fact, characterized by an astringent economy which deserves our notice. This human subject is a free agent capable of controlling his own behavior by "general rules"—that is all. At least, that is all that appears on the surface.

Now we are concerned with contemporary thought, not with Kant; but there are two reasons for pausing a moment at this thinker—one, that the gaunt austerity of his thought throws into relief what has been added, and the other that there is so much there, not on the surface and not even yet dug out, that he is in many ways still contemporary.

Kant presents his subject of law as interested solely in one thing—freedom of action. This is to say very little, perhaps nothing. For if a man wants to act, he wants to act "freely"—to be impeded in action is just so far to be unable to act. Kant does not so much as raise the question of what his subject wants to do with his action.

He presents his theory in the form of an admonition to this legal subject to regulate his own action: "Act outwardly so that the free use of your volition can coexist with the freedom of everybody, within a general rule." The meaning of law, on this showing, is to ensure, through self-regulation, a maximum of free action for all members of a given community.

Note that for Kant the "living law" is occupied not primarily in settling quarrels in court, as the contemporary school of legal realism would have it,

but in the far more voluminous and incessant business of *preventing conflict.* Hence his subject of law must have an intelligent preference for harmonized rather than conflicting patterns of action; he must be a person who seeks a self-operating lawfulness in order that law need not be invoked.

Note also, however, that Kant's injunction, as addressed to the law-preferring individual, *cannot be carried out by him.* Kant does not tell what the "general rule" is that will harmonize free actions—that is a part of his admirable parsimony: it amounts merely to the "law that there shall be law." But neither does he enquire whether there is *only one solution.* What if there are as many non-conflicting patterns of free action as there are square-dances which successfully avoid collisions? In general, there are plural solutions. In that case, no individual can impose his pattern on the others: there must be an *authoritative decision* if any pattern is to become an operative "general rule." Some one must call out the figures! Kant's call for self-regulative reasonableness thus turns out to be a requirement for positive law: in brief, Kant implies Austin. This is, I believe, an unnoticed merit of Kant's view, and surely one of which the author was unaware.

Note, thirdly, that these freely-acting and rule-conceiving individuals are *already in community,* at least to the extent of having an identical sphere of action, otherwise there would be no occasion for conflict and no motive to avoid it. The Kantian individual cannot be the author of the community which his law-seeking dispositions presuppose.

Note finally that, while this community of other persons is assumed, the individual subject of law is not pictured by Kant as having any emotional interest in its presence pro or con. This is in keeping with his intention to restrict the province of law to external behavior, omitting all issues of motivation —which are, after all, the despair of all legal administration. Accordingly, there is no suggestion in the Kantian picture that the active individual desires the presence of his neighbors, nor yet that he is irked by them or inclined to question their numbers. Only, since they are the sole source of possible conflict and he must have free action, the individual necessarily views his neighbors with a slightly negative slant—the fewer they are, the easier his problem!

Let me now indicate certain respects in which our view of the political individual has gone, or has still to go, beyond Kant.

(a) Kant's interest in freedom, as was the temper of the liberal elements of his age, appeared unaware that liberty has a dialectical character. It cannot be increased *ad libitum* without developing contradictory aspects.

It is true that Kant saw the double character which the human associate always bears: "We can't live without him and we can't live with him." But he failed to develop in the context of law the consequences of the negative slant mentioned above that the neighbor is in one respect the creator of the problem of freedom, and in so far a menace. Kant's political individual shows no need of solitude—nor did Aristotle's; yet a region of seclusion is as essential to a tolerable human existence as is a region of free action. Indeed, it is a conse-

quence of the demand for freedom itself. For if one is to realize the ideal of freedom, unhampered by the presence of the "many too many," one must find or create a region from which the crowd may be excluded. If he cannot gain this *Lebensraum* like a solitary explorer at the outer edge of the community *Lebensraum*, he must build it inside that domain: he accordingly seeks to erect a set of walls about a spot which he calls his private property, and there to exercise the *jus prohibendi*—the right of excluding all the rest of the world, except perhaps his chosen few.

But here the achievement of ideal freedom involves a restriction of freedom. For obviously our individual can neither keep nor gain his sanctuary without the consent of the community enclosing it. This consent will be forthcoming because, and only because, his need is a general one. But as the private-property enclave becomes general practice, the course of free action in the common *Lebensraum* meets a new and growing obstacle: the freedom to create realms of perfect freedom within the area of relative freedom tends to limit the relative freedom otherwise available. And this internal restriction both creates new occasions of conflict and adds force to an aspect of the urge for freedom (which Kant, in another connection, has recognized), the tendency of the area of freedom to expand.

(b) Kant's picture of the freely-acting individual who meets his problem of possible conflict by accepting a rule or pattern valid for all assumes that a solution once found remains good. But it lies in the nature of the freedom-loving individual to challenge any proposed limit, even when that limit is set up by the logic of his own solution.

The institution of private property is nonetheless what we have shown it to be, a demand of freedom, if we find the demand of freedom fighting against it. Private property has always been an incitement to intrude, to trespass, to poach. (Recall the folktale on which John Masefield tells us that he built his poem *The Everlasting Mercy*—the tale of two poachers who fought by moonlight because each claimed the same area of trespass as his private right.) But if every limit is to be outpassed—and the history of exploration indicates that we have here an actual psychological factor and not a mere exercise in the mathematics of infinite series—it follows that each individual's *Lebensraum* tends to be simply all accessible space. (At this point, we must give Kant credit once more for prescience: he was, so far as I know, the first to develop the legal outlines of a *Weltbürgerrecht*, a law of world citizenship, including therein the right to travel, to converse with and do business with other world-citizens regardless of national boundaries.)

This individual bent to expansion might of itself offer release for pent-up energies of freedom were it not for the fact that community domains—municipalities, nation-states, etc.—claiming a quasi-private property right within the world community, tend to expand also. If law is to be the answer to the problems created by freedom, it must deal with this situation, though it has very rarely received legal attention. An interesting case appeared in our Supreme Court in 1915. Mr. Justice McKenna delivered an opinion for the Court

in the case of *Hadachek v. Los Angeles.*[1] Hadachek, some years earlier, had developed a brickyard outside the city. Brickyards are not beautiful to everybody —at intervals they give out smoke and fumes; but being placed at a distance from the settled region, Hadachek created no nuisance when he built. However, the city of Los Angeles, as its habit is, grew out and surrounded the brickyard; its ordinances were invoked, and Hadacheck was called upon to close his yard. Having built his thriving business in good faith, on brick clay which does not grow on every bush, Hadachek contested the demand. In the opinion of the Court, Los Angeles was in the right. "There must be progress"—these are the words of the judgment—"and in its march private interests must yield to the good of the community." Not pausing to dwell on the fact that when the sagacious Justice wished to indicate the weakness of Hadachek's position he chose the word "interests" instead of "rights," we note the implied assertion of the judgment that political entities must on occasion be allowed a *right to expand*, expansion being considered a normal symptom of "progress."

In any case, in our concept of the political individual, to the demand for freedom of action must be added the demand for expanding the scope of free action; whereas the demand for private property and for expanding the scope of private property growing out of this same concern for freedom, and operating on a community level as well, offers increasing resistance to the growing demand for elemental freedom. The chief problems of world order arising in this complex situation are not capable of resolution on the simple Kantian basis of harmonized patterns of activity. In fact, the injection of the economic factor into all questions of political life by the Marxian programs, blind as these programs were to the nature of private property, brought a rude reminder of the insufficiency of stating the political problem as one of seeking liberty through law.

(c) But the chief defect of Kant's concept of the political individual stems from his attempt to *exclude motivation*, on the ground that law has to do only with overt acts. Neither law nor politics can evade the question of the mainspring of human volition, and Kant's attempt was necessarily unsuccessful. Kant had to assume the high value men place on liberty and on the avoidance of conflict; but, as intervening times have taught through experiences of tragic import, neither liberty nor harmony nor both together can tell the full meaning of the individual's inclusion in the political community. In the community men seek life. They adhere to political forms, including forms of law, because of their continued hope that life lies that way; their political motivation must have no less amplitude than the meaning of life itself.

For the majority of human beings the political community is an unquestioned fact: it is there and they are in it. It either lies across their path as an opaque necessity which it is easier to conform to than to shatter and remould; or else it appears as an aid in rough-hewing the outlines of their life's course. In either case, it is the whole will of man that is at stake. What is this whole will? In Jefferson's triad of unalienable rights, the third item, the pursuit of happiness, has been the weak sister, probably because of a large vagueness (which it shares

[1] 239 U. S. 394.

with Aristotle's "the good life"). The concept is little suited to political theory, yet its amplitude is the precise measure of our problem; Jefferson realized the important political fact that it is something more and other than liberty. Thomas Hobbes had already caught a glimpse of the total will. He had denied that it is the satisfaction of day-by-day desires and the freedom of actions leading thereto that chiefly concern the political animal: that animal, Hobbes found, casts his glance through an indefinite future, impelled to "assure forever the way of his future desire"; and to this end he must set his will on adequate power. Hobbes spoke for the majestic—and indeed unending—time-range of the political vision and will: his solution is unacceptable, his concept of the problem immortal. He contributed to our idea of political motivation by fostering our necessary concern with power and security—which must be seen as co-factors with liberty and harmony.

But both liberty as conceived by Kant and power as conceived by Hobbes have a distinct anti-social coloring. The fellow man, though a necessity, is for one a potential obstacle and for the other a potential rival. No doubt, the fellow man has both of these characters; it is equally true that these are not for the social animal his primary political meanings.

With these comments we take leave of the sinewy and prophetic Kantian philosophy, whose very defects leave us immediately in the midst of twentieth century speculation and turmoil. We seek the *political aspect of the total human will to live.*

The germ of this will is not created by the political community. We have learned to see it as a biological deposit. The community helps it to unfold, interprets and shapes it—but leaves always the question whether some other shaping and interpreting would have been better, fairer to the possibilities of the original germ.

This question would be meaningless unless it were true—and the truth is crucial for our problem—that *the germ has its own trend*, its own way of unfolding—what Aristotle (and later Hans Driesch) calls its "entelechy" and Aquinas its "synderesis"—and therefore its own independent critique of all kind aids and recommenders such as parents, educators, customs, institutions, laws, and the occupational pressures of the social order. Its own bent is individual, a spring of untamable wildness at the core of the biological organism which remains forever outside the political community. To say that the community makes the man is like saying that the trellis makes the vine because the vine requires its shaping and lifting aid. Yet it is the highest task of the community to bring this wild potency to maturity. How shall we conceive it?

Here contemporary psychology comes forward with various proposals—one in particular of almost insistent urgency. It gains its foothold from the fact that the individual himself hardly knows the nature of the force within him which animates his perpetual striving-ahead and his discontent with every socially-proffered interpretation of his will. In his conscious life he intends to govern his life by "reason": but this force—which is, after all, himself—lies

deeper than his rationality. If he will understand himself, he must lead an ear—probably a reluctant ear—to the theory of "subconscious motivation."

The doubt is raised whether our human individual's motivation is discoverable in any daylight inspection, or whether he is driven by subconscious, perhaps unconscious, impulses, hailing from human or subhuman ancestry, or from infantile impressions. Our century has so far specialized in exploring irrational factors of human conduct as to lead the "rational animal" into a rational doubt of his own rationality. It is necessary for us to face this doubt, for if this analysis of human motivation is valid, political theory must be revised *ab ovo*.

Already one phase of political theory, that dealing with crime and its treatment, is radically affected. In a creature of irrational drives, crime and delinquency are forms of disease whose proper treatment is not punishment but cure: moral reaction is outmoded, and the psychiatric process promises to replace the judicial process in such cases. But if the general hypothesis of subconscious motivation is valid for what we regard as pathological types, normal political life is also subject to analogous interpretation. Since Mr. Justice Cardozo published his genial study of the judicial process, much has been made of the irrational factors which control the opinions of the bench. A writer in the *California Law Review* has even held that "the written opinion is little more than a special plea made in defense of impulses which are largely unconscious."[2] And if this be true of the judge, who has a special obligation to "objectivity," what of the various grades of laymen? It is hard to conceive a limit to the impact of this view on political theory short of submitting all political processes to the guidance of qualified psychoanalysts.

At this point, the crucial question for all political theories arises in a new light, *Quis custodiet custodes?* Who shall analyze the qualified analysts? Since in the words of our writer "there can never be a judge without predispositions," and since the analyst is by necessity a judge—a judge of judges—it would seem indicated (and C. G. Jung concurs) that the analyst should be analyzed before being admitted to practice. The problem how to light on the original standard-setting analyst, thus develops an infinite regress. And this, evidently, must be the logical situation of any doctrine of human nature which removes the criteria of self-judgment from the conscious focus to a subterranean darkness in which only an esoteric priesthood of the subconscious can provide the decisive oracles.

We cannot, in short, invite the irrational to take charge of the human individual, still less of the political individual, without self-contradiction. But this conclusion, while it relieves us of a current danger of abuse, does nothing to impugn, nor to explain, the far-reaching significance of the subconscious for political theory, especially in the interpretation of that "total will" of which we

[2] Theodore Schroeder in Vol. 6, p. 89 (1918). The writer continues by saying that in order to grasp the real meaning of the opinion we must see it as "a revelation of the emotions, the phantasies, the desires, the persistent pastlife, and the present intellectual status of the judge"—a vision, he insists, which only the qualified analyst can achieve. Quoted by Jerome Hall, *Readings in Jurisprudence* (Indianapolis, 1938), pp. 1129–1130.

are in search. I venture to think that the solution of this problem is now within reach. Let me indicate its direction.

In the nature of their practice, psychoanalysts and psychiatrists are concerned with the subconscious chiefly in its clinical incidence—its critical or protesting relations to the conscious direction of life. But what if there were, beside the critical subconsciousness, a concurrent or *allied subconsciousness?* And what if this allied subconsciousness were by all odds the greater part of the subconscious life? This appears to be the case.[3]

The term "subconscious" is a convenient label for a wide range of mental life, demonstrably at work affecting current judgments and actions, yet not being "at the focus"—not being directly thought *of*. This is the case, for example, with the great bulk of our "memories" organized into the total of our "experience": our experience affects every present perception and feeling, yet without being recalled in detail—just as a whiff of sea-breeze has an emotional tang due to unrecalled experiences at sea. It is the case also with what are conveniently called "instincts": congenital impulses, not hailing from our own experience, which light up their specific objects with an untaught interest and active direction—for food or fight or sex—whose sources we cannot consciously trace. They, too, are subconscious; in a sense we may say that they do not appear in consciousness *in person* at all! We are wholly incapable of ticking them off on our fingers, and psychologists differ widely on their number. (They used to deny their existence—fair evidence that they are not part of the conscious foreground.) One reason for this difficulty of identification is that, while they have different mechanisms, impulses sprout out, so to speak, from a common root: they are diverse expressions of a single life-impulse. It is this common impulse that Schopenhauer, with some pertinence, called "the will to live"; the impulses are, we may say, congenital hints of a program for classifiable occasions—now eat, now sleep, now fight, now run away—but always for the same individual impulse to survive, to grow, to develop a shape of life for oneself. In any case, what we so far see is that "the subconscious" is no idle subcellar, breeding cross-currents of impulse in the dark, but an ever-active function of daily living, working with and not against the conscious program.

If we ask whether the subconscious impulses are "irrational," the answer is that they are pre-rational: they do not explain themselves, nor ask leave, before lighting up their occasions with their interests and values. The rationality of man does not consist in his thinking out in advance *why* he values what he values: it consists in his "integration." He is rational in so far as he maintains a consistent course towards understandable ends, woven into a significant purpose. Instinctive drives are, in this sense, *rationable;* they are admitted, by the mature individual, to influence on his behavior only on condition of contributing to the going program of action. And this integrable character of instinct-life is promoted by the common rootage of the several drives in the single hereditary vector-factor of the individual—on the biological side, the "will to live,"

[3] See the author's "Note on the Subconscious" in *The Meaning of God in Human Experience* (New Haven, 1912), pp. 527–538.

on the psychological side, the groping will to realize a human destiny, to do one's human living *well*.

The human individual is driven—as lower animals presumably are not—not merely to become a fair specimen of the human type, but to achieve a destiny unique to himself. He comes to consider "doing his living well" as involving the use of distinctive powers of his own: he wants to "find himself" in the discovery or acceptance of a unique task. For that reason, the growing-up of the human individual is likely to be attended, as presumably animal growing-up is not, with an undercurrent of anxious concern lest one fail to identify the specific task which puts worth into one's unique existence. Here "the pursuit of happiness" has its troubles. Even in the subconscious groping of childhood and in the more definitely suffering explorings of youth,[4] there is a purely human feeling of responsibility. Responsibility to what? Responsibility not directly to the community but to the total source of one's being—say to the universe at large. In this striving—like all persistent things more subconscious than conscious—to become fully human (the will to live) and to do a fully human job (the will to power), we recognize the activities of what we above called "the germ," the intergrating factor which weaves a plurality of pre-rational ingredients into a rational totality. This rational totality of will *is* the human individual.[5] Its horizon is cosmic, not political. In what way, then, is it related to the political individual?

If you should ask a human being point-blank "What *are* you?" his self-consciousness, diving inward, would certainly discover a mass of organic sensations, a sort of hearthfire kept by a "self" whose name could be forthcoming on demand. The human "I am" appears to have its *being* in this center. It is, to be sure, also an "I think," reaching out to infinity, and an "I will," reaching forward in time, clearly for a short distance, and then less clearly without limit. But all these outreachings report back to the central hearth: we cannot agree to dissolve the "I am" in the "I will." The self is surely a striving; it is also surely a passionate concern for the meaning and destiny of all striving: it is a perpetual recoil as well as a perpetually expanding adventure, eternally

[4] See, for example, Masefield's *So Long to Learn* (New York, 1952).

[5] Cf. the author's *Human Nature and Its Remaking*, rev. ed. (New Haven, 1923), Ch. 11 and pp. 474–477.

Our psychologist-philosophers—James, Royce, Dewey—agree with our cosmologist-philosophers—Peirce, Whitehead—that the individual is internally a multitude. Royce calls him a society of selves, Whitehead a "society of occasions." But they also agree that the individual is not the multitude but the unity of the multitude; and it is Royce who most clearly and simply expresses this view of the individual: "the self is a purpose," a purpose such that no other individual could fulfill it (*The World and the Individual*, New York, 1901, Vol. 2, p. 276). William James, much occupied with the instincts and the latent "energies of men," also identified the individual with a unique function or task—and saw here the basis for a democratic individualism—but he more directly expressed the conviction that it is the function of subconscious energies to support, not to distract, the conscious course of life: they may enable us "to tap deeper levels of will-power than are habitually used." See R. B. Perry, *The Thought and Character of William James* (Boston, 1935), Vol. 2, pp. 217, 266.

making up its mind about the world while eternally working there. All of this being said, we agree that the human individual "finds himself" in an eminent sense when he finds an active function, a task, which is peculiarly his: he is willing to be identified in the world's eyes with and by that function. And it is this function or task, not any preëxisting right, which makes him the political individual.

We have said that Hobbes caught a glimpse of the psychology of the political man, at one point: its ambitious time-dimension, and the implied need for power "to assure forever the way of his future desire." Hobbes was right about the time-span; he was wrong about the "desire." Man is not interested in enjoying forever, he is interested in doing something that will *last*. And since he himself cannot last forever, he can secure endurance for his work only if it can be embedded in a continuing current of life, the life of an historic community. If for no other reason, the state is essential to the perishable individual in order to lend to his work its own perpetuity.[6]

But the political community has something more than time-span to contribute to an individual's work. It contributes the whole setting which makes "a task" mean anything whatever.

We speak of the community as "historic," as having a "continuing current of life." In Kant's picture of the work of law, this notion of a continuing current is absent: there is community, in the sense of a group of individuals interested in free action within an identical *Lebensraum* without conflict; but their actions could be simply the continued pursuit of the round of human wishes, the same from time to time. In such a community, a "task" has no sense. But Kant's own argument offers the handle to give it sense. We have said that, on Kant's showing, there are plural solutions to the problem of non-conflicting free actions; and that the decision among them must be authoritative—that law must be positive. Every actual legal community thus represents a decision, a law-pattern that might have been otherwise: but this means that *every positive law-system is experimental*, a way of living subject to revision by the results of experience. And this, in turn, means that a certain consecutive argument enters into the life of the community: it has a significant history, as former law-patterns are left behind. (And changes in law-patterns imply changes in all institutional life.) *This significant historic sequence of decisions embedded in law is what constitutes the nation-state:* the nation-state is an experiment in law-making, having its own individuality. On these grounds, the community must be political—not only in order to protect its continued existence, but also in order to make the positive decisions which give it an individual history. And it is only in such a community that individual "tasks" can occur, contributing ideas, critical and constructive, to the common cultural enterprise.

Unless, then, the community is political, in the sense of having its own individuality of legal decision, no human being can achieve the individuality of having his own "task." *Without the nation-state, no human individuals at all*—

[6] See the author's *Man and the State* (New Haven, 1926), pp. 321, 325.

unless in its absence they undertake to set one up! This is a crucial "unless" for the whole relation of individual to state.

From the argument so far, it might appear that the political community is necessary to the individual's very being to the extent that "the state is prior to the individual"—gives him whatever meaning he can have. The community is certainly an organ of the individual's life. Can it be, also, that the individual is an organ of the community's life?

We have noted certain respects in which the fellow-man, both individually and in his corporate capacity, is a menace to the individual. The Kantian need for freedom and the Hobbesian quest of power look on the fellow man as potential intruder, obstacle, rival. And when Marx and Engels brought forward the economic motive as fundamental, they tried to build on one of the emphatically competitive aspects of the human-fellow: however cooperative he may be in production, at the point of distribution and consumption he is the competitor; and the promise of class war, thus built into the premises, cannot be expunged in the mythical classless society. Certainly these negative aspects of association exist; but they are not the whole, or even the primary, truth of the social relationship. If they are to be absorbed or overcome, it must be by finding within the concept of the striving and expanding individual will a non-competitive development which can absorb and subordinate the competitive aspects. This is the step we have now to take.

Consider the impulse sometimes reckoned among the instincts, "sociability," primarily a type of mental hunger rather than a herding impulse. It involves speech as a continuous give-and-take of ideas. Consider this mutual transfer as involving a flux of power. To transfer a physical possession is to relinquish its use; to transfer an idea is to give without relinquishing—to exercise a power while enhancing the power of the receiver. In so far as a will to power is involved, it is a non-competitive will. The transfer of ideas may have a definite intention to build the other mind, as in education, where the will to power becomes a will to create—the most audacious form of social relationship, yet as prevalent as human care.[7] It is the specific impulse of the parent, the teacher, the legislator in Rousseau's sense (*Social Contract*, Book 2, ch. 7). But it is also the impulse of everyone possessed of an idea which he conceives valid for all. If it is the mark of the individual to have a unique purpose, it must also be his mark to bring his idea into the current of community life; he must have a non-competitive will to power.

Now suppose that the political community is there, and our individual is a part of it, but is its critic. He is at once in it and alien to it; it is indispensable

[7] There is still something for political theory in Plato's anticipation of the theory of subconscious motivation. When Plato puts into the mouth of Diotima the proposal that all desires are forms of love and that all love is an impulse to create, he is asserting a subconscious element of identity in the impulsive life, which anticipates—with better proportion—the early doctrines of Freud. It is perhaps the first assertion of a psychological unity of impulse underlying conscious will. Cf. *Human Nature and its Remaking*, pp. 96, 97, 99.

to him and he is at odds with it; "he can't live without it, and can't live with it"; his independent "germ" asserts its judgeship. Then it becomes his task, or an integral part of his task, to revise the community. He cannot make the community, for the community is made; but he may re-make it. On the whole, this is the normal and typical relation of the individual to the political community.

Every existing community has its customary ways of guiding individual members in the satisfaction of their instinctive drives, without conflict. Every individual utilizes the going community pattern as a working hypothesis—reserving himself from complete commitment to it, not because he wishes to be alien but because in his "germ" he is external, responsible to the universe, and must make the comment he makes. But this, his inescapable externality, is the point of leverage which Archimedes sought: it is the individual's possibility of creating some element of the community of tomorrow. Indeed, the historic community, the nation-state, cannot live by conserving alone; it must live by the continued renewal of the decisions which identify it. And *the individual is its only organ of rebirth, its only organ of fertility.* There is no creation or invention except by individual persons.

Thus we confirm what at first we surmised, that there is a circular relation between individual and state; each, in a sense, makes the other. The sense in which the state makes the individual is, however, somewhat Pickwickian: the *existence* of the state makes the individual *possible*—without it, he couldn't be—but his actual making, the finding of his task and doing it, has to be done by the individual himself. By contrast, the sense in which the individual makes the state is quite literal, if only we specify the state of tomorrow and not the state of yesterday—and specify further that the extent of creation by any one individual is seldom more than a fragment, the contribution somewhere of a single tile or ornament to the slow rebuilding of the great city.

Shall we say, then, with Jefferson, that the political individual, defined as the non-competitive will to power through ideas, which requires the political community for its satisfaction, has a set of inalienable rights which the state exists to secure?

There is one right in the situation, and only one. The existence of a right implies the existence of an obligation on the part of the subject claiming the right. If the individual feels himself responsible to the universe from which he comes for doing his living well, then he has a right to that doing, not otherwise. Unless he does his task, both he and the state must wither away; for their interest is identical and vital; but the responsible individual has the right. Let us call it *the right to do his task.* If this is what Jefferson meant by "the pursuit of happiness" (to the contemporary mind, the pursuit of happiness may have other connotations)—and indeed it is the only intelligent pursuit of happiness—then here we have the aboriginal right for whose securing governments are instituted among men.

COMMENTS ON THE THEORY OF ORGANIZATIONS*

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This is an attempt to sketch in very rough form what seem to me some of the central concepts and problems of organization theory. In the first section I have tried to define the field of organization theory and to indicate with some care what justification there is for regarding it as a distinct area of theory, related to, but by no means identical with, the theory of small groups and the theory of social institutions. The comments in the second section on subject-matter areas simply spell out the implications, many of them perhaps obvious, of the central argument of the first section.

This paper is concerned with all kinds of organizations, and not simply with those that fall within the area of public administration. This definition of the scope of organization theory reflects my own conviction that there are a great many things that can be said about organizations in general, without specification of the particular kind of organization under consideration. Moreover, even if we were interested solely in governmental organizations, I believe that a great deal can be learned from the comparison of their characteristics with those of other kinds of organizations, and from attempts to explain the similarities and differences that are found. Neither of these statements denies the existence of numerous and important phenomena that are peculiar to governmental organizations or the need for theory in public administration to deal with these phenomena.

THE SUBJECT OF ORGANIZATION THEORY

Human organizations are systems of interdependent activity, encompassing at least several primary groups and usually characterized, at the level of consciousness of participants, by a high degree of rational direction of behavior toward ends that are objects of common acknowledgment and expectation. Typical examples of organizations are business firms, governmental administrative agencies, and voluntary associations like political clubs.

In complex enterprises the definition of the unit is not unambiguous—a whole agency, a bureau, or even a section in a large department may be regarded as *an* organization. In such a nest of Chinese blocks the smallest multiperson units are the primary groups; the largest are institutions (e.g., "the economic system," "the state") and whole societies. We will restrict the term "organization" to systems that are larger than primary groups, smaller than institutions. Clearly, the lower boundary is sharper than the upper.

Complexity in any body of phenomena has generally led to the construction

* These comments were originally put down on paper without any view toward publication, and later were circulated among the persons who attended a conference on organization theory sponsored by the Social Science Research Council at Princeton, N. J., June 17–18, 1952. I have been prevailed upon, with some misgivings, now to expose them to a wider audience.

of specialized theories, each dealing with the phenomena at a particular "level." Levels are defined by specifying certain units as the objects of study and by stating the propositions of theory in terms of intra-unit behavior and inter-unit behavior. (Cf. the sequence of elementary particle-atom-molecule in physics and the sequence: gene-chromosome-nucleus-cell-tissue-organ-organism in biology.)

Not every arbitrarily selected unit defines a suitable level for scientific study. The most important "unities" that make a level an appropriate one for theory construction and testing appear to be the following:

(a) The units at the level in question should exhibit a high degree of internal cohesion relative to their dependence on each other. Under these circumstances we can discover generalizations about the internal properties of the individual units as quasi-isolated systems (e.g., propositions about communications patterns among component primary groups of an organization). We can also discover approximate generalizations about the relations between units as wholes (e.g., propositions about competition between two organizations).

(b) The units should exhibit internal properties that are different (or depend on different mechanisms) from those that predominate in the internal properties of sub-units at the next level below (e.g., the determinants of the volume of communication between members of two different primary groups in an organization should be distinguishable in important respects from the determinants of the volume of communication between members of a single primary group).

These two tests are not intended as metaphysical assertions about "wholeness" or "emergent" properties, but simply as criteria determining whether, in fact, verifiable propositions can be constructed employing the units in question as approximations to the full complexity of nature. Even if at some stage in inquiry we should be able to reduce the propositions of theory at one level to those at the next lower level—as the theory of gases has been reduced to statistical mechanics—the former propositions would still retain their usefulness for purposes of application and economy of statement. Indeed, the value of both sets of propositions is enhanced by their translatability from the one to the other.

Human organizations would seem to qualify to a high degree as suitable units defining a level of analysis of systems of human behavior. With respect to the first criterion stated above, the most superficial observation shows that the boundaries between organizations have real behavioral significance; and that it is meaningful, in first approximation, to state propositions about the relations between organizations regarded as wholes. (I trust that I have made clear that no notion of "group mind" is implied in this last statement.)

With respect to the second criterion, I believe that enough is known about the psychological mechanisms that are primarily responsible for cohesion and interdependence in the primary group to show that these mechanisms cannot easily account for the corresponding phenomena in the larger organized aggregates; and that there are important organizational phenomena that do not have exact counterparts at the primary group level. A number of examples of

these mechanisms and phenomena, which are central to organizations but absent from or of lesser importance to primary groups, will be given in the next section.

But why speak of *a* level of organization theory? Do we not need as many levels as there are structural layers between primary groups and institutions? I think not, because I do not believe that these various levels are distinguishable to an important extent in terms of the second criterion suggested above —i.e., there are no important new mechanisms to be discovered at these successive levels. The propositions of organization theory can probably be stated with systematic ambiguity so as to refer indifferently to the relations of divisions within a bureau or the relations of bureaus within a department. As small differences in degree begin to approach qualitative significance at the upper end of the scale, we have probably already reached the level of institutional theory. In the future, of course, the results of research may force us to revise this assumption and to introduce additional levels of theory.

MAJOR PROBLEM AREAS

The study of organizations has hardly progressed to the point where a definitive list can be constructed of the major areas for research. The following list was arrived at primarily by considering which characteristics of organization—particularly those distinctive ones that identify the level of organization theory —require dissection and explanation. I have not tried to construct watertight categories, and it will become evident that several of the items represent different ways of looking at the same problem. Until we know what frames of reference are going to be the most useful for organization theory, it will surely be desirable to retain alternative frameworks, and to take considerable pains to develop means for translating from one framework to another.

1. *The process of decision-making in organization.* A language for the description of decision-making processes appears to offer considerable promise as a framework for the study of organizations. The central notion is that a decision can be regarded as a conclusion drawn (though not in any strict logical sense) from premises; and that influence is exercised by transmitting decisions, which are then taken as premises for subsequent decisions.

When the problem of influence is stated in these terms, our attention is called to some features that are not prominent in other formulations. We see, for example, that the process may depend not only upon interpersonal relations between influencer and influencee, but also upon the structure and accepted rules of transformation of the language employed by them. One can begin investigation here by posing such questions as how influence is transmitted in an organization between professional groups that employ different problem-solving technologies, e.g. accountants and engineers. Work on organization theory utilizing this framework could probably soon be related, in a mutually beneficial way, to research on the sociology of knowledge and on the psychology of the problem-solving process.[1]

[1] The relation between organizational behavior and individual decision-making and problem-solving processes is discussed in the author's *Administrative Behavior* (New York,

2. *The phenomena of power in organizations.* A characteristic feature of the mutual influence of organization members upon one another is that this influence exhibits striking asymmetries—as, for example, in the superior-subordinate relationship. These asymmetries appear to be what we have chiefly in mind in using such terms as "power" and "authority." The following are a number of important research tasks in this area:

a. A fully operational definition of power and methods for observing and measuring power relationships is not yet at hand, but would seem fundamental to the description of organizational behavior.

b. More needs to be learned about the motivational basis of power in organizations, including the roles of sanctions, identifications, and attitudes of legitimacy in the acceptance of authority. Progress has been made in the study of the analogous phenomena in primary groups (e.g., work on leadership and on group morale),[2] but it is not obvious that the mechanisms of influence within the primary group tell all, or even most, of the story of influence processes in larger organized aggregates.

c. In elaboration of the last point, the distinction between the "formal" and the "informal" in organizations appears to lie, in part, in differences between the psychological bases of cohesion that are involved. When we refer to power as formal, what we appear to mean is that internalized attitudes toward legitimate authority provide the motivation for acceptance of the relationship. While feelings about legitimacy undoubtedly play a role in primary group relationships, I would conjecture that they take on additional importance when they serve as a substitute for the immediate experience of approval and disapproval in face-to-face relationships.[3]

d. Another mechanism that is important in the transmission of influence in organizations is the interlocking of primary groups through the dual membership of supervisory employees. In general, each supervisory employee is a member both of a group in which he is formal leader and of another in which his

1947), Ch. 5. My researches in the decade since this connection occurred to me have steadily deepened my conviction that a very deep relation—not by any means analogical or metaphorical—exists between decision processes in organizations and the processes described by Gestalt psychologists in their study of the problem-solving process. Since the purpose of this paper is to state problems, not to solve them, I will have to be content here with this simple statement of my belief.

[2] For an introduction to the literature, see Harold Guetzkow (ed.), *Groups, Leadership, and Men* (Pittsburgh, 1951), and "Human Relations Research in Large Organizations," *Journal of Social Issues*, Vol. 7, no. 3 (whole number), 1951.

[3] An overreaction from the excessive emphasis on formal organization in the earlier work on organization theory has led, in the last two decades, to an almost equally serious neglect of the importance of attitudes toward legitimacy. The same overreaction—from legalistic analyses of the state in terms of "sovereignty" to a pure power-politics approach to political behavior—has occurred in the other areas of political science as well. (Lasswell and Kaplan, for example, in *Power and Society* (New Haven, 1951) come very close to treating legitimate authority as an epiphenomenon that has no independent influence on the development of a system of political behavior.) With the reconstruction of "legitimacy" as a psychological, rather than a legal concept, the way is now open to a reconciliation of the formal and the informal (legitimate authority and power) within a behavioral framework.

immediate superior is formal leader. The principal research problems here are to determine the behavior patterns that are adopted by executives in these "cross-pressure" situations; and, if there are several such patterns, to find what determines which one will be adopted. The same questions need to be answered with respect to the "staff" man who, because he is attached to a "line" unit, also has potential or actual membership in two primary groups. It remains to be seen whether cross-pressures produce the same behavior in these organizational situations as in the other social situations where they have been studied.

3. *Rational and non-rational aspects of behavior in organization.* Organizations are the least "natural," most rationally contrived units of human association. But paradoxically, the theory of an organization whose members are "perfectly rational" human beings (capable of unlimited adaptation) is very nearly a perfectly vacuous theory. It is only because individual human beings are limited in knowledge, foresight, skill, and time that organizations are useful instruments for the achievement of human purpose; and only because organized groups of human beings are limited in ability to agree on goals, to communicate, and to cooperate that organizing becomes for them a "problem."[4]

Organization theory is centrally concerned with identifying and studying those limits to the achievement of goals that are, in fact, limits on the flexibility and adaptability of the goal-striving individuals and groups of individuals themselves. The entrepreneur of economic theory is limited only by constraints that are external to himself and his organization—the technology—and by the goal-striving of individuals whose interests are not identical with his. Administrative man is limited also by constraints that are part of his own psychological makeup—limited by the number of persons with whom he can communicate, the amount of information he can acquire and retain, and so forth. The fact that these limits are not physiological and fixed, but are instead largely determined by social and even organizational forces, creates problems of theory construction of great subtlety; and the fact that the possibilities of modifying and relaxing these limits may themselves become objects of rational calculation compounds the difficulties.

In this general area of research, promising suggestions as to the direction in which we might move are contained in oligopoly theory and game theory (formulation of the "outwitting" problem),[5] and in sociological speculations about the self-confirming prophecy. I would single out the following areas for special attention:

a. Identification of the limits of rationality. We need a more complete and systematic taxonomy of the constraints, internal to the system of social action, that serve as limits to the attainment of goals. This would lead to empirical research on the questions: (i) under what circumstances particular constraints

[4] This point is also elaborated upon in *Administrative Behavior*. See particularly pp. 39–41, 80–84, 96–102, 240–44.

[5] See John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern, *Theory of Games and Economic Behavior* (Princeton, 1944), especially Ch. 2.

do and do not operate, including inter-cultural uniformities and differences, and (ii) under what circumstances the modification or removal of particular constraints becomes an object of rational calculation.

b. Theory of organizational innovation and change. Plans are regarded as "utopian" when their implementation would require changes in internal constraints that are thought to be unchangeable. Essentially, utopian plans are rejected because "you can't change human nature" in those respects that would be essential to achievement of the plan. Research is needed as to the criteria that are applied by human beings in planning situations to determine which of the behavior variates they will regard as variable (i.e., subject to rational determination), and which as fixed (i.e., constraints on goal attainment).

c. Reification of groups. The limit of human understanding in the presence of complex social structures leads human beings to construct simplified maps (i.e., theories or models) of the social system in which they are acting, and to behave as though the maps were the reality. To the extent that such maps are held in common, they must be counted among the internal constraints on rational adaptation. What we have just said applies, of course, to all systems of classification which, by determining when situations are "similar" and when "different," provide the individual with the social definition of the situation.

My earlier comments about the relation of "formal" organization to attitudes of legitimacy can be generalized in terms of this notion of social classification. The process of organizing involves, among other things, securing acceptance by the organization members of a common model that defines the situation for them, and provides them with roles and expectations of the roles of others, and with commonly accepted classificatory schemes. Attitudes of legitimacy probably provide a principal motivational base for the organizing process.

What is needed here is study of the factors that determine how an organization will be perceived by the persons in it, how the mode of perception affects behavior, and what the effects are of a greater or lesser degree of sharing of such perceptions.

4. *The organizational environment and the social environment.* Members of an organization generally come to it already equipped with the mores of the society in which it operates. To what extent can and do organizations develop and inculcate mores that are distinct from the mores of the society? To what extent are there in a society *generalized* mores about behavior in organizations that provide the basis for the operation of the individual organizations in the society (e.g., generalized mores about superior-subordinate roles)?

Organization theory has been largely culture-bound through failure to attack this problem.[6] The theory of bureaucracy as developed by Max Weber and his followers represents the furthest progress in dealing with it. The historical data appealed to by the Weberians need supplementation by analysis of contemporary societies, advanced and primitive. A comparison of intra-cultural uniformity and variation in organization patterns with inter-cultural

[6] Cf. Robert A. Dahl, "The Science of Public Administration: Three Problems," *Public Administration Review*, Vol. 7, pp. 1–11 (Winter, 1947).

uniformity and variation would provide the evidence we need to determine to what extent the cooperative patterns in organizations are independent of the mores of cooperation of the society.

5. *Stability and change in organizations.* Any theory of the movement of a system of organizational behavior through time must take account of the apparent stability exhibited by organizations. From every evidence, this stability must be an extremely complex phenomenon. It may rest in part on the kinds of bonds, which we might refer to as non-rational, that have been observed in the primary group; it may depend in part on the rational calculations of members that their interests are served by the organization. It is because the role of these, and possibly other, bases of stability needs to be explored that I offer the following suggestions:

a. It is possible that systems in which the "non-rational" type of stabilizing mechanism predominates will behave in a qualitatively different fashion from those in which the "rational" type of stabilizing mechanism prevails. If, by construction of models embodying the two types of mechanisms, a qualitative difference could be deduced, the way would be open to empirical assessment of the importance of the two mechanisms.[7]

b. The work that has been done to date on the theory of the "rational" mechanism would suggest that stability in this case depends on certain relations between the aspiration levels of members and their achievement levels. If so, we can draw on the psychological research that has already been done on these latter phenomena to design experiments and field studies that would test whether this is, indeed, one of the mechanisms involved in stability.

c. We may borrow the economists' term "entrepreneur" to refer to an individual who specializes as a broker in finding mutually acceptable terms on which a group of persons can be induced to associate, or to continue association, in an organization.[8] We need research to determine what the role is of entrepreneurship, so defined, in the process of organizational activity. I conjecture that there are some close relationships both with the "middleman" notion, introduced in topic 2 d, and with the kind of stability mechanisms discussed in 6 b. Study is also needed of whether the uniqueness or non-uniqueness of the acceptable terms of association is an important determinant of the amount of authority

[7] For further discussion of these mechanisms in the context of mathematical models, see Herbert A. Simon, "A Formal Theory of Interaction in Social Groups," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 17, pp. 202–11 (April, 1952), and "A Comparison of Organization Theories," *Review of Economic Studies*, forthcoming.

[8] I believe that this usage does not do too much violence to the term, at least as it is used by economic historians and those concerned with the dynamic theory of the firm, e.g., Schumpeter. In terms of this definition, entrepreneurship is not peculiar to business concerns but is present (and, I believe, to the same important extent) in governmental and voluntary organizations as well. Examples of important entrepreneurs in governmental, non-profit, and voluntary organizations would be William Alanson White, Gifford Pinchot, William Rainey Harper, Clarence Streit—the list is inexhaustible. Anyone attempting to describe the roles of men like Charles Merriam and Louis Brownlow within the fields of political science and public administration can hardly avoid using the concepts of entrepreneurial theory.

that can be exercised over organization members. This relationship has been exhibited in some formal models, but it needs empirical verification.

d. The two topics just discussed get very close to the heart of the processes of bargaining and the formation of coalitions, insofar as these processes involve rational calculation of advantage.[9] The formal apparatus of game theory appears to provide an appropriate language of theory formulation, and, on the empirical side, some of the problems could probably be examined by means of relatively small-scale laboratory experiments.

e. Another aspect of survival and stability is the question of how organizations adapt themselves to uncertainty and incomplete information. In the past two decades this has been a favorite topic of economists,[10] but only in the last five years has there been much attention to the two aspects of greatest importance to organization theory: (i) reduction in the impact of uncertain events by retention of "flexibility" and (ii) the role of a stable social environment as a means of providing predictability to the individuals who are a part of it.

Under the first heading, research is needed as to the implications of particular ways of organizing behavior for the adaptability of the organization under changing, unpredictable circumstances. Under the second heading, research is needed as to the existence and nature of mechanisms in social organizations that are analogous (in the sense of performing the same function) to the homeostatic mechanisms of organisms. Whether organizations are adaptive and possessed of homeostatic mechanisms is an empirical question, but one which, in all probability, can be answered in the affirmative. But the important theoretical issue is the nature of the mechanisms—a question that is not solved by reference to the organismic analogy. Moreover, while primary groups and social institutions may also exhibit homeostasis and adaptivity, there is no reason to believe that the mechanisms involved are the same ones that produce these phenomena in organizations. Functional equivalence does not imply structural equivalence.[11]

6. *Specialization and the division of work.* The division of work and the design of the organizational communications system have in the past been the central concerns of persons interested in organization theory for purposes of application. The question usually asked is: "How do we divide the work, and what channels of communication do we establish in order to operate efficiently?" For purposes of research, the question is more properly stated: "What are the consequences for organizational activity of dividing the work one way rather

[9] The process that Philip Selznick refers to as "cooptation" fits in here also. See his *TVA and the Grass Roots* (Berkeley, 1949).

[10] See the excellent survey of the economic literature in Kenneth J. Arrow, "Alternative Approaches to the Theory of Choice in Risk-Taking Situations," *Econometrica*, Vol. 19, pp. 404–37 (Oct., 1951).

[11] This last proposition is an important part of our justification, in the first part of this memorandum, for the study of "levels." The issues involved are discussed with great sophistication by T. C. Schneirla, "The 'Levels' Concept in the Study of Social Organization in Animals," in John J. Rohrer and Muzafer Sherif (eds.), *Social Psychology at the Crossroads* (New York, 1951).

than another, or employing one set of communications channels rather than another?"

The last half of the question (communications) is best answered in terms of the frames of reference of topics 1 and 2. The subject of the division of work requires further comment. We are considering, of course, not only the question of specialization of the individual organization member, but also the allocation of tasks to whole organization units—in fact, it is the question of specialization among the larger aggregates rather than specialization within the primary group that is the proper concern of organization theory. We are equally concerned with "vertical" specialization—i.e., allocation of decision-making functions to various status and authority levels in an organization—and with "horizontal" specialization—i.e., fixing the jurisdictional boundaries of coordinate organizational units.

a. Current theories of specialization in organization (excluding the "human relations" approach to the primary group) are largely derived, via the scientific management movement, from Adam Smithian notions that specialization is a means to efficiency, and hence to effective competition. There has been little examination of the alternative Durkheimian idea that specialization is a means of *protection* from competition.[12] The research problem suggested by the contrast is to examine in what respects specialization (and what kinds of specialization) increases organizational stability; in what respects it jeopardizes stability; and to what extent these considerations enter into decisions about specialization. The problem is also related to 5 e in that certain forms of specialization may make an organization less dependent on what other organizations do, and hence may provide a means for dealing with uncertainty.

b. The consequences of specialization depend on the constraints discussed in topic 3. It is an important question as to how far specialization is determined by constraints external to the organization—the technology of its activities—and how far it is determined by internal constraints—the psychological and sociological limitations upon rational adaptation. (The situation is even a bit more complicated because the technology—in the sense of the physical, chemical, biological, etc., processes involved in the organization's activity—is not independent of the state of technological knowledge, and the latter may, in turn, be interdependently related to the forms of social specialization that prevail.) In almost every city, the fire department is a recognized organization unit, and in almost every steel mill, the blast furnace department. Here are examples of specialization that appear to be dictated by the technology—the units are "natural" in this sense. On the other side we find units that are "natural" in the sense of being specialized to handle socially-defined purposes, which, in turn, depend on the processes of reification discussed in 3 c (e.g., the Children's Bureau). Research into the theory of specialization making use of the framework suggested in topic 3 is needed to clarify these issues, and to formulate and test propositions about the consequences of specialization.

[12] My former colleague, Victor A. Thompson, first pointed out to me the significance of this distinction.

c. The relationship between specialization and the internal constraints on rational adaptation is two-way. The division of work may be determined, partly or wholly, by such constraints; it will in turn create constraints. That is, the form of specialization will be a major determinant of the frames of reference, skills and knowledge, identifications and foci of attention of organization members. Probably this is the most promising viewpoint from which to tackle the non-rational aspects of formation of group identifications (or "interests" in the political sense) and the effects of such identifications upon inter-group processes (cf. 5 d on the "rational" aspects).

d. Problems of vertical specialization are closely related to topics 1 and 2. In applied organization theory, the questions are usually stated in terms of "centralization" and "decentralization."

This list of research areas illustrates, I think, that the phenomena of organization constitute an important level of theory—a level that is encompassed neither by the usual conceptualizations of small-group processes nor by those of the more macroscopic analyses of cultures and institutions.

The characteristics of this level that give it its particular "flavor" are the following: (a) its focus is on relations among interlocking or non-interlocking primary groups rather than on relations within primary groups; (b) it is largely concerned with situations where *zweckrationalität* plays a large role relative to *wertrationalität* (as compared with the study either of small groups or of cultures); (c) in these situations the scheme of social interaction becomes itself partly a resultant of the rational contriving of means and the conscious construction and acting out of "artificial" roles; and (d) explanation of phenomena at this level requires the closest attention to the fluid boundaries of rational adaptation, including the important boundaries imposed by group frames of reference, perceptual frameworks, and symbolic techniques. In contrast to these characteristics, the level of primary group theory must pay much more attention to the personal values that are emergent from the process of group interaction itself, the acculturalization of individuals to the group, and the particular forms of cohesion that arise out of face-to-face interaction and individual sensitivity to group approval.

It would be wrong, of course, to insist that none of the primary group phenomena are relevant to inter-group relations, or vice versa. Nevertheless, the important work that has been done on small groups in the past generation—much of it involving the observation of groups that were part of larger organizational structures—has contributed very modestly to the solution of the problems of organization theory.

THE ISSUE OF A SCIENCE OF POLITICS IN UTILITARIAN THOUGHT

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The contested status of the science of politics has compelled its supporters to pursue their endeavor in an atmosphere of continual apology. The contemporary exponents of scientific aspirations in the realm of political phenomena remain on the defensive as they are confronted with the tenacious persistence of two focal problems: (1) Does the study of politics reveal the potentiality of a science, in view of the immense diversity of human behavior, which appears to be unpredictable and beyond control for the purpose of observation? (2) What would constitute the criteria of a science of politics, provided that the possibility of establishing such a discipline is conceded? In its essential features, this dual issue represents the current manifestation of a controversy which emerged in Utilitarian thought. The parties to the dispute were James Mill, Thomas Babington Macaulay (the only participant who cannot be identified with Utilitarianism), and John Stuart Mill. The respective arguments of the contestants were presented in James Mill's *Essay on Government* (1828), in Macaulay's article, *Mill's Essay on Government* (1829), and John Stuart Mill's *A System of Logic* (1843). Although these works have suffered no neglect in the history of political theory, the controversy which they reveal in their combined context has not commanded as much attention as its pertinence to contemporary problems merits. Fundamentally, the issue under discussion had been quiescent for centuries prior to the era of Utilitarianism, in the form of the latent conflict between Plato's rationalism in the search for the ideal state and Aristotle's empiricism in the comparative study of governments. However, in the debate between James Mill, Macaulay, and John Stuart Mill, this issue was cast into a perspective which has retained its significance to the present time.

I. JAMES MILL'S DEDUCTIVE SCIENCE OF GOVERNMENT

As a disciple of Jeremy Bentham, James Mill hardly could have escaped the ideas of his senior fellow Utilitarian. In his approach to a science of government, Mill accepted Bentham's tenet that every individual tends to maximize his pleasures and minimize his pains. He modified this precept by placing the emphasis on the motivation of all human actions by self-interest, and used it as the major premise in his deductive science of government. If, for the moment, the empirical validity of Mill's premises is not questioned, the logical consistency of his deductive argument must be conceded.

Mill readily admitted the logical dependence of his theory on the proposition that all human actions are determined by self-interest: "That one human being will desire to render the person and property of another subservient to his pleasures, notwithstanding the pain or loss of pleasure which it may occasion

to that other individual, is the foundation of Government."[1] If the first premise is the proposition that all human beings are motivated by self-interest in their actions, the conclusion that all rulers tend to serve their interests can readily be obtained by means of a syllogism: all human beings are motivated in their actions by self-interest; rulers are human beings; therefore, rulers are motivated by self-interest. Mill was explicit in stating his conclusion: "With respect to the community, then, we deem it an established truth, that the rulers, one or a few, desire an exact conformity between their will and the acts of every member of the community."[2]

Mill qualified his basic premise before he proceeded to further deductive elaborations. He emphasized that there is no limit to man's self-interest, no saturation point at which all desires of an individual would be satisfied, and no point beyond which human actions would cease to be motivated by self-interest. Consequently, there also would be no limit to the extent to which rulers would exploit their subjects, no point at which all their desires would be satisfied, and no point beyond which they would cease to take advantage of their subjects. Mill fundamentally disagreed with the view of Hobbes that government by the one or by the few will lead to less exploitation than government by the many. According to Hobbes, there is a definite limit to an individual's desire, and, in the case of one or few rulers, that limit would be reached at a lesser expense to the community than in the case of many rulers. Such possible limitation of the self-interest of rulers was not accepted by Mill, who was convinced that only a positive check could curtail the powers which rulers attempt to exercise.

If the object of government is the greatest happiness of the greatest number —the favorite postulate of the Utilitarians—government cannot be entrusted, therefore, to the one or to the few:

> Whenever the powers of Government are placed in any hands other than those of the community, whether those of one man, of a few, or of several, those principles of human nature which imply that Government is at all necessary, imply that those persons will make use of them to defeat the very end for which Government exists.[3]

Direct government by the community—the only form which would be a safeguard against public exploitation—is technically impossible, however, according to Mill. To assemble the whole community as often as action by government is required would preclude the activities necessary for the livelihood of its members, and thus would make the existence of the community inconceivable. Furthermore, the conduct of government necessitates the organization of functions, which cannot be attained by the participation of the entire community in governmental affairs. If the maximization of communal happiness is the ultimate aim of government, Mill was logically consistent in reaching the conclusion that none of the three simple forms of government would serve the desired object; not monarchy, *i.e.*, government by the one, not aristocracy,

[1] James Mill, *Essay on Government*, etc. (London, 1828), p. 9.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 10.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 8.

i.e., government by the few, and not democracy, *i.e.*, direct government by the entire community:

> We have thus seen, that of the forms of Government, which have been called the three simple forms, not one is adequate to the ends which Government is appointed to secure; that the community itself, which alone is free from motives opposite to those ends, is incapacitated by its members from performing the business of Government; and that whether Government is intrusted to one or a few, they have not only motives opposite to those ends, but motives which will carry them, if unchecked, to inflict the greatest evils.[4]

The examination of possible combinations of simple forms of government, focused on the desired maximization of communal happiness, is the next logical step in Mill's deductive theory of government. The combination of monarchy and democracy, or of aristocracy and democracy, would be in contradiction with the basic proposition that man is motivated in all his actions by self-interest. The one or the few would not enter a coalition with the many, for such an agreement would be a voluntary cession of part of their self-interest. Likewise, the majority would never surrender their interests by seeking an alliance with the privileged minority. A combination of monarchy and aristocracy would be possible, in view of the similarity of their interests, but it would be as detrimental to the community as the simple forms of government by the one or by the few. Mill's objection to a combination of all three forms of government is based on the same line of reasoning as his objection to the combination of any two.

At this stage of Mill's argument, the process of elimination has been carried to a point where only one alternative is left for a form of government which maximizes communal happiness. Direct government by the community, government by a combination of the community and the few, and government by a combination of the community and the one, all are impossible according to Mill. Government by the few, by the one, or by a combination of the one and the few, is possible, but not desirable. Consequently, the only available course of action is to make some possible form of government also desirable. Mill's solution of the problem is the adoption of monarchial or aristocratic government, with adequate means to control governmental power in the interest of the community. Since the community is incapable of performing any function of government, however, a body which represents the interests of the community (actually the interests of the majority) must check the power of the monarch or of the aristocracy. Mill remained consistent with his basic proposition as he stressed that the representative body, like any aggregate of individuals, will be motivated by self-interest. In order to assure, therefore, that the representative body actually will represent the interests of the community as well as be able to function effectively, two main requirements must be met:

> I. The checking body must have a degree of power sufficient for the business of checking.
>
> II. It must have an identity of interest with the community; otherwise it will make a mischievous use of its power.[5]

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 13. [5] *Ibid.*, p. 17.

To meet the first requirement, the representative body must be able to overcome the power which the ruling one, or few, or one and few combined, can employ to achieve ends detrimental to the community. The extent of power which is vested in the representative body, therefore, is determined by a necessary minimum. Consequently, in meeting the second requirement, it would not be in the interest of the community to limit the scope of power of the representative body; such limitation would interfere with its effective functioning. The control which the community must exercise over the representative body would have to be directed at its duration in office rather than at the extent of its power.

The establishment of a representative body for checking the power of the ruling monarch or the ruling aristocracy is the principal conclusion of Mill's argument, conceived in the framework of a deductive science of government. That Mill was fully aware of the nature of his inquiry is apparent from the following statement:

> The whole of this chain of deduction is dependent, as we stated at the beginning, upon the principle that the acts of man will be conformable to their interests. Upon this principle, we conceive that the chain is complete and irrefragable. The principle, also, appears to stand upon a strong foundation. It is indisputable that the acts of men follow their will; that their will follows their desires; and that their desires are generated by their apprehensions of good or evil; in other words, by their interests.[6]

There would be no dispute with Mill about the fact that "the chain is complete and irrefragable," *i.e.*, that his system is consistent on the basis of deductive logic. There would be considerable doubt, however, about the premises on which his deductive elaborations rest. The assurance that "the principle, also, appears to stand upon a strong foundation" is not nearly so convincing as Mill thought. Certainly, it did not convince Macaulay, Mill's most vocal critic.

II. MACAULAY'S CRITICISM OF JAMES MILL'S POSITION

The intense sarcasm with which Thomas Babington Macaulay reviewed James Mill's essay almost impaired the effectiveness of his criticism. His reference to Mill as "an Aristotelian of the fifteenth century, born out of due season" hardly conveys the impression of an unbiased appraisal. Nevertheless, the adequacy of his criticism cannot be denied as long as his challenge is directed at Mill's disregard for empirical inquiry. Macaulay voiced his opposition to Mill's rejection of experience as a guide for inquiry in most eloquent terms. He initiated his attack by quoting Mill:

> "Experience," says he [Mill], "if we look only at the outside of the facts, appears to be *divided* on this subject. Absolute monarchy, under Neros and Caligulas, under such men as the emperors of Morocco, and the sultans of Turkey, is the scourge of human nature. On the other hand, the people of Denmark, tired out with the oppression of an aristocracy, resolved that their king should be absolute; and, under their absolute monarch, are as well governed as any people in Europe."[7]

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 28.

[7] Thomas B. Macaulay, "Mill's Essay on Government," in *Critical and Miscellaneous Essays* (New York, 1861), Vol. 5, p. 271.

The pertinence of Macaulay's reply to the foregoing statement, by which Mill attempted to justify his method of deduction from *a priori* principles, cannot be sufficiently emphasized:

> *Experience* can never be divided, or even appear to be divided, except with reference to some hypothesis. When we say that one fact is inconsistent with another fact, we mean only that it is inconsistent with the theory which we have founded on that other fact. But, if the fact be certain, the unavoidable conclusion is, that our theory is false: and in order to correct it, we must reason back from an enlarged collection of facts to principles.[8]

The significance of the preceding argument can be appreciated more fully in relation to the principal steps of procedure employed in scientific inquiry. Four such steps may be distinguished: (1) the accumulation and classification of facts; (2) the relation of these facts to an explanatory principle in the form of a hypothesis; (3) the empirical verification of the hypothesis by its consequences, *i.e.*, its establishment as a scientific law; (4) the deductive elaboration of the verified hypothesis, *i.e.*, of the scientific law. It is obvious that, in his essay, Mill relied exclusively on deductive elaborations of hypotheses which had not been verified, which had not been established as scientific laws, and which, as a result, were contestable assumptions. Macaulay's criticism is clearly directed at Mill's complete neglect of empirical verification. Indeed, "experience can never be divided." If empirical evidence fails to support the logical consequences of the hypothesis, the hypothesis must be continually revised until a point is reached where the logical consequences of the hypothesis will not conflict with empirical evidence. Deductive elaborations are an integral part of scientific inquiry only in so far as they use empirically verified hypotheses as their premises.

It is regrettable that Macaulay deprived his argument of its initial impact by contesting the validity of Mill's premises on *rational* grounds. Macaulay's assertion that man is not motivated exclusively by self-interest, that social approval and public opinion are as decisive in determining human actions as self-interest,[9] is based on as little empirical evidence as Mill's *a priori* proposition that all human actions are determined by self-interest. The counter-argument which could be raised in Macaulay's defense would be that his statement is not the presentation of any material truth, but merely a claim of Mill's obligation to prove the contrary. The validity of this rebuttal would have to be conceded. But, how would Macaulay have defended his statement that Mill's conclusions on monarchial and aristocratic government would be correct only if man were motivated exclusively by self-interest? Obviously, Mill's reply would have been that, even if man's actions were not based exclusively on self-interest, government by the one or by the few still should be checked by the majority. And in his claim that constitutional checks on the ruling minority are ineffective and superfluous because "the fear of resistance and the sense of shame operate, in a certain degree, on the most absolute kings and the most illiberal oligarchies,"[10] Macaulay would have had less support from empirical evidence than Mill. The mistake Macaulay committed was to con-

[8] *Idem.* [9] *Ibid.*, p. 277. [10] *Ibid.*, p. 289.

test Mill's premises and conclusions on the ground of their rationality. In that manner, he succumbed to the error of *a priori* argument—the very object of his attack on Mill. Certainly, Macaulay should have been aware of his own statement: "Our objection to the essay of Mr. Mill is fundamental. We believe that it is utterly impossible to deduce the science of government from the principles of human nature."[11]

Macaulay's criticism is much more consistent with his fundamental position when it is directed at Mill's disregard for empirical evidence. Accordingly, the pertinence of his comment that "Mr. Mill is not legislating for England or the United States . . . but for mankind,"[12] cannot be denied. Indeed, the tendency of formulating a theory of government which has universal application was as characteristic of James Mill as it was of his fellow Utilitarian, Jeremy Bentham. It is the concomitant of deductive reasoning from *a priori* principles, which are regarded as universally applicable, which have not been tested as to their validity, which have not been examined as to their agreement with empirical evidence, which—in other words—are not treated as hypotheses requiring independent verification. The result of this approach is the fallacy which Macaulay pointed out: a complete disregard for the numerous variables of the cultural setting which determine political organization.

The method of inquiry for a science of government which Macaulay recommended as an alternative to Mill's approach is in full accord with the emphasis on experience in his opening attack on Mill's essay. His description of the suggested method reveals a conception of scientific inquiry to which little would have to be added:

> How, then, are we to arrive at just conclusions on a subject so important to the happiness of mankind? Surely by the method which, in every experimental science to which it has been applied, has signally increased the power and knowledge of our species,—by that method for which our new philosophers would substitute quibbles scarcely worthy of barbarous respondents and opponents of the middle ages,— by the method of induction;— by observing the present state of the world,—by assiduously studying the history of past ages,—by sifting the evidence of facts,—by carefully combining and contrasting those which are authentic,—by generalizing with judgement and diffidence,—by perpetually bringing the theory which we have contrasted to the test of new facts,—by correcting, or altogether abandoning it, according as those new facts prove it partially or fundamentally unsound.[13]

In contrast to James Mill, who relied exclusively on deduction as a method of inquiry for the study of politics, Macaulay placed primary emphasis on induction. At this point, however, the following question demands attention: Is Macaulay's main concern merely *induction versus deduction*, or is it an issue of greater proportions?

On the basis of the above mentioned four procedural steps in scientific inquiry, the reliance of science on induction can be hardly denied. The verification of hypotheses by their consequences (the third procedural step) necessitates the following process: Representative samples from the infinite class of all

[11] *Ibid.*, p. 298. [12] *Ibid.*, p. 290. [13] *Ibid.*, p. 302.

possible logical consequences of the hypothesis under investigation are selected. By inductive reasoning, it is then inferred that what is empirically true of the selected consequences of the hypothesis, probably is true of all possible consequences. This process of inductive inference has led to the view that induction may be characterized as inference from the particular to the general, whereas deduction may be identified as reasoning from the general to the particular. The significance of this distinction between induction and deduction is questionable, however, because induction follows the general pattern of deductive reasoning just as much as deduction itself. Both forms of reasoning infer conclusions from premises. The decisive distinction between induction and deduction is that the former is concerned with the empirical validity of its premises, whereas the latter is not.[14] In deduction, *a priori* concepts are acceptable as premises. In induction, however, the emphasis rests on the material truth of the premises, *i.e.*, on their compatibility with empirical evidence.

Applying the foregoing considerations to the controversy under discussion, it would seem that Macaulay's primary concern was not merely the issue of *induction versus deduction*, but the more extensive epistemological issue of *empiricism versus rationalism*—the conflict between two competitive theories of knowledge for a science of politics. This view is supported by Macaulay's repeated emphasis on empiricism in his objection to James Mill's reliance on reasoning from *a priori* concepts. It is regrettable that John Stuart Mill failed to see the debated issue in this broader perspective when he attempted to reach a compromise between the respective approaches of James Mill and of Macaulay.

III. JOHN STUART MILL'S COMPROMISE

John Stuart Mill entertained no illusions about the status of the study of government in his time. He readily admitted that the objections to a science of politics were justified in so far as deplorable errors had been committed. In his words:

> And in politics, the questions which engaged general attention were similar: Is such an enactment, or such a form of government, beneficial or the reverse—either universally, or to some particular community? without any previous inquiry into the general conditions by which the operation of legislative measures, or the effects produced by forms of government, are determined. Students in politics thus attempted to study the pathology and therapeutics of the social body, before they had laid down the necessary foundation in its physiology; to cure disease without understanding the laws of health.[15]

Nevertheless, the potentiality of the study of politics in the direction of a science—despite the erroneous deviations of the past—was vigorously defended by Mill:

> It is not necessary even to the perfection of a science, that the corresponding art should possess universal, or even general rules. The phenomena of society might not only be completely dependent on known causes, but the mode of action of those causes might be re-

[14] See Morris R. Cohen and Ernest Nagel, *An Introduction to Logic and Scientific Method* (New York, 1934), p. 278.

[15] John Stuart Mill, *A System of Logic*, 8th ed. (New York, 1895), p. 606.

ducible to laws of considerable simplicity, and yet not two cases might admit of being treated in precisely the same manner. . . . But although, in so complicated a class of subjects, it is impossible to lay down practical maxims of universal application, it does not follow that the phenomena do not conform to universal laws.[16]

The important feature here is Mill's belief in the possibility of detecting regularities in the behavior of social phenomena. In his opinion, the difference between natural and social phenomena does not warrant different methods of inquiry for their study, but merely necessitates an awareness of the greater complexity of social phenomena in employing one and the same method. More specifically,

There is, indeed, no hope that these laws, though our knowledge of them were as certain and as complete as in astronomy, would enable us to predict the history of society, like that of the celestial appearances, for thousands of years to come. But the difference of certainty is not in the laws themselves, it is in the data to which these laws are to be applied.[17]

No injustice would be done to Mill by restating his foregoing point as follows: the difference between the phenomena with which astronomy deals and the phenomena with which social sciences are concerned does not lie in the procedure by which hypotheses about them are formulated and verified. The difference lies in the degree of probability ("certainty" in Mill's terms) with which these hypotheses can be verified. Since the subject matter of astronomy is relatively homogeneous, its hypotheses can be verified with a comparatively high degree of probability. Since, on the other hand, the subject matter of the social sciences is relatively heterogeneous, their hypotheses can be verified only with a relatively low degree of probability. Nevertheless, the method of inquiry remains the same.

Accordingly, Mill's aim was not the differentiation between two scientific systems—one for natural and one for social phenomena—but the application of one, unified scientific method to both natural and social phenomena. It is in the search for an adequate application of the scientific method to social phenomena in general and to political phenomena in particular that Mill rejected—somewhat inconsistently—the Chemical, or Experimental, Method and the Geometrical, or Abstract, Method.

Mill's Rejection of the Chemical, or Experimental, Method. Mill's fundamental objection to the Experimental Method in politics was that no adequate technique could be developed to control the numerous factors which determine political phenomena. He was willing to concede that inductive inference, which he associated with the Experimental Method, would be theoretically possible in the study of politics. He was unduly disturbed, however, about the necessity of making inferences from historical situations, and he was convinced that the control of variables which determine such historical situations would encounter insuperable difficulties.

To illustrate his point, Mill advanced the following hypothesis: national wealth is determined by restrictive tariff legislation. The employment of

[16] *Ibid.*, p. 607. [17] *Loc. cit.*

particular devices of experimental inquiry in testing this hypothesis appeared to Mill inconclusive as far as the verification, or refutation, of the proposed relationship is concerned.[18] To be sure, any sincere supporter of a science of politics would agree with Mill that the numerous uncontrollable variables which operate in the sphere of social phenomena make experimental inquiry extremely difficult. The defender of scientific aspirations in politics would raise a serious objection, however, to Mill's ready dismissal of induction in social inquiry on the ground that the Experimental Method is inapplicable to the study of social phenomena. Induction is an integral and indispensable part of scientific investigation. The Experimental Method, as conceived by Mill, is merely one of two possible techniques of verification employed in scientific inquiry. The other technique is the method of relative frequency (statistics). Applied to Mill's hypothesis on national wealth and restrictive tariff legislation, this technique would endeavor to establish a correlation between the two conjectured phenomena from a number of representative samples. By means of induction, it would be inferred that the observations made in the selected instances apply to all possible instances. Inductive inference must be regarded, therefore, as the common characteristic of both techniques of verification—the Experimental Method, as well as the method of relative frequency. It appears, then, that Mill relied on an erroneous identity as he attempted to justify his rejection of induction for social inquiry by proving the inadequacy of the Experimental Method for the study of social phenomena. Moreover, he failed to substantiate his argument by referring to an analogy from chemistry:

> In an age in which chemistry itself, when attempting to deal with the more complex chemical sequences—those of the animal or even the vegetable organism—has found it necessary to become, and has succeeded in becoming, a Deductive Science, it is not to be apprehended that any person of scientific habits, who has kept pace with the general progress of the knowledge of nature, can be in danger of applying the methods of elementary chemistry to explore the sequences of the most complex order of phenomena in existence.[19]

Mill's notion of a deductive science of chemistry—as an example of the natural sciences—definitely is subject to further dispute. It cannot be denied, of course, that chemistry does resort to deductive inferences; but these inferences are deductive elaborations of hypotheses which have been verified with a high degree of probability, which have acquired the status of scientific laws. By no means has chemistry abandoned inductive inference, and Mill's rejection of induction for the study of social phenomena on the ground that natural sciences have relinquished induction, has no valid foundation. It is obvious that Mill's position needs further clarification; for in his rejection of the Geo-

[18] The particular devices of experimental inquiry which Mill discussed are the Method of Difference, the Method of Indirect Difference, the Method of Agreement, the Method of Concomitant Variations, and the Method of Residue. Their general definitions are found in *A System of Logic*, pp. 280–291. Their inapplicability to social sciences was expounded by Mill in *op. cit.*, pp. 610–613.

[19] *A System of Logic*, p. 613.

metrical, or Abstract, Method, he objected to deduction from *a priori* principles in a science of politics as vehemently as to induction.

Mill's Rejection of the Geometrical, or Abstract, Method. The attempt to deduce a science of politics from *a priori* principles was designated by John Stuart Mill as the Geometrical, or Abstract, Method. His criticism of this method was tacitly, but unmistakably, directed at James Mill's essay:

> The profound and original thinkers who are commonly known under this description, founded their general theory of government on one comprehensive premise, namely, that men's actions are always determined by their interests. . . . The theory goes on to infer, quite correctly, that if the actions of mankind are determined in the main by their selfish interests, the only rulers who will govern according to the interest of the governed, are those whose selfish interests are in accordance with it. And to this is added a third proposition, namely, that no rulers have their selfish interests identical with that of the governed, unless it is rendered so by accountability, that is, by the dependence on the will of the governed. In other words (and as the result of the whole), that the desire of retaining or the fear of losing their power, and whatever is thereon consequent, is the sole motive which can be relied on for producing on the part of rulers a course of conduct in accordance with the general interest.[20]

The inadequacy of the premises was the primary object of John Stuart Mill's criticism of this approach to a science of government. He was careful not to commit Macaulay's error of taking issue with the consistency of the deductions which are based on these premises. Accordingly, Mill commented: "I am only concerned with showing that their method was unscientific; not to measure the amount of error which may have affected their practical conclusions."[21]

At this point of Mill's discussion, the issue of a science of politics is in a state of perplexing abeyance. His antipathy for both induction and deduction arouses intense curiosity concerning his own discovery of an acceptable method of inquiry for social studies.

Mill's Concrete Deductive and Inverse Deductive Methods. The seeming conceptual conflict between induction and deduction was resolved by Mill through the adaptation of the Concrete Deductive Method, a system of inquiry which he ascribed to physics, to the study of social phenomena. The essence of the Concrete Deductive Method appeared to Mill in the following perspective: "The ground of confidence in any concrete deductive science is not the *a priori* reasoning itself, but the accordance with its results and those of observations *a posteriori*."[22]

Mill thus seemed to clarify his rejection of both the Experimental and Abstract Methods. Apparently he was opposed to an exclusive reliance on either empirical data or rational derivations, but was willing to tolerate their integration into a unified system of inquiry. Moreover, his description of the Concrete Deductive Method, with its decisive emphasis on empirical verification, conveys a conception of scientific inquiry which offers no ground for objections. However, a minor modification (minor in Mill's opinion) which he introduced, entailed a complete distortion of his suggested method:

[20] *Ibid.*, p. 616. [21] *Ibid.*, p. 618. [22] *Ibid.*, p. 620.

Nothing more results than a disturbance in the order of precedency of the two processes, sometimes amounting to its actual inversion: insomuch that instead of deducing our conclusions by reasoning, and verifying them by observation, we in some cases begin by obtaining them provisionally from specific experience, and afterwards connect them with the principles of human nature by *a priori* reasonings, which reasonings are thus a real Verification.[23]

To say the least, Mill was grossly underestimating the consequences of his modification in asserting that "nothing more results than a disturbance in the order of precedency of the two processes." In its ultimate effect, Mill's inversion amounts to a repudiation of an essential criterion of scientific inquiry, namely, empirical verification. *A priori* reasoning may, under circumstances, lead to the formulation of hypotheses, but it never can serve the purpose of their verification. Mill did admit that "verification" by *a priori* reasoning does not furnish a sufficiently high degree of probability in order to make predictions, that it only indicates possible developments. What Mill should have recognized, however, is that *a priori* reasoning does not yield any verification at all. His reliance on *a priori* "verification" in his Inverse Deductive Method deprived this method of its validity as scientific inquiry.

To relegate Mill's conception of *a priori* "verification" to a semantic dispute would not be justifiable in view of his elaborated discussion of the Inverse Deductive Method (alternatively designated by Mill as the Historical Method) in the subsequent section of his treatise on *Logic*. He agreed that empirical laws relating to social phenomena could be obtained from history through observations *a posteriori*, but he held these laws in questionable esteem:

But even if the case were so, it cannot be the ultimate aim of science to discover an empirical law. Until that law could be connected with the psychological and ethological laws on which it must depend, and, by the consilience of deduction *a priori* with historical evidence, could be converted from an empirical law into a scientific one, it could not be relied on for the prediction of future events, beyond, at most, strictly adjacent cases.[24]

Since Mill attributed a sub-scientific status to empirical laws, he obviously equated his superior psychological and ethological laws to rational derivations. In this context, his insistence on *a priori* verification reveals no substantial change. It appears that, despite his endeavor to maintain his intellectual independence from his immediate predecessors, Mill could not divest himself of the rationalist tradition engendered by the earlier Utilitarians. He failed to see that any science—natural or social—must be orientated in the epistemological framework of empiricism. Had John Stuart Mill reached his compromise between the respective views of James Mill and Macaulay by adhering to the Concrete Deductive Method rather than by proceeding to the Inverse Deductive Method, his argument would have been much more convincing.

IV. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CONTROVERSY FOR CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

The prospects of the study of politics in the direction of a science and the determination of the criteria for such a science were the focal points of concern

[23] *Idem.* [24] *Ibid.*, p. 633.

in the dispute between James Mill, Macaulay, and John Stuart Mill to the same extent as they are the subjects of persistent disagreement in the current debate between students of government. The potentiality of the study of politics as a science (the first aspect of the issue) is challenged by exponents of human free will and habitual sceptics as vehemently today as it was during the era of the Utilitarians. The contemporary defenders of a science of politics hardly could invoke a more persuasive argument on behalf of their cause than the one suggested by John Stuart Mill: "But although, in so complicated a class of subjects [social studies], it is impossible to lay down practical maxims of universal application, it does not follow that the phenomena do not conform to universal laws . . . the difference of certainty [*e.g.*, between astronomy and political science] is not in the laws themselves, it is in the data to which these laws are to be applied." Mill's deliberations on this point permit a noteworthy inference. Natural and physical sciences cope with a subject matter that is comparatively homogeneous, inasmuch as few uncontrolled variables are involved. Consequently, the hypotheses in a field like astonomy can be verified with a relatively high degree of probability, *i.e.*, they readily attain the status of scientific laws. Social sciences, on the other hand, are confronted with a subject matter that is comparatively heterogeneous, inasmuch as many uncontrolled variables are encountered. The hypotheses in a field like political science, therefore, are limited to verification with a relatively low degree of probability, *i.e.*, their status as scientific laws is in abeyance. It is most important, however, to note that both natural and social phenomena are subject to the same method of inquiry—the scientific method, which is not the inherent prerogative of any particular discipline, and which is as applicable to the study of politics as to any other branch of knowledge.

As far as the criteria of a science of politics are concerned (the second aspect of the issue), exponents of scientific aspirations in politics would be as sceptical about James Mill's deductive science of government today as Macaulay and, to some extent, John Stuart Mill were in their time. Deductions from *a priori* principles are tantamount to deductive elaborations of hypotheses which have not been verified, for which, moreover, no attempt at verification has been made, and which, as a result, remain contestable assumptions. Macaulay's criticism of this approach would deserve greater sympathy from contemporary defenders of a science of politics than John Stuart Mill's compromise. John Stuart Mill would have been committed to accept empirical verification as a major criterion of scientific inquiry on logical grounds alone. He did agree that empirical verification is a principal characteristic of the Concrete Deductive Method, which he ascribed to physics. Moreover, he contended with remarkable sagacity that natural and social phenomena are subject to the same system of inquiry, *i.e.*, the scientific method. Consequently, he would have been obligated to concede the importance of empirical verification for social sciences as well as for natural sciences. Nevertheless, in his formulation of the Inverse Deductive Method, which he applied to social phenomena, he subordinated empirical inquiry to *a priori* reasoning. Mill failed to see, or was not willing to

admit, what Macaulay had emphasized, namely, that any science—politics as well as physics—is committed to empiricism as a theory of knowledge, while rational inference is an indispensable agent of scientific coordination, but not an implement of verification.

An additional implication for current problems which can be detected in the controversy between the Utilitarians and their opponent, is the perennial conflict between ethics and objectivism in political inquiry. John Stuart Mill's reference to political "therapeutics" and "pathology," as opposed to political "physiology," is the only direct allusion to this particular issue in the entire dispute. Macaulay missed the opportunity to attack James Mill on this point. The deductive science of government expounded by James Mill is directed at the attainment of a political balance which would assure the greatest happiness of the greatest number. However, the greatest happiness of the greatest number is an ethical postulate, it is an expression of preference, which is not subject to empirical verification, and which, therefore, is beyond scientific proof. James Mill definitely had assumed the part of a political reformer, a role which Macaulay would have been obligated to praise as a public-minded citizen, but which he should have thoroughly resented as a political scientist. Of all the points of controversy—manifest or tacit—in the dispute between James Mill, Macaulay, and John Stuart Mill, the conflict between ethical responsibility and objective detachment in the study of politics has maintained the greatest polemic vitality.

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A GUIDE TO BOOKS ON INDIA

One night during Nehru's 1949 tour of the United States, he was taken to see the musical play *South Pacific*. When he visited backstage with the star of the show, Mary Martin, they discussed books about India. Nehru recommended Gandhi's autobiography. Miss Martin not only read that book but followed some of its philosophical leads until she came to write a preface to a new edition of one of Tolstoi's religious works.

Gandhi's autobiography makes an excellent beginning toward an understanding of India as well as for an understanding of a certain religious philosophy. The American edition is entitled *Gandhi's Autobiography* (Public Affairs Press, Washington, 1948) but the Indian editions bear the original title *The Story of My Experiments with Truth*. As the western reader discovers what "truth" means to Gandhi, and how he experimented with it, he begins to know something of this leader and of the people whom he led.

The very strangeness to a western reader of some of Gandhi's premises is a useful reminder that ideas about social and political life common in western countries are not necessarily widely held in India and elsewhere. This book, together with Gandhi's other writings, is a prime source for the political historian and provides vivid data for the student of culture and personality.

Jawaharlal Nehru's *The Discovery of India* (John Day, New York, 1946) is another fundamental book. It is partly autobiography, but mostly a review of Indian history together with reflections on the meaning of India's past and the portent of the future. The prose is sonorous and sometimes beautifully eloquent, but it is not a book which can be skimmed through lightly. It is a full book, in thought and in scholarship. Its view of India's history is often expressed as a personal one, but the scholarship of the work is noteworthy, not only because the author has devoted his career to arduous political activity, rather than academic studies, but also because the work was written during five months in 1944 when the author was in prison. His access to reference books there was exceedingly limited but in part compensation for that he had access to his fellow prisoners, like him top leaders of the national movement, and some of them among the foremost scholars in the land.

These are books with which to begin. The books with which to go on may be discussed in four groups: first some general and survey books which are useful as introductions and orientations to the principal aspects of Indian life; then some basic works on Indic civilization, about the main cultural traditions of the subcontinent and about the mainstreams of Indic history; thirdly, some of the outstanding descriptions of the peoples of India; and finally some contemporary writings concerned with politics, economics, and literature. The works listed are those which the present writer happens to know and can recommend; there are undoubtedly many others which deserve to be included.

Only books are mentioned; the listing of journal articles is beyond the

scope of this paper although not infrequently such articles are of importance. The bulk of the western literature about India is in English, and the principal works in French and German are here cited in their English translations when such are available. Major works in various of the Indic languages are mentioned only if English translations for them exist.

An excellent statement by Daniel Thorner of "Recent Books on India and Pakistan" has appeared in *The Middle East Journal*, Vol. 6, pp. 89–93 (Winter, 1952). While there is some overlapping between that article and the present one, the reader is referred to Dr. Thorner's paper for a more complete listing of works on economics and economic history than is given here.

Political events in India have moved so rapidly during and since World War II that much of the literature which deals with modern political subjects and related social and economic factors is out of date, at least in part. The content of books published before 1947 and our discussion of them refers to undivided India. Discussion of books dealing with the independent nation of Pakistan has been omitted in anticipation of a review of such books in a later issue of this journal.*

I

Those Americans who specialize in the study of India not infrequently hear admiration expressed—in a kind of left-handed compliment—for their temerity in tackling so large, complex and bewildering a subject. India is large and complex, but is not nearly as confusing and inchoate as it is sometimes made out to be. The main outlines of this land and its people are not too difficult to grasp. They are sketched in elementary fashion in a useful little guidebook, *Introduction to India*, by F. R. Moraes and R. Stimson (Oxford, Bombay, 1943). It was written by two newspapermen for British and American troops stationed in India during the war, and still is good as a very simple sketch. On about the same level, but written for Indian schoolchildren and mainly concerned with the elementary economic facts of Indian life, is *Our India*, by Minoo Masani (Oxford, New York, 1942). Masani was formerly, among other political activities, mayor of Bombay and ambassador to Brazil and is currently an industrial executive.

A series of pamphlets published during World War II under the title of *Oxford Pamphlets on Indian Affairs* (Oxford, Bombay, 1942–1944) provides another useful first view of the Indian scene. The pamphlets were written by various people of eminence and although the series is uneven in quality and in present day pertinence, a good many of the booklets are excellent short surveys of important problems.

A good summary of the geography of the subcontinent is the section on India and Pakistan written by Professor O. H. K. Spate, now of the Australian National University, in his and W. G. East's book, *The Changing Map of Asia*

* Suggestions offered by the following persons in response to my requests are gratefully acknowledged: Joan V. Bondurant, Vera M. Dean, B. S. Kesavan, Alice Thorner, and Wallace Stegner.

(Dutton, New York, 1950). More detailed geographic discussion is in Spate's *India and Pakistan: a Social and Regional Geography* (Methuen, London, 1952).

The historical background, mainly of the British regime, is given in brief compass by Professor C. H. Philips of the University of London in his *India* (Hutchinson's, London, n.d. [1948]). Another brief survey which has the history of the British period as a principal focus, but which also includes general chapters on Hinduism, Islam, and modern problems is *India, Pakistan, and the West* (Oxford, New York, 1949), by Percival Spear of Cambridge University. Sir Atul Chandra Chatterjee, who held many responsible posts during his long career as a civil servant, in his book *The New India* (George Allen and Unwin, London, 1948) has written a convenient set of introductory chapters to such topics as communities, religions, industry and education. Similar topical treatment is found in *India, Pakistan, and Ceylon* (Cornell, Ithaca, 1951), edited by W. Norman Brown, Professor of Sanskrit and Chairman of South Asia Regional Studies at the University of Pennsylvania. The articles in this book were originally written by various authors for a new edition of an encyclopedia; they are succinct and informative although fragmented according to encyclopedia headings and compressed into encyclopedia style.

Another useful topical survey by several contributors is *Social Service in India* (H. M. Stationery Office, London, 1939, 1946), edited by Sir Edward Blunt, formerly of the Indian Civil Service. The chapters of this book, written by former administrative officials in India, were originally compiled for use as a text book for probationers in the Indian Civil Service.

A different point of view is presented in Daniel and Alice Thorner's section on India and Pakistan in *Most of the World* (Columbia, New York, 1949), edited by Professor Ralph Linton. The Thorners are on the staff of the Department of South Asia Regional Studies at the University of Pennsylvania, and their excellent article is one of the best of the concise reviews of the Indian scene. Their emphasis in this section is on recent history with a good depiction of economic forces in the development of urban centers and in rural changes.

In the *Population of India and Pakistan* (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1951), by Professor Kingsley Davis of Columbia University, there is happily available a fine treatise on Indian demography broadly conceived. The headings of its six major parts will give an idea of the scope of this major contribution: the over-all picture; the fight against death; human fertility in India; the net balance: natural increase; migration: its direction and extent; social structure and social change.

A broad view of Indian political development is to be available in Professor W. Norman Brown's forthcoming book.

An introduction to the principal facets of the civilization of India is afforded in *The Legacy of India* (Oxford, London, 1937), edited by G. T. Garratt. Fifteen distinguished scholars contributed to this symposium, which includes chapters on music and science as well as on Buddhism and Islam. The classic civilization is discussed in *India's Past* (Oxford, London, 1927), by A. A. Macdonell,

who was for many years Professor of Sanskrit at Oxford. The subtitle of this book reveals its scope: "A Survey of Her Literatures, Religions, Languages, and Antiquities."

A survey of wider purview and a very useful work both for orientation and reference is *Modern India and the West* (Oxford, London, 1941), edited by L. S. S. O'Malley. This is a solid work, about a third of which was written by O'Malley himself, with other chapters by leading authorities in their respective fields. It is the largest and most comprehensive of the survey works we have mentioned and includes considerations of law, education, the press, and economic development, as well as of the Hindu social system, Muslim culture and religious thought, literature and drama, through O'Malley's final long chapter which gives an over-all view of the relations between India and the western world. Though many of its passages are now dated and despite the overtones of British Imperial rule which may be discerned in the discussions by O'Malley and some of the other contributors who, like him, were British officials, it remains a good book for the serious student.

While such surveys of institutions, arts and history have been published, there are not yet comparable surveys available which will introduce the western reader to the living peoples of India. Three briefer books by O'Malley are possible aides for this purpose, subject to the above mentioned limitations. They are *Indian Caste Customs* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1932), *India's Social Heritage* (Oxford, London, 1934), and *Popular Hinduism* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1935). The feel of village life may be sensed in Gertrude Emerson's *Voiceless India* (Doubleday, Doran, New York, 1930; rev. ed., John Day, New York, 1944), and in Charlotte V. and William H. Wiser's *Behind Mud Walls* (Smith, New York, 1930). Miss Emerson (Mrs. G. E. Sen) lived in a north Indian village as a journalist with more than ordinary journalistic interest in the people, and the Wisers have lived among villagers in their work as Presbyterian missionaries. Both books described villages in Uttar Pradesh (United Provinces) and both should soon be supplemented by reports from the anthropological field work which has been going on in various parts of India in recent years.

II

The ancient and classic civilizations of the subcontinent are worthy of close study for many reasons. One which may interest students of government is the evidence of quite efficient municipal administrations in the cities of the Indus valley four to five millennia ago. The most readily available summary of what is now known about these Mohenjo Daro-Harrappa cultures is in *Prehistoric India to 1000 B.C.* (Penguin, Harmondsworth Middlesex, 1950), by Professor Stuart Piggott of Edinburgh University. The scope of the book is more restricted than the title implies, being mainly concerned with bronze age cultures of western India. Despite the fact that the author professes a distaste for the cultures described in the book, it is nonetheless a good summary.

Following the Mohenjo Daro-Harrappa civilization, came the development

of the great literary tradition, first the religious compositions called the Vedas, then the epic poems and the voluminous commentaries. A fine sample of this literature is *The Song Celestial*, by Sir Edwin Arnold (Kegan Paul, London, 10th ed., 1906; reprinted in F. Edgerton, *The Bhagavad Gītā*, Vol. 2, Harvard, Cambridge, 1944). It is a translation of the *Bhagavadgita*, the best known portion of the great epic, the *Mahabharata*. Although there are more recent versions, Arnold's still is to be recommended on its literary merit. For a learned translation and philosophical interpretation, there is *The Bhagavadgītā*, by India's present Vice President, Professor S. Radhakrishnan (George Allen and Unwin, London, 1948).

Two modern poets have had a try at the Sankrit literature, Christopher Isherwood together with Swami Prabhavananda in *The Song of God Bhagavad-Gita* (Phoenix House, London, 1947) and W. B. Yeats together with Shree Purohit Swāmi in *The Ten Principal Upanishads* (Faber and Faber, London, 1937).

Most readily available of the translations of the two epics is R. C. Dutt's *The Ramayana and Mahabharata* (E. P. Dutton, Everyman's Library, New York, 1910, 1936); this book is a condensed version but is a fairly faithful rendition. Among the liveliest translations of the classic literature are those by the late Professor Arthur W. Ryder of the University of California. Best known is his version of the collection of tales, *The Panchatantra* (University of Chicago, Chicago, 1925, 1942; Jaico, Bombay, 1949). Ryder was more concerned with aesthetic effect in his translation than with scholarly precision, but he did manage to convey some of the literary flavor of the original Sanskrit. Students who would like to learn something of the Sanskrit literature in the finest tradition of modern Indological scholarship may turn to the works of Professor Franklin Edgerton of Yale, among them *The Panchatantra Reconstructed* (American Oriental Society, New Haven, 2 vols., 1924) and *The Bhagavad Gītā* (Harvard, Cambridge, 2 vols., 1944).

An ancient work which is of particular interest to students of government is Kautilya's manual of statecraft, dating from perhaps the third century A.D. It discusses both the theory and practice of politics with comments on the nature of bureaucracy and of corruption in government, along with detailed accounts of military maneuvers, famine and flood relief, and civil and criminal law (English translation by R. Shama Sastri, 2nd ed., Wesleyan Mission Press, Mysore, 1923).

The principal works of Sanskrit literature are surveyed in a brief book, *Classical Sanskrit Literature* (Oxford, London, 1923), by A. Berriedale Keith, who was both a lawyer and Professor of Sanskrit and Comparative Philology at the University of Edinburgh. Keith's *The Sanskrit Drama* (Oxford, London, 1924) and *A History of Sanskrit Literature* (Oxford, London, 1928) are fuller discussions of the classic literature. The most complete treatise in English on the subject is a *History of Indian Literature* (University of Calcutta, Calcutta, Vol. I, 1927, Vol. II, 1933), by M. Winternitz, who was Professor of Indology at the University of Prague.

There are several good accounts of the history of the times during which the

classic literature was composed and of the cultures reflected in those writings. Gertrude Emerson Sen's *The Pageant of Indian History* (Longmans Green, New York, 1948, Vol. I) is written in a popular vein. An excellent review of the society, philosophies, and arts of the period, as well as of its history, is *Ancient India and Indian Civilization* (Kegan Paul, London, 1934), by P. Masson-Oursel of the École des Hautes-Études and two associates, Willman-Grabowska and P. Stern. More recently another group of French scholars, headed by Professor Louis Renou, has issued the first volume of a work of similar scope under the title of *L'Inde Classique* (Payot, Paris, 1949). A group of Indian scholars has compiled a very useful volume edited by R. C. Majumdar, on the history and culture of the period of the earliest writings, *The Vedic Age* (George Allen and Unwin, London, 1951).

The law and jurisprudence established in the classic literature is reviewed in *Hindu Law and Custom* (Greater India Society, Calcutta, 1928), an English translation of the German work by Professor Julius Jolly which first appeared in 1896. The centuries-old codes of Hindu law as applied in litigation under the British administration are set forth in *A Treatise on Hindu Law and Usage* (Higginbotham's, Madras, 10th ed., edited by S. Srinivasa Iyengar, 1938), by J. D. Mayne.

The philosophical systems developed in the Sanskrit literature are reviewed in Professor S. Radhakrishnan's two volumes, *Indian Philosophy* (George Allen and Unwin, London, rev. ed., 1932), and in Professor S. N. Dasgupta's five volume work, *A History of Indian Philosophy* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1922–1949; Vol. 5 in preparation). The contemporary use of these systems by modern Indian philosophers may be appreciated in the volume edited by Radhakrishnan and J. H. Muirhead, *Contemporary Indian Philosophy* (George Allen and Unwin, London, rev. ed., 1952) and in the book entitled *Radhakrishnan, Comparative Studies in Philosophy Presented in Honour of His Sixtieth Birthday* (George Allen and Unwin, London, 1951).

A convenient introduction to the arts of the subcontinent is contained in a little handbook, *Indian Art* (Philosophical Library, New York, 1948), edited by H. G. Rawlinson. Three brief books in the *Heritage of India* series review painting, sculpture, and music respectively. They are *Indian Painting* (Oxford, London, 4th ed., 1932), by Percy Brown, *Indian Sculpture* (Oxford, London, 1933), by Stella Kramrisch, Professor of Indian Art at the University of Calcutta, and *The Music of India* (Oxford, London, 1921), by H. A. Popley. Architecture seems not yet to have similar brief and competent presentations, but is treated in such monumental works as Percy Brown's *Indian Architecture* (Taraporevala, Bombay, rev. ed., Vol. 1, 1949, Vol. 2, 1942) and Stella Kramrisch's *The Hindu Temple* (University of Calcutta, Calcutta, 2 vols., 1946). Art history seems also authoritatively enshrined in thick tomes; two of these are *History of Indian and Indonesian Art* (Edward Goldstein, London, 1927), by the late A. K. Coomaraswamy, formerly of the Boston Museum of Fine Arts, and Vincent A. Smith, *A History of Fine Art in India and Ceylon* (Oxford, London, 2nd rev. ed., 1930).

For general history, four surveys may be mentioned, each with a different

emphasis. Political and economic forces are stressed in *A Short History of India* (Longmans Green, London, 2nd rev. ed., 1944, 1947), by the late W. H. Moreland and Sir Atul Chandra Chatterjee, both former Indian Civil Service officers. The development of religions, society and the arts is featured in *India, A Short Cultural History* (Cresset Press, London, rev. ed., 1948), by H. G. Rawlinson. A fresh view of India's national career is presented in *A Survey of Indian History* (Meridian Books, London, 1947), by K. M. Panikkar, a distinguished Indian historian who has also been active in political affairs as, among his other high offices, prime minister of a princely state and ambassador to the Peoples' Republic of China. A well illustrated work which includes discussion of post-partition events and of India's place in Asian history is *India in the New Era* (Scott, Foresman, Chicago, 1951), by T. Walter Wallbank of the University of Southern California.

A useful set of maps on which historical facts are plotted is contained in *An Historical Atlas of the Indian Peninsula* (Oxford, Bombay, 1949), by C. Colin Davies, Reader in Indian History at Oxford.

The history of the British administration is reviewed in *The Rise and Fulfillment of British Rule in India* (Macmillan, London, 1934), by E. J. Thompson and G. T. Garratt. The legal developments of that period are definitively treated in *A Constitutional History of India, 1600–1935* (Methuen, London, 1936), by Arthur Berriedale Keith, who wrote this book in his capacity as barrister-at-law rather than as Professor of Sanskrit. A sound book that illuminates the early period of English influence is *John Company at Work* (Harvard, Cambridge, 1938), by Professor Holden Furber of the University of Pennsylvania. One view of the impingement of imperialist pressures on India is given in *India and British Imperialism* (Bookman Associates, New York, 1951), by Professor Gorham D. Sanderson of the City College of New York.

There are three standard, comprehensive one volume histories which are valuable for the reader who already has some knowledge of India but are hardly for the novice. They are *The Oxford History of India* (Oxford, London, 2nd ed., 1923), by the late Vincent A. Smith of the Indian Civil Service, *The Cambridge Shorter History of India* (Macmillan, New York, 1934), edited by Professor H. H. Dodwell of the University of London, and *An Advanced History of India* (Macmillan, London, rev. ed., 1948), by three Indian historians, R. C. Majumdar, H. C. Raychaudhuri, and K. Datta. Most comprehensive of all the histories now available are the six volumes of *The Cambridge History of India* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1922–1937, Vol. II not yet published).

III

Depictions of village life or of groups of city folk, as we have noted above, are yet very few. Some of the most vivid insights must now be obtained from such sources as autobiographies, published diaries, and even fictionalized accounts. There is a fine autobiography called *Himself* (translated by Katherine Van Akin Gates, Longmans Green, New York, 1938), by Mrs. Ramabai Ranade, which tells of her life in Western India between the 'seventies of the last

century and the first years of this. Nirad C. Chaudhuri's *The Autobiography of an Unknown Indian* (Macmillan, New York, 1951) contains interesting chapters on his boyhood in towns and villages in East Bengal although the political and philosophical ideas of his maturer years presented in the book will find few, if any, takers. A work of fiction which the present writer happens to like because it combines some astute observations on rural folk in North India with a readable murder mystery plot is *Call the Next Witness* (Harcourt Brace, New York, 1946), by Philip Woodruff (Philip Mason).

The diary observations made by Sir Malcolm L. Darling, formerly of the Indian Civil Service, while he was on official tours in the Punjab and other parts of North India, have been published in a series of books. One recently reissued is *The Punjab Peasant in Prosperity and Debt* (Oxford, Bombay, 4th ed., 1947); the latest is *At Freedom's Door* (Oxford, London, 1949). Such writings afford glimpses of rural conditions and interactions which hold true for very many of the communities on the subcontinent irrespective of caste or religious affiliations.

The caste system is a principal feature of the social organization of the Hindu peoples and also may be discerned in the internal stratification of most non-Hindu folk as well. A simple and sound introduction to the subject is Emile Senart's *Caste in India* (Methuen, London, 1930). One of the more recent and more detailed discussions is *Caste in India* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1946), by J. H. Hutton, who was long a civil servant in India and later Professor of Social Anthropology at Cambridge. Another is *Caste and Class in India* (Popular Book Depot, Bombay, 1950), by Professor G. S. Ghurye of the University of Bombay. This is a revised and expanded version of his well known work, *Caste and Race in India* (Knopf, New York, 1932).

An old account of Hindu culture patterns which is still very useful both on its own merits and because nothing much better is yet available is *Hindu Manners, Customs and Ceremonies* (Oxford, London, 3rd ed., edited by H. K. Beauchamp, 1928), by the Abbe J. A. Dubois. The work was completed in 1806; its author lived mainly in South India as a Catholic missionary, and his writing naturally reflects both his times and his vocation. But it is still a pertinent work for the student of Indian peoples.

Several books sketch the nature of Hinduism. *The Hindu View of Life* (George Allen and Unwin, London, 1927), by Professor S. Radhakrishnan, is a philosopher's exposition of the meaning of Hinduism. The fundamental beliefs and practices of the religion are given in *A Primer of Hinduism* (Oxford, London, 2nd ed., 1912), by J. N. Farquhar, who was an official of the YMCA in India. The same author wrote an historical account of various sects and modern reform trends within Hinduism: *Modern Religious Movements in India* (Macmillan, New York, 1915). The principal festivals are outlined in *The Hindu Religious Year* (Oxford, London, and Association Press, Calcutta, 1921), by M. M. Underhill, and in *Hindu Holidays and Ceremonials* (Thacker, Spink, Calcutta, 2nd ed., 1919), by B. A. Gupte.

The elaborate rituals and ceremonies observed among the Brahmans of Gujerat are detailed in *The Rites of the Twice-Born* (Oxford, London, 1920),

by Mrs. Sinclair Stevenson, who was a missionary in that area. There are some useful monographs which describe castes at the other end of the caste scale. A good ethnographic study of a low ranking group, the Nimar Balahis of Madhya Pradesh (Central Provinces), is *The Children of Hari* (Verlag Herold, Vienna, 1950), by Stephen Fuchs, who has lived for many years among these people as a Catholic missionary. One of the very lowest groups in the social scale is described by the anthropologist, Dr. A. Aiyappan, in *Anthropology of the Nayadis* (Madras Govt. Museum Bulletins, N.S., Vol. 2, No. 4, Madras, 1937). Three other low castes are briefly described in *The Religious Life of India* series by former missionaries: the Dheds in Mrs. Sinclair Stevenson's *Without the Pale* (Oxford, London, 1930); the Chamars in G. W. Briggs' *The Chamārs* (Oxford, London, 1920); and the Mahars in Alexander Robertson's *The Mahar Folk* (Oxford, London, 1938). A good summary of the economic and social position of such lower ranking groups is found in *The Depressed Classes* (Hind Kitabs, Bombay, 1947), by Dr. Mohinder Singh. The political leader of the depressed castes, Dr. B. R. Ambedkar, has written a number of books on the subject, one of which is *The Untouchables* (Amrit Book Co., New Delhi, 1948).

Among the different religious groupings, the Sikhs have been the subject of an able historical study, *The Sikhs* (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1946), by Professor John Clark Archer of Yale. Jain belief and ritual are the subject of *The Heart of Jainism* (Oxford, London, 1915), by Mrs. Sinclair Stevenson. A good study, using the modern approach of social anthropology, is *Religion and Society among the Coorgs of South India* (Oxford, London, 1951), by S. N. Srinivas, Professor of Anthropology at the University of Baroda.

Concerning the Muslims of the subcontinent, there is a fine history of recent political movements and social ideas: *Modern Islām in India* (Minerva, Lahore, 1943; Gollancz, London, 1946), by Professor Wilfred C. Smith of McGill University. A survey of the religious history of Indian Islam, written by a missionary long resident among Muslims in India, is *Indian Islam* (Oxford, London, 1930), by Murray T. Titus. But for some account of the particular lifeways of Indian Muslims, the student must still refer to an old but still useful work, much as is the case for Hindus. It is *Islam in India* (Oxford, London, edited by W. Crooke, 1921), originally compiled in 1832 by a surgeon, G. A. Herklots, from the writings of a Deccani Muslim, Ja'far Sharīf. A companion volume contains the letters relating to Muslim ways written in the same period by an Englishwoman, Mrs. Meer Hassan Ali, who was married to a Shiah Muslim of Lucknow. It is entitled *Observations on the Mussulmauns of India* (Oxford, London, 2nd ed., 1916).

While there is still a dearth of descriptive and analytic literature on the ways of the villagers and townspeople—Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs, Jains, and Christians alike—there are excellent accounts of some of the tribal peoples, who number some twenty-five million in all. Thus Verrier Elwin has written a noteworthy series of books as an outcome of his many years of devotion to the study and welfare of tribesmen in Central India. Two of his works are *The Baiga* (John Murray, London, 1939) and *The Muria and Their Ghotul* (Oxford, London, 1947). Another enterprising series of anthropological books is by Professor Dhirendra Nath Majumdar of Lucknow University, whose recent work

on the Ho people of Eastern India is entitled *The Affairs of a Tribe* (Universal Publishers, Lucknow, 1950). Professor Christoph von Fürer-Haimendorf of the University of London has contributed several important works, among them the study of a tribe in Hyderabad, *The Reddis of the Bison Hills* (Macmillan, London, 1945). His book, *The Naked Nagas* (Thacker, Spink, Calcutta, rev. ed., 1946), is a popular account of some of the Naga tribesmen of easternmost India, who have also been the subject of a fine set of monographs written by British administrative officials, J. H. Hutton, J. P. Mills, T. C. Hodson and others. A well written account of a people, Mongoloid in physique and Tibeto-Burman in language, on the northern Himalayan border is Geoffrey Gorer's *Himalayan Village* (Michael Joseph Ltd., London, 1938). Tribal life at the northwestern edge of the subcontinent is reflected in the free translation, by Sir Denis Bray, of an eloquent tribesman's discourse. It is called *The Life-History of a Brāhūī* (Royal Asiatic Society, London, Prize Publication Fund, Vol. IV, 1913). All these are accounts of particular tribes; a book summarizing modern anthropological knowledge of the various tribes has yet to be written.

IV

Between the end of the first World War and that of the second, political events developed rapidly. An incisive description of that development is contained in *Strangers in India* (Reynal and Hitchcock, New York, 1945), by Penderel Moon. Moon knew the administrative system as a member of the Indian Civil Service and knows Indian peoples of various classes well as a sympathetic and intuitive observer. His brief book, made all the more readable by the use of dialogue, is an excellent introduction to recent political happenings. Similar in scope, more detailed in presentation, also sympathetic to the Indian effort, is H. N. Brailsford's *Subject India* (John Day, New York, 1943).

A useful digest of the political facts of the war and inter-war years is by the Canadian political observer Raleigh Parkin, *India Today* (John Day, New York, 1946). The same title is borne by a book written from a different perspective. It is by the Communist writer R. Palme Dutt (*India Today*, Peoples' Publishing House, Bombay, 2nd rev. Indian edition, 1949). Some of the speeches and writings of a Socialist leader, Jaya Prakash Narayan, are collected in *Towards Struggle* (Padma, Bombay, 1946).

A source book for the political history of this period is the weighty and official *The History of the Indian National Congress* (Vol. I, Working Committee of the Congress, printed at Law Printing House, Madras, 1935; Vol. II, Padma Publications, Bombay, 1947), by Dr. Pattabhi Sitaramayya. Another valuable source, written with a different perspective, is by Professor Reginald Coupland of Oxford. Originally published in three volumes under the title *Report on the Constitutional Problem in India* (Oxford, London, 1942–1943), it was reissued in a single volume entitled *The Indian Problem* (Oxford, New York, 1944). The results of Professor Coupland's constitutional studies are more briefly put and the historical background sketched in his *India: A Re-statement* (Oxford, London, 1945). The economic and societal forces which helped shape the nationalist movement are discussed in A. R. Desai's amplification of his doctoral dissertation, *Social Background of Indian Nationalism* (Oxford, Bombay,

1948). One of the few American political scientists to be interested in India before World War II was the late Professor William Roy Smith of Yale whose *Nationalism and Reform in India* (Yale, New Haven, 1938) traces political developments to 1935.

A sound summary report of the first few years of independence for the Republic of India is *India Since Partition* (Praeger, New York, and Turnstile Press, London, 1951), by Andrew Mellor, a journalist with the *Daily Herald* of London. A chapter on India by L. K. Rosinger in *The State of Asia* (L. K. Rosinger, ed., Knopf, New York, 1951) provides a good brief survey of the state of the nation as of the third year of independence.

A principal political achievement of post-independence India is *The Constitution of India* (Government of India Press, Manager of Publications, Delhi, 1949), a document which embodies the law of the land and expresses the aspirations of its leaders. A very short but quite illuminating glimpse of the political ideas, especially concerning international affairs, of India's present leader is contained in *Talks with Nehru* (John Day, New York, 1951), which is, as the title page says in lieu of author designation, "a discussion between Jawaharlal Nehru and Norman Cousins." It is the record of some informal, spontaneous and pertinent conversation.

Some important aspects of foreign relations are dealt with in the report of the 1949 India-American conference held under the auspices of the Indian Council of World Affairs and the American Institute of Pacific Relations. This report, *Indian-American Relations* (Oxford, Bombay, and Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi, 1950), gives the gist of the conference discussions. Another publication of the Indian Council, by K. P. Karunakaran, reviews India's foreign relations from the date of independence to mid-1951: *India in World Affairs* (Oxford, New York, 1952).

On economic factors hinges much of the political future, and the future of the next five years, as envisaged by top Indian planners, is outlined in *The First Five Year Plan, A Draft Outline* (Government of India, Planning Commission, New Delhi, 1951). The agrarian background for the plan may be gathered from *The Indian Rural Problem* (Indian Society of Agricultural Economics, Co-operator's Book Depot, Bombay, 1944), by Sir Manilal B. Nanavati, formerly of the Reserve Bank of India, and J. J. Anjaria of the University of Bombay. One of the best surveys of rural economics is the *Final Report of the Famine Enquiry Commission* (Government of India, New Delhi, 1945). A sharp appraisal of the problems of economic planning is N. V. Sovani's *Planning of Post-War Economic Development in India* (Gokhale Institute, Poona, 1951, distributed in the U. S. by the Institute of Pacific Relations, New York).

Two brief books impart some of the human problems involved in the agricultural economic situation. *Socrates in an Indian Village* (Oxford, Calcutta, 5th ed., 1941) is cast in the form of conversations with villagers and was written by F. L. Brayne, who had many conversations with villagers as a member of the Indian Civil Service and commissioner for rural reconstruction. A thoughtful appraisal of problems and a program of action is given in *Poverty and Social Change* (Longmans, Green, London, 1945), by Tarlok Singh.

The industrial foundations of the economy are ably surveyed by one of India's leading economists, P. J. Thomas, in *India's Basic Industries* (Orient Longmans, Bombay, 1948). Economic facts and figures are reviewed by Rowland Owen, a United Kingdom trade commissioner, in *Economic and Commercial Conditions in India* (Board of Trade, H. M. Stationery Office, London, 1949). Other standard economic analyses relating to the subcontinent are given in Daniel Thorner's article in *The Middle East Journal*, cited above. To his list may be added two books on industrial workers. Margaret Read's *The Indian Peasant Uprooted* (Longmans, Green, London, 1931) is an excellent summary of the 1931 findings of the Royal Commission on Labour in India. Some useful data of more recent date are in *The Indian Working Class* (Hind Kitabs, Bombay, 1945), by Professor Radhakamal Mukerjee of Lucknow University.

A promising series of pamphlets, issued as the *Library of Indian Economics*, has been planned and the first has appeared. It is *Gandhian Economic Thought* (Vora, Bombay, 1951), by J. C. Kumarappa. The general editor of the series is Professor C. N. Vakil of the University of Bombay, whose *Economic Consequences of Divided India* (Vora, Bombay, 1950) is the most comprehensive work on the subject.

An insider's report of the hectic months preceding partition is well told in *Mission with Mountbatten* (R. Hale, London, 1951) by Allan Campbell-Johnson who was the Secretary to the then Viceroy, Lord Louis Mountbatten. The strains of those and of the following months are portrayed in the prose and pictures of Margaret Bourke-White's *Halfway to Freedom* (Simon and Schuster, New York, 1949).

Students of the economic aspects of government and of public administration will be particularly interested in two reports by A. D. Gorwala, *Report on Public Administration* and *Report on the Efficient Conduct of State Enterprises* (Government of India, Planning Commission, New Delhi, 1951).

All these political and economic writings give facts and analyses, but for some sense of the entailed emotions, personal situations, and human hopes it is well to supplement them with more humanistic readings. The works of the revered writer, the late Rabindranath Tagore, have been translated into English by himself and by others. The collection of short stories called *The Hungry Stones* (Macmillan, New York, 1916) is a good introduction to the Tagore literature. His volume of poems *Gitanjali* brought him the Nobel prize for literature. It has been reprinted, together with his other translated poems and plays, in *Collected Poems and Plays of Rabindranath Tagore* (Macmillan, New York, 1951).

The English translations of poems by the great Muslim poet, Mohammed Iqbal, lose in the translation but are still important for their political impact as well as for their literary distinction. One translation is entitled *Secrets of the Self* (Macmillan, London, 1920; rev. ed. Ashraf, Lahore, 1940). A poetess whose political activities (she was President of the Indian National Congress) matched the fire of her poems, the late Sarojini Naidu, has a volume in English, *The Sceptred Flute* (Dodd, Mead, New York, 1917, 1918).

Contemporary Bengali writers are represented in *Best Stories of Modern*

Bengal (Signet Press, Calcutta, Vol. I, 1944; Vol. II, 1945), edited by Dilip K. Gupta and translated by Nilima Devi. Several present day novelists, writing of the parts of the Indian scene they know, have won critical acclaim for their works in English. Among these works are Mulk Raj Anand's *The Village* (J. Cape, London, 1939) and *Coolie* (Penguin ed., New York, 1945), R. K. Narayan's *The English Teacher* (Eyre and Spottiswoode, London, 1945), K. S. Venkataramani's *Paper Boats* (Svetaranya Ashrama, Madras, 1943), and Dhan Gopal Mukerjee's *My Brother's Face* (Dutton, New York, 1924).

English novelists have also written some penetrating novels, especially of relations between Englishmen and Indians as they perceived such relations. Best known of these is E. M. Forster's classic *A Passage to India* (Harcourt Brace, New York, 1924); Edward Thompson's *An Indian Day* (Knopf, New York, 1927) is of the same genre.

There are several books which record impressions of and personal responses to Indian peoples and affairs. In *Richer by Asia* (Houghton, Mifflin, Boston, 1947) the writer, Edmund Taylor, tries to think through the meaning for world affairs of his experiences in India during the war. A series of keen essays on Indian life and tradition may be found in *Modern Indian Culture* (Hind Kitabs, Bombay, 2nd rev. ed., 1948), by Dhurjati Prasad Mukerji of Lucknow University. Santha Rama Rau's gifted pen describes her Asian travels and experiences in *East of Home* (Harper, New York, 1950). Her comments and comparisons cast light on Indian problems as well as on those of the people among whom she stayed. A vivid, sometimes impassioned account of a six months' tour of India in 1949 is *India Afire* (John Day, New York, 1951), by two young Americans, Clare and Harris Wofford, Jr. Their book has some minor errors which stem from their lack of long acquaintance with the country, and it contains some misinterpretations, but their general impressions were intensively gained and are intensely described.

The Woffords found Gandhi's influence still very powerful, and this article may well close with mention of some writings about Gandhi just as it began with writings by him. There is even now a large literature on Gandhi and many additions to it appear every year. One biography is Louis Fischer's *The Life of Mahatma Gandhi* (Harper, New York, 1950). The impact of Gandhi's life and teaching is the subject of Vincent Sheean's *Lead, Kindly Light* (Random House, New York, 1949). The principal burden of his teaching is discussed by Horace Alexander and others in *The Social and Political Ideas of Mahatma Gandhi* (Oxford, London, 1949). Among the very many personal recollections of the great leader, there is a volume edited by Chandrashanker Shukla which contains brief but often poignant pieces by many different contributors. It is entitled *Reminiscences of Gandhiji* (Vora, Bombay, 1951). But for a most sensitive appraisal of the meaning of the man for India and for the world, the reader will do well to turn to the selection from the writings and speeches of Jawaharlal Nehru, a small book entitled *Nehru on Gandhi* (John Day, New York, 1941, 1948).

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BOOK REVIEWS

Charles Evans Hughes. By MERLO J. PUSEY. (New York: The Macmillan Company. 1951. 2 vols., paged continuously, pp. xvi, vii, 829. $15.00 a set.)

Mr. Pusey has put us much in his debt. As the result of six years of devoted labors he has given us a full-length portrait and a painstaking account of the varied activities of one of the foremost public men and personalities of our time. These volumes are, to be sure, not beyond criticism. The style in which they are couched, while serviceable, is undistinguished; in the few instances that the author has attempted a rhetorical *tour de force*, the result has usually been unhappy.[1] And while sharply censuring him on a few occasions, Mr. Pusey is most of the time only too ready to wield the cudgels in his subject's behalf, if not always wisely, yet stoutly. This, however, is not altogether surprising, nor is it without its compensations, for this, as Mr. Pusey explains in his brief Preface, is an "authorized" though not "official" biography. Just what this distinction imports I am unable to say; what is certain, and most important, is that the author has enjoyed freest access to, and has conscientiously utilized, a vast mass of first-hand materials. These comprise Mr. Hughes' public and private papers and "several hundred pages of biographical notes" which were prepared by Mr. Hughes himself, while "even more fruitful in some respects," Mr. Pusey records, "were my interviews with Mr. Hughes in the latter years of his retirement. During the spring and fall months that he spent in Washington, I visited him once or twice a week over a period of two and a half years. Seated at his desk in a reminiscent mood, he would often answer my questions for three hours without a break, speaking with candor and clarity—drawing upon his amazing memory of events over fourscore years. In this manner we reviewed his experiences as a youth and as a lawyer and discussed all the momentous events of his public career" (p. vii).

The most engaging portion of the work (Chs. 1–9) covers Charles Evans' birth, childhood in a humble Baptist parsonage, school days, which came late, college days at Brown, a teaching experience, study of the law at Columbia, entrance upon legal practice. On his eighth birthday his father gave Charles a *Greek New Testament with Lexicon.* A few years later, believe it or not, Charles read *Pilgrim's Progress* "several times!" Probably it went more easily after the first try. At Brown he earned money for a pair of skates by writing essays for some necessitous fellow students. A certain sophomore, Charles wrote home, "only wanted a fair one. I wrote it and received $1.00"; but a certain "fine scholar" for whom he wrote "a fine essay," had to pay $2.00. Replying to parental criticism of this method of financing skating, Charles argued: (1) That skating was "a very healthy exercise and also pleasing"; (2) that "earning money is also a fine thing for youth"; (3) . . . ; (4) that "hack-writing is a per-

[1] "Mr. Hughes could no more be impassive in this situation than could a bobolink at the burst of dawn" (p. 369). "The year 1925 made its debut upon the stage of time" (p. 610).

fectly legitimate business"; (5) that "writing like everything else can be bought and sold"; finally, that "the other fellows must settle the moral point with themselves." In deference, nevertheless, to parental scruples he discontinued the practice, though still obviously unconvinced of its iniquity (p. 49). This section of the book is a real American success story, and ends fittingly enough with Charles becoming his boss's partner and marrying his boss's daughter. The Horatio Alger formula usually reversed the order of these events.

Cromwell asked to be painted "warts and all." Mr. Pusey, touching upon the bristly subject of the Hughes whiskers, thinks a word in extenuation called for. The origin of the whiskers, which he places in 1890, he explains as follows: "He [Hughes] had never learned to shave," but had kept a shaving cup at the Hotel Astor "for several years. . . . Had safety razors been in use at the time the famous beard would never have been grown" (pp. 88–9). I find this account of matters incredible. In the first place, Hughes must have been shaving some years before he came to maintain a shaving mug at the Hotel Astor. In the second place, he had a vastly better reason than lack of a Gillette for growing a beard, namely, to improve his looks, by concealing his too prominent front teeth[2] and his long and far from handsome chin. Also, it should be noted, Hughes initially grew a much longer beard than he wound up with, one which could have been trimmed, and doubtless was trimmed later on, by the use of scissors. It was this original beard that evoked from Hearst the disrespectful epithet, "animated feather-duster" (p. 176). Not till 1918 did the curtailed beard of the handsome Jovian countenance which today looks down from the pediment of the Supreme Court Building in Washington, make its appearance. It was the consequence of a conversation between Hughes and his friend Meier Steinbrink. "Why," Hughes asked Steinbrink, "does the public continue to regard me as a human icicle?" "I think," Steinbrink answered, "there are two reasons. . . . First, the public doesn't know you. Second, you wear a full beard. Can you think of any public man with a big, formidable beard who has the reputation of being affable and friendly?"

As this anecdote suggests, Hughes was much concerned over being thought austere, and as these pages show, Mr. Pusey takes his subject's concern much to heart. It is a topic to which he returns repeatedly. What he succeeds in showing, with ample documentation, is that Mr. Hughes was a loving son, husband, and father, and that his acquaintances frequently found him a very companionable, even humorous associate. Yet the impression of austerity is not altogether dispelled. Mr. Hughes' sportive moods seem at times to be weighted down with a kind of dutifulness and self-consciousness;[3] and sometimes it is worse than that, at least for Mr. Hughes. Mr. Pusey relates an anecdote apropos of Hughes' return to private practice which furnishes a case in point. On his first appear-

[2] The two center ones were apparently artificial. (*See* pp. 16, 17.) Incidentally, Mr. Pusey is in error in suggesting that safety razors were not in use in 1890. The "Star Safety" was put on the market by Kampfe Bros. of New York City in 1880. *See* Joseph N. Kane, *Famous First Facts* (New York, 1950), p. 387.

[3] The impression arises in part from the appearance in these pages of certain productions of the Hughes pen which were intended only for the family circle. *See passim.*

ance before the Supreme Court, Chief Justice Taft, following adjournment of Court, rushed up to him, exclaiming, "Hughes, my boy, I am delighted to see you." "Mr. Chief Justice," Hughes replied politely, but coolly extending his hand, "I am honored to see you," leaving Taft "looking deflated." To the inquiry why he had greeted the Chief Justice so coldly, he replied: "I did it intentionally . . . as I intend to win my cases on their merits and not thru friendship with the judges" (p. 635). With all due respect to Mr. Hughes, I surmise that this rather self-righteous explanation—which, it should be noted, reflects quite gratuitously on the Chief Justice's intention—was pure afterthought, an effort on Mr. Hughes' part to rationalize his inability to meet Taft's heartiness half way. Yet why should he have felt it necessary thus to assume the defensive? He was austere? Yes; but then, so have been many other worthy gentlemen, from George Washington down to the present. Currently, to be sure, austerity is about the last thing we have to complain of in our public men. "The common touch" is all too common.[4]

In the chapters dealing with Hughes' campaign for the presidency (Chs. 31–34) Pusey becomes sharply critical of his subject, and was evidently aided and abetted by the subject himself in this attitude. That Hughes' choice for campaign manager was a poor one, that his speeches were ineffective, that he gratuitously put his money on the wrong horse in California and failed altogether to take command in that State, that in Los Angeles the Sunday he left California he was kept in ignorance of the presence of Governor Johnson in the same hotel with himself and was blissfully being photographed in the municipal museum alongside a mastodon when he should have been conferring with California's political master—all this is admitted in a chapter entitled the "California Incident." A better title would have been "Throwing Away the Presidency on a Sunday Afternoon." Yet it may well be that Mr. Hughes builded better than he knew on this crucial occasion. For had he carried California by a small margin, he would still have been a "Minority President" by over a half-million votes, which at that particular juncture of affairs would have been most unfortunate. The *efficient*, the *real* cause of Mr. Hughes' defeat was the Democratic slogan, "He [Wilson] kept us out of War," which Mr. Wilson himself endorsed in his Shadow Lawn speech late in the campaign when he warned his listeners, "If you elect my opponent you elect a war."

A book of this length is bound to provoke the question whether it could not have been shortened to advantage. In this review I have omitted consideration of the chapters dealing with Hughes' public career prior to his emergence upon the national scene. If I were to recommend a cut in the pages here covered it would be in those chapters which deal with his performance as Secretary of State (Chs. 39–54). In the presence of today's problems the majority of them

[4] The late President Hibben of Princeton University told me this anecdote. At a meeting of the Board of Trustees it became necessary for him to designate a member of the Board to confer with Mr. Hughes, then Secretary of State. Turning to Trustee X, Mr. Hibben said, "I think you are the person among us who is nearest to Mr. Hughes, aren't you?" "Yes," said Mr. X, "I presume I am, but the intervening distance is entirely filled with ice!"

carry an odor of far off happier days, and of total irrelevance to these. Under the title "Inspired Hour," Mr. Pusey retells the story of November 12, 1921, when in his words, the "whiskered enigma" opened the Washington Conference with a speech proposing a ten-year naval holiday. "Delegates," he continues, "caught their breath and moistened hot lips as Hughes went on to detail the sacrifice the United States was prepared to make" (p. 470). A dramatic occasion, no doubt; yet the account which Mr. Pusey gives of the ensuing negotiations is fairly convincing that the Secretary's oratorical coup netted substantially nothing. One effect of his experience as a member of the Cabinet in Hughes' own thinking deserves special notice in this REVIEW, namely, his impression of that body's worthlessness "as a team of presidential advisers." "Each member," Mr. Pusey records, "became wrapped up in the affairs of his own department. . . . The Cabinet meetings thus came to be brief and not very helpful, the talk running to generalities and politics" (p. 427). It is also noted that the oil leases, of unhappy memory, "were never discussed or acted upon by the Cabinet"; nor was FDR's court plan (pp. 567, 753).

It will come as news to many readers that Mr. Hughes missed the Chief Justiceship twice before he finally made it. When in April, 1910 President Taft nominated Hughes to succeed Justice Brewer, he wrote Hughes that if the Chief Justiceship were "now open I should offer it to you," and added that it was "probable that if it were to become vacant during my term, I should promote you to it, but of course, conditions change" and it would not be right for him to make any promises. Conditions apparently did change, although it would seem that the President did not decide on White as Fuller's successor till the very last moment (pp. 271–3). It appears that Mr. Taft had felt compelled to give heed to the objections of certain members of the Senate Judiciary Committee, who in turn reflected the views of some of the older Justices. The second time Hughes missed his destiny was in 1916, when Chief Justice White, shortly before the Republican National Convention that year, informed him that Wilson was prepared to nominate him to the vacancy which White's impending resignation would produce. Hughes thought the suggestion "had the smell of a deal" and repelled it (p. 324).

Rumor has also had its say in connection with Mr. Hughes' actual appointment. The story is to the effect that President Hoover really desired to appoint Stone, but felt duty-bound to get first a refusal from Hughes, which he thought would be readily forthcoming inasmuch as Hughes' son would have to resign his post as Solicitor-General if his father became Chief Justice. Hughes' prompt acceptance, we are told, left Hoover flabbergasted. Mr. Pusey produces evidence which casts some doubt on this story, but clearly does not dispose of it (pp. 652–53). He admits that on the afternoon when Taft's resignation reached President Hoover's desk "George Akerson, presidential secretary, walked into the White House pressroom and whispered: 'It's Stone.' That false report," Pusey continues, "was flashed all over the country"; and he later adds, "Akerson's blunder has never been fully explained." Certainly Mr. Pusey does not explain it.

One of the best chapters in the book is Chapter 64, entitled "Inside the Supreme Court." It is an interesting and informative account of the day-to-day operation of the Court under Mr. Hughes's able presidency, and supplements admirably Chapter 2 of his own book on *The Supreme Court of the United States*.[5] Moreover, Mr. Pusey's chapter contains one piece of news, namely, that in January, 1932 a majority of the Court noting that while Justice Holmes could still write clearly, "he could no longer do his full share in the mastery of the work of the Court," "asked the Chief Justice to request Holmes' resignation." Hughes complied promptly and with such consideration as the case admitted of, and Holmes, "the soul of equanimity," produced the required document on the spot (p. 681).

Mr. Pusey devotes three chapters (69, 70, and 71) to the battle between the Court and the New Deal. The point most labored is that the Court's action in sustaining the Wagner Labor Act in the Jones-Laughlin case, on April 12, 1937,[6] did not represent any change of position on the part of Hughes himself from that set forth in his opinion nearly two years earlier in the so-called "Sick Chicken Case,"[7] in which NIRA was set aside. The demonstration is far from conclusive. Pusey's principal reliance—aside from Hughes' own assurances to him on the point (see e.g., p. 768)—seems to be on the Chief Justice's invocation in Jones-Laughlin of the rule that Congress is empowered to protect interstate commerce against detriment from whatever source arising, even though otherwise the cause of the detriment would fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of a state or states. Unfortunately this argument fails to take account, first, of the ideology of the Sugar Trust Case,[8] that production was intrinsically local and that any effect upon interstate commerce from conditions surrounding it was "indirect" and as such beyond the reach of Congress; and secondly, of the fact that in the Schechter case Hughes pronounced "the distinction between direct and indirect effects of intrastate transactions upon interstate commerce" "a fundamental one, essential to the maintenance of our constitutional system,"[9] language which reasonably implies that he then thought the distinction to be generic, and hence untouchable save by constitutional amendment. Indeed, in its decision in the Carter case,[10] midway between the Schechter and Jones-Laughlin cases, the controlling majority of the court, speaking by Justice Sutherland, declared that the distinction between a direct and an indirect effect did not turn "upon the magnitude of either the cause or the effect," but was one of kind, and on this ground held that Congress had been without power to regulate wages and hours in the soft coal industry;[11] and while dissenting on the question of the severability of the act before the Court,

[5] The Blumenthal Lectures for 1927 (Columbia University Press, 1928).

[6] *National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.*, 301 U. S. 1 (1937).

[7] *Schechter Bros. v. U. S.*, 295 U. S. 495 (1935).

[8] *United States v. E. C. Knight Co.*, 156 U. S. 1 (1895); *see also Oliver Iron Co. v. Lord*, 262 U. S. 172, 178–9 (1923).

[9] 295 U. S. at 548.

[10] *Carter v. Carter Coal Co.*, 298 U. S. 238 (1936).

[11] *Ibid.*, 307–9.

Hughes agreed that its labor provisions were void, saying: "The provision goes beyond any proper measure of protection of interstate commerce and attempts a broad regulation of industry within the State."[12] But in his Jones-Laughlin opinion, the Chief Justice, while in words reiterating the distinction between "direct" and "indirect" effects, asserted that the question was "necessarily one of degree."[13] Reviewing then the Company's "far flung activities" he continued: "It is idle to say that [the effect of a stoppage of these] would be indirect or remote. It is obvious that it would be immediate and might be catastrophic. We are asked to shut our eyes to the plainest facts of our national life and to deal with the question of direct and indirect effects in an intellectual vacuum."[14] Mr. Pusey, to be sure, lays great stress upon the relative insignificance of the Schechters' business in comparison with that of Jones-Laughlin Co. This argument, too, fails, for the reason that the decision in Jones-Laughlin was straightway applied by the Chief Justice to cases involving two small companies, a stoppage of whose operations could by no manner of means be deemed "catastrophic" to anybody except, perhaps, the companies themselves.[15]

Mr. Pusey's argument for Hughes' consistency is brought to its highest pitch in the contention that it was not the Court but Congress which reversed itself (p. 771). This astounding claim is apparently based on nothing more substantial than the fact that Congress did not re-enact NIRA after Jones-Laughlin. True, it didn't; but it enacted the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, in sustaining which[16] the Court, with Hughes still a member of it, placed, as former Justice Roberts has recently written, "the whole matter of wages and hours of persons employed throughout the United States, with slight exceptions, under a single federal regulatory scheme and in this way completely . . . superseded state exercise of the police power in this field."[17]

Mr. Pusey is in error, I submit, in contending that Hughes' opinion in Jones-Laughlin did not represent a shift—a revolutionary shift, in fact—in Hughes' conception of the relation of the commerce power to States' rights. But this error probably saved him from a more serious one, namely, that of claiming for his subject the leading role in bringing this revolution about. The credit for that, so far as it is ascribable to the Court itself, must go to Justice Stone, for his classic dissent in the Triple "A" Case,[18] and to Justice Cardozo, for his thoughtful dissent in the Carter case.[19] Indeed, Stone felt a "certain resentment . . . that Hughes, in choosing to assign the opinion [in Jones-Laughlin] to himself, should have taken a plum that belonged rightly to Cardozo."[20]

I have dwelt at such length on the question of Chief Justice Hughes's con-

[12] *Ibid.*, 318–9. [13] 301 U. S. at 37. [14] *Ibid.*, 41.

[15] Pusey calls Jones-Laughlin Corporation an "octopus"—a term hardly applicable to either the clothing or the trailer company. *See* pp. 758–9.

[16] This occurred in *United States v. Darby*, 312 U. S. 100 (1941).

[17] *The Court and the Constitution* (Harvard University Press, 1951), p. 56.

[18] 297 U. S. 1, 78 (1936). [19] 298 U. S. at 324 ff.

[20] Professor Alpheus T. Mason, "Harlan Fiske Stone and FDR's Court Plan," *Yale Law Journal*, Vol. 61, pp. 791, 813 (June, 1952).

sistency not only because of the intrinsic interest of the subject, but also because Mr. Pusey's treatment of it illustrates so adequately an outstanding characteristic of his portrayal of Hughes—a certain static quality. The suggestion is that the perfectly functioning Hughes mentality was the same yesterday, today, and always—or *almost* always. One is reminded of Bagehot's quip regarding the great Macaulay, "He didn't grow, he was cast."

Someone will someday feel it incumbent upon him to attempt a more objective study of Mr. Hughes, one less directly reflective of Mr. Hughes' retrospect of himself.[21] Such a one will of necessity draw much of his material from these pages, thanks to the skill and industry with which their author has exploited a most unusual opportunity.[22]

EDWARD S. CORWIN.

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Uncle Sam in the Pacific Northwest; Federal Management of Natural Resources in the Columbia River Valley. BY CHARLES MCKINLEY. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 1952. Pp. xx, 673. $7.50.)

[21] Even now we have a much more satisfactory account and evaluation of Justice and Chief Justice Hughes' work in the field of constitutional interpretation than Mr. Pusey's, in Samuel Hendel's *Charles Evans Hughes and the Supreme Court* (Crown's Press, Columbia University, 1951).

[22] Some Hughes off-the-bench constitutional views are the following: Coolidge became President the moment Harding died, and took the oath of office *as President* (p. 563); "Whatever is pertinent to our international relations . . . is within the sweep of the power to make treaties" (Mr. Pusey's words, p. 612); "The House has no right to inquire into a treaty that requires ratification of the Senate only" (p. 415). I should endorse the first two of these statements, but not the third. The House may inform its judgment as to anything requiring legislative action. Most treaties require at least an appropriation to carry them out, and all treaties are subject as law of the land to repeal by Congress.

It was in 1907 that Mr. Hughes "uttered his most frequently quoted phrase," says Mr. Pusey, ". . . The Constitution is what the judges say it is." Mr. Pusey continues: "Through the remainder of his life he was to hear and see this casual phrase, torn from the context of an extemporaneous speech, repeated again and again as if he had, in a moment of candor, exposed the solemn function of judging as a sort of humbuggery. Of course he had done nothing of the sort. 'The inference that I was picturing constitutional interpretation by the courts as a matter of judicial caprice,' he wrote in his Biographical Notes, '. . . was farthest from my thought. I was not talking flippantly or in disrespect of the courts, but on the contrary with the most profound respect. I was speaking of the essential function of the courts under our system in interpreting and applying constitutional safeguards, and I was emphasizing the importance of maintaining the courts in the highest public esteem as our final judicial arbiters and the inadvisability of needlessly exposing them to criticism and disrespect by throwing upon them the burden of dealing with purely administrative questions' " (p. 204). I doubt if Mr. Hughes had a very substantial case against those who thus quoted him "out of context." It seems to me that in the above phrase, which stands very well by itself, he gave a rather realistic description of the power of judicial review as exercised by himself on certain occasions. These furnish it ample context. Besides, when an important man speaks or writes quotably on an important topic, he must expect to be quoted, whether out of context or otherwise. It is one of the risks of the trade. Sir Frederick Pollock has some sensible remarks on the subject in one of his letters to Holmes.

Charles McKinley is one of many political scientists who have combined scholarship with public service, but in few cases have the two careers complemented and enriched each other so markedly. McKinley's connections with the Northwest Regional Planning Commission, the natural resources task force of the Hoover Commission, and the research staff of the President's Water Resources Policy Commission, are only the most notable of his public undertakings. By reason of his study and experience, he has become one of the nation's wisest counselors on problems of administrative organization for natural resources development, and he has poured his unrivaled experience with these problems in the Pacific Northwest into this monumental volume.

Actually, there are books within this book, all perfectly integrated. The first two thirds is primarily descriptive, beginning with a broad discussion of the resources and management problems of the region. Then come eleven chapters, each devoted to one of the federal resource agencies active in the area, sketching its development and regional program. Especially important is the detailed account of the interrelationships of these agencies. The chapter on the Bonneville Power Administration amounts to a monographic study of that agency, and the Army Engineers, Bureau of Reclamation, and Forest Service receive equally thorough treatment.

Important as this material is, it is only a prologue to the analysis and policy recommendations of the latter part of the book. The problem to which McKinley addresses himself is the pressing one as to whether the programs of these eleven separate agencies add up to the kind of regional program which the area needs and for which the nation is paying. Actually both Interior and Agriculture have been sensitive to the need for harnessing their own bureaus, and for a measure of interdepartmental coordination. McKinley devotes two chapters to the institutional arrangements adopted for these two purposes.

But such palliatives fall far short of an integrated regional program. A large segment of opinion insists that a valley authority is the only satisfactory way to administer a regional resource program. In order to give a basis for judging the various CVA proposals, McKinley introduces another monograph on the TVA. Based in part on his own investigations in the TVA area, this long chapter is a remarkably fine analysis of that agency.

This brings us to the last two chapters, where McKinley states his recommendations. He is obviously drawn very strongly to the authority device, but he would give the departmental plan one more chance to prove that it can adapt itself to regional development administration. He would create, in a renamed Department of the Interior, a National River Development and Management Administration which would take over the relevant functions of the Army Engineers, Federal Power Commission, Bonneville Power Administration, and Bureau of Reclamation. This new national agency would function through decentralized, quasi-corporate regional operating organizations which would initiate the planning, perform the construction, and operate the facilities within the several river basin regions. In the Pacific Northwest this job would be done by the Columbia River Administration. The various watershed and

land-management agencies would be realigned in an enlarged and renamed Department of Agriculture.

This plan would, McKinley believes, greatly reduce the most important sources of bureau conflict in the management of federal natural resources. But it would result in two major administrative structures for resource management in each region, in contrast to the unity of a valley authority, though markedly improving on the present eleven or twelve quasi-independent bureaus. McKinley solves the problem of coordination between these two powerful agencies by placing a field representative of the Office of the President in each region. This is the only way, he believes, of making the traditional functional departmental plan of national administration work. There must be something above the department level but below the Washington level. "Only a center of concern for the total result of all federal programs which Congress and the president have authorized can transcend interest partiality and create that sense of interrelatedness that is the most unique characteristic of the personnel of the Tennessee Valley Authority."

McKinley admits that his is a complicated plan. But the alternative is a new batch of valley authorities, which would also create problems. "We must not forget that the multiplication of valley authorities would quickly introduce numerous complications in national administration for which new layers of organization structure would have to be provided. Complicated or not, we shall either have to adopt some structure comparable to the one outlined here or court the risk, if we use the valley-authority mechanism without new complexities of structure for its control, of nine or a dozen competing regional agencies defying effective administrative guidance and supervision by the only office, the presidency, which can be ultimately responsible for federal resource administration."

Of course there is another alternative. We can, and probably will, continue to rely for planning and coordination upon a makeshift system of field committees and inter-agency basin committees. But McKinley has demonstrated that there is a better way.

C. Herman Pritchett.

University of Chicago.

Morality and Administration in Democratic Government. By Paul H. Appleby. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press. 1952. Pp. xiii, 261. $4.00.)

This is a rewarding book for the serious and sophisticated reader. Originating in lectures given to a university audience, it takes for granted a substantial knowledge of government and politics, and goes on to the discussion of morality and administration with a minimum of description. The author is concerned chiefly with the big moral problem of protecting and promoting the public interest, rather than with the moral failures of individuals so well publicized in recent years, which he is sure are both relatively rare and relatively petty, when seen in perspective. The first half of the book is deliberately general and abstract, with few graphic examples; and it avoids reference to personalities

or specific situations. In the later chapters, however, Dean Appleby returns more to the direct and vivid style to which his readers are accustomed, and gets down to brass tacks in discussing the responsibilities of officialdom. In fact, the word "responsibility" might have been substituted for "morality" in the title of the book without making it less accurate. The book is at its best in discussing specific responsibilities of administrators.

Among the points developed in the essays, some of them recurrently, are the following:

1. The moral problem of public officials and the "performance of government" can be understood only in the context of American life.

2. This context is a pluralistic world of many organizations, interests, and special publics which have somewhat lower moral ideals than society seems to set for democratic government.

3. The big moral problem of government in a democratic order is to defend and further the public interest amid the striving of these many special publics which operate with much narrower moral horizons.

4. The responsibility for defending the public interest falls too exclusively on administrators. Legislators, political leaders, and others outside the ranks of administration center their attention on administrators and ignore their own irresponsible behavior. Even the judiciary is concerned most of the time with issues much narrower than the public interest.

5. Where there is "good administration," administrators collectively do a remarkably effective job in protecting the public interest and in containing the particular pressures which would skew public policy and warp the individual official. The analysis of the interdependence of administrative organization and morality in the national government is one of the strong sections of the book.

6. Among the threats to the effectiveness of administration in carrying its heavy moral responsibility is the public's tendency to misunderstand, ignore, and violate the principle of organizational integrity through hierarchy. The peril of government is not centralized power but such loss of unity that in its uncoordinated parts it becomes the captive of special interests, thus destroying the moral ideal which is at the heart of democracy.

Many readers will wish that the author had developed more fully some of the ideas presented. For example the tendency to resort to formalism, which at times approximates an escape from reality rather than a resolution of its problems, is treated at several points in the volume in a penetrating way. It is argued for example that the ideal of "due process" depends chiefly upon "good administration," not the courts. The restrained remarks on the retreat from reality which is involved in the current "security" ritual are in the same vein. And there is still briefer reference to the peril of formalism in the civil service system. Fuller attention to the problem of formalism would be appropriate, also, since without it the emphasis of the essays upon organization and structure seems somewhat mechanistic.

Perhaps it is inevitable that an author who knows American politics and administration so well, would, in his own approach, reflect some of the features of American life which he challenges. Although Dean Appleby argues that both

causes and cures for moral problems are largely in other hands than administrators', he too gives most of his attention to administrators and their problems. He argues the importance of context but does not examine it closely. The high moral standards of American democracy are a product of ideas as well as circumstances, and most of the author's wide audience would welcome his analysis of them. Nor is attention given to the role of personality and individual leadership in the dynamic pluralism of organized America. Such deficiencies of a short book are of course inherent in its shortness, and the reviewer mentions them only to express the hope that the author will pick up the threads of his story and go on with it. This small volume is a contribution to the understanding of government; but it is a segment rather than the statement of a rounded theory of democratic government.

GEORGE A. GRAHAM.

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Congress at Work. By STEPHEN K. BAILEY AND HOWARD SAMUEL. (New York: Henry Holt and Company. 1952. Pp. x, 502. $3.50.)

This volume consists of a series of case studies or stories of the operation of Congress, presented in a lively, highly readable, and penetrating style. The two authors have enjoyed unusual opportunities to observe at first hand Congress at work, and have succeeded in portraying its dynamic quality, the struggle of forces and personalities which is an essential part of the legislative process. Professor Bailey, whose earlier work on *Congress Makes a Law* attracted wide attention and recognition, served for a period as legislative aide to Senator Benton, and has been a student of the legislative process in Congress for a number of years; Mr. Samuel has served as a staff member of the Washington office of a national organization, whose duties have enabled him to keep in close touch with legislative matters.

Each of the case studies is based not alone on the printed record, but also upon numerous interviews with the leading actors—members of Congress and their staffs, executive officers and employees, White House aides, correspondents, lobbyists, and others. The details of each story have been selected with such nice discrimination that the authors have succeeded in depicting the major aspects of the work of Congress within 500 pages. The volume is comparable to the case studies of public administration published this year by the Inter-University Case Program (*Public Administration and Policy Development: A Case Book.* Edited by Harold Stein. New York: Harcourt Brace and Company.)

Although the volume is in no sense a treatise on Congress, the authors state frankly at the outset their points of view. Thereafter they confine themselves to describing the workings of Congress and the forces inside and out of Congress influencing the legislative process, without attempting to pass judgment on men or measures, or the functioning of Congress as an institution. Yet the very selection of materials, as the authors are careful to state, indicates a point of view which is critical of Congress on two counts: (1) the power exercised by concurrent minorities, and (2) the inability of Congress to concentrate on major policy issues. The authors point out, however, not only the great importance of Congress today, but also the fact that at times it has performed its tasks

with amazing skill. With these points of view the reviewer finds himself in entire agreement. The authors contend that before Congress can be reformed agreement must be reached on what its proper function is in the middle of the twentieth century. In answer to this question they suggest tentatively and briefly that Congress should: (1) divest itself of a lot of "mean and petty" business, (2) establish responsible means for determining its legislative agenda, and (3) deal only with those "core elements of public policy that are understandable and explainable to a sovereign public" (p. 10). The reviewer regrets that these points are not discussed and developed somewhere in the volume.

The first case study describes the election of two members of the House and one Senator, and tells briefly in each instance about the candidate, his district, the organization, appeals, and maneuvers of the campaign, and something of what it cost to be elected. A later chapter traces a typical day of each of these three members during a session of Congress. The description of the organization of the office of Senator Lehman, with its staff of 25 persons who handle the large volume of mail, take care of requests, and conduct research on legislative matters, write speeches, reports, etc., will be amazing to some readers. Few students have any real comprehension of the large volume of official business handled by the office of a Senator from a large state. Half of Senator Lehman's staff, it may be noted, are paid out of his own pocket.

The account of the opening of Congress in 1949 pictures the organization, the struggle over committee assignments, the three presidential messages, and other incidents. The description of the fight to curb the House Rules Committee unfortunately is so brief that it fails to give the story adequately, and no mention is made of the fact that two years later the amendment to the rules was rescinded.

One of the most brilliant chapters of the book deals with "pork'—the Rivers and Harbors and Flood Control Act of 1950. Here the story is told of the close relations of the Corps of Engineers and Congress, the power of the Rivers and Harbors Congress, headed by Senator McClellan of Arkansas, the ineffective role of the Bureau of the Budget in heading off uneconomic projects, and the valiant but futile attempt by Senator Douglas in a one man fight against "pork." Speaking of Senator Douglas' fight, Senator Lister Hill of Alabama exclaimed: "If there was ever a case of a Don Quixote charging windmills, this is it" (p. 190).

Other chapters deal with congressional patronage, private bills, Senator Norris and the T.V.A. Act, pressures and lobbies, investigations, appropriations, tax measures, treaties, the Taft-Hartley Act and its veto. Each chapter contains a brief but excellent prefatory note indicating the significant features of the case study, which will be highly useful to the student.

The book is admirably suited as a text or supplementary text for courses dealing with Congress and the legislative process, and is a "must" both for the teacher and the student in such courses.

JOSEPH P. HARRIS.

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The Future of American Politics. By SAMUEL LUBELL. (New York: Harper and Bros. 1952. Pp. viii, 285. $3.50.)

Parts of this book have been so much quoted and paraphrased that they are already widely known. The author, moreover, has been highly honored by the American Political Science Association. He received, *in absentia*, the Woodrow Wilson Foundation Award for 1952, on nomination by a committee of the Association.

Mr. Lubell does not wear his political heart upon his sleeve, but he does make it clear (pp. 25–26) that he thinks we are in a crisis: "The overhanging threat of war requires a strengthening of the Presidency. . . . Yet, domestically, the prevailing political currents are directed at weakening Presidential power. . . . So torn and divided is the established majority that the compromise of mutual frustration is the only harmony its clashing elements can find. Yet, there is no party realignment in sight which promises to bring a new majority into existence."

The major part of the book reflects a sustained effort to understand eight forces in American politics which the author considers of prime importance: (1) The coming of age of the urban minorities; (2) a new middle class; (3) the Negro in restless migration; (4) in the South, the pressure for political unification with the rest of the nation; (5) the frustrations of isolationism among certain ethnic groups; (6) farmers who remember the depression; (7) the changing politics of organized labor; and (8) the impact of the cold war. Each of the first seven topics is the subject of a readable chapter. In each case, the object is to show its relationships to the coalition that has supported the presidency since 1936, to the deadlocks that have increasingly characterized that coalition, and to the heightened tensions of the cold war.

Most of the treatment is non-quantitative, although the author professes to have examined many statistics. Relative importances are not fully clarified. But the analysis is perceptive, quotable, and stimulating. It seems particularly significant as a contribution to the study of urban politics in a country wherein the urban population is increasing at the rate of 1,500,000 or more annually.

The concluding part of the book is in effect a plea for a political realignment which the author himself considers "foolhardy to predict." He looks to the time when an effective majority will again be created. He thinks it may not come for a decade. Meanwhile, we may have a "politics of twilight, with the Democratic sun on the wane . . . " This seems to imply that the new majority party, built according to the specifications of the "new theory of political parties," will be a reconstructed Republican party, taken over and revitalized by the new middle class, including the middle class of the urban South, that is now so frustrated with the Democratic party and yet so reluctant to leave it. At the same time, the author sees no prospect—unless it be inflation—of changing the existing political stratification that firmly attaches the lower income urban groups to the Democratic party (pp. 216, 256). He leaves unanswered the question as to whether the Democratic party could be pushed into a continuing minority status if it retains the affections of those groups in an increasingly urbanized economy.

Obviously we should not blame Mr. Lubell for the paradoxes and inconsistencies that exist in nature. Perhaps the future will seem more clear on November 5; this is being written in October. But I suspect that parts of this book will be worth pondering for a long time to come. This may be particularly true after the new Administration's honeymoon, if it has one, is over.

PAUL T. DAVID.

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Judicial Legislation; A Study in American Legal Theory. By FRED V. CAHILL, JR. (New York: Ronald Press. 1952. Pp. ix, 164. $4.00.)

The subtitle of this book is somewhat misleading, since this is not primarily a study *in* American legal theory but is rather a critique of American theories of the judicial function with particular reference to the standards of judgment and the scope of judicial discretion. The two chronological benchmarks which largely delimit the focus of the study are 1860 and 1937. This period, according to Mr. Cahill, is the epoch of the judicially formulated Constitution, during which industrialization came of age in the United States and the judiciary retarded the necessary readjustment of legal norms to the changed economic and social facts of life. He warns, however, (p. 31) that: "The actual result of the juristic theories of the past seventy or eighty years has been to elevate the courts to an even higher position than that which they held before. Comparative satisfaction with the constitutional changes of the past fifteen years should not conceal the fact that those changes came about by the exercise of the judicial power. Taken together, the constitutional decisions of the period since 1937 give us a new Constitution, but it is a judicially formulated Constitution quite to the same degree as was the one that preceded it. The difference is that such judicial activity now has a theoretical sanction that it did not previously have."

Yet with the exception of his third chapter, which is based primarily on case materials, Cahill is not concerned so much with judicial review as an aspect of judicial legislation as with modern theories of the actual and proper role of judges in non-constitutional adjudication. What is the law? Does the judge discover it or make it? If the latter, does conscious self-recognition of his power induce greater responsibility on his part? Is responsibility to professional standards an acceptable alternative to political responsibility in what purports to be a democratic polity?

These questions are considered at length, but the theorists whom Cahill discusses stop abruptly short from even raising, let alone attempting to answer, the last question, as he himself takes pains to point out. Therefore, Cahill's study does not entail a consideration of the relationship between judicial legislation, administrative legislation, statutory legislation, and constitutional legislation such as one finds in Ernst Freund's *Standards of American Legislation* or James W. Hurst's *The Growth of American Law; The Law Makers*, neither of which is cited in his study. Instead, he focuses his attention almost exclusively upon the necessarily isolated problem of (and the divergent views concerning) the courts conceived, alternatively, as instrumentalities of "The

Law" before which "the government" appears as a party (with, alas, increasing frequency), and as agencies of the government inevitably involved in the formulation as well as the execution of public policy. The views analyzed range from the traditionalist (i.e., conservative, Blackstonian) position which holds that the law is a seamless web of fixed, certain rules discovered and applied by judges who act only as catalysts; through the pragmatism of Holmes, who would retain respect for legal rules but maximize recognition of the discretion of legislative assemblies to change them; to that of the exponents of sociological jurisprudence (Dean Pound, Justice Cardozo, and Chief Justice Stone) who would, at root, have judges interpret and change the legal rules in terms of the needs of contemporary society rather than of the society which gave birth to the initial expression or formulation of the rules.

The major section of the book, however, is devoted to an examination of the heterogeneous theories of the legal realists, whose insistence upon the significance and extent of unstandardized judicial discretion in contemporary adjudication leads them to offer such varying solutions as an acceptance of interstitial judicial legislation and a dependence upon professionalism (Llewellyn), unabashed advocacy of judicial hypocrisy (Thurman Arnold) and reliance upon the super-ego as a curb on the judge who wittingly wields his quantum of political power in handing down each decision (Jerome Frank), and the total codification of law through statutory processes to eliminate the discretion of the judge, other than as an occasional *ad hoc* arbitrator (Fred Rodell). If attainable without the arbitration, as it would ideally be, the latter extreme of legal realism would restore the judge, in theory, to the role of automaton that he has held so long under the traditionalist concept.

In his concluding comments (pp. 156–160), Cahill does undertake to explicate a common focal assumption which the proponents of sociological jurisprudence and legal realism alike ignore: that the concept of the judge as "social engineer" is anomalous in the frame of reference of democratic theory. It may be suggested that the stock checks-and-balances relied upon for the control of administrative expertise are judicial review and the superintendence of legislative committees; the former remedy is available for the control of the judicial bureaucracy, but it is patent that neither can apply, under prevailing constitutional mores, to the Supreme Court of the United States. One by-product of modern theories of jurisprudence which countenance an expansion in non-constitutional judicial legislation is, therefore, the largely sublimated question of whether—to say nothing of how—to institutionalize political control over judicial expertise. The legal realists have incidentally destroyed the dichotomy of choice between a government of laws or of men, leaving in its place the question: Which men?

This is a scholarly book, and Mr. Cahill, a conscious stylist who carefully selects *le mot juste*, is subdued in his statements almost to the point of litotes. One might cavil about certain imperfections, such as a noteworthy tendency towards repetition (e.g., in quotations from Llewellyn on the legal realist's attitude towards facts, and his reference to Pound's "queer blindness or willful

perversity," p. 118, n. 8 and p. 144, n. 16); or the author's apparent relish for certain phraseology, such as language which is "more arresting than descriptive" (pp. 77, 157); the citation of the latest printing of earlier works without indicating anywhere the original date of publication (e.g., the citation of what is actually the new preface to the sixth printing of Jerome Frank's *Law and the Modern Mind* as "New York, 1949" on p. 132, n. 44—followed almost immediately by reference to an article by Llewellyn reviewing Frank's book in 31 *Columbia Law Review* 82 (1931), at p. 132, n. 45 and p. 133, n. 49; see also p. 97, n. 2); and the index, which is limited in its usefulness because it is in substance little more than an author index. These are all minor defects, however, and should not detract from the fact that Cahill has made a genuine contribution to the systematic analysis of the epistemology of the judicial process. It is encouraging that such a venture should come from a political scientist.

GLENDON A. SCHUBERT, JR.

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Thomism and Aristotelianism; A Study of the Commentary by Thomas Aquinas on the Nicomachean Ethics. By HARRY V. JAFFA. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1952. Pp. viii, 230. $5.00.)

In happier days, it was necessary to make no apology for writing a serious book on Aristotle, St. Thomas, or the relation between the two. In particular, a competent demonstration, like the present, of the utter incongruity between the two authors would have claimed attention on its own merits. But today, it appears, no book is justified except as a weapon in the cold war. Dr. Jaffa has related his book to the international crisis by a rather involved argument. The positivism of our social science has no answer to a system of thought, like the Marxist, which fuses fact and value. Thomistic Aristotelianism purports to supply a scientific method of establishing values; but this system is fundamentally theological and is therefore unacceptable to many persons. The purported reliance of Aquinas upon Aristotle has led those who reject St. Thomas to reject Aristotle also. But if it can be shown that St. Thomas was a bad Aristotelian, Aristotle will be relieved of the clerical stigma; and the way will be opened for a reappraisal of Aristotle. This book attempts no such reappraisal; its purpose is only to make the examination of Aristotle's system a plausible undertaking. Perhaps, from such an examination, there may emerge "convictions that reasonable men, and men of good will, in all lands, can be brought to share." So faint and defenseless a hope deserves the charity of forbearance.

As a matter of fact, however, the book has a timeliness which the author does not mention. In view of the current vogue of Neo-Thomism, and the multiplying attempts to establish a "western" political philosophy extending from Aristotle through Aquinas to Jefferson and Truman, a painstaking examination of the foundations of Thomism is badly needed. With a care which at times approaches the meticulous aridity of scholasticism, Dr. Jaffa has appraised the soundness of Aquinas' *Commentary* on the *Ethics*.

Choosing the two authors' treatments of courage and magnanimity as test

cases, he shows that St. Thomas distorted the specific teachings of Aristotle and misrepresented the entire plan of the *Ethics*. These are not casual errors: they were forced upon St. Thomas by the necessity of Christianizing Aristotle. Turning then to two major problems, the conceptions of manhood and of natural justice in the two authors, Dr. Jaffa shows the gulf between Christian and pagan teachings. This is really the purpose of the book and it is successfully achieved.

There is no examination of the systematic teaching of Aristotle. The author reports his conviction that the *Ethics* is organized in terms of a ripening moral insight. The teachings which appear early in the book are suited to the untutored understanding; as the reader is led along toward enlightenment, the earlier teachings are displaced rather than contradicted by the later. A very similar thesis, much less flattering to Aristotle, might be offered. He begins with the moral terms of common speech, and undertakes to systematize them. But it is not true that there is a philosophy implicit in common speech. Consequently the intellectualization of the vulgar vocabulary yields principles which repudiate their own foundations, and at the same time fail to harmonize with other principles. Dr. Jaffa believes that Aristotle mounts to higher levels, kicking away the rungs of the ladder as he ascends. To this reviewer, the *Ethics* is a radically incoherent book the fragments of which lie in a welter of confusion. This is not to say, however, that there are no central ideas which can be taken as representative of Aristotle. Dr. Jaffa has explored some of these, and has shown their fundamental variance from the teachings of Aquinas. Thus he has shown that secular Thomism is a contradiction in terms. A very large number of people would profit from reading his book.

FRANCIS D. WORMUTH.

University of Utah.

Hobbes and His Critics; A Study in Seventeenth Century Constitutionalism. BY JOHN BOWLE. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1952. Pp. 215. $2.75.)

Political theorists have for long been aware that Hobbes' political thought was severely attacked, forthrightly criticized, and partially answered by a host of polemicists during his own life time and the succeeding generations. Yet, one or two thinkers and statesmen apart, the critics have generally remained at most bare names to all save the specialist: their tomes and pamphlets have stayed unread, and the content and cogency of their arguments has been a matter of idle curiosity. For they have enjoyed collectively the orally transmitted reputation of triviality or of impotence. Hitherto, they were held variously controversialists on behalf of conventional opinion, partisans seeking place and influence, or honest men whose good will far exceeded their intellectual powers. All were minnows in the presence of Leviathan.

In our own day the insecurity of constitutional government, the use of emergency powers, the frequent primacy of the executive, and the appeal and repulsion of dictatorships have together conspired to give Hobbes' teaching renewed relevance alike as the most profound philosophic foundation for forceful government over and on behalf of man in society, and as devastating analy-

sis of the psychological and metaphysical bases of human behavior, and of the resultant generation, use, and avoidance of power. In part as a consequence of the current situation, philosophic students of thought have in recent decades subjected Hobbes' ideas to an exhaustive critical examination such as they had not previously received. They have emphasized the depth and scope of his thought, his basic concern with the very fundaments of man's being and fate, with the means as well as the nature of his knowing and acting in the world. Such philosophic concern constituted the foundations of a political philosophy which was in intent and fact the drawing out of the consequence and implications of a much broader inquiry than was reflected in Hobbes' more normally emphasized concern for the attainment of internal peace by imposed order. It is this scope, indeed, which makes his teaching of lasting importance to opponents and proponents of constitutional government alike, and much more and other than a political defense of strong government and unrestrained public power.

Yet, while distance, whether or not it lends enchantment, at least permits disinterested penetration, closeness may give a clearer perception, if not of intent, then at least of impact and consequences. Thought, no doubt, is debased and simplified as it is seized upon by publicists, whether their purpose is to use or to rebut it: the subtleties, and often the intended meaning, of the great creative mind are quite normally lost or perverted in the very process of impact. Nevertheless, the overall tendency of a seminal thinker is normally grasped; and where, as in Hobbes' case, man's nature is demeaned and men's rights are denied, the conclusions reached and the course so forcefully advocated are of even greater moment to mankind, at the time and subsequently, than the brilliant insights and subtle errors on which they depend; though a later day must as in duty bound use the insights and combat, and, if possible, permanently destroy, the errors.

On this thesis, Mr. Bowle's examination of Hobbes' seventeenth century critics is an undertaking of real value. Apart from the indictment by Filmer at the beginning, and by Clarendon towards the end of the period, men both celebrated, though for far different reasons, Bowle examines the anti-Hobbesian works of Rosse, Ward, Lawson, Hunton, Bramhall, Eachard, and Whitehall, all worthies in church, state, or letters in their day, and all serious and forceful critics, whether crabbed or elegant, whether moralists or politicians. He shows that, for all their diversity of purpose and disparity of style; despite their differences on the issue of unrestrained prerogative—absolute monarchy as source of law and embodiment of nation, or monarchy as servant and subject of laws limited in concept even though not formally constitutionalized; and regardless of whether their primary concern was men's morals and religion, or their political allegiance, they shared a common heritage as they foreshadowed a new and different constitutionalism, achieved by continuity in evolution, not by revolution.

Hobbes was the cuckoo in the nest, in ethics as in politics the enemy of tradition-grounded principles. For all his yearning for order, he was at bottom the radical revolutionary. His critics by contrast were the links between three periods and viewpoints: medieval constitutionalism and its rule of law; the

subsequent absolutism which, whatever its divine right teaching, sought national welfare, respected custom, and defended law, even though largely on grounds of expediency rather than principle; and the new constitutionalism of consent and of representation, as it developed from Locke to the present. Whatever the immediate purposes of such critics, not in all cases worthy men, and in most possessed of conventional prejudices, they were at bottom right in their recognition of the danger he represented, not simply to their interests and the transient institutions and passing attachments of their day, but to all securely rooted loyalties and attachments, and to all moral law. Whatever their party labels, they were in this sense, and as against Hobbes, pre-Burkean conservatives (though Bowle does not so make the point) and, for all their limitations, humanely liberal.

The thesis is an interesting one, and, in my judgment, well taken. Moreover, most of the critics made sound and important specific criticisms, and did so not infrequently with elegance, charm, wit, or bite. Yet their virtues cannot disguise their limitations of scope or depth, and their almost uniform lack of serious pretentions to philosophic competence, let alone greatness. Nor, I fear, does Mr. Bowle make the most of them. He gives us facts about their lives, deeds, and writings, sometimes to the point of provoking real interest through a sense of real personalities. He places them. He summarizes, and often quotes, their criticisms and arguments. Indeed, he begins the book with a chapter on who and what they were, something more than a catalogue, yet less than well-wrought miniature biographies or thumbnail sketches. He follows that, too, with a brief statement of Hobbes' position, under the title "Hobbes Reconsidered," which is misleading insofar as it leads to expectation of a new and modern assessment, yet is just and useful in that it does what it ought to do, namely, present Hobbes' thought as his critics, both contemporary and in subsequent generations, saw it, and we are asked to see it. Mr. Bowle's failure is in truth a failure to vitalize: despite some contrary evidences, his *dramatis personae* remain mechanical, labels and hooks with ideas and arguments appended or dependent. I venture the guess that that failure results largely from the mechanics of research and research notes, and their over-use in writing. Since Mr. Bowle has a real thesis, and a conviction, the failure is to be regretted. For the contribution, and the consequent corrective to established interpretations and attitudes, are real and valuable.

THOMAS I. COOK.

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The Rise of Totalitarian Democracy. By J. L. TALMON. (Boston: Beacon Press. 1952. Pp. xi, 366. $4.00.)

This important work is the first of three projected volumes on the subject of totalitarian democracy. The first volume deals with the eighteenth century in France, the second will deal with the nineteenth century in Western Europe, and the third will consider the twentieth century in Eastern Europe. The present work takes up the development of totalitarianism and secular messianism in the period immediately preceding and during the French Revolution. Mr.

Talmon carefully analyzes the theories of those hopeful children of the Enlightenment—Rousseau, Morelly, Mably, Sieyès, Robespierre, Saint-Just, Babeuf, and Buonarroti. The author states his thesis as follows: "This study is an attempt to show that concurrently with the liberal type of democracy there emerged from the same premises in the eighteenth century a trend towards what we propose to call the totalitarian type of democracy. . . . The tension between them has constituted an important chapter in modern history, and has now become the most vital issue of our time." While he finds that much of totalitarian democratic doctrine lay buried in the general pattern of eighteenth-century thought, he points out that a schism took place following the Revolution in France out of which emerged liberal democracy and totalitarian democracy.

The common rationalist faith of the eighteenth century produced a belief in the complete rationality of man, which needed for its operation the elimination of old traditions, institutions, and beliefs that had forced men into an "unnatural" state of existence. All of these had "to be replaced by deliberately planned uniform patterns, which would be natural and rational." This would bring about a situation in which full faith could be placed in the operation of man's reason and which would form the base of an infallible general will of all men for the guidance of men and governments. The drastic liquidation of opponents of the new order during the Terror was but a necessary and effective means of clearing the ground for the new secular heaven to be established on earth. When the large masses turned out to be indifferent to the emerging paradise it became necessary for the enlightened few to interpret for all the new gospel of freedom and equality and to force men into the new paradise. Dictatorship was inevitable, but faith in the coming millennium remained unaltered. With the new political order went a new faith, a new religious order; they would in fact be one and the same, and Rousseau's idea of a civil religion with its special ritual and exercises would be realized. The rationalist idea "suggested a form of social determinism, to which men are irresistibly driven, and which they are bound to accept one day. It just postulated a single valid system, which would come into existence when everything not accounted for by reason and utility had been removed." Not only would the old religious form be done away with but all groupings—societies, guilds—to which men gave some measure of loyalty must be abolished. Nothing must stand between man and the state.

Mr. Talmon does an excellent job in showing the development of totalitarian democracy among the enlightened of the period he considers, but that some of the same ideas remained and still remain in the liberal democratic school he does not indicate. Perhaps he will bring this out in his volume on the nineteenth-century trends.

The tendency in some circles to make of democracy not a political faith but a religion crops up constantly. At the same time among some liberals of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries one finds a tendency to forget the fundamental pluralistic nature of democracy in their suspicion of all apparently strange, deviationist, or dissenting groups. Such people would substitute uniformity for unity in diversity. They would have all educated in the same state schools in

the same way; they would have all people express their religious convictions in the same manner. More serious, however, in the theories of liberal democracy is the acceptance of positivist theories of law that define as true law any regulation of civil authorities. In the state, or in some vague unit called society, lies the power of establishing all norms of justice, beyond which no standards exist. This, too, is democratic totalitarianism, even when masquerading under the title of liberal democracy.

Mr. Talmon has done a noteworthy piece of work, and if his succeeding volumes maintain the high standards of the present work they will constitute a valuable contribution to the field of political theory.

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A History of the League of Nations. By F. P. WALTERS. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1952. 2 vols. Pp. xv, 833. $11.50.)

For some time scholars have been waiting in anticipation the appearance of a comprehensive account of the League of Nations by the former Deputy Secretary-General, F. P. Walters. Financial assistance was provided by the Rockefeller Foundation, and scholarly assistance by the Royal Institute of International Affairs. The book has now appeared: it is a pleasure to record that it is not only authoritative, as was expected, but that it is written in a very interesting and pleasing style. Mr. Walters gives credit to Arthur Sweetser, without whom the book would not have been "begun, continued or completed"; it would be hard to find two men who know more of the League of Nations than these two.

The author has written a history, as the title indicates. It may be further delimited as a political history. As much attention is given to the political factors influencing Members as to the machinery and functioning of the League itself. It is intended as "a narrative clear to the ordinary student" (p. 817); it is not a treatise, in the ordinary connotation of that word; it has few footnotes or citations, none to League documents, no bibliography; it does not go widely into administrative or constitutional problems; it does not burden itself with the paraphernalia of scholarship. It is not the reference work which some might desire. It is addressed not to sentimental supporters of the League of Nations (though they will like it) but on a high level to statesmen and those who study how nations can get along together and why they have failed to do so.

With this understanding, it must be said that Mr. Walters has done a superb job. The writing is amazingly compact; there are many pregnant sentences, penetrating brief characterizations, vignettes of persons, paragraphs which explain such things, for example, as "the Geneva atmosphere" (p. 296). He distributes condemnations openly and fairly, gently or severely, but never in a nasty tone, and always with well-balanced judgment. This record shows that, in terms of building a world of peace and cooperation, the United States and the United Kingdom were probably the least helpful; both peoples should read this book and ponder its lessons.

The two volumes, continuously paged, are divided into five parts: "The Making of the League" (80 pp.); "The Years of Growth" (to 1924—175 pp.);

"The Years of Stability" (to 1931—200 pp.); "The Years of Conflict" (to 1936—234 pp.); and "The Years of Defeat" (116 pp.). The theme is stated in the opening sentence, quoted from Woodrow Wilson: "A living thing is born." Though it was based on past development, the League was revolutionary in its "forward leap of unprecedented extent and speed"; it can never again be doubted, Mr. Walters says, that the community of nations "has the moral and legal right to judge the international conduct of its members." Morality and legality, League of Nations and United Nations, are looked upon with contempt in recent books by Morganthau and Kennan; this reviewer hopes that the statesmen of the United Nations will choose to learn from Mr. Walters and the lessons of the League.

It was a weakness of the League that it was so much derived from passionate sentiment and not always based on understanding. The author regards with special favor, among the serious studies leading to the establishment of the League, Norman Angell's *Great Illusion*, J. S. Woolf's *International Government*, and Jan Smuts' *The League of Nations: a Practical Suggestion*. The role of the Covenant (ch. 5) is regarded as more extensive than that of the constitution of any state; the Members, he asserts, tried to live up to it as the supreme authority. The defection of the United States (ch. 6) was calamitous, but the decision of others to go ahead with the League of Nations was proven justifiable.

For a time, the Council was the League; it had numerous problems of establishment, and was criticised as neglecting the primary function of peace. "The flame of hope fell low," but was revived when the First Assembly met in "the grey little town of Geneva." Harding had been elected and had pronounced the League dead; the British were indifferent; the French were interested only in execution of the Treaty of Versailles. But the small states took over, seeking to obliterate the war-made divisions of Europe; in one session, the Assembly became the central organ. It was a poverty-stricken institution, without even money to send a commission to Manchuria to prevent war, until the disputants themselves paid its expenses. The budget of the League, says Mr. Walters, was subjected to a series of controls for which it would be hard to find a parallel.

Doubtless a parallel could be found in the United Nations, for the penury of nations is as great today, toward the institution which they expect to save and improve humanity! Similar thoughts of comparison appear at many points in this narrative: inability to push forward technical assistance (ch. 28); the idea (of Chamberlain) that the League was only "part of a diplomatic system to be used or not according as convenience might dictate" (p. 339; see also pp. 344–45); statesmen who, like Chicherin, said "Let others bind themselves if they wish; we remain free" (p. 359); the escapist efforts at disarmament; the Iranian oil question, in almost the same words (ch. 47); the ideological division (p. 703); nothing so striking as the failure to build up during the fat years reserves of strength for the lean years.

The Great Depression of 1929 began the decline of the League. It exacerbated every dispute, gave control to militarists, inflated nationalism, made statesmen uncertain. The numerous forces at work during this period are covered competently: the French, fearful of Germany and of security in general;

the British "inglorious policy of doing nothing and hoping for the best" (p. 275); the United States with its head buried in the sands of neutrality, each step by Mussolini or Hitler unchecked; failure to make use of the membership of the Soviet Union; and hundreds of other items leading up to the chapter headed "The Assembly Abandons the Covenant." "Ceaselessly attacked by the Axis, progressively abandoned by the democracies, the League had been deprived of all the powers by which its founders had hoped to make of it the guardian of the world's peace. Without a complete reconversion to the principles of collective security on the part of Britain, France and the United States, these powers could not be revived" (p. 782).

On April 19, 1946, the League of Nations ceased to exist. The complicated process of transferring its functions to the United Nations is not described here, but Mr. Walters insists that continuity remained unbroken.

The reviewer has not found sensational revelations in this work, but much illumination has been added; many details round out the picture. One understands better such matters as the Corfu crisis (1923), or the admission of Germany or the Soviet Union, or such persons as Stresemann, or Sir John Simon, or Avenol. The author has a gift for compact summarization, as demonstrated in the introductory chapter, the statement of the purposes of the League (p. 563), chapter 16 on "The Structure of the League," and the chapters on disarmament. There are many apparently trivial or incidental comments which lead into significant thoughts. The comment upon the Council Chamber of the new Palais des Nations reminds one of the remarks by Paul Hasluck concerning the Security Council room at Lake Success (*Workshop of Security* [Melbourne and London, 1948], pp. 143–145); and this leads into speculations as to the purposes of such a room. Is it a place, as Walters says, for "quick and spontaneous discussion" (p. 699), or should it be equipped for press and television? To the League, the press was "*the* legitimate channel of information" (Egon F. Ranshofen-Wertheimer, *The International Secretariat* [Washington, 1945], p. 207).

Mr. Walters has written a compelling narrative, which builds up the story so that one wishes to continue reading it. It is written on personal authority with little evidence offered; but the authority of the writer is great. One may disagree with some statements in this tone of authority: e.g., that the "system of Permanent Delegations was of no serious significance" (p. 199); or that "the veto of Brazil would have been impossible" had the United States been in the Council when Germany was admitted (p. 322). The sweep of the whole performance absorbs such small criticism. It is a masterly work which, within its purposes, will not be superseded.

CLYDE EAGLETON.

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The American Approach to Foreign Policy. By DEXTER PERKINS. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1952. Pp. 195. $3.00.)

This is a thought-provoking analysis of the motives and direction of American foreign policy as well as of its principles and practice. It has been written

by one of our leading authorities on American diplomatic history, and had its origin in a series of lectures given at the University of Uppsala under the Gottesman Foundation.

Its purpose is to demonstrate that American foreign policy, taken as a whole, has been peaceful and non-imperialistic, rather than the opposite as some of its critics have argued. While recognizing that the United States has had its period of imperialism during the first two decades of this century, and that there were times during the nineteenth century period of expansion, notably in the events leading up to the Mexican War, when the action of the United States was provocative, Professor Perkins suggests that these are not typical of American foreign policy as a whole. In general, he feels that "the American people have been rather slow to anger," and "have never directly plotted aggression" as did Hitler in the 1930's or the Soviet Union in 1939 against Poland (pp. 86–87). Whenever they established control over other people, they did so "with an uneasy conscience" (pp. 32, 76–78), and with a feeling that those people should be prepared as soon as possible for self-government. Imperialism was not an end in itself, as it had been so often in the case of the European powers, but only a "passing phase" in the development of the weaker nations towards genuine independence. Moreover, when in the mid-1930's the United States renounced the right to use force to intervene in Latin America, it was taking a step unprecedented for a state so powerful. During the last twenty years, in Professor Perkins' judgment, United States policy "has been an example almost without precedent in abstention from policies of force in relation with weaker states" (p. 38).

The author has drawn extensively on his rich knowledge of American diplomatic history to support his conclusions. His approach is topical rather than chronological. After examining in the second chapter the extent of imperialism in American foreign policy, he analyzes the influence of capitalism on American foreign policy (Ch. 3), the moralistic influences on this policy (Ch. 4), and the American public attitudes towards war and peace (Chs. 5 and 6). Incidentally, there is a good analysis of the validity of the Marxian interpretation of foreign policy on pages 58–62.

While recognizing and respecting the weight of Professor Perkins' evidence, one cannot but feel that he tends to justify American policies more than would some other students of the subject, and does not adequately examine the reasons why a good many thoughtful non-Communists in both Asia and Europe are disturbed over some of the recent trends in American foreign policy. He relies heavily, for example, on the fact that the United States has renounced the right of armed intervention in the affairs of other states and has taken positive steps towards granting self-government to the peoples of the Philippines, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands, as well as of postwar Germany and Japan. He does not, however, consider fully the question of whether the United States in recent years may have substituted the use of economic and political power for military power in dealing with weaker states. The State Department's pressure against Argentina from 1943-1947, for example, is only briefly mentioned, and there is no reference to the question of whether in the United Nations the

United States may have employed various kinds of indirect pressure on the smaller powers in order to secure their votes for policies we deemed desirable.

The book apparently went to press before the enactment of the Mutual Security Act of 1951, but its general conclusions do not adequately prepare the reader for the adverse reactions in Asia and the Middle East to American efforts to make its economic and military aid conditional upon broad cooperation with American military policy. Nor does it explain the desire of European groups like the Bevanites in Great Britain to have a foreign policy which will be more independent of the United States. The real test of Professor Perkins' conclusions will be how a well-informed and fair-minded Asiatic, Latin American or African reacts to his interpretation.

But it is the debatable points like these which make the book stimulating to the student of American foreign policy. It will be invaluable to those who wish to supplement a systematic survey of American foreign policy with a challenging analysis of the objectives and purposes of that policy. It is a study which should be read alongside Morgenthau's *In Defense of the National Interest* or Kennan's *American Diplomacy, 1900–1950*. Although not intended primarily to deal with the processes of foreign policy formulation, it also contains two chapters near the end which discuss the role of the executive, the Congress and public opinion, and which admirably summarize the main features and problems of the American constitutional framework for handling foreign affairs.

ELTON ATWATER.

Pennsylvania State College.

Red Flag in Japan; International Communism in Action, 1919–1951. By RODGER SWEARINGEN AND PAUL LANGER. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1952. Pp. xii, 276. $5.00.)

This is an interesting, crisply written, historical and analytical study of the Communist party in Japan. One-third of the book covers developments in "Imperial Japan"—as the authors rather surprisingly distinguish pre-postwar Japan; the remainder deals with "Postwar Japan." The chapters are admirably succinct and excellently organized to identify and clarify the salient aspects of the subject. The authors include five former Japanese Communists among their benefactors; undoubtedly these men contributed notably to the freshness and authenticity of the study. The book is scholarly but will be read with pleasure and understanding by laymen.

The authors find that Japan has been a serious focus of Soviet Communist evangelism since 1918. Evidence of Comintern midwifery at the Japanese party's birth, though slight, is accepted as proof sufficient by the authors. Little evidence is available, apparently, upon pre-Bolshevik evolution of Communism in Japan—surely a highly important aspect of the authors' problem. Japanese Marxists appear to have been aided rather than originally inspired by Moscow, but the amount and direction of the aid were highly influential in directing their course.

Included among the features of postwar renascence, flowering and at least

outward fading of the Kyosanto are an all-too-brief description of party organization, vignettes of leaders and of typical converts, a sketch of the political, economic and social program, and a survey of strategy and tactics used in appealing to urban and rural workers as such and to intellectuals, women, young people, children and minority groups, particularly the Koreans. The shift in 1950, from espousal of parliamentarism to complete acceptance of international Communism's demand for direct action and for separatism from occupational policies and procedures, is explained, as are subsequent rivalries within the party and relations with Soviet, Chinese and Korean Communists. The study is concluded with an account of recent anti-communist activities in Japan, both public and private.

The authors give some attention to postwar conditions promotive of sympathy toward Communism in Japan but refrain from analysis and evaluation of the attitudes shown and measures taken by SCAP and Japanese conservative cabinets to alleviate conditions. They conclude, however, that: "Whether Communism will be victorious in Japan will hinge in some measure on international developments, but above all it will depend on the extent to which the future government of Japan will show itself superior to its prewar predecessors in solving the pressing social and economic problems of the nation" (p. 252).

This reviewer found few errors of fact, none of importance to the main theme. The suffrage for Diet elections in 1928 was not, comprehensively, "adult male" (p. 27); only formally is it true of the Japanese Emperor that ". . . only with his approval were decisions made" (p. 125); the expression "Communist sympathizer," may be acceptable grammatically but it is not a model of definiteness. A question may, perhaps, be raised as to the validity of the authors' apparent premise that the inevitable agreement in ideology of Communists, wherever found, warranted exclusion of any serious treatment of Japanese Communist theory. It is, moreover, apparent that exhaustive research in Communist historical records, biographies, etc., and in Japanese Home Office and police files—one of the outstanding features of this study—did not, in every instance, provide adequate data for conscientious conclusions. For example, the degree of "Communist control" of labor organizations remains to be determined. The authors do not claim definitiveness for their work but they have contributed notably to our knowledge and understanding.

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Central and Local Government; Financial and Administrative Relations. By D. N. CHESTER. (London and New York: The Macmillan Co. 1951. Pp. ix, 421. $6.00.)

The Finance of Local Government; England and Wales. By J. M. DRUMMOND. (New York: The Macmillan Co. 1952. Pp. vii, 206. $4.50.)

Along with considerable triumphs, British socialism has its ironies. One is that the victory of a doctrine which proposed to bring control over the social

order closer to the people seems in some respects to have failed to close the gap, and in some ways even to have appreciably widened it. This doubt is raised by the case of the nationalized industries. It is made acute by that of local government, whose continuing loss of functions and independence to Whitehall has called forth the impassioned message of Mr. Chester's book.

In his opening chapters he discusses the non-financial powers of central departments, including the new powers added since the war. The bulk of the book, however, is devoted to a detailed and painstaking analysis of the powers and effects flowing from various types of Exchequer grant, which, he holds, is the principal instrument of central domination. The upshot of this scholarly analysis is a criticism that would be hard to match in vehemence even among the utterances of the fairly large number of people in Britain today who are deeply disturbed by what they regard as overcentralization. Mr. Chester is suspicious of a school of thought which, he says, has adherents in Whitehall and which, he believes, wishes "to get rid of local government by transferring education, police and other major services to a central Department and for the rest turning Local Authorities into agents of Whitehall." He is alarmed by "the trend in central-local relations" which in his opinion has weakened local democracy and "has undoubtedly made it easier to introduce a dictatorship by legal and constitutional means." These are not the exaggerations of a polemical conservative; Mr. Chester is himself a member of the Fabian Society.

Not the least merit of the book is Mr. Chester's reclassification of the various types of grants. Instead of using the conventional headings—"unit," "percentage," "block," etc.—he distinguishes grants according to whether they are conditional or unconditional; specific or general; fixed or variable in relation to volume of service; and whether they are distributed on a uniform basis or according to the means and needs of localities. Analysis of how various types of grant are well- or ill-suited to certain purposes—for instance, the utility of the specific, variable grant in encouraging a new service—and estimation of the effects of grants upon local autonomy are considerably assisted by this scheme. And in developing the possibilities of the types and combinations of types, Mr. Chester has contributed not only to our understanding of central-local relations in England and Wales, but also to what he calls "the international body of administrative knowledge." Yet his emphasis on deductive analysis, while making it easier to convert the lessons of British experience into a form that is relevant to similar problems in other countries, has meant that he has devoted less attention than one might wish to illustrating how certain grants have actually affected the relations of specific local authorities and specific central departments in recent years.

There is need for such up-to-date, factual information if the reader is to assess certain of Mr. Chester's judgments, such as that upon the Exchequer Equalisation Grant, a "general, variable, means" grant, inaugurated by the Local Government Act of 1948. Successor to the General Exchequer Contribution of 1929, which in prewar years covered more than a fifth of total expenditure by local authorities, this grant provides generous assistance to the poorer

localities. It has in Mr. Chester's judgment the "major defect" of being "a variable grant of the kind which experience has conclusively shown involves the most detailed kinds of control."

If, on the other hand, we consult Mr. Drummond's lucid introduction to local government finance, we are given a less gloomy view of this particular grant and of the grant system in general. Himself a borough treasurer, Mr. Drummond does not find that the Exchequer Equalisation Grant has extended central control. Its defect being in his eyes its failure to provide general aid for all authorities, he concludes that once this is remedied the grant promises to solve the problem of extending central assistance "without undermining the independence of the local authorities and their sense of financial responsibility."

With the proportion of local government expenditure met from grants running around fifty per cent and showing signs of further increase, there can hardly be doubt, however, that local autonomy will be severely circumscribed. The trend to centralization is not new, nor does it date from the Labor victory of 1945. Professor Robson sounded the alarm more than twenty years ago. But there are compulsions in the British situation that make it difficult to see how the trend could be reversed. The creation of larger units of local government, desirable as that may be, will not of itself, as Mr. Chester points out, greatly fortify the independence of these units. His own plea for additional independent sources of revenue, however, also fails to meet the objections, as, for instance, they are set out by Mr. Drummond. As more aspects of government action become subjects of national policy, must not central control follow? Central planning of fiscal policy, for one thing, entails comprehensive control over local as well as central expenditure. Nor does it seem that local variety can be tolerated when the public, and not simply the centralizers of Whitehall, demand national uniformity in the services provided by government. The forces of "bureaucratization," to which British socialism itself has had to conform, are working against local democracy.

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The California Progressives. By GEORGE E. MOWRY. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 1951. Pp. xi, 349. $6.00.)

Boss Ruef's San Francisco; The Story of the Union Labor Party, Big Business, and the Graft Prosecution. By WALTON BEAN. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 1952. Pp. xii, 345. $5.00.)

At the turn of the century California Progressives revolted against control of state and local governments by the political-economic combination, headed by the Southern Pacific Railroad Company. Reform victories in Los Angeles and San Francisco in 1906 were followed by the organization, in August, 1907, of the League of Lincoln-Roosevelt Republican Clubs. Hiram W. Johnson was elected governor in 1910 and comprehensive reform legislation was enacted.

Closely identified with the national progressive movement from its inception, the California State Progressive Party was formed in December, 1913.

Progressive leaders, few in number, were mainly urban journalists, attorneys, and independent businessmen, of the upper middle class, young, well-educated, "literate and historically minded." Republican insurgents, extremely individualistic, they attacked privilege, corruption, and politically organized capital, labor, and socialism. Sharp personal conflicts among the leaders developed. Centering around the character and ambitions of Hiram Johnson, the discussion of these rivalries and of the "progressive mind" is a notable feature of Mowry's book.

The Progressives failed to eliminate corporation influence, to widen economic opportunities for the masses, and to solve the labor problem. But they did rout corruption, provide decent government, introduce an "ethical yardstick" into public affairs, and give to the people effective instruments for control of government.

Based on original sources, Professor Mowry's book is a complete history of the movement from 1900 to 1920. It is well organized, well written, and the commentary is objective. Historians and political scientists will find it an indispensable work.

Like many American cities, San Francisco, in 1900, had boss and machine rule. The standard techniques of graft and corruption were employed—bribery, extortion, patronage, protection of vice and crime, sale of influence and favors.

Boss Ruef, through the new Union Labor Party, dominated city affairs in alliance with corporate and other privilege-seeking interests. Opposing them was a small but able group of "Graft Hunters"—Older, Spreckels, Heney, and Burns—the latter two on leave from the federal government. Begun in October, 1906, year of the earthquake and fire, the graft prosecution relentlessly fought to convict the bribe takers and the bribe givers, with only partial success. An attempted assassination of prosecutor Heney failed and Hiram W. Johnson concluded the trials. Machine power was broken, Ruef went to the penitentiary, but not a single corporation executive shared his fate. Leaders of the prosecution joined with others in the state to form the progressive movement and to elect Hiram Johnson governor in 1910.

Professor Bean presents a lively narrative of the dramatic clash of personal, political, and economic interests in San Francisco during the first decade of the century. Effectively using the voluminous record of the trials, appeals, and other contemporary sources, the book has factual detail and also recognition of the broad implications of the struggle. A significant case study, it illustrates the difficulties of reform but demonstrates also that the citizenry, when united and properly led, can secure honest government.

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BOOK NOTES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

The Federal Taxing Process. By Roy Blough. (New York: Prentice-Hall. 1952. Pp. x, 506. $5.00.)

This book fills an important gap in the literature of public finance. The author served for a number of years as head of the then Division of Tax Research in the Treasury Department, and in this capacity participated in and observed the process of tax policy formulation in both the Administration and the Congress. The federal taxing process is examined in all its elements, such as the nature of the "public interest," the role of pressure groups, the influence of the expert, the shaping of the Administration's tax program, the nature of congressional action, the role of revenue administration and of the courts, and the economic effects of revenue measures. Omitted here are the canons of taxation and a set of absolute guiding principles. The author does not attempt to tell us what the federal tax system should be; he does an excellent job of telling us how it got to be what it is.

To Blough, tax policy is a political process, and it is the responsibility of the experts who are involved to make this process work more effectively. Further, taxation is an instrument for the stabilization and regulation of the economy, and must therefore serve the requirements of the broader goals of public policy. This permits, for example, no legalistic barriers which separate the tax power from the police power; taxation is inherently regulatory in character.

Students of public administration will be particularly interested in the discussion of decision-making in tax policy, and the role of the expert therein (Ch. VI). The author examines the various points in the process at which expertise is employed, discusses the difference between effective and ineffective experts, and traces some causal factors in experts' feelings of frustration. The role of discretion in administration, as exercised by the Bureau of Internal Revenue, also comes in for critical analysis; the author manages to give little comfort to either the Bureau or the beleaguered taxpayer. Also, that select circle known as revenue estimators will find in this volume (Ch. XII) the first comprehensive, albeit generalized, discussion of their art.

This volume should not be regarded as a comprehensive treatment of the economics of taxation. Issues which have dominated recent texts, such as the interrelations between the corporate and the individual income tax, are not examined in a comprehensive fashion. Such problems are mentioned, of course, but in the context designed to reveal their complexity, and the varying attitudes which have been adopted toward their solution. This is not a "technical" book on the economics of taxation. No curvilinear analysis is employed in any discussion of shifting and incidence. Rather, the present volume comes close to occupying that tenuous position discussed in university curriculum committees as the "integration of economics and political science."

This does not mean that the author has forsaken his native discipline. In one passage he refers to economics as ". . . perhaps the most highly developed of the social sciences"! —Jesse Burkhead, *Syracuse University.*

The Political Almanac; 1952. Compiled by George Gallup and the American Institute of Public Opinion Staff. (New York: B. C. Forbes & Sons Publishing Company. 1952. Pp. xv, 317. $5.95.)

The greater part of this book consists of recent election statistics on the presidential, gubernatorial, and congressional races. In his introduction, Dr. Gallup states that the present volume is "an attempt to remedy the deplorable situation pointed out by the Social Science Research Council's committee and by many others who deal with election statistics." He claims with justification that the record of presidential voting as presented in the volume is more complete and more accurate for the years since 1928 than that to be found in any other publication. Much of the material was compiled from original sources; in some cases, the Institute's interviewers were used as agents to obtain it.

It would be easy to suggest further improvements. The most conspicuous omissions are the absence of any data on the composition of state legislatures and on the political complexion of the major city governments. Nevertheless, it must be recognized that we are all in Dr. Gallup's debt for the latest volume in a

series of publications that he initiated in 1946. —PAUL T. DAVID, *Brookings Institution.*

America's Manpower Crisis. EDITED BY ROBERT A. WALKER. (Chicago: Public Administration Service. 1952. Pp. viii, 191. $3.00.)

This report of the Institute on Manpower Utilization and Government Personnel, held at Stanford University in 1951, presents the findings and recommendations and the background papers of the three seminars on Government Policies for Manpower Allocation, the More Effective Utilization of Manpower, and Factors Affecting Administrative Leadership. Brief discussions of "The Present Status of Manpower Mobilization" furnish the necessary introduction to the topics considered by the seminars. Of special significance to political scientists are the papers dealing with executive leadership in government.

Executives for the Federal Service; A Program for Action in Time of Crisis. BY JOHN J. CORSON. (New York: Columbia University Press. 1952. Pp. xii, 91. $1.50.)

In this brief study the author, who is thoroughly familiar with the problem he treats, discusses the difficulties in recruiting competent top-level executives for the federal service and proposes plans for meeting both the immediate crisis and the long-term needs in this regard.

Health Resources in the United States; Personnel, Facilities and Services. BY GEORGE W. BACHMAN AND ASSOCIATES. (Washington: The Brookings Institution. 1952. Pp. xvi, 344. $5.00.)

A review of health progress in the United States since 1900, and a survey of the personnel, facilities and services now available in the health field. Data for this survey were compiled by a staff of experts in health and welfare, assisted by some 700 public and private agencies. A large number of statistical tables are included. It is the first in a series of studies contemplated by the Brookings Institution in the field of health.

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Contains a summary and critical discussion of the significance of advertising and the role of types of advertising media and advertising agencies; of the work of the several federal agencies exercising control over advertising; and of the chief proposals for further control of advertising, by voluntary or government action, both to strengthen older elements in public policy and to prevent the impairment of anti-inflation control efforts.

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Relates the subject of licensure to major public issues. Presents in summary and tabular form state-by-state data on occupations licensed; organization, powers, duties, and financial practices of state licensing agencies; and number of applicants licensed in selected occupations.

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Judicial Review of Legislation in New York, 1906–1938. BY FRANKLIN A. SMITH. (New York: Columbia University Press. 1952. Pp. 251. $3.50.)

A classification and analysis of 451 state statutes sustained and 136 invalidated on constitutional grounds by New York courts between 1906 and 1938. Cases involving municipal ordinances, local laws, and administrative decisions are not included. Judicial review is appraised as neither a "cure for legislative misbehavior" nor an "insuperable obstacle to essential laws."

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A composite of human interest stories about

Woodrow Wilson connected, for the most part, with his Princeton career as professor and president and gleaned largely from the recollections of nearly four hundred Princeton alumni of the classes of 1890–1915.

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A collection of letters of value to the student of administration, politics, and international relations. President Franklin D. Roosevelt's trust in Josephus Daniels was not misplaced.

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FOREIGN AND COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT

Consultation and Co-operation in the Commonwealth; A Handbook on Methods and Practice. By HEATHER J. HARVEY. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1952. Pp. viii, 411. $5.00.)

This "handbook on methods and practice" (an exact description of the scope of the book) is essentially a guide to the anatomy rather than the physiology of the Commonwealth. Yet despite this limitation, there is no up-to-date book on the Commonwealth which is more useful to the student. It replaces and improves upon Chatham House's useful but long out-of-date handbook of 1934 with a similar title. The earlier book is still important for the picture it gives as of that year, and its record of developments in the previous decade.

The object of the compiler, as the preface modestly states it, has been "to collect, in one volume, the facts about the machinery of consultation and cooperation in the Commonwealth which would otherwise have to be sought in a multitude of other publications; and to present them without comment, save in the form of quotations from official and ministerial statements."

The handbook, as the publisher notes, is a compilation which does not attempt analysis. The compilation has been done excellently; and as anyone who tries to keep in touch with the constant changes in the Commonwealth knows only too well, this is in itself a most important service. In fact the book has a precision of statement and a mastery of principle which makes it much more than a mere compilation.

"Few people," as the publisher rightly states, "are fully aware of the means which exist for consultation, exchange of information, and for joint action on intra Commonwealth affairs." The book divided the story into three parts: (1) Machinery for consultation and cooperation, including chapters on the Crown and Governors General, nationality and citizenship, the Imperial Conference, and meetings of prime ministers. (2) Defense, with sections on collective defense, atomic energy, and defense policies. This part is a masterly summary of special importance to students of American foreign policy and international politics. The members of the Commonwealth are America's principal allies, and the most stable and dependable of her allies. Yet all too little is known in this country of their defense arrangements. (3) Machinery of Commonwealth participation in international action, with chapters on participation in international conferences and organizations, including the United Nations, and the handling of multilateral treaties, and regional organs including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

There is also in part three a chapter on cooperation in wartime. This, as the reviewer can testify (since he has been working for some years on the British official war histories based on the official records), suffers from being written from very inadequate and often misleading secondary sources. This is no doubt a weakness of the book as a whole, although the author has received and made excellent use of a great deal of help and guidance from very well-informed people in different parts of the Commonwealth. But the difficulty is one which besets any writer on the Commonwealth. For its really important affairs are conducted in private "family" talks and conferences of Ministers of the Crown, parliamentarians, civil servants and officers of the armed services. The public business of the Commonwealth is never conducted in the blaze of publicity which illuminates—or obscures—public business in the United States. Nor is it the practice in any British Commonwealth country to throw open departmental files to private research, or even parliamentary enquiry conducted by private members, until at least a generation has passed.

The limitations of a book of this kind, as well as its merits, have to be underlined, especially since the volume is likely to be and should be used as a partial textbook on the Commonwealth. No description such as this volume gives of machinery or practice can explain the nature of the Commonwealth, or its functioning, or why it works at all. The physiology of the body politic is notoriously difficult to analyze. This book has a more modest purpose. It puts aside any idea of attempting to analyze the living processes of the Commonwealth. Thus, the sections on the Crown give the student no idea of the real function of the Crown as a symbol which unites the peoples individually and collectively with each other and which links all the governing elements in each part with each other in bonds of corporate fellowship. Nor from the few scattered references to parliamentary rela-

tions will the student guess the existence and role of the Commonwealth's unique "community of parliamentarians."—H. DUNCAN HALL, *British Embassy, Washington, D. C.*

Political Parties and the Party System in Britain; A Symposium. EDITED BY SYDNEY D. BAILEY. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger. 1952. Pp. xii, 211. $3.50.)

This symposium, gathered under the auspices of the Hansard Society, is composed of brief essays written by English specialists, each one presenting mainly the elementary material on the subject. The first of its three sections deals with the history of the party system from earliest times to the twentieth century; the authors refurbish the arguments and clash of "isms" of the past—of popery and puritanism, and so forth. Perhaps the best written of these first essays is that of D. C. Somervell on the twentieth century, but your reviewer can hardly agree with the author that "The party system is rather a joke, but it is a very English joke and we must make the best of it" (p. 41).

The second section deals with the history and principles of each of the major parties—Conservative, Labor, and Liberal, and contains, in addition, a chapter on minor parties. In the historical chapters there is a good deal of material much like that in the first section, although it is written from a somewhat different angle. The chapters on party principles are mainly written from the point of view of advocates of the particular party.

The third section deals with party organization and functioning. In the reviewer's opinion, these chapters are the most valuable ones in the symposium. They illuminate such problems as the extent to which a party has a mandate from the voters, and how a party originates the policy it later translates into governmental action.

Those particularly interested in the British party system will find some of the essays stimulating reading; the more general readers will find the whole volume useful as a brief introduction to the British party system.—EDWARD G. LEWIS, *University of Illinois.*

The Danish System of Labor Relations; A Study in Industrial Peace. BY WALTER GALENSON. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1952. Pp. xii, 321. $4.50.)

Comparative Labor Movements. EDITED BY WALTER GALENSON. (New York: Prentice-Hall. 1952. Pp. xiv, 599. $6.50.)

Political scientists, and indeed, students of labor-management problems in all fields, are indebted to Professor Galenson for his stimulating and well-written case studies of the role of government in labor controversies. In 1949, *Labor in Norway*, by the same author, brought the rich experience of that country to the reader. The present volume on Denmark is also a first book on the subject in English. To Norway and Denmark, Professor Galenson in *Comparative Labor Movements* adds case studies of the labor movement in Great Britain by Allan Flanders, Scandinavia by Walter Galenson, Australia by Kenneth Walker, Germany by Philip Taft, France by Val Lorwin, Italy by John Adams, and Russia by Isaac Deutscher. The labor movement in each country has grown out of the environment of that country and some striking differences are presented in the part played by government in labor questions. Of major interest to the political scientist, however, are such similarities as (1) legislation, including basic labor-management relations statutes enacted by parliaments; (2) labor courts, for the settlement of important labor disputes by semi-judicial officers; (3) pressure groups, tending toward stronger national organizations of both labor and management; and (4) a trend toward increased intervention by government agencies in labor disputes. Because these factors are vital issues in leading governments, and are problems of prime political significance in our own country, the lessons of a diverse foreign experience are made available for study by Professor Galenson and his associates. In short, *The Danish System of Labor Relations* is a clear, well organized and documented study which includes the text of basic labor statutes, while *Comparative Labor Movements* is an integrated symposium which applies the method of comparative analysis and interpretation to seven major political jurisdictions of the world. Both volumes represent achievements in newer areas of research and scholarship, and both contribute to factual understanding of legislative policies and governmental procedures affecting labor-management problems.—EDWARD W. CARTER, *University of Pennsylvania.*

Quellen zum Staatsrecht der Neuzeit; Band II, Deutsche Verfassungsdokumente der Gegenwart, 1919–1951. BY ERNST RUDOLF HUBER. (Tübingen: Dr. M. Matthiesen & Co., K. G. 1951. Pp. 694. DM 32.)

This is the second of three volumes of con-

stitutional documents. The first volume covers German constitutional law from 1806 to 1918, the third will deal with non-German constitutional sources of the 18th to the 20th century. The present volume devotes less than one-fifth of its almost 700 pages of small print to the main constitutional documents of the Weimar Republic. The period of Hitler's Third Reich is left out altogether, except for the well-known Hindenburg-Hitler decree of February 28, 1933, which suspended the fundamental liberties and established what the author calls "a transition to a permanent state of emergency." The remaining four-fifths of the book deals with the period 1945–1950 (plus a few addenda reaching until April 13, 1951) and that is the most useful part of the volume. The author has collected, with proverbial German thoroughness, all constitutional documents of importance for a student of the constitutional and political development of postwar Germany.

Länderkammer der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik. 1. (Konstituierende)–6. Sitzung. (*Stenographische Niederschrift.*) 9. November 1950–8. Februar 1952. (Berlin. 1950–52. 6 nos., 100 p.)—*Gesetzesvorlagen und Anträge, Landerkammer der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, Drucksachen*, 1–19. (Berlin. 1950–52. 19 nos. in 8.)

The Länderkammer of the German Democratic Republic consists of 50 members representing the five states of Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt, Thuringia, Brandenburg and Mecklenburg plus thirteen members from the capital city Berlin in an advisory capacity. The Länderkammer has the right to introduce bills in the Volkskammer as well as to veto legislation enacted by the Volkskammer. The stenographic reports of proceedings of the relatively few meetings are accompanied by documents (Drucksachen) reproducing only the text of the laws as enacted by the Volkskammer. The two series bear no place of printing or printer, and are apparently intended mainly for the use of members.—J.B.C.

Volkskammer der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik. 1. (Konstituierende)–20. Sitzung. (*Stenographische Niederschrift.*) 8. November 1950–19. März 1952. (Berlin. 1950–52. 20 nos., 594 p.)—*Anfragen, Gesetzesvorlagen und Anträge, Volkskammer der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik. Drucksachen 1–81.* (Berlin. 1950–52. 81 nos. in 47, a few mimeographed.)

The Volkskammer, the supreme authority of the German Democratic Republic, having 400 members, was elected on October 15, 1950. The stenographic report of its proceedings contains the statements of the government, of particular importance in understanding the East German attitude towards the Bundesrepublik, as well as the discussion of proposed legislation. The Volkskammer legislates, subject to the veto of the Länderrat, and holds its sessions much more frequently than the Länderrat. The printed documents include the drafts of proposed legislation, lists of petitions, and certain other materials of national importance. Both stenographic reports and documents bear no place of printing or printer, and seemingly are intended mainly for the use of members. Laws as enacted by the Volkskammer and as approved by the President of the DDR are promulgated in the *Gesetzblatt der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik*, published by the Deutscher Zentralverlag, Berlin.—J.B.C.

Manual of German Law; Volume II, Private International Law, Civil Procedure, Criminal Law, Criminal Procedure. PREPARED BY THE FOREIGN OFFICE. (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office. 1952. Distributed by York House, London. Pp. xv, 167. £1 1s.)

This is the second and final volume of *The Manual of German Law*, published by the British Government for the use of occupation officials in the British Zone. The present volume covers private international law, civil procedure, criminal law, and criminal procedure. Features of the book include a brief historical introduction to each subject, a list of German legal terms and considerable comparative discussion of German and common law principles, designed to aid the Anglo-American lawyer in understanding the peculiarities of the German Law. The two volumes represent the only up-to-date discussion in English of the German legal system and commend themselves to the attention of students of comparative law and government.

Politieke Organisatie in West Europa na 1800. BY J. J. DE JONG. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff N.V. 1951. Pp. xii, 516. Fl. 17.50.)

A constitutional history of England, France, Belgium, and the Netherlands since 1800, with emphasis on electoral laws, party and trade union organization. An appendix in English provides an accurate and detailed description

of the postwar structure of the Communist and Socialist parties in these four countries, as well as of the British Conservative party, the French MRP, the Belgian and Dutch Catholic parties, and the Dutch Anti-Revolutionary party. The information about the organization of those Belgian and Dutch parties which are covered here appears to be more complete than can be found elsewhere in English.

Britain and Europe; Pitt to Churchill, 1793–1940. EDITED BY JAMES JOLL. (London: Nicholas Kaye, 1950. Distributed by The British Book Centre, Inc., New York. Pp. xv, 385. $3.50.)

The Conservative Tradition. EDITED BY R. J. WHITE. (London: Nicholas Kaye. 1950. Distributed by the British Book Centre, Inc., New York. Pp. xix, 256. $3.50.)

The English Radical Tradition, 1763–1914. EDITED BY S. MACCOBY. (London: Nicholas Kaye. 1952. Distributed by the British Book Centre, Inc., New York. Pp. xiii, 236. $3.50.)

Now available are the three latest issues in this excellent series, the editors of which have produced five volumes and promise five more. The assumption is that most political writing in Britain has been empirical and immediate rather than abstract and general and that the reader would need to roam extensively through pamphlets and debates to search out the essential ideas. The purpose of these volumes is to assemble in convenient form these diverse and widely scattered materials relating to aspects of the British political tradition. This purpose is well served by judicious selection, careful editing and explanatory notes.

British Pamphleteers; Volume II, From the French Revolution to the Nineteen-Thirties. EDITED BY REGINALD REYNOLDS. (London: Allan Wingate. 1951. Distributed by The British Book Centre, Inc., New York. Pp. 302. $4.50.)

The first volume of this series carried the chronology from the sixteenth century to the French Revolution; this second volume brings it up to the depression years. Excellent introduction (by A. J. P. Taylor) and explanatory notes (by Reynolds) to a group of twenty-one pamphlets distributed through the period, mainly concerned with social protest.

Autonomy and Delegation in County Government; A Study of Delegation in Education and Local Health Administration. BY EMMELINE COHEN. (London: Institute of Public Administration. n.d. [1952?] Pp. ix, 81. 6s. 4s. 6d. to members of the Institute.)

A careful report on the extent and techniques of delegation of authority to county governments (in England) under the Education Act, 1944 and the National Health Service Act, 1946, together with an assessment of the effectiveness of these arrangements.

British Planning and Nationalization. BY BEN W. LEWIS. (New York: Twentieth Century Fund. 1952. Pp. xi, 313. $3.00.)

A summary of economic planning and nationalization, 1945–1951, in selected areas, including the coal, transportation, electricity and steel nationalization programs, town and country planning, and planning with relation to housing, health, agriculture, and the distribution of industry. Goals, operations and results are succinctly described, and issues identified. Planning machinery is briefly discussed, but the study does not purport to analyze the administrative features of planning and nationalization, or their political implications.

Greece; American Dilemma and Opportunity. BY L. S. STAVRIANOS. (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company. 1952. Pp. ix, 246. $3.25.)

An analysis of postwar political developments within Greece by a professor of history at Northwestern, who fears that U.S. policies in Greece have strengthened the country militarily while effecting few of the many necessary political, social, and economic reforms. The result has been a weakening of the Center parties while the Left and Right have gained supporters, the most notable Rightist development being that of the Greek Rally led by General Papagos who would make Greece "... the Franco Spain of the eastern Mediterranean."

La Wallonie. BY MAURICE-PIERRE HERREMANS. (Bruxelles: Editions Marie-Julienne. 1951. Pp. 363. 150 Fr.)

A Belgian political scientist of Walloon descent explores the Walloon problem in its social, economic, cultural, and political aspects, and reviews various proposals designed to effect a settlement.

Le Drame de Vichy; II, Finances sous la Contrainte. BY YVES BOUTHILLIER. (Paris: Librairie Plon. 1951. Pp. 552. 825 fr.)

The second volume of a skillfully written history and apology of the Vichy government by its Finance Minister is a presentation of his own policies under the occupation as a model to which the prewar and post-liberation governments failed to conform. Pétain submitted "to reality, not to Germany," whereas both "free" and "collaborating" Frenchmen were mere dreamers. Worshipping "the Marshal" in the mystical language fashionable ten years ago, the author is among those who have learned and forgotten nothing.

Om offentlig redovisning av den politiska propagandans finansiering. Partifinansieringisakkunigas betänkande. (Stockholm. 1951. Pp. 83. Statens offentliga utredningar, 1951: 56, Justitiedepartementet.)

The Swedish government inquiry on responsibility for the financing of political propaganda contains supplements giving Swedish political party receipts and expenditures for the years 1948 and 1949. The whole report might well be more generally available to the non-Swedish reader as a contribution to the not too voluminous literature on foreign political parties.—J.B.C.

Det proportionella valsättet vid val till Riksdagens Andra Kammare 1950 års folkomröstnings—och *valsättsutrednings betänkande. I.* (Stockholm. 1951. Pp. 136. Statens offentliga utredningar, 1951: 58, Justitiedepartementet.)

The first of a three part Swedish government inquiry deals with election to the Second Chamber, and includes a summary of the situation in certain other European countries. The second part is to be devoted to "folkomröstingsfrågan," and the third to "valsättet vid landstingsmannaval."—J.B.C.

Recensement général des agents des services publics en 1950. By Institut national de la statistique et des études economiques. (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale & Presses Universitaires. 1951. Pp. 114. Fr. 600.)

In the second census of French government workers are included those carried in the general and supplementary budgets of the national government and of the departmental and communal governments. Workers in the nationalized enterprises, mixed companies and social security funds are not included. The total number of government workers in France as of April 1, 1950, is given as 1,573,000. The first census was taken in 1947.—J.B.C.

Assemblea regionale siciliana. *Manuale per i deputati.* Dal Segretariato generale. (Palermo: Grafiche A. Renna. 1951. Pp. 862. L. 1700.)

The manual for the deputies of the Sicilian Regional Parliament at Palermo contains first the text of the Constitution of the Italian Republic followed by the Statute, or Constitution, for the Sicilian Region and the other basic acts concerning the regional organization. Detailed results of the election of April 20, 1947, to the first Regional Parliament, and of June 3, 1951, to the second, are given. There is a brief biographical directory of the deputies as well as a directory of the regional offices and agencies. Sardinia, Trentino-Alto Adige, Friuli—Venezia Giulia and the Valle d'Aosta are the other regions of Italy having autonomy under art. 116 of the Republican Constitution. —J.B.C.

Diario de sesiones de la Asamblea Constituyente de 1945, año 1 de la Revolución. Impreso por acuerdo de la Comisión de régimen interior del Congreso de la República de 1949. (Guatemala, C. A., Tipografia Nacional, 1951. Pp. 928.)

Some six years after the present Constitution of Guatemala was decreed on March 11, 1945, the full debates of Constitutional Assembly, which sat formally from January 10th through March 15, 1945, have been made available in volume form. Marking the distinct change from the former dictatorial constitution and government in one of the Central American countries, the proceedings would seem to have a peculiar significance. Use of the volume would be much facilitated if there were a table indicating the action on the different sections of the Constitution as well as a name index. Debates of the Comisión de los 15 for constitution drafting have not been printed. Even though the Assembly was to break with the past, the Facultad de Ciencias Jurídicas y Sociales de Guatemala published as época III, tomo VIII nums 2, 3 y 4 of its *Revista* for July–Dec. 1944, a "Digesto constitucional de Guatemala" containing the texts of all previous constitutions.—J.B.C.

República dos Estados Unidos do Brasil. *Constituicões federal e estaduais. Textos vigentes, Indice comparativo.* (Rio de Janeiro: Ministério da justica e negócios interiores, Servico de documentação. 1952. Pp. 811.)

The Brazilian Ministry of Justice and Interior has just published in one volume the fed-

eral constitution of 1946 and the 1947 constitutions of the twenty states (as in force) arranged in alphabetical order, together with an alphabetical topical index referring to the sections in the different constitutions. Five of the states as follows have had some amendments to their constitutions since 1947: Maranhão, Mato Grosso, Pará, Rio de Janeiro, and Sergipe. The volume does not include the organic act of the Federal District.—J.B.C.

The Executive Power in Uruguay. By Philip B. Taylor. (Berkeley: University of California. 1951. Pp. iv, 133.)

A mimeographed copy of a doctoral dissertation, University of California, based on research in Uruguay. The executive power under the Constitution of 1942, as described in this study, is no longer the current form due to the recent adoption of the plural executive or Council of Government.

Public Administration in Hong Kong. By Sir Charles Collins. (London & New York: Royal Institute of International Affairs. 1952. Pp. ix, 189. $3.00.)

Public Administration in Ceylon. By Sir Charles Collins. (London & New York: Royal Institute of International Affairs. 1951. Pp. viii, 162. $3.00.)

Two volumes in a series that also is to include Malaya, Burma, and Siam. In short space these studies compress early history and first periods of British rule, and then move to a more detailed consideration of the development of administrative machinery and practices (along western lines) in response to demands for social reform, economic and industrial change, population and racial problems, unemployment, a desire for greater local autonomy, and—in the case of Ceylon—the achievement of independence and self-government.

Ceylon. By Sydney D. Bailey. (New York: Hutchinson's University Library. 1952. Distributed by Longmans, Green and Co. Pp. vii, 168. Trade $2.25, text $1.80.)

A brief outline history ranging from the pre-historic period through independence in 1948; about half of the book is devoted to the British period since 1795.

East Africa High Commission. *Proceedings of the East Africa Central Legislative Assembly. Fourth session, 1951–52. Official report, vol. IV* (Nairobi. 1952. Pp. 154.)

At the session of June 13, 1951, the Assembly passed a motion asking for amendment of the East Africa (High Commission) Order-in-Council, 1947, to provide for the continuance of the Assembly for a further period of four years from Jan. 1, 1952. The volume reports the debates in full. Enactments of the Assembly relative to the joint enterprises of Kenya, Tanganyika and Uganda are published currently as a part of the *Official Gazette of the East Africa High Commission*, and collected annually in separate volumes of *Acts*. Detailed annual appropriations for the East Africa High Commission and its various agencies as passed by the Assembly are not included in the volumes of *Acts* but printed as separate brochures entitled *Estimates of revenue and expenditure of the East Africa High Commission Non-selfcontained services for the year.*—J.B.C.

Report on Southern Africa. By Basil Davidson. (London: Jonathan Cape. 1952. Distributed by The British Book Centre, Inc., New York. Pp. 285. $3.50.)

A journalist's perceptive report on the racial and economic problems in the Union and in the British territories in the area. Strongly opposed to the South African Nationalists but critical of British policy as well.

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MARIO EINAUDI
Cornell University

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INTERNATIONAL LAW AND RELATIONS

British Labour's Foreign Policy. By Elaine Windrich. (Stanford: Stanford University Press. 1952. Pp. ix, 268. $5.00.)

In this volume Professor Windrich has recorded the international policies accepted by the Labour party and a variety of its spokesmen during the half-century of the party's existence. It is useful to have such a record available within one well-organized, fully annotated volume. However, Professor Windrich's account is almost entirely uncritical, and the reader is allowed, if not positively encouraged, to infer that socialist principles have made for a foreign policy of special foresight, intelligence, and beneficence. The theme of the book, the author states, is "the continuity of British Labour's international policy," whether in opposition or in office. This, in our age, would be a good deal to expect of any political party. Professor Windrich finds continuity of Labour policy in such general matters as opposition to the bogies of militarism and balance of power diplomacy, as well as in proclamations of faith in collective security and international co-operation. That Labour's persistence in these slogans never wavered, at least after 1918, is evidenced by the host of conference resolutions, party manifestoes, left-wing pamphlets, and parliamentary speeches which are so amply cited in the book. But whether the opposition to "militarism" in combination with the devotion to collective security made for an effective and consistent anti-fascist policy in the 1930's is left for the reader to put together himself. In fact, Professor Windrich does not give much attention to analyzing the incompatibility of Labour's undoubtedly sincere desire to check fascist aggression with its equally sincere reluctance to support increased British arms and military conscription. It is not enough simply to report the Labour explanation of its unwillingness to trust the Tory Government with the arms. Rather there could be found in the prewar record a reflection of socialist dislike of military preparedness as a means of implementing foreign policy, which should help us to understand the party's present difficulties, now that it is again in opposition, in accepting the Anglo-American emphasis on arms and power politics as deterrents to aggression. Surely the socialist ideology which so significantly affects, while not necessarily determining, Labour party foreign policy needs more than a sympathetic recording.—Leon D. Epstein, *University of Wisconsin.*

The End of Extraterritoriality in China. By Wesley R. Fishel. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 1952. Pp. xi, 318. $4.50.)

Professor Fishel has drawn on the hitherto unpublished records of the State Department, the Department of Justice, and the Strawn papers to produce the only full and comprehensive study of extraterritoriality in China. His book is well-organized and clearly written. Only occasionally does he lapse into the somewhat flatulent style of the diplomatic papers which he has studied so carefully. His scholarship is competent and his analysis convincing and thorough. The book should prove useful to students of diplomatic history for a long time to come.

The study is timely in that the Chinese have neither forgotten nor forgiven the so-called "unequal rights" and "unequal treaties." Communist propaganda continues to make capital of the old relationship and to insist that the idea of extraterritoriality is alive and vigorous in the imperialistic designs of the United States.

While Professor Fishel has not uncovered much that is new, either of fact or of interpretation, it is satisfying to know that our understanding of extraterritoriality in China retains its validity in the unfolding of the full story. The day of special privileges has not passed but in the future they are likely to stand on a basis quite different from the extraterritoriality principle. Professor Fishel's work may provide us with some valuable lessons in point.—Mark T. Orr, *University of North Carolina.*

The Political Role of the General Assembly. By H. Field Haviland, Jr. (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 1951. Pp. 190. $2.75.)

Mr. Haviland's volume is the seventh of the series of *United Nations Studies*, published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. It contains a foreword by Mr. Nasrollah Entezam, an introduction, one chapter on the Charter background of the General Assembly's political role, another chapter reviewing five years of Assembly practice, a third on the types of action used as instruments of policy, three chapters on major decisions taken in the political field, a final chapter embodying the author's conclusions, and an appendix of major Assembly resolutions in the political field. The author uses the term "political" to designate "those questions that are so highly charged that they are a potential threat to international peace"; he wisely admits, however, that the term is "a rather slippery concept."

The first six chapters of the book provide material extremely helpful in understanding the Assembly as a live, active body, and they are convincing because of their excellent documentation and scholarly construction. The author's conclusions, in a seventh chapter, are highly interesting and quite provocative, but somewhat less convincing because they usually appear to be only opinions as to why the Assembly's political role has expanded, the significance of the development, and so on. It should be said, however, that the opinions are considered opinions and entirely plausible even though they do not seem to be justified by the findings of the preceding chapters.—Norman Hill, *University of Nebraska.*

Survey of International Affairs, 1947–1948. By Peter Calvocoressi with Introduction by Arnold Toynbee. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1952. Pp. x, 581. $9.00.)

Documents on International Affairs, 1947–1948. Selected and Edited by Margaret Carlyle. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1952. Pp. xxvii, 878. $14.00.)

A review of the two critical years in which "postwar" gave way to "cold war," beginning with an analysis of Russian-American relations, and following that basic conflict as it affected or was affected by all other developments around the world. This is the period of Truman Doctrine, Marshall Plan, and first steps toward collective security in western Europe; of the Czech coup, the cementing of Soviet control in eastern Europe, and Titoist heresy; of the division of Germany; and in Asia of Japanese reform, Dutch defeat in Indonesia, and Communist success in China. R. G. Hawtrey contributes a section on "The Economic State of Europe," and the chapters on the Far East are by F. C. Jones.

With the *Survey* the Royal Institute of International Affairs resumes what was before World War II, and will be again after the 1949–1950 volume, an annual study. The organization of the *Documents* follows that of the *Survey* and is a very complete and useful companion source. The gap of the war period is to be filled by several volumes of narrative and documentation now under preparation.

The Year Book of World Affairs, 1952. Edited

BY GEORGE W. KEETON AND GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger. 1952. Pp. xii, 378. $7.50.)

The latest volume of the London Institute of World Affairs contains twelve leading articles together with reviews of leading books in the international field. The subjects treated are both geographical and functional. With the suspension of the journal, *World Affairs*, it is planned to use the *Year Book* for articles on major international issues that are not covered adequately in other publications.

Peace in Their Time; The Origins of the Kellogg-Briand Pact. BY ROBERT H. FERRELL. (New Haven: Yale University Press. 1952. Pp. x, 293. $4.00.)

An interesting and detailed addition, based mainly on U. S. sources, to the history of the peace movement of the 'twenties when some men hoped to abolish war by treaty. The author, who undertook the study as a Yale doctoral thesis, concludes that the Pact was the result of cautious diplomatic maneuvering overtaken by public enthusiasm. Briand's original proposal of a bilateral Pact of Perpetual Friendship was really a "negative military alliance"; this Kellogg hoped to sidestep by proposing a multilateral treaty renouncing war, which he expected the French to turn down. Briand could not afford such an outright rejection, and the world peace movement—especially stimulated by such Americans as James T. Shotwell, Nicholas Murray Butler, Salmon O. Levinson, John Haynes Holmes—built so much pressure that the diplomats, some converted to believing in their proposals, had to go ahead with the Kellogg-Briand Pact denouncing war as an instrument of national policy.

Formosa under Chinese Nationalist Rule. BY FRED W. RIGGS. (New York: Macmillan Company. 1952. Pp. ix, 195. $2.75.)

A summary of military, political, economic and social conditions on Formosa, as revealed in printed materials and reports available in the United States. The author concludes, among other things, that most Formosans have little friendliness toward the million-odd arrivals from the mainland; that the island's productivity has jumped considerably since 1945 but that the increased population and defense activity more than consume the difference; that the administration is relatively honest and efficient but that Chiang Kai-shek is still the center of competing cliques; and that the Nationalist army is not well enough trained or equipped to make a significant showing in any invasion of China. Conditions in Formosa itself have not deteriorated, thanks to U. S. advisory missions and economic assistance that will top $300 million by next June.

The Carthaginian Peace or The Economic Consequences of Mr. Keynes. BY ÉTIENNE MANTOUX. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1952. Pp. xvii, 210. $3.00.)

A reexamination of *Economic Consequences of the Peace*, attacking Keynes' twin arguments that the reparations the Allies proposed to levy could not be squeezed from the German economy and, even if they could, that there was no acceptable way to accomplish the transfer of such large sums. The wide reception given Keynes' theories strengthened the German case, weakened the Allies' firmness toward Germany, and helped defeat the Versailles Treaty in the United States. Mantoux, who was killed in 1945, revived the controversy because he feared the same theories would influence peacemakers in this generation.

Whither Europe—Union or Partnership? BY M. J. BONN. (New York: Philosophical Library. 1952. Pp. 207. $3.75.)

A study by a former financial adviser to the Weimar Republic, dealing with difficulties which stand in the way of any scheme for a federal Western European Union. The author is highly skeptical as to the feasibility of such a union in the near future and believes rather in a cautious build-up of limited cooperation which may gradually develop a "sentiment of European unity."

Oder-Neisse Line; A Study of the Political, Economic and European Significance of Poland's Western Frontier. BY Z. JORDAN (London: Polish Freedom Movement. 1952. Pp. 133.)

A study by a group of anti-Communist Polish exiles advocating the Oder-Neisse line as the final Polish-German frontier. Includes excerpts from declarations of American, British, and Soviet statesmen and other international documents bearing on the problem, takes issue with German claims on the Oder-Neisse territories and advances arguments why they should belong to Poland.

La Guerre en Question. By Jules Monnerot. (Paris: Gallimard. 1951. Pp. 262.)

A description in the language of Toynbee of the conflict between the new eastern empire and the old western open societies. Stalinism, which now holds the initiative, can be checked only by an ideological counter-offensive under the coordinated leadership of an aristocracy of western intellectuals. The author realizes that non-communist opinion is united only by its anti-communism; yet he relies on this weapon alone to win the cold war. His ideas are more akin to those of James Burnham than representative of current western European thinking.

Foreign Relations of the United States; Diplomatic Papers, 1935. Volume II, The British Commonwealth, Europe. Compiled by the U. S. Department of State. (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office. 1952. Pp. lxxi, 816. $3.00.)

Little new information appears in these documents covering a relatively uneventful period of U. S. diplomacy. The reports from Germany as the Hitler government continued to centralize power, rearm, and sanction Jewish persecution are omens of worse to come.

Soviet Foreign Relations; Documents and Readings. Edited by Donald G. Bishop. (Syracuse, N. Y.: Syracuse University Press. 1952. Pp. viii, 223. $3.75.)

A collection of highly diversified documents relating to Soviet foreign policy since 1917, including excerpts from the Soviet constitution, international agreements, declarations of Soviet and American statesmen, newspaper and magazine articles.

May God Forgive Us. By Robert H. W. Welch, Jr. (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company. 1952. Pp. ix, 134. $1.50.)

The author, a Boston candy manufacturer, indignant at the MacArthur dismissal, summarizes U. S. policy vis-à-vis world Communism and especially in China, and concludes that " . . . whatever strings may have been pulled and whatever puppets activated to exert their combined insidious pressures, MacArthur was fired by Stalin." Despite book jacket endorsements by Wedemeyer, Denfeld, Hugh Gibson, and others, some will dispute that it is a "straightforward clarification of some important recent history in Asia."

Ministério das relacãoes exteriores, Servico de publicações, *Lista de publicações, 1826–1950.* (Rio de Janeiro. 1951. Pp. 67.)

The list of publications of the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Relations, 1826–1950, itemizes the annual "relatórios" from the first in 1826, with the principal contents of each. There is a statement of the treaty collections and of the titles of the individual numbers of the Brazilian treaty series (*Coleção de atos internacionais*). Such a full and up to date list of the official publications of the ministry of foreign relations in each of the other American republics would not only aid in the effective conduct of foreign relations, but would serve the needs of students, and tend to help in making sources of accurate information more readily available.—J.B.C.

História da organizacão administrativa da Secretaria de estado dos negócios estrangeiros e das relacões exteriores, 1808–1951. Prefácio do Embaixador Cyro de Freitas-Valle. By Marcos Roméro. (Rio de Janeiro: Ministério das relacões exteriores, Serviço de publicacões. 1951. Pp. 365.)

The author analyzes objectively and rather briefly the organization of the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Relations from its organization in 1808 to the present, giving with each chapter references to the sources cited. There is an index to personal names. Although this useful reference volume was printed only at the end of 1951, it is reported to be already out of print.—J.B.C.

Great Britain and Egypt, 1914–1951. (London & New York: Royal Institute of International Affairs. 1952. Pp. vii, 216. $2.25.)

A timely survey of British-Egyptian relations since the First World War with an appendix which includes several treaties and notes. A revised edition of a Royal Institute Information Paper first published in 1936.

Der automatische Erwerb und Verlust der Staatsangehörigkeit durch völkerrechtliche Vorgänge, zugleich ein Beitrag zur Lehre von der Staatensukzession. By Hansjörg Jellinek. (Berlin: Carl Heymanns Verlag. 1951. Pp. xxiv, 253.)

A discussion of rules of international law regulating the automatic change of citizenship in certain cases of cession of territory by one government to another, rules which supersede the right of each state to make its own citizenship laws.

Warum wurde Krupp verurteilt? Legende und Justizirrtum. By Tilo Frhr. von Wilmowsky. (Stuttgart: Friedrich Vorwerk Verlag. 1950. Pp. 224. Bound, DM 7.80; paper, DM 5.80.)

A plea for the innocence of Alfred Krupp and his ten collaborators who were convicted by an American Military Tribunal on charges of looting and forced labor practices in the occupied countries. The main argument is that they merely carried out government orders.

Dokumente zur Austreibung der Sudetendeutschen. Herausgegeben von der Arbeitsgemeinschaft zur Wahrung Sudetendeutscher Interessen. (Im Selbstverlag der Arbeitsgemeinschaft zur Wahrung sudetendeutscher Interessen. 1951. Pp. xxix, 590.)

These documents consist of alleged eyewitness accounts by Sudeten German expellees, which describe plunderings, tortures, and other excesses committed against them by the Czechs. More interesting to the student of the minority question are the Czech expulsion decrees which are reproduced in the appendix, some of them photographically.

Saggio sullo statuto dell'O.N.U. in riguardo alla costituzione materiale della società internazionale. By P. Zancla. (Palermo: G. Priulla Editore. 1951. Pp. 103.)

A discussion of the well-known changes in the interpretation of the United Nations Charter under the impact of the political trend toward a two power world.

The United Nations; Background, Organization, Functions, Activities. By Amry Vandenbosch and Willard N. Hogan. (New York: McGraw-Hill. 1952. Pp. xiii, 456. $5.00.)

A useful text on the subject; includes a background discussion of international cooperation, the League, and the founding of the United Nations, as well as a detailed treatment of the organization and functions of the United Nations itself. Emphasis on the collective security role of the United Nations. Includes 100 pages of documentary material.

Realities of World Power. By John E. Kieffer. (New York: David McKay Company, Inc. 1951. $4.00.)

An effort to expound the "science of geopolitics" and to catalogue the "geopolitical" resources of the world (with the omission of all Africa and all Latin America) for an American public blind, in the author's opinion, equally to the inevitability of war with the Soviet Union and to how it may be won.

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H. ARTHUR STEINER*
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POLITICAL THEORY, RESEARCH, AND METHODOLOGY

Socialism and American Life. EDITED BY DONALD DREW EGBERT AND STOW PERSONS. BIBLIOGRAPHY BY T. D. SEYMOUR BASSETT. (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1952. 2 vols. Pp. xiv, 776; xiv, 575. $10.00 each, $17.50 a set.)

The need for a scholarly appraisal of American socialism and its impact upon American society has long been apparent; these volumes partly satisfy it. Volume I is a rather miscellaneous group of essays of varying quality by various writers. The most useful are Daniel Bell's long (190 pp.), well-constructed, and objective account of the history of Marxian socialism in the United States, arguing effectively that American Marxists always suffered from their inability to operate successfully in the politics of a capitalist world which they rejected, and Will Herberg's short, well-digested essay on American Marxist political theory. An essay on the socialist philosophy of history is based on a detailed lecture outline by the late David F. Bowers. Sidney Hook's short statement on the philosophical basis of Marx-

ism is provocative, but valuable rather as incisive criticism of Communist ideology than as exposition of Marxism. Paul Sweezey's essay on the influence of Marxian economics is lucid and orthodox, but neither comprehensive nor entirely convincing. These essays are preceded by an essay by the editors on terminology and types of socialism, essays by E. Harris Harbison and by Harry W. Laidler on European socialism before and after 1848, an essay by Albert T. Mellegen on the religious basis of socialism, and essays by Stow Persons and T. D. Seymour Bassett on Christian and secular utopian socialism in America. Essays by Wilbert E. Moore and by George W. Hartmann on the sociology and the psychology of American socialism are hard going for a political scientist who believes that even complicated ideas can be conveyed in simple English, but the former has some excellent data and comment on the American class structure in relation to Marxian theory. The volume concludes with a brief, pointed essay by Willard Thorp on "American Writers on the Left," and an omnibus essay by Donald Drew Egbert on "Socialism and American Art."

There is much repetition, partly because most contributors explain their versions of socialist theory before settling down to their topics. Some of the essays proceed at a very leisurely pace; some are burdened with too much detail. The volume could probably have been cut by one-third with advantage to both reader and publisher. The collaborative plan has left some important aspects of American socialism inadequately presented: there is, for example, no systematic analysis of the ideas and significance of Laurence Gronlund, Henry George, or Edward Bellamy; there is no discussion of the Mormon experiments (covered, however, in the bibliography); the Christian socialism of the late nineteenth century is considered very briefly. In general, although many contributors offer suggestive material and comment, the book fails to provide a systematic summing up of the various answers to the old question why American socialism was not more successful, a systematic appraisal of the relation of American socialism to other types of American reformism, or a systematic appraisal of the impact of socialism upon American policy in the past three or four decades.

Volume II, a detailed critical bibliography, topically organized to correspond roughly with the organization of Volume I, will be invaluable to students of American socialism.—JOHN D. LEWIS, *Oberlin College.*

Bericht über den Stand der Ausbildung in der Wissenschaft von der Politik in Deutschland, für die International Political Science Association in Paris. (Berlin-Dahlem: Institut für politische Wissenschaft. 1951. Pp. 108. Mimeographed.)

Description of the place of political science in the curriculum of West German institutions of higher education. List of political science courses offered by each university (including those in the Soviet sector). One gathers that the number and variety of these course offerings is now greater than after World War I, even though most institutions still lack separate political science departments.

Amerika und England im deutschen, österreichischen und schweizerischen Schrifttum der Jahre 1945–49; Eine Bibliographie. BY RICHARD MÖNNIG. (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer Verlag. 1951. Pp. ix, 259. DM 10.)

A bibliography of (1) German translations of American and British writings; (2) books in German about the United States and England; (3) original editions of works by American and English authors published in Germany, Switzerland, and Austria from 1945 to 1949. Writings dealing with political matters are listed under "Law and Jurisprudence," "Economics and Labor," "Politics and Current Events."

Caste in a Peasant Society. BY MELVIN M. TUMIN. (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 1952. Pp. xiii, 300. $5.00.)

An ethnographic analysis of the isolated pueblo of San Luis Jilotepeque, ninety miles east of Guatemala City, where 1,100 Ladinos (of Spanish descent) forming the upper caste, live in a state of peaceful tension with 2,400 Indians comprising the lower caste. Though a relatively complete and detailed description is given of this community, the emphasis is upon the social relations of these two groups, making for "a case study in the dynamics of caste," by an anthropologically trained member of the Sociology Department at Princeton.

Hobhouse Memorial Lectures, 1941–1950. (London: Oxford University Press. 1952. Pp. 265.)

The second decennial collection of annual lectures in the fields of Hobhouse's interest,

principally politics, philosophy, and sociology. These ten lectures (already separately published) include pieces on diverse subjects by R. G. Collingwood, A.M. Carr-Saunders, Herbert Morrison, H. N. Brailsford and others.

Calhoun; Basic Documents. EDITED BY JOHN M. ANDERSON. (State College, Pa.: Bald Eagle Press. 1952. Pp. 329. $5.00.)

In addition to an editor's introduction, this volume contains "A Disquisition on Government" and eleven speeches delivered between 1811 and 1850 which "delineate the personal position" of Calhoun.

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NEWS AND NOTES

PROFESSIONAL CONFERENCES

Forty-eighth Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association: Transactions of the Council and General Business Meeting

The Council of the American Political Science Association convened in Parlor B of the Statler Hotel, Buffalo, New York, at 10:00 A.M. on Monday, August 25, 1952. President Luther Gulick called the meeting to order. The following officers and members of the Council were present: M. Margaret Ball, Wilfred E. Binkley, Taylor Cole, John H. Ferguson, Lee S. Greene, Luther Gulick, Ray F. Harvey, Pendleton Herring, Edward H. Litchfield, Boyd A. Martin, Roscoe C. Martin, Dean E. McHenry, John D. Millett, Roy V. Peel, Robert S. Rankin, Lloyd M. Short, Ivan M. Stone, David B. Truman, and Edward W. Weidner. Past Presidents William Anderson, Peter H. Odegard, and Henry R. Spencer, Committee Chairmen V. O. Key, Jr., Julian Park, and William S. Stokes, Acting Chairman Marshall Dimock, Paul T. David, Director of the Cooperative Research Project for the Study of Convention Delegations, and Harvey C. Mansfield, member of the Committee on Organization, were also present.

The Managing Editor of the REVIEW, Mr. Taylor Cole, presented both an oral and written report. He reported that two meetings of the members of the Editorial Board had been held during the year. At the January meeting it was decided that a policy of solicitation of articles, as distinguished from a purely laissez-faire policy, was necessary and desirable. Changes in the format were agreed upon and were instituted in the March, 1952 issue. Mr. Cole called attention to the fact that printing costs are steadily increasing, even though economies, such as the use of lighter weight paper, have been introduced. In resigning as Editor of the REVIEW, Mr. Cole expressed his deep appreciation to the News and Notes Editor, Walter H. Bennett; to the two Associate Editors, Merle Fainsod and Robert J. Harris, and to the other members of the Editorial Board, Franz L. Neumann, Philip W. Buck, Charles S. Hyneman and Charles M. Kneier; to the Editorial Associates, H. Arthur Steiner, Francis G. Wilson, Mario Einaudi, Herbert A. Simon, J. Alton Burdine, and Emmette S. Redford. He called attention to the loyal and devoted services of Professor Frederic A. Ogg, who was a member of the Board until his death in the fall of 1951. Mr. Cole also paid tribute to Mr. Hugh L. Elsbree, who has been Book Review Editor for the past three years and who has been selected by the Council as the next Managing Editor.

In the absence of Chairman Claude E. Hawley, Mr. Marshall E. Dimock presented the report of the Committee on the Advancement of Political Science Teaching. During the year the Committee held one meeting, but all other plans and proposals were worked out through correspondence. The Committee expressed an interest in the preparation of: (1) a comprehensive political science bibliography prepared for college and university library guidance, (2) a brochure on professional opportunities for political science majors, (3) an inquiry to political science department heads as a follow-up on *Goals for Political Science*, and (4) a proposal for producing a film on the processes leading to nomination of presidential candidates. Mr. Dimock particularly called the attention of the Council and Association members to the recommendation made in *Goals for Political Science* that there is an urgent need for a careful and authoritative study of the working conditions of teachers of political science and their general economic status. He emphasized the Committee's belief that this was a matter to be studied carefully, possibly in cooperation with a committee of the American Economic Association. He asked whether the Council members felt this to be an urgent matter and expressed the belief that if there were no objections the Executive Committee should be encouraged to explore the subject further. There were no objections.

In the absence of the chairman of the Committee on American Legislatures, President Gulick briefly summarized the written report. During the past year Committee members have again revised their recommendations for the reorganization of the state legislatures in the United States and in 1953 the Committee hopes to publish its study which is tentatively

entitled "Representative Assemblies of the American States."

Mr. Lloyd M. Short, Chairman of the Committee on Awards, reported orally and in writing. He stated that this year eighty-five books were received for consideration from thirty-five commercial and university publishers. Panel members voted in favor of Josué de Castro's *The Geography of Hunger* to receive the Franklin D. Roosevelt Foundation Award for the best book in the field of Government and Human Welfare. The Willkie Memorial Building of Freedom House panel recommended that the award in the field of International Relations go to George F. Kennan's *American Diplomacy 1900–1950*. The members of the Woodrow Wilson Foundation panel made their award in the field of Government and Democracy to Samuel Lubell for *The Future of American Politics*. Mr. Short raised the question as to the future of the Association's awards program. He pointed out that it has been six years since these awards were established and since 1947 several questions have come up which should be clarified for the guidance of future chairmen and panel members. He suggested that the President of the Association appoint a special committee to review the regulations formulated in 1947, with a view to their clarification and possible revision in time to be of help to the 1953 Committee on Awards. Mr. Herring asked for an expression of opinion from the Council members on this suggestion. Mr. Odegard felt that the entire process should be re-examined and that the Foundations might be asked to express their interest in the awards program in some tangible way. He suggested that the Council recommend to the incoming President and Executive Director that the possibility of putting this program on a more reciprocal basis be taken up with the Foundations. Mr. Roscoe Martin moved that the incoming President place this matter before the Executive Committee and the Council, urging that such action be taken as the Committee would advise. The motion was seconded by Mr. Peel and passed.

President Gulick reviewed briefly the written report of the Committee on Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union in the absence of the Committee's Chairman. A major portion of Chairman Barghoorn's work this year was in connection with the planning of that portion of the Buffalo Program which was devoted to their area. One meeting of the Committee was held during the year, at which major interest was expressed in the possibility of the Committee interesting itself in some substantial way in three main enterprises: a source book of materials on Eastern Europe, a "political dictionary" on the Soviet Union or Eastern Europe, and a survey of post-war developments in the major fields of intellectual activity in the U.S.S.R.

The written report of the Committee on the Far East was also briefly reviewed. The Committee's interest in the preservation and transfer to the United States of SCAP (Tokyo) files of documents, reports and memoranda, in order to safeguard and make them available for scholarly research was noted. The Committee report had commented with special interest upon the progress of classification of the microfilm collection of documents related to Japanese foreign policy in the Library of Congress. It urged as extensive translation of the microfilmed documents as might be practicable; it also expressed to the Department of State the view that Chinese and Japanese should be included among the languages that may be offered by candidates for the written examinations for the Foreign Service. Members of the Far East Committee planned the panels for the Annual Meeting devoted to their area and a subcommittee of three members, David N. Rowe, Amry Vandenbosch and Robert A. Scalapino, prepared the report on the subject of procedures and curricula desirable for the preparation of political scientists for teaching and research in Far Eastern subjects.

Mr. Litchfield briefly reviewed the report of the Committee on International Relations in the absence of the Committee's Chairman, who resubmitted to the Council the basic recommendations the Committee had made in 1951 of kinds of activities which this kind of committee might usefully perform on behalf of the Association. President Gulick commented that this Committee had a greater number of specific suggestions for projects covering a larger area, but the possibility of carrying out any of the suggestions could be considered only after the functions of the Association's committees had been decided upon.

In summarizing the written report of the Committee on Labor-Management Relations, President Gulick noted that the Committee had arranged two panels for the Buffalo meeting jointly with the Industrial Relations Research Association. The Committee's Chairman recommended that continued liaison

between the two groups would be beneficial to the Association.

Chairman William S. Stokes of the Committee on Latin American Affairs presented a written and oral report to the Council. No meeting of the Committee was held during the year, but Latin Americanists were polled as to their preference for topics and personnel for the Buffalo program and a questionnaire was sent to as many political scientists in the United States as possible with primary teaching and research interests in the comparative government or international relations of the Latin American countries. From the replies an introductory report on the tentative and suggestive findings was prepared, which indicated the almost unanimous feeling that Latin Americanists are expressing a preference for interdisciplinary methodology with an emphasis on political dynamics. The Committee recommended that the study be continued and expanded to fill in gaps and to include those Latin Americanists who did not contribute to the work. The Committee also hopes to work on the following projects which members would hope to complete and make available to all Latin Americanists in the near future: (1) a directory of all Latin Americanists; (2) a directory of all courses dealing with Latin America given by colleges and universities in the United States; (3) a memorandum on the major research possibilities and problems in Latin American government and politics; and (4) a national list of all unpublished dissertations and theses concerned with Latin America.

In the absence of the Chairman of the Committee on Nominations, James McCamy, President Gulick presented the written report. He stated that Association members could take great pleasure in the quality of the slate of candidates presented, and asked whether the general system of nomination of officers in use at the present time left anything to be desired by the council. When there were no comments he assumed the Council members were satisfied with the present system. The Committee report indicated that a letter had been sent to the chairmen of 114 departments of political science which offer graduate work, requesting the chairmen to consult with their colleagues and to send to the Committee suggestions of candidates to be considered. Suggestions were received from 38 persons outside the membership of the Committee, who submitted names for consideration in the following number: 37 for President Elect; 62 for Vice Presidents; and 79 for members of the Council. In a preliminary ballot by mail the Committee on Nominations considered all names suggested, and in a second ballot chose the following slate of candidates to be presented to the Annual Business Meeting on August 27: President Elect—Ralph J. Bunche, United Nations; Vice Presidents—Charles Aikin, University of California (Berkeley); Charles McKinley, Reed College; E. E. Schattschneider, Wesleyan University; new members of the Council for a two-year term—Walter H. Bennett, University of Alabama; Hugh A. Bone, University of Washington; Robert A. Dahl, Yale University; David Fellman, University of Wisconsin; Victor Jones, Wesleyan University; Jack W. Peltason, University of Illinois; Emmette S. Redford, University of Texas; Clinton L. Rossiter, Cornell University.

Mr. Julian Park, Chairman of the Local Arrangements Committee, briefly summarized the significant aspects of the preparatory work involved in preparation for the meeting. At the conclusion of his comments the President expressed the Association's deep appreciation for Dean Park's activities and asked that he convey that appreciation to the members of his group.

The written report of the Committee on Public Administration was reviewed by President Gulick and it was decided to discuss the work of this Committee after the place of committees in the Association structure had been established.

President Gulick called attention to the proposal of the Chairman of the Committee on Research Methods, who was in Europe for the summer, that this Committee be dissolved. Mr. Gulick felt that perhaps the difficulties arose from too broad a definition of the functions assigned to the Committee, and suggested this experience be kept in mind in the consideration of future Association committee structure.

A written report of the Committee on Science and Technology was prepared by Mr. Albert Lepawsky as Acting Chairman, in the absence of the Committee's Chairman. On the recommendation of the Council in 1951, Chairman Arthur Holcombe submitted an application to the Ford Foundation for a grant to the group as independent of the Association. While the Foundation had responded cordially, it was Mr. Lepawsky's opinion that further attention would probably not be given the request until the fall of 1952.

Chairman V. O. Key, Jr., reported orally

and in writing for the Committee on Political Parties. He noted that in August of 1951 a statement was issued recommending that the major parties hold conventions in 1954 as a step toward regular sessions in off-years. Reactions to this proposal were reported in the REVIEW, June, 1952, pp. 617–621. Two subcommittees, on national conventions and the 1950 Report, are continuing their work, and the Association's Cooperative Research Project on Convention Delegations grew out of the work of the Committee. The Committee devoted its single meeting of the year to a discussion of the problems of the project. Mr. Key recommended to the Council that the Committee be continued for a year for the purpose of: (1) completing those undertakings it now has under way; and (2) preparing research memoranda indicating problems within the field of political parties judged by the Committee to be worthy of high priority in the allocation of resources for research or inquiry through appropriate instrumentalities either within or without the Association.

Mr. Roy V. Peel, Chairman of the Census Advisory Committee, reported orally. He stated that the Bureau of the Census has a number of professional advisory committees, but this is the first composed of political scientists. The Committee will hold its first meeting in September. Mr. Peel said the Census Bureau would welcome suggestions as well as the opportunity to be helpful to the profession whenever possible.

President Gulick asked the Council members for any broad comments they wished to make concerning the substance, areas covered, or the practice followed in the past with respect to committees. Mr. Herring referred to Mr. Litchfield's letter of December 4, 1951 to all committee chairmen, and commented that in reading over the committee reports he observed that in a few outstanding instances the chairmen had found useful committee tasks to do, but there were also other extremes where the chairmen were unhappy because of no financial support for the committees' activities. Some committees have found a field for usefulness, largely by communicating with other people in their field. Mr. Litchfield commented on the response to his letter to committee chairmen and noted that the response had been particularly favorable with regard to assistance in preparation for the annual program.

The Executive Director presented a written and an oral report on negotiations for financial support for a study of delegations to the national political party conventions. He further noted that there had been interest expressed on behalf of a family foundation in strengthening the work of both the professional staff in Washington and also the Association's general efforts to identify research problems and design study projects for their solution. He announced at this time the receipt of a grant of $15,000 a year for a three-year period beginning September 1, 1952, which would provide $10,000 each year for strengthening the Association's central offices and $5,000 for each of the three years for aid in project design. Mr. Litchfield indicated that the Executive Committee's actions soliciting these grants must be approved by the Council if the grants themselves were to be accepted.

In this connection President Gulick pointed out the gain in Association membership, the special research projects which had been undertaken during the last several years, and the other worthwhile activities which had resulted from the opening of the Washington office through the assistance of the Carnegie Corporation. He said that in his judgment the proposed foundation grant would offer an opportunity to consolidate the gains already made. After a brief discussion, Mr. Odegard moved that the Council not only gladly accept this grant, but commend the officers of the Association for their initiative in soliciting support for further vital activities of the Association and for bringing the negotiations to such a successful conclusion. The motion was seconded by Mr. Rankin. Members voted unanimously in favor of accepting the grant.

Mr. Herring reported that the Ford Foundation had asked the Association, the Social Science Research Council, the Public Administration Clearing House, the League of Women Voters, the National Planning Association, and the National Civil Service League to join in sponsoring a representative Commission of Inquiry for Public Service Personnel. After some discussion the Council accepted the Foundation's invitation and agreed to join with the other organizations in taking such steps as might be required to submit a panel of names for membership on the Commission to the Board of Directors of the Ford Foundation. The motion accepting the invitation was made by Miss Ball, seconded by Mr. Truman, and carried unanimously.

The financial report of the Executive Director was presented to the Council, both orally and in writing, by Mr. Litchfield, who

noted that exclusive of the $15,000 foundation grant for the coming year and the $14,000 which remains from the study of convention delegations, the Association's income during the next year will amount to approximately $65,000. He pointed out that now the gap had been closed between what the Association needs and its resources and that additional funds are needed only because of additional activities. He also called attention to the fact that the expenses of the executive and editorial offices had been partially combined.

President Gulick asked that the auditor's report, attached to the report of the Executive Director, be acted on first by the Council. The auditor had commented with reference to the general endowment and trust funds, totalling close to $40,000, which are invested entirely in United States Government securities and produce a rather low rate of income. He also stated that a certain portion of these funds are not endowment funds, but have accumulated from current income. President Gulick recommended that incoming officers make the necessary audit of the funds and present to the Council a policy with reference to the endowment fund and its use. Mr. Binkley moved that the auditor's report be accepted. The motion was seconded by Miss Ball and carried unanimously. After discussing the proposed budget submitted by the Executive Director, Mr. Roscoe Martin moved that the budget as presented in Attachment B of the Report of the Executive Director be approved for the year, August 1, 1952 to July 31, 1953, with the authority vested in the Executive Committee to approve transfers between the items as listed by the Executive Director. The motion was seconded by Mr. Odegard and carried.

Mr. Litchfield then commented on Attachment C of his report, the Report of Progress and Proposed Future Plans of the Cooperative Research Project on Convention Delegations. He explained that the Committee on Political Parties had originally identified this as an area in which either the Committee itself or some other Association instrumentality should undertake research. Shortly after this expression of interest, members of the subcommittee on conventions and representatives of the Committee on the Advancement of Political Science Teaching met. As a result of this meeting a project designed by Mr. Paul T. David, a member of the Committee on Political Parties, was examined by the Executive Committee and submitted for foundation support. The Brookings Institution agreed to contribute a substantial portion of Mr. David's salary during the time he would work on such a project, and as a result of this and a $30,000 foundation grant, a project was set up and Mr. David was invited to undertake the directorship. It was pointed out that individual members of the Committee on Political Parties have occasionally offered advice and counsel, but Mr. David functions independently as project director, reporting jointly to the Executive Director of the Association and the President of Brookings Institution. Mr. Litchfield said that the enthusiasm generated by the project so far has been not only gratifying, but surprising, and is indicative of the type of cooperative projects which can be undertaken by the Association as a whole.

Mr. David then presented his written and oral report to the Council. He explained that he had been exceptionally fortunate in having more than the usual amount of time to devote to the planning of the project before the funds were actually obtained and the office opened on March 10, 1952. After a general discussion of the alternative courses of action which the present status of the project involves, the Council authorized the Executive Committee to proceed to solicit additional funds with which to explore more fully the research materials already at hand. At the same time the Council was quite clear in specifying that, should it prove impossible to obtain additional funds, the project must be completed on the terms originally outlined and with the use of resources already available.

The Council adjourned for luncheon, and reconvened at 2:00 P.M. In addition to those present in the morning, Mr. Hugh L. Elsbree, the new Editor of the REVIEW, and Mr. Robert, V. L. Wright, assistant to Dr. David, attended the afternoon session.

Mr. William Anderson presented the written and oral report of the Committee on Organization, in the absence of its Chairman, Mr. James K. Pollock. The Committee proposed a reduction in the size of the Council, the elimination of the office of Secretary, the use of a bank officer as Treasurer, and a more detailed statement of the duties and responsibilities of the Executive Director. The Committee also addressed itself to the need for meetings of the Council prior to the time of the annual meeting as a method of preparing the major issues for consideration in the business meeting at the time of the annual convention. It further discussed the significance of substantive discussions of professional policy questions

in the business meeting itself. A discussion of these and related committee recommendations followed. There was some feeling that there should be a change in the composition of membership on the Executive Committee. There were others who expressed concern about the expense involved in calling a special Council meeting early in the summer for the consideration of issues to be put to the business meeting. Likewise, there were comments concerning the functions of a secretary to the Council as distinct from a functioning administrative secretary, and his relationships to the Executive Director. There was discussion of the appropriate role of a Treasurer in the structure of an expanding organization. At President Gulick's suggestion, the Council accepted the report of the Committee on Organization with appreciation for its careful and thought-provoking effort. The Council then authorized the incoming President to appoint a Committee on Style, which would attempt to reconcile the several proposals made by the Committee on Organization and the other members of the Council. It would also undertake a comprehensive revision of the language of the constitution to the end that a more consistent document might emerge. It was understood that the new draft would be circulated to the members of the Council well in advance of the meeting in Washington in 1953, that adequate notice would be given to the membership prior to that meeting, and that final action would therefore be delayed until the convening of another annual meeting.

There followed a lengthy discussion of the controversial question of the functions of committees within the Association's structure. The Council reviewed the problems associated with proposed committee activity in the absence of adequate financial resources with which to permit committee meetings. Several of the Council members expressed concern as to the appropriateness of Association-sponsored research activities carried on by individual committees. On the other hand, there were many who urged the importance of Association efforts to identify problems and undertake specific kinds of research activities which were beyond the competence of individual scholars or institutions. As a consequence of this discussion, President Gulick appointed a committee consisting of Mr. Short and Mr. Litchfield to draft a resolution for Council consideration. After committee deliberation Mr. Short moved and Mr. Millett seconded the following resolution: "It is the consensus of the Council that the Association, its committees, and affiliates should be encouraged to engage in problem identification and project design, and the gathering of factual data of value to the members of the Association on the authorization of the Executive Committee. The engaging upon substantive research projects, however, shall be referred to the Council before commitments are made. The primary concern of the Association at all times shall be to be of assistance to individual and institutional research. Only where the nature or the immediacy of the problem, or the requirement of facilities is beyond the control of individuals and institutions, shall the Association undertake a substantive research project. It is our further observation that committees of the Association lend themselves particularly to the problem identification and project design functions. In those exceptional circumstances in which substantive research is undertaken, the committee system would appear to be less satisfactory."

The motion was carried unanimously and the Executive Director was instructed to use the resolution as the basis for subsequent committee activities.

On the motion of Mr. Millett, seconded by Mr. Herring, it was resolved that hereafter the Council of the Association shall elect the three representatives of the Association on the Social Science Research Council (instead of their being appointed by the President), and that the senior representative of the Association shall be invited to present an annual report of the activities of the Social Science Research Council to the Association. One vacancy occurs each year. This year Mr. Taylor Cole was appointed by President Gulick to serve a three-year term.

Mr. Elsbree spoke briefly concerning the future of the REVIEW and nominated the following persons to serve as members of the Editorial Board for the year 1952–53: V. O. Key, Jr., Harvard University, and James L. McCamy, University of Wisconsin, Associate Editors; Taylor Cole, Duke University; Henry W. Ehrmann, University of Colorado; Harvey C. Mansfield, The Ohio State University; C. Herman Pritchett, University of Chicago; and Francis O. Wilcox, Washington, D. C. By unanimous vote all were elected to membership on the Editorial Board.

The Council adjourned at 6:15 P.M.

The Annual Business Meeting of the American Political Science Association was held in

the Chinese Room of the Statler Hotel, Buffalo, New York, on Wednesday, August 27. The meeting was called together at 4:45 P.M. by President Luther Gulick who announced that a quorum was present. The President reported briefly on action taken by the Council on August 25. He noted that it had been agreed that the Association would accept the invitation of the Ford Foundation to join in the sponsorship of a Committee on Public Service Personnel, that the Council had accepted a recent grant of $15,000 a year for each of the following three years for the strengthening of Association activities, that the Committee on Organization had made a most useful report and that work was going forth on a constitutional revision which would incorporate the proposals made by the Committee, along with the suggestions for modification which had been proposed by members of the Council.

The Executive Director and Secretary-Treasurer, Edward H. Litchfield, reported that the membership now had reached 6,000, an increase of 20% in the two-year period since the Washington office was opened. He briefly summarized the report he had submitted to the Council and advised that the Council had adopted the budget which estimated revenues for the fiscal year 1952–53 of $95,934.43, including the balance remaining for the completion of the study on convention delegations now under way and the $15,000 grant mentioned by President Gulick and discussed at greater length at the Council meeting.

The Managing Editor of the REVIEW, Mr. Taylor Cole, summarized his report to the Council. He mentioned the rising costs in publishing the REVIEW and the change in format. He noted with regret the death of Professor Frederic A. Ogg, who was Editor of the REVIEW for many years and was a member of the Editorial Board until the time of his death. He introduced the new Editor of the REVIEW, Mr. Hugh L. Elsbree, who announced the new members of the Editorial Board as approved by the Council. Mr. James Fesler moved that the Association express its warm appreciation to Mr. Taylor Cole for his distinguished service as Editor of the REVIEW. The motion was seconded by Mr. Odegard and carried with acclaim.

In the absence of Chairman McCamy, Mr. Joseph P. Harris reported for the Nominating Committee. After explaining the procedure the Committee had followed, he announced the following slate of officers to be placed in nomination: President Elect—Ralph J. Bunche, United Nations; Vice Presidents—Charles Aikin, University of California (Berkeley); Charles McKinley, Reed College; E. E. Schattschneider, Wesleyan University; new members of the Council for a two-year term—Walter H. Bennett, University of Alabama; Hugh A. Bone, University of Washington; Robert A. Dahl, Yale University; David Fellman, University of Wisconsin; Victor Jones, Wesleyan University; Jack W. Peltason, University of Illinois; Emmette S. Redford, University of Texas; and Clinton L. Rossiter, Cornell University.

It was moved by Mr. Max Kampelman that a single ballot be cast for the nominees as presented. The motion was seconded by Mr. Chester C. Maxey and carried unanimously. President Gulick then turned the chair over to President Elect Herring.

On the motion of Mr. Clarence A. Berdahl, seconded by Mr. Martin, the following resolution regarding State Department publications was adopted:

"WHEREAS: Some of the most crucial issues of our times involving the security of the nation are in the field of international relations, and

"WHEREAS: Wise policies cannot be devised and pursued for national security in a free society without the guidance and support of an enlightened public opinion, and

"WHEREAS: For the formation of such informed opinion it is essential that the government take the public into its confidence by supplying official information honestly and frankly both as to current policies and historical policy developments to the fullest extent possible, subject only to genuine security requirements:

"BE IT THEREFORE RESOLVED by the American Political Science Association:

"1. That the Association approves the widest possible dissemination by the Department of State of objective, factual information on current foreign policy through its publication program and other channels of communication;

"2. That the Association deplores the fact that the official public record of American foreign policy presented in *Foreign Relations of the United States* has been allowed to drop farther and farther behind, and that the Association urges that every effort be made to speed up the publication of this series.

"3. That the Association also urges continued support for the publication of *Docu-*

ments on German Foreign Policy and calls attention to the importance of making both this series and that of *Foreign Relations of the United States* available to the public as soon as possible through the war period so that historical writing on the origin and conduct of the war may be based on authentic information, and

"4. That the Secretary of the Association be directed to bring these resolutions to the attention of the Department of State and the appropriate committees of Congress."

Mr. John Manahan moved that the Association's appreciation be expressed to the Hotel Statler and the subsidiary hotels for their cooperation and hospitality. The motion was seconded and carried. On the motion of Mr. Charles Ascher, which was seconded and passed, the compliments and thanks of the membership were extended to members of the Local Arrangements and Program Committees.

President Herring asked for suggestions from the membership regarding future annual meetings and programs. Mr. Gulick suggested that one more summer meeting be held before reconsidering a change and recommended that the Executive Committee and the Council establish a policy for the Association meetings by polling the entire membership after the 1953 meeting. Mr. William Anderson stated that he felt Boston was not the most desirable place for the Association's 50th anniversary in 1954. He also called attention to the long and distinguished career of Professor Frederic A. Ogg in the field of political science.

The 1952 Business Meeting was adjourned at 6:15 P.M.

EDWARD H. LITCHFIELD, *Executive Director.*

The International Political Science Association held its Second World Congress in The Hague, September 8–12, 1952. More than two hundred political scientists from thirty-three countries were in attendance. The American representation included eighteen persons from various parts of the United States; some had already spent several months in Europe while others made the trip especially for the Congress.

The meetings were organized around four major subjects: (1) The Role of Ideologies in Political Change; (2) Local Government as a Basis for Democracy; (3) The Political Role of Women; and (4) The Teaching of Political Science. Formal papers on various aspects of these general subjects were prepared by political scientists from most of the countries represented in the Congress. A limited number of copies of those papers are now available in the executive offices of the American Political Science Association and additional copies are no doubt available for purchase through the office of M. Jean Meynaud, executive secretary of the International Political Science Association, 27, Rue Saint-Guillaume, Paris VII°, France.

New officers of the International Association were elected for a three-year period. Professor Quincy Wright, the first president of the Association, was succeeded by Professor William A. Robson of the London School of Economics. Professor James K. Pollock of the University of Michigan was elected senior vice president; and Professor Maurice Duverger, Universities of Paris and Bordeaux, was elected vice president. Members of a governing Executive Committee were also elected. They include, in addition to the four officers, the following: Benjamin Akzin, dean of the faculty of law, Hebrew University, Jerusalem; J. Barents, professor at the University of Amsterdam; Marcel Bridel, rector of the University of Lausanne; Themistocles B. Cavalcanti, dean of the national faculty of economic sciences of the University of Brazil; D. N. Chester, fellow of Nuffield College, Oxford University; Edward H. Litchfield, executive director of the American Political Science Association; C. B. Macpherson, professor at the University of Toronto; Francesco Vito, professor at the Catholic University of the Sacred Heart, Milan; and a representative to be appointed from the Indian Political Science Association.

The first meeting of the executive committee of the International Political Science Association was held during the concluding days of the meeting in The Hague. Tentative plans have been made for the creation of a subcommittee on financial development and another working group to consider basic problems of future functions of the International Association. It is expected that the executive committee will hold its next meeting to consider these basic problems in Florence, Italy, in June of 1953.—EDWARD H. LITCHFIELD.

The Executive Bureau of the International Committee for Comparative Law met at Cambridge, England, on July 17, 1952. A two-day colloquium followed to which specialists from the Continent and the United States were invited. The Bureau admitted Turkey as a new member of the Committee and reviewed the work to date. The report on legal education in eight countries has been completed. UNESCO will publish the reports from the

United States, France, and the United Kingdom. All eight will be synthesized by Professor Charles Eisenmann of the University of Paris as part of the social science report of UNESCO.

An annotated bibliography of French law has been completed in English by Professor René David of the University of Paris. Similar bibliographies are in preparation for the law of Argentina, Brazil, Canada, India, Italy, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The first volume to appear under the Committee's imprint will be a French translation of H. C. Gutteridge's well-known work on Comparative Law. It was scheduled for publication in the autumn of 1952. A volume under the editorship of Professor Henry Ussing of the University of Copenhagen was commissioned in order to make known in English the principal features of the laws of Denmark, Iceland, and Norway. Another volume on United States law is being written in French by Professor and Madame André Tunc of the University of Grenoble.

A colloquium will be held in Paris by the Committee in July, 1954, just prior to the Fourth Congress of the Academy of Comparative Law. While the two meetings will be sponsored separately, they are expected to bring to Paris during the summer of 1954 the principal law professors of all continents. In the interim, the Executive Bureau will hold its next meeting in Copenhagen in May, 1953.

The legal education colloquium established a common aim for legal education, namely, to provide well-rounded servants of the community having special technical knowledge in the field of law. All parties were agreed that the day of the narrowly trained legal technician is past. It was recognized that the manner of preparation of the new type of men and women will vary. England, France, Austria, and Egypt can be expected to adhere to their tradition of legal education following the middle school and containing much cultural material along with that of technical legal character. The United States, Belgium, and Mexico can be expected to retain their system of post-graduate legal education, but even here there will be some intermingling of subjects such as economics in the law school curriculum. In spite of the different systems, enough similarity in teaching problems was found to make fruitful an exchange of experience in teaching methods. All agreed that teaching methods are likely to vary with the psychological past conditioning of teacher and student, but all favored an appropriate blending of lectures and seminar work, with emphasis upon the modified case method in the United States and on the tutorial system in England.—JOHN N. HAZARD.

From August 31 to September 6, 1952, the International Law Association was in session at Lucerne, Switzerland, with the Swiss Branch of the Association as hosts. Some thirty-five Americans attended, including Professor Clyde Eagleton, president of the American Branch, Lawrence Preuss (Michigan), Kurt H. Nadelmann (Harvard), Miss Margaret Lambie, and others. The subject of Sovereignty and International Cooperation was opened by Professor van Hamel (Netherlands), and Professor Karl Loewenstein (Amherst) led the discussion thereon. Except for the paper by Loewenstein, the discussion was theoretical, and led to no definite subjects upon which the Association might work in the future. Professor J. P. A. Francois (Netherlands and International Law Commission) reported, in continuation of previous consideration of Rights to Seabed and Subsoil, and the subject is to be continued to the next session. The report upon Legal Status of Aircraft, by Professor J. C. Cooper (Institute of International Air Law, Montreal), was received with favor and he was asked to put it into the form of a draft convention to be submitted to the International Civil Aviation Organization. The Committee on State Immunities (Professor Carabiber, France) proposed the principle that foreign states should not be immune from suit in relation to their acts when engaged in private enterprise; this was approved by the Conference. Other topics discussed were Trade Marks (Professor Derenburg, New York University); International Monetary Law (Professor F. A. Mann, England); International Companies (Professor Gutzwiller, Switzerland); Family Relations (Mr. William Latey, England). Professor Gutzwiller was elected president of the Association.—CLYDE EAGLETON.

The eleventh annual meeting of the Midwest Conference of Political Scientists will be held at Michigan State College, May 7–9, 1953. Program suggestions may be sent to Marshall Knappen, University of Michigan, chairman of the program committee, or to Kirk H. Porter, State University of Iowa, president.

The next annual meeting of the Western Political Science Association will be held March 29–31, 1953, at the University of Southern California.

OTHER ACTIVITIES

An Institute of Public Administration is being established in Manila by the Institute of Public Administration of the University of Michigan, in cooperation with the University of the Philippines and the Mutual Security Agency. Under a contract between the two Universities, with MSA financing, the University of Michigan will provide the required professional staff and library facilities, and the University of the Philippines will provide physical facilities. The Institute is planned to combine in one center an educational program in public administration, a research and publication program, and a service and consulting program. The educational phase of the project is twofold, combining an academic program with both undergraduate and graduate curricula for students preparing for government service, and in-service training courses for governmental employees.

The period of the contract is two years. At the end of that time, the expectation is that the Institute in Manila can continue under Philippine auspices. Professor John W. Lederle, director of the University of Michigan Institute of Public Administration, is in Manila to direct the first year of operation under the contract. Other staff members already in Manila are Professor J. T. Salter, on leave from the University of Wisconsin, Dr. James E. Larson, formerly with the Bureau for Government Research at West Virginia University, and Theodore H. Drews, from the Michigan Institute of Public Administration. Additions to the staff of the Manila Institute will be made in the near future. Professor Ferrel Heady, assistant director of the Michigan Institute of Public Administration, is coordinator in Ann Arbor for the Philippine program.

The Ford Foundation recently made a grant to the American Committee for A United Europe to enable it to ask a group of scholars at Harvard University, connected with the Graduate School of Public Administration and the Law School, to undertake a comprehensive review of experience with federal government, especially as it has worked in Australia, Canada, Germany, Switzerland, and the United States. Such a review has been requested by the *Commission d'Études pour une Constitution Européenne*, established by the European Movement under the presidency of M. Paul Henri Spaak of Belgium, former president of the European Consultative Assembly at Strasbourg. The preparatory work of this Commission, composed of leading jurists from the six nations of the Coal and Steel Community Treaty, is closely tied in with the constitution for the European Community envisaged by the European Defense Community Treaty (Article 38), the drafting of which has recently been authorized by the Foreign Ministers of the six nations and will be in the hands of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Coal and Steel Community.

The Federalism Research Project at Harvard is under the joint direction of Professor Carl J. Friedrich and Professor Robert Bowie of the Harvard Law School. Others associated with it are Professors Freund, Sohn, and Sutherland of the Harvard Law School, Professors McCloskey and Brinser of the Graduate School of Public Administration, and Professor McWhinney of the Yale Law School and department of political science, as senior associates, as well as a group of younger men. While an important part of the work reached the preliminary draft stage by the end of September in order to be available for meetings at Strasbourg and Brussels, it is expected that the work of the Project will continue throughout the winter.

Gordon Gray, chairman of the Ford Foundation Board on Overseas Training and Research, announced on October 6 the list of winners of the Foreign Study and Research Fellowships awarded by the Board. The awards, aggregating $473,850, are for periods of from one to three years and will enable 83 young American scholars to initiate or continue studies on various problems concerning Asia and the Near and Middle East. Recipients, who were selected from more than 700 qualified applicants, range in age from 21 to 43, the great majority being between 26 and 32. Eighteen of the fellowships were awarded to political scientists. Other special fields of interest represented are: anthropology, 11; economics, 7; languages, 6; history, 13; Islamic studies, 3; geography, 4; literature, 3; sociology, 7; journalism, 6; law, 1; area studies, 4.

The purpose of this program, which was originally announced last March by the Ford Foundation, is to stimulate study of certain critical foreign areas and to help meet their

urgent need for large numbers of men and women well qualified in business, education, government, agriculture, labor relations, and the professions. No decision has as yet been reached with respect to the possibility of continuing the program for a second year.

The *Institut International de Droit Public*, which was founded in 1927 and is connected with the *Faculté de Droit* at Paris, elected to membership Professors Thomas I. Cook, Carl J. Friedrich, Erich Hula, and Manley O. Hudson at its 1952 meeting, the first that has been held during the postwar period. This meeting was devoted to the problem: "Individual Liberties in International Society." Papers were delivered by Professor Georges Scelle of the *Faculté de Droit* and by Professor Boris Mirkine-Guetzévich, secretary general of the *Institut*, who teaches at the *Faculté de Droit* and is dean of the French University in New York.

National officers elected by Pi Sigma Alpha, honorary political science fraternity, at the biennial convention held in Buffalo are: Elwyn A. Mauck, Maryland State Fiscal Research Bureau, president; J. Eugene Harley, University of Southern California, vice-president; Joseph R. Starr, University of Maryland, secretary-treasurer. Newly elected members of the Council are: Mona Fletcher, Kent State University; Cullen B. Gosnell, Emory University; and Charles W. Shull, Wayne University.

The Citizenship Clearing House, with a grant from the Maurice and Laura Falk Foundation, sponsored a workshop at Colgate University, September 1–12, 1952, on the subject: "College Preparation for Politics." Instructors from twenty-one colleges in New York State participated in roundtable discussions, listened to lectures, and worked on the parts of their courses in political parties, American government, and social science relating to active citizen participation in political and party affairs. The staff of the workshop included: Paul S. Jacobsen, Colgate; James W. Miller, Michigan State; Rodney L. Mott, Colgate; Arthur Naftalin, Minnesota; Thomas H. Reed, Doris D. Reed, and E. E. Schattschneider, Wesleyan; and George H. Williams, New York University Law School. A number of Democratic and Republican political leaders and workers from New York State also participated in the discussions.

Public Administration Clearing House convened a Conference on Comparative Administration at Princeton, N. J., September 12–14, 1952, to canvass resources, human and documentary, for teaching and research to meet the increasing needs of Americans who must deal directly with administrators in other countries or with problems at home that require understanding of foreign administrative processes. Herbert Emmerich, director of PACH, presided. Among the political scientists participating were: Charles S. Ascher, Brooklyn College; Karl W. Deutsch, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; William Ebenstein, Princeton University; Rowland A. Egger, University of Virginia; Herman Finer, University of Chicago; Pendleton Herring, Social Science Research Council; Arthur N. Holcombe, Harvard University; Roy C. Macridis, Northwestern University; Roscoe C. Martin, Syracuse University; Arnold Miles, Bureau of the Budget; Dankwart Rustow, Princeton University; Wallace S. Sayre, City College of New York; Walter R. Sharp, Yale University; Rufus D. Smith, New York University; Harold Stein, Inter-University Case Program; H. Arthur Steiner, University of California (Los Angeles); Donald C. Stone, Mutual Security Agency.

Institutions participating in the Washington Semester plan of The American University during the fall semester of 1952–53 are: Beloit College, Birmingham Southern College, Bucknell University, Denison University, Dickinson College, Hamline University, Lindenwood College, Millsaps College, Transylvania College, and William Jewell College. William E. Briggs, assistant professor of political science and public administration, is academic director of the program.

A new combination program for graduate students in the field of public administration was launched at the State University of Iowa last September. The new arrangement combines a study program in public administration and political science, directed by the staff of the department of political science, with an in-service training program in public administration, under the supervision of the Institute of Public Affairs.

The in-serving training feature of the new program will include the placement of interns with various city, county, and state administrative units for portions of their training. Internship will be supplemented by research into problems of state, county, and municipal

government. Studies of value to public officials will be published and distributed by the Institute of Public Affairs. Some of the internships will carry stipends and tuition scholarships on a merit basis.

The academic side of the new program in public administration brings together basic courses and advanced courses which have been presented for years in the department of political science and other liberal arts departments, and in the College of Commerce. The academic program for a graduate student in public administration may include, in addition to a concentration in political science, courses in the departments of geography, psychology, sociology, economics, accounting, general business, and labor and industrial management. Programs for graduate students will be flexible and will be adapted to individual needs.

The main purpose of the combination arrangement is the addition to a sound academic program of an opportunity for intimate, first-hand contact with the functions, problems, and activities of government offices and departments.

A study of the public administration aspects of the atomic energy program is being made at the Institute of Public Administration of the University of Michigan. The project is financed by a grant from the Michigan Memorial-Phoenix Project which was created to commemorate the war dead of the University of Michigan by study of the peacetime uses of atomic energy. Assistant Professor Morgan Thomas of the department of political science and Dr. Richard Tybout of the department of economics compose the faculty research staff. Associate Professor Ferrel Heady, assistant director of the Institute of Public Administration, is the project coordinator for the Institute.

At Princeton University, Professors George A. Graham and Marver H. Bernstein, assisted by Professors Donald H. Wallace and William M. Beaney, Jr., are completing a study of the postwar stock pile program as part of the current administrative history program of the national government, sponsored by the Bureau of the Budget. This study has been done under contract with the Bureau of the Budget, the National Security Resources Board, and the Office of Defense Mobilization, and was used as a training project during 1951–52 in the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs.

A Committee for Research in Social Sciences was recently established at Stanford University, under a $100,000 grant from the Ford Foundation. Professor Albert H. Bowker, head of the statistics department, is chairman of the Committee, and Professor Alfred de Grazia has been named executive officer. Two extensive projects have already been authorized. One is a study of political and economic problems arising from social changes; the second project involves population surveys of the San Francisco Bay Area.

Edward S. Corwin, McCormick Professor of Jurisprudence, Emeritus, Princeton University, served as editor in the Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress from September, 1949, to January 2, 1952, directing a revision of *The Constitution of the United States of America (Annotated)*. Professor Corwin also lectured in the department of law, New York University, February to April, 1952. He gave a course in the New School for Social Research during the spring term of 1952, and participated in the Conference of the Institute of Natural Law, University of Notre Dame, December 10–14, 1951. On April 10, 1952, Professor Corwin addressed a joint dinner meeting of the Philadelphia Men's Association of Phi Beta Kappa and the University Club of Philadelphia on the subject: "Our Expendable Constitution."

Carl J. Friedrich, professor of government at Harvard University, was given an LL.D. degree by Grinnell College on June 8, 1952; he also delivered the commencement address at that institution. Professor Friedrich was recently elected a permanent vice-president of the *Académie International de l'Histoire Constitutionnelle et de la Science Politique* at Paris in place of Professor Joseph P. Chamberlain of Columbia University, deceased.

Meredith P. Gilpatrick, formerly of Ohio State University, was a Fulbright visiting lecturer in political science in Austria during 1951–52, serving for the first semester at the University of Innsbruck and at the University of Vienna during the second semester. In February and March, Professor Gilpatrick taught at the Salzburg Seminar in American Studies, and in late June attended the *Internationales Treffen für Erwachsenbildung* held in Salzburg as one of the United States delegates.

Alfred J. Hotz, chairman of the department of political science of Western Reserve Uni-

versity, will give a special seminar on "NATO: New Concept in International Organization" at the January, 1953, session of the Salzburg Seminar in American Studies.

Joseph E. McLean, associate professor of politics at Princeton University, is handling the staff work for the Committee on Selection for the Rockefeller Public Service Award Program. Professor McLean has also been appointed a member of the New Jersey Law Enforcement Council by Governor Driscoll.

Norman D. Palmer, professor of political science at the University of Pennsylvania, who is in India as a visiting Fulbright professor at the University of Delhi, addressed the Indian Council of World Affairs in New Delhi, August 22, 1952, on the subject: "United States Policy Toward China in the Postwar Period." Professor Palmer is assisting in the inauguration of a postgraduate program in political science at the University of Delhi, and is lecturing to the students who are enrolled in this program. He is also visiting other Indian universities for brief periods, for lectures and consultation.

John E. Stoner, associate professor of government at Indiana University, is engaged in a comparative study of highway administration, and during the summer conducted a pilot study of the highway administration in three adjoining counties in Indiana, Ohio, and Michigan. The project is sponsored by the Graduate School of Indiana University, The Joint Highway Research Project at Purdue University, and The Highway Research Board of the National Research Council.

APPOINTMENTS AND STAFF CHANGES

Spencer D. Albright, of the University of Richmond, was a visiting professor of political science at Emory University during the 1952 summer session.

Andrew Anderson has left the University of Connecticut to engage in the private practice of law.

Vernon Aspaturian has been named assistant professor of political science at The Pennsylvania State College and will teach courses in international organization and international law. He received his doctorate at the University of California (Los Angeles) in 1951, and, until his appointment to the faculty at Penn State, served in the Psychological Warfare Section of the Far East Command stationed in Tokyo.

Robert S. Avery has been advanced to a full professorship at the University of Tennessee and has been granted a leave of absence to serve in the Point Four Program in Panama.

Theodore Stevenson Baer has been appointed instructor in the department of government at Harvard University.

Charles P. Beall of Indiana University has been appointed to an assistant professorship at the University of Wyoming.

Curt F. Beck is on leave of absence from the University of Connecticut to serve as an intelligence research analyst in the Division of Research for USSR and Eastern Europe, Department of State.

George Belknap, formerly with the Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan, has been appointed assistant professor of political science and associate director of the Governmental Research Bureau at Michigan State College.

Marver H. Bernstein, assistant professor of politics at Princeton University, is on leave of absence during the 1952–53 academic year. Professor Bernstein plans to be abroad from January until August, 1953.

Donald G. Bishop has been promoted to professor of political science in the Maxwell Graduate School of Citizenship and Public Affairs at Syracuse University. He is also serving as chairman of the Board of Russian Studies during the current academic year.

Frederick F. Blachly, who recently completed an assignment as a research director for the Committee for Study and Recommendation of Reorganization of the Executive Branch, State of New Mexico, is teaching at the University of Redlands during the current academic year.

George Blair has been designated acting associate director of the Bureau of Public Administration at the University of Tennessee.

William T. Bluhm has accepted an appoint-

ment to the faculty of the department of government at the University of Rochester for the 1952–53 academic year.

Ralph J. D. Braibanti, of Kenyon College, has returned to his teaching duties after spending the summer as political adviser to the Civil Administrator of the Ryukyu Islands. While in the Far East, he spent some time in Japan surveying political conditions. Next year Professor Braibanti will start a two-year study of Japanese bureaucracy under the auspices of a fellowship awarded by the Ford Foundation Board on Overseas Training and Research.

Edward H. Buehrig, associate professor of political science at Indiana University, has been granted an extension of leave until the second semester of 1952–53 to serve as a member of the research staff of the Brookings Institution.

Edgar B. Cale has resumed his duties as associate professor of political science at the University of Pennsylvania after having served for one year as assistant director of the Albert M. Greenfield Center for Human Relations.

Alan Keith Campbell has been appointed instructor in the department of government at Harvard University.

William N. Cassella, Jr., has been promoted to an assistant professorship in political science at the University of Missouri.

Mary M. Clarke, formerly of Fordham University and The Johns Hopkins University, has been reappointed as lecturer in political science at Bryn Mawr College for the 1952–53 academic year.

Kenneth C. Cole, who was acting chairman of the department of political science at the University of Washington during the past year, has been made permanent chairman of the department, effective September 15.

Robert M. Darrow has been appointed instructor of politics at Princeton University.

Emmett Davidson has been promoted to an associate professorship in political science at the University of Minnesota, Duluth Branch.

William E. Diez, associate professor of government at the University of Rochester, is on sabbatical leave in Uganda for the purpose of studying the political institutions and processes of the Kingdom of Buganda.

Edward F. Dow, professor and head of the department of history and government at the University of Maine, has been granted a leave of absence during the fall semester of 1952–53 in order to serve as executive secretary of the Committee of Citizens to Study the Government of Maine. Professor Dow is also serving as technical assistant to the Legislative Research Committee, which is making a study of county government in Maine.

Aurie N. Dunlap is serving as acting head of the department of international relations at Lehigh University during the absence of Professor Leon Godshall.

Samuel J. Eldersveld has been advanced to an associate professorship at the University of Michigan.

Eugene Elkins, formerly employed by the Office of Price Stabilization in Washington, D. C., has accepted an appointment as research assistant in the Bureau for Government Research at West Virginia University.

Ernest A. Engelbert, on leave from the University of California (Los Angeles), has joined the staff of the Ford Foundation as a resources analysis consultant for the fall semester, 1952.

Julian Fahy of Alexandria, Virginia, is serving on the staff of the President's Commission on Immigration and Naturalization.

G. Lowell Field, formerly of Wayne University, has been appointed professor and head of the department of government and international relations at the University of Connecticut.

Guy Fox resumed his duties as associate professor of political science at Michigan State College in September after spending one year on Okinawa assisting in the establishment of the University of Ryukyus.

Edgar S. Furniss, Jr., on leave from Princeton University, is spending the 1952–53 academic year in France.

W. Leon Godshall, head of the department of international relations at Lehigh University, has been appointed to the U. S. Foreign Service as executive officer of the Fulbright program in Tokyo.

Milton Greenberg has been appointed instructor in political science at the University of Tennessee and research associate in the Bureau of Public Administration.

Lee S. Greene has resumed his duties as professor and head of the department of political science at the University of Tennessee and director of the Bureau of Public Administration after a two-year leave of absence.

Morris A. Greene, regional administrative officer, North American Regional Office, United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, has accepted a lectureship in the department of political science and public administration at The American University.

Farid Hanania, professor of law and chairman of the department of political science and law at the American University of Beirut, Lebanon, is serving as a visiting professor during 1952–53 in the Woodrow Wilson School of Foreign Affairs at the University of Virginia.

John H. Herz, formerly professor of international relations at Howard University, has been appointed associate professor of government at the City College of New York. During the summer, Professor Herz taught at Columbia University.

John P. Horlacher is teaching part time at the University of Pennsylvania, in addition to serving as director of the Regional Wage Stabilization Board in Philadelphia.

Clyde E. Jacobs, who recently completed his graduate work at the University of Michigan, has accepted an appointment as instructor of political science at the University of California (Davis Campus).

Walter O. Jacobson, chief of the Training and Development Division, Office of Civilian Personnel, Office of the Secretary of the Army, has been appointed lecturer in political science and public administration at The American University.

Ralph T. Jans, recently of Berea College, has been appointed instructor in government and politics at the University of Maryland in the European program.

Scott D. Johnston has been designated director of the Maurice and Laura Falk Foundation program at Hamline University with the rank of associate professor.

Otto Kirchheimer, chief of the Central European Branch, Division of Research for Western Europe, U. S. Department of State, has been appointed lecturer in the department of political science and public administration at The American University.

Norman Kogan has been promoted to an assistant professorship in political science at the University of Connecticut.

Fred Kort has been transferred from the Hartford branch of the University of Connecticut to the main campus at Storrs.

Edward G. Lewis is on leave from the University of Illinois for the academic year 1952–53 to lecture at the University of Grenoble and to do research on the French legislative process, on a Fulbright grant.

Ernest M. Linton has been promoted to the rank of professor at Indiana University.

Benjamin E. Lippincott, of the University of Minnesota, has been appointed visiting professor of political theory at Stanford University for the winter and spring quarters of 1952–53.

Theodore V. Liss, of the University of Michigan, has accepted a one-year teaching appointment at West Virginia University.

W. Richard Lomax resigned his position in the department of government at Indiana University to become deputy director of personnel in the Federal Housing Administration.

Daniel S. McHargue has been promoted to an assistant professorship in political science at the University of Michigan.

Edwin B. McPheron has been advanced to an associate professorship at Indiana University.

Robert Humphrey Marden has been appointed instructor in the department of government at Harvard University.

David Mars, formerly associated with Rutgers University, has been appointed instructor in the department of government and international relations at the University of Connecticut.

Henry L. Mason has joined the staff of the department of political science at Tulane University as an assistant professor. Last year he was an assistant professor of government at Louisiana State University.

Wallace Mendelson has been promoted to the rank of professor of political science at the University of Tennessee.

Lester Milbrath has been appointed research associate in the Bureau of Public Administration at the University of Tennessee.

James W. Miller, on leave of absence from Michigan State College, is spending the current year as associate director of the Citizenship Clearing House, New York University.

Malcolm Moos has been promoted to a full professorship in political science at The Johns Hopkins University.

Robert L. Morlan has been advanced to an associate professorship at the University of Redlands.

Martin W. Moser has been appointed assistant professor of government and politics at the University of Maryland in the European program.

Clark F. Norton has been advanced to a full professorship in the department of political science at DePauw University.

Miriam E. Oatman, who recently completed an assignment as a research director for the Committee for Study and Recommendation of Reorganization of the Executive Branch, State of Mexico, is teaching at the University of Redlands during the current academic year.

C. Bickford O'Brien has been named acting chairman of the department of history and political science at the University of California (Davis Campus).

Gene D. Overstreet, of the Russian Institute, Columbia University, has been appointed instructor in political science at Michigan State College.

Guy Jean Pauker has been appointed to an instructorship in the department of government at Harvard University.

George A. Peek, Jr., has been advanced to an assistant professorship at the University of Michigan.

Lester H. Phillips, professor of government and director of the division of social science at the University of Redlands, is serving as visiting professor at Florida State University during 1952–53.

Palmer C. Pilcher has been appointed to the faculty of the department of political science and public administration of The American University as assistant professor.

Elmer Plischke returned in July from Europe where he served as special historian in the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany. During the two years of his service abroad, Dr. Plischke prepared five monographs which were published by the Historical Division. Since his return, he served for two months as a consultant in the U. S. Department of State. Upon resuming his duties at the University of Maryland, Dr. Plischke was promoted to a full professorship.

Felix Rackow, who taught last year at Lawrence College, has been appointed instructor in political science at Brown University.

Joseph M. Ray has been granted a two-year leave of absence by the University of Maryland to serve as assistant chief, Information and Education Branch, Headquarters U. S. Air Force.

Martin R. Ream has been appointed instructor in political science at the University of Pennsylvania.

John S. Reshetar, of Princeton University, spent the summer at the Russian Research Center at Harvard University engaged in analysis of materials for the Harvard Project on the Soviet Social System.

Marian E. Ridgeway has joined the staff at Southern Illinois University as assistant professor of political science.

Clayton L. Ringgenberg, formerly research assistant with the Rhode Island Public Expenditures Council, has been appointed assistant professor and research specialist in the Institute of Public Affairs, State University of Iowa.

Dorothy Roberts was recently transferred from the Hartford branch of the University of Connecticut to the main campus at Storrs.

Nicholas de Rochefort has been appointed lecturer in the department of political science and public administration at The American University.

Dankwart A. Rustow has been appointed assistant professor of politics at Princeton University.

John W. Schwada has been advanced to an

assistant professorship in political science at the University of Missouri.

Harry H. Shapiro has been appointed assistant director of the Albert M. Greenfield Center for Human Relations and lecturer in political science at the University of Pennsylvania.

Walter R. Sharp, of Yale University, spent July and August, 1952, in Southeast Asia as special consultant for the Public Administration Service of Chicago, assisting the Mutual Security Agency in the development of its technical assistance program in public administration for Cambodia, Laos, and Viet-Nam.

William Siffin, formerly a member of the staffs of the Tennessee Valley Authority and the Kentucky Legislative Research Commission, has accepted appointment as assistant professor and director of the Institute of Training for the Public Service at Indiana University.

Hans Speier, chief of the Social Science Division, The Rand Corporation, is serving as professorial lecturer in political science at The American University.

Murray S. Stedman, Jr., has been advanced to the rank of associate professor at Swarthmore College.

T. Noel Stern has been promoted to the rank of associate professor in the department of government at Boston University.

Ward Stewart has been appointed assistant commissioner for program development and coordination in the U. S. Office of Education. Dr. Stewart comes to the Office of Education from the Economic Stabilization Agency where he served on the staff of the administrator. He recently returned from South America where he served for six months as deputy chief of the Public Administration Mission to Colombia in Bogota.

Edwin J. Stillings, who has completed his graduate work at the University of Chicago, has been appointed instructor in government and politics at the University of Maryland.

Dorothee Strauss has resigned from the Bureau of Public Administration, University of Tennessee, to continue graduate work at the University of Michigan.

Robert Strausz-Hupé has been appointed professor of political science at the University of Pennsylvania.

Earl Strong, director of executive development programs, U. S. Civil Service Commission, has been appointed professorial lecturer in public administration at The American University.

Albert L. Sturm is on leave of absence from West Virginia University this year and is serving as visiting professor of political science at the University of Michigan and visiting research associate in the Institute of Public Administration.

Joseph Sutton, formerly of the University of Michigan and recently returned from Japan where he made a special study of Japanese political behavior, has accepted a position as instructor in the department of political science at Western Reserve University.

Eugene D. Thoenen, of West Virginia University, has accepted an appointment as assistant professor of international relations at Lehigh University.

Henry A. Turner, assistant professor of political science at the University of California, Santa Barbara College, has been awarded a fellowship by the Ford Foundation to spend the 1952–53 academic year in Washington, D. C. studying the functioning of political and administrative institutions in the national capital.

John E. Turner has been promoted to an assistant professorship in political science at the University of Minnesota.

James Dyke Van Putten has accepted a position as acting chairman of the department of political science and history at Hope College for the 1952–53 academic year. During the past summer, he was a visiting professor at the State University Teachers College, New Paltz, New York.

Gerhard von Glahn, head of the department of political science at the University of Minnesota, Duluth Branch, has been advanced to a full professorship.

Henry Wells has returned to his post as assistant professor of political science at Yale University, following a year's service as a visiting professor and research associate in the School of Public Administration at the University of Puerto Rico. Professor Wells was a

member of the research group that assisted the Puerto Rican Constituent Assembly in drafting a constitution for the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.

Lloyd M. Wells has been appointed instructor of politics at Princeton University.

Norman Wengert has resigned his position as assistant professor of government in the City College of New York and is now chairman of the department of social science at North Dakota Agricultural College. During the past year he was on leave from the City College while serving with the Program Staff, Office of the Secretary, United States Department of the Interior.

Robert R. Wilson has returned to his position as professor of political science at Duke University after a year spent in Turkey as a Fulbright professor at the University of Istanbul.

Roland A. Young has been advanced to a full professorship at Northwestern University.

William H. Young has been named chairman of the department of political science at the University of Wisconsin.

R. R. Zimmerman has been promoted to the rank of professorial lecturer in the part-time faculty of the department of political science and public administration of The American University.

SPECIAL ANNOUNCEMENTS

Suggestions Requested by Nominating Committee

The Nominating Committee of the American Political Science Association for 1953 is as follows:

JOSEPH P. HARRIS, *Chairman, University of California (Berkeley)*
HUGH L. ELSBREE, *Library of Congress*
GEORGE A. GRAHAM, *Princeton University*
CHARLES B. HAGAN, *University of Illinois*
CHARLES B. ROBSON, *University of North Carolina*
E. S. WENGERT, *University of Oregon*

The officers to be elected at the next meeting of the Association include a President-Elect, three Vice-Presidents, and eight members of the Council. Members of the Association are invited to send in suggestions of persons to be considered for nomination to the Chairman of the Nominating Committee. All suggestions should be received by February 1, 1953.

Information Needed for the New Directory

The editor of the next edition of the *Directory* reports that there are still 2,000 members who have not submitted biographical data. Naturally he is anxious to include in the *Directory* as many biographies of the members as possible. Hence it is urged that those members who have not yet submitted biographical data do so as early as possible. In the event that there is doubt on the member's part as to whether he has submitted the data, an inquiry to Dr. George P. Bush, 1785 Massachusetts Avenue, Washington 6, D. C., will receive a prompt reply, either to the effect that the data is on hand or in the form of another copy of the questionnaire.

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

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